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THE COLORADO COUNSEL CONUNDRUM: PLEA




Colorado's procedures for handling misdemeanor prosecutions raise
novel questions of Sixth Amendment law that have not been squarely
addressed by state or federal courts. At the center of Colorado's counsel
conundrum is a statute, Colorado Revised Statute § 16-7-301, which re-
quires the prosecution to negotiate plea deals with a person charged with
a misdemeanor before the defendant has an opportunity to meet with an
attorney. There are strong incentives for defendants to accept a pre-
counsel offer; indeed, by accepting an early, pre-counsel plea, a defend-
ant may accrue sentencing or charge concessions from the prosecution.'
Moreover, and more significant, for defendants who are not released on
bail, the consequences of refusing a pre-counsel plea offer are even more
immediate: such a defendant faces the Hobson's choice of pleading
guilty to a crime without the advice or assistance of counsel and thus
obtaining one's immediate release from custody, or remaining in jail for
several more days until a second appearance when counsel is appointed.2
That is to say, insisting on one's right to counsel in a misdemeanor case
may come at a cost, both in terms of the ultimate sentence, and the length
of the time they are subject to pretrial detention.3 Even a defendant who
is arrested for an offense for which jail is a most unlikely sentence4 could
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law.
t J.D. 2012, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law.
We are grateful for the substantive and editorial suggestions offered by Rebecca Aviel, Alan Chen,
Ian Farrell, Nancy Leong, Sam Kamin, and Kris Miccio. We also acknowledge the consistent excel-
lence of the Denver University Law Review in striving to publish timely articles at the intersection of
theory and practice.
I. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-301 (4)(a)(1) (2011).
2. The Colorado rules provide for the appointment of counsel at the second appearance,
which usually occurs three days after the initial appearance for persons in custody. By contrast,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44 requires that counsel be appointed to defendants "from initial
appearance through appeal, unless the defendant waives this right"; however, an attorney need not be
provided if the federal court determines that the charged offense is a petty offense, defined as a case
"for which the court determines that, in the event of conviction, no sentence of imprisonment will
actually be imposed." Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(a)(3). See also 2 F. LEE BAILEY & KENNETH FISHMAN,
HANDLING MISDEMEANOR CASES § 29:1 (2d ed. 2011) (identifying a circuit split as to whether the
scope of Rule 44 is broader than, or coextensive with the federal constitutional right to counsel).
3. This is consistent with statistics from other jurisdictions demonstrating that the "most
significant predictor of defendants entering a plea of guilty or no contest at arraignment was their
custody status." See, e.g., ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT'L. ASs'N. CRIM. DEF. LAW., THREE-
MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA'S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 15 (2011).
4. If a sentence of actual incarceration is not authorized by the statute, then existing case law
precludes Sixth Amendment claims. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369, 372-74 (1979). This raises
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be held in jail for days while he is awaiting the appointment of counsel
and the next round of plea negotiations if he is not released on bail at the
*- 5initial appearance.
This is not a merely hypothetical problem. There are a variety of
crimes for which a defendant might be detained in pretrial custody even
on a charge for which he will not likely receive a sentence of imprison-
ment. For example, a first DUI offense will likely not result in a sentence
of incarceration, but rather some probationary term and classes. Howev-
er, it is not uncommon for such a defendant to be detained overnight pri-
or to the initial appearance. Accordingly, a DUI defendant, and many
others facing misdemeanors, will be forced to confront the option of ac-
cepting a pre-counsel plea offer from the prosecution, or spending an
extra couple of nights in jail. Many defendants will, quite reasonably, opt
for the prompt, pre-counsel resolution of their case.
In view of this reality, Colorado's pre-counsel plea bargaining sys-
tem presents a trio of difficult Sixth Amendment questions, namely:
(1) At what point does the attachment of the right to counsel occur
in Colorado (under Rothgery v. Gillespie County6);
(2) Does the negotiation and entry of an un-counseled misdemean-
or plea constitute a critical stage for which appointment and presence of
counsel is required (under, for example, United States v. Wade7 ); and
(3) Do sentences of time served or home arrest constitute "actual
incarceration" (under the test announced in Scott v. Illinois8 )?
In short, Colorado's system for prosecuting misdemeanor offenses
presents a constitutional conundrum that has important consequences for
misdemeanor defendants, that is tantalizing for academics, and that is
desperately in need of judicial review. This Article is designed for all
three audiences. The direct constitutional analysis of Colorado's provi-
sions is designed to serve as a guidepost for judges and litigators. Like-
wise, the thorough accounting of the gaps in the academy's collective
knowledge about Sixth Amendment doctrine will hopefully spur addi-
tional empirical, historical, and doctrinal scholarship regarding the right
to counsel in misdemeanor cases.
an important question as to whether, in certain circumstances, the scope and duration of pretrial
detention, standing alone, should suffice to trigger the right to counsel even if the crime does not
authorize a sentence of incarceration. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 203-04 (2008).
5. Jenny M. Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 277, 367 (2011) (observing that the Colorado system has
the effect of encouraging thoughtless waivers of the right to counsel).
6. 554 U.S. 191, 203 (2008).
7. 388 U.S. 218, 236 (1967).
8. 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979) (holding that "actual imprisonment" is "the line defining the
constitutional right to appointment of counsel").
328 [Vol. 89:2
THE COLORADO COUNSEL CONUNDRUM
In analyzing the Sixth Amendment concerns raised by these pre-
counsel misdemeanor plea negotiations, we are mindful of the practical
constraints on the criminal justice system. To be sure, the resources
needed to provide defense counsel at every misdemeanant's initial ap-
pearance would be substantial, and the efficiencies of the current system
are apparent.9 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly empha-
sized that efficiency gains and resource constraints cannot trump the
right to counsel.' 0
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the relevant Sixth
Amendment law. Part I provides a comprehensive account of the prose-
cutorial policies and state-mandated procedures that are relevant to mis-
demeanor prosecutions in Colorado. Finally, Part III analyzes the nature
and viability of constitutional challenges to Colorado's misdemeanor
procedures. Colorado's system for misdemeanor prosecutions presents a
valuable case-study for understanding the federal right to counsel-its
scope, its limits, and the gaps in current doctrine as it applies to misde-
meanor cases.
I. THE THREE-TIERED TRIGGER FOR THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment is the seminal protection for individuals fac-
ing criminal charges. An effective lawyer is often an essential catalyst for
the meaningful realization of other constitutional and statutory rights to
which a defendant is entitled." Moreover, although "the trial may be the
most dramatic and exciting part of the criminal process," it is beyond
debate that deprivations of the right to counsel in the pretrial context will
often affect a greater hardship on the defendant than the absence of coun-
9. Some scholars have argued that the political realities of indigent defense funding make the
persistent clamoring for increased budgets impractical and misguided. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The
Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 464 (2007) (arguing that to
solve "the indigent defense crisis, states should redirect resources now spent on [most misdemean-
ors] to reduce indigent defender caseloads so that those who represent defendants charged with more
serious crimes will have more time to spend on those cases."); id. at 465-66 (pointing to empirical
data suggesting that in low-level misdemeanors "counsel do not appear to provide significant benefit
to the defendants"); id. at 466 ("Indeed, in the federal system, pro se misdemeanor defendants have
better outcomes than every category of represented misdemeanor defendants, including those who
retain attorneys and those represented by appointed counsel."). Likewise, a recent empirical study in
Massachusetts has concluded that in certain contexts, providing counsel to civil litigants does not
provide any statistical advantages. James D. Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, & Jonathan
Hennessy, How Effective Are Limited Legal Assistance Programs? A Randomized Experiment in a
Massachusetts Housing Court, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESOURCE NETWORK (2011),
http://ssm.com/abstract-i 880078.
10. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); see also Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25, 41 (1972) (Burger, J., concurring) ("Were I able to confine my focus solely to the
burden that the States will have to bear in providing counsel, I would be inclined, at this stage of the
development of the constitutional right to counsel, to conclude that there is much to commend draw-
ing the line at penalties in excess of six months' confinement. Yet several cogent factors suggest the
infirmities in any approach that allows confinement for any period without the aid of counsel . . . .");
see also Hashimoto, supra note 9, at 477 ("Argersinger has had an enormous financial impact on
states and counties-an impact arguably greater than that of Gideon.").
11. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 70 (1932) (recognizing the right to "counsel as perhaps
[a defendant's] most important privilege").
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sel during the trial.12 This is particularly true in view of statistics that
consistently show that more than 90% of all criminal cases are resolved
without a trial,13 and the percentage is likely even higher for misdemean-
ors.14 In recognition of these realities, the Supreme Court has expressly
held that the right to counsel extends beyond the mere right to have a
lawyer present during one's trial.'
The right to counsel in the pretrial setting is not, however, without
limitation. As an initial matter, entirely distinct from the substantive mer-
it of the alleged injury, three distinct threshold limitations must be satis-
fied: first, the right to counsel must have attached; second, the stage dur-
ing which the alleged harm to the defendant occurred must be deemed
"critical"; and third, the defendant must be sentenced to actual incarcera-
tion following his trial or plea. The remainder of this section will focus
on describing the individual and aggregate effects of these limitations on
the right to counsel, both as they apply generally and in Colorado specif-
ically.
A. Attachment
The first limitation on the right to counsel, attachment, is controver-
sial among academics.' 6 The attachment requirement is essentially a doc-
trinal recognition that the right to counsel does not extend indefinitely
back in time before the commencement of the criminal trial; in essence,
the term "attachment" is a shorthand for the earliest point in a case when
a defendant enjoys Sixth Amendment protections.17 This temporal limita-
tion is understood as a measure designed to give effect to the Sixth
Amendment's text, which provides that only during "criminal prosecu-
12. Justin Marceau, Pretrial Ineffective Assistance, U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2012).
13. E.g., Brooks Holland, A Relational Sixth Amendment During Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 381, 382 (2009) ("[T]he vast majority of today's criminal cases-90% or more-
are resolved by negotiated disposition rather than trial."); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Weigh
Effects of Bad Plea Advice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/3 1/us/supreme-court-to-hear-cases-involving-bad-advice-on-plea-
deals.html?_r-1 ("Last year [2010], 97 percent of convictions in federal courts were the result of
guilty pleas. In 2006, the last year for which data was available, the corresponding percentage in
state courts was 94."); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 Yale L.J. 857, 1012-
13 (2000) ("[l]n modem American courtrooms ... guilty-plea rates above ninety or even ninety-five
percent are common.").
14. See, e.g., SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 3, at 9 (reporting that in a Florida study, the
authors found that "94% of misdemeanor cases are resolved before trial").
15. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
688 n.6 (1972) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 224-25 (1967); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993). As one
Sixth Amendment scholar has observed, "a 'fair trial' implicates much more than the trial itself ...
[because] [d]efendans ... rarely face their accusers during traditional courtroom proceedings . . .
Holland, supra note 13, at 381-82.
16. There is a long and impressive line of scholarship assailing the attachment requirement as
overly formalistic and inconsistent with the spirit of the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., id. at 381;
Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right to Counsel Doctrine, 97 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1635, 1636 (2003).
17. See, e.g., Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688-90.
[Vol. 89:2330
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tions" shall a defendant enjoy the right to counsel.18 In other words, even
though the right to counsel extends beyond representation at trial, the
defendant must be facing something akin to a criminal prosecution be-
fore the right to counsel applies. But as a practical matter, a rigid insist-
ence on the commencement of a criminal prosecution has the formalistic
effect of depriving defendants of the right to counsel in many of the most
important stages of their defense. For example, police interrogations and
identifications routinely occur before the formal attachment of the right
to counsel;' 9 although the entire fate of one's case may turn on the advice
and aid of counsel during an interrogation or identification, the Sixth
Amendment's protections do not extend to these proceedings. 20 As rele-
vant for the Colorado procedures discussed herein, the scope of the right
is, therefore, often associated with formalism much more than with a
functionalist inquiry of whether counsel would be valuable at a particular
stage of the criminal process.21 As Professor Metzger has explained, the
Court's rigid insistence on the attachment requirement marks a "triumph
of the letter over the spirit of the law."22
The right to counsel, then, has not been interpreted as providing a
continuum of protections in the pretrial context. If the right to counsel
has not attached, then the right to counsel provides no protections, not
merely lesser protections.23 Notably, the Court's elaboration on the point
of attachment has been largely relegated to cryptic dicta, but a few nota-
ble data points stand out. For example, in Kirby v. Illinois,24 the Court
defined attachment as the point of "formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment information, or arraignment." 2 5 Likewise, cases arising in the
interrogation context identified the "arraignment" 26 or even just an ar-
raignment on the complaint or "outstanding arrest warrant" 27 as the point
of attachment.
For many states and the federal government, the point at which the
right to counsel attaches for constitutional purposes is of merely academ-
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. Although the protections of Miranda v. Arizona apply to all custodial interrogations, 384
U.S. 436, 500 (1966), the Miranda right to counsel is, as a practical matter, nothing more than a right
to remain silent until the court appoints a lawyer. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-87
(1981) (recognizing that the invocation of the right to counsel by a suspect requires only that police
cease questioning until the defendant has met with his attorney).
20. Holland, supra note 13, at 384-85. But cf Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932)
(noting that the right to counsel may not be so circumscribed as to preclude counsel from giving
meaningful "aid in the preparation and trial of the case").
21. Contra Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (describing the attachment requirement as giving effect to
the language of the Sixth Amendment, rather than as a "mere formalism").
22. Metzger, supra note 16, at 1671 (citing United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 615 (6th
Cir. 2000)). "There are other pre-indictment procedures one might use to demonstrate how the
bright-line [attachment] rule fails to honor the Sixth Amendment's promise." Id at 1668 n.200.
23. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90.
24. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
25. Id. at 689.
26. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964).
27. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 391, 399-401 (1977).
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ic interest. Most jurisdictions, including all federal districts, require the
appointment of counsel at the first appearance of a defendant who has a
- 28right to counsel.
Colorado, however, is a notable exception. Colorado law does not
provide for the appointment of counsel at the defendant's first appear-
ance even in cases where the defendant has a right to counsel. 29 Specifi-
cally, the rules in Colorado provide that for misdemeanor defendants the
right to counsel is delayed until after the defendant speaks with the pros-
ecutor about potential plea options.30 In Colorado, then, the appointment
of counsel may be delayed for days after the initial appearance.
The state of Texas also is among the minority of states that do not
appoint counsel until after the initial appearance. The United States Su-
preme Court recently considered the Sixth Amendment implications of
Texas's procedures for the appointment of counsel in Rothgery v. Gilles-
pie County.31 The procedural posture of the case was such that the consti-
tutionality of denying counsel at an initial appearance was not before the
Court; instead, it was a pure question of attachment: whether a defend-
ant's first appearance is sufficient to trigger the attachment of counsel if
the public prosecutor is not aware of or involved in that first appear-
ance?32 Specifically, the question before the Court was whether the Fifth
Circuit was correct in affirming a summary judgment order in a § 1983
case on the grounds "that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not
attach" at an initial appearance because prosecutors were not aware of or
involved in that appearance. Answering the question unequivocally, the
Court held that "the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
applies at the first appearance before a judicial officer at which a defend-
ant is told of the formal accusation against him and restrictions are im-
posed on his liberty," even if the public prosecutor is not aware of or
present at the initial proceeding. 34 Thus, although Texas did not require
the appointment of counsel for the first appearance or even the notifica-
tion of the prosecution, an initial appearance was recognized as marking
the point of attachment for the right to counsel.
28. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 203-04 (2008) ("We are advised without
contradiction that not only the Federal Government, including the District of Columbia, but 43 States
take the first step toward appointing counsel before, at, or just after initial appearance." (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Of course, the mere appointment of counsel does not resolve questions as
to the scope of ineffective assistance of counsel protections prior to trial. See, e.g., Marceau, supra
note 12 (discussing, in Section 1(c), that the right to counsel does not apply to convictions that do not
result in incarceration); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972).
29. COLo. REV. STAT. § 16-7-301(1) (2011).
30. § 16-7-301(4)(a), discussedin infra Part II.
31. 554 U.S. at 191.
32. Id. at 194-95.
33. Id. at 197-98.
34. Id. at 194-95.
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The unmistakable implication of Rothgery for Colorado is that the
initial appearance of the defendant, where the defendant is informed of
the "formal accusation"35 against him, triggers the attachment of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Under Colorado Criminal Proce-
dure Rule 5, a defendant must be advised of his rights and the charges
against him at the initial appearance; 37 the proceeding is, therefore, func-
tionally identical to the proceeding at issue in Rothgery.
Notably, however, the Colorado courts are presently stuck in a rut
of outdated Sixth Amendment precedent.38 Treatises and lower courts
continue to cite a Colorado Supreme Court decision from 1992, People v.
Anderson, for the proposition that an initial appearance under Colorado
Rule 5 is insufficient to trigger the attachment of the right to counsel.3 9
This conclusion cannot survive the Rothgery decision. During the initial
appearance in Colorado, commonly referred to as a Rule 5 proceeding, or
more formally "the Crim. P. 5 proceeding," the defendant must be ad-
vised of the nature of the charges against him, his rights-including the
right to counsel, to a jury, and the right against self-incrimination-and
the terms of his bail, if he is bailable, are set. 40 Because Rothgery recog-
nized that there was "'no doubt' that the right to counsel attached at the
initial appearance,"4A and because the inquiry is functional rather than
technical-that is to say, the right to counsel attaches once there is "an
35. Because there are not formal charges for purposes of a felony case until after an indict-
ment or initial appearance, the Supreme Court used the term "formal accusation" to designate the
point when the right to counsel attaches. See id. at 194.
36. Colorado's current case law appears to be inconsistent with the federal standard on this
point, articulated in Rothgery. People v. Anderson, 842 P.2d 621, 623-24 (Colo. 1992) (holding that
an initial appearance does not trigger attachment).
37. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 5(c)(2) ('At the first appearance in the county court the defendant shall
be advised in accordance with the provisions set forth [regarding felonies] ... , except that [in mis-
demeanor cases] the defendant shall be advised that an application for the appointment of counsel
shall not be made until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken with the defendant as provided in
C.R.S. 16-7-301(4)(a)."). Under Rule 5, then, there is at least the possibility that prosecutors might
meet with defendants to offer plea deals after the initial appearance. It seems, however, that the
common practice is to meet with the misdemeanor defendants regarding plea offers prior to the
initial appearance.
38. For example, the leading Colorado treatise has posited that "[tihe Colorado Supreme
Court has adopted the same test for determining when the right to counsel attaches under the Colora-
do Constitution." 14 COLO. PRAC., CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 13.52 (2d ed. 2011) (citing
Anderson, 842 P.2d at 623).
39. Anderson, 842 P.2d at 623. It is worth noting that apparently at the time of Anderson's
initial appearance the prosecution had not yet filed a complaint (and no complaint had been filed).
Id. Under the reasoning of Anderson it was significant that the prosecution had not yet "elected to
prosecute the defendant [and] [for this reason, the [Rule] 5 proceeding did not constitute an initia-
tion of an adversary judicial proceeding against the defendant." Id. But the Rothgery holding is clear
that the "attachment rule [is] unqualified by prosecutorial involvement." 554 U.S. at 209-10 ("[A]n
initial appearance following a charge signifies a sufficient commitment to prosecute regardless of a
prosecutor's participation, indictment, information, or what the County calls a 'formal' complaint.").
40. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(2).
41. Id. at 211 (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977)).
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initial appearance before a magistrate'A2-there is no question that the
Rule 5 proceeding signals the attachment of the right to counsel.
The failure of Colorado courts to expressly recognize that the Sixth
Amendment attachment occurs at the Crim. P. 5 proceeding is probably
more a product of the recency of the Rothgery decision than a reflection
of inattention or disregard on the part of the Colorado courts. 4 3 In short
order, a case turning on an attachment issue will present itself to the Col-
orado Supreme Court, and to be sure, the Colorado Supreme Court will
be bound by the holding of Rothgery that "a criminal defendant's initial
appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against
him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary
judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel."4
B. Critical Stage
The attachment of the right to counsel is a necessary, but not a suf-
ficient, condition for the full protections of the Sixth Amendment. In
Montejo v. Louisiana, for example, the Supreme Court held that a de-
fendant does not enjoy an unlimited right to have counsel's guiding hand
at all points post-attachment; instead, the defendant's "right to have
counsel present" extends only to "critical" stages of the criminal pro-
ceedings. 45 Viewed in this light, the determination that one's right to
counsel has attached is, standing alone, a rather hollow constitutional
victory for a defendant. Although a violation of the right to counsel can
never arise before attachment, neither does the deprivation of counsel
post-attachment constitute a constitutional injury unless the proceeding
42. Id. at 199 (noting that the name of the proceeding is irrelevant; if there is a "hearing at
which 'the magistrate informs the defendant of the charge in the complaint, and of various rights in
further proceedings', and 'determine[s] the conditions for pretrial release,"' then the right to counsel
attaches (alteration in original) (quoting WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.4(g) (3d
ed. 2007))). Again, it is notable that in Colorado, apparently some proceedings appear to commence,
via initial appearance under Rule 5, without a complaint being filed. See Anderson, 842 P.2d at 623.
However, the absence of a formal complaint, no more than the absence of prosecutor involvement, is
not dispositive-the Rothgery approach is clearly one of function over form: "[A] criminal defend-
ant's initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and his
liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attach-
ment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213. The initial appearance in
Colorado clearly satisfies each of these criteria. Contra Anderson, 842 P.2d at 622-23.
43. The Supreme Court of Colorado has not yet had occasion to analyze the Rothgery deci-
sion, but the one Colorado case citing to Rothgery notes that the decision "refin[es] the test for
attachment of the 6th Amendment right to counsel." People v. Wright, 196 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Colo.
2008).
44. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213.
45. 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009) ("[O]nce the adversary judicial process has been initiated,
the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all "critical" stages
of the criminal proceedings."); see also Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 212 ("Once attachment occurs, the
accused at least is entitled to the presence of appointed counsel during any 'critical stage' of the
postattachment proceedings . . . .").
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in question was a critical stage. As the Court has explained, "the enquiry
into that right is a different one from the attachment analysis."46
That is to say, the right to the appointment and presence of counsel
is not necessarily coextensive with the attachment of the right to counsel.
As a result, the range of constitutional benefits that inhere from the at-
tachment alone is relatively meager. The principal advantage to defend-
ants resulting from attachment is the right to have counsel present for a
variety of non-trial proceedings that have been recognized as critical
stages. Most notably, formal police efforts designed to elicit incriminat-
ing statements from the defendant in the absence of an attorney run afoul
of the right to counsel once the right has attached, even if the defendant
is not in custody.47 Likewise, whereas pre-attachment corporeal identifi-
cations do not implicate the right to counsel, once the right has attached,
a defendant has the right to the presence of counsel at all in-person iden-
tification procedures.48
More generally, however, due to the distinction between the at-
tachment of the right to counsel and the right to the presence and assis-
tance of counsel, an understanding of what constitutes a critical stage is
essential for all varieties of Sixth Amendment concerns, including the
Colorado procedures for misdemeanor plea bargains at issue in this Arti-
cle. Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court's guidance on what
constitutes a critical stage has been mind-boggling in its opacity.49 For
46. Id.
47. Prior to the attachment of the right to counsel, only the Fifth Amendment protects a de-
fendant from coercive police interrogation techniques. Notably, the Miranda warnings, unlike the
Sixth Amendment protections, are only triggered by custodial interrogation. See Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298, 300-02 (1980). Moreover, so long as Miranda warnings are provided to
the defendant, only the most conscience shocking behavior implicates Fifth Amendment concerns.
See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-24 (1959). Indeed, most confessions obtained after
the provision of Miranda warnings will be deemed voluntary. See Kenji Yoshino, Miranda's Fall,
98 MICH. L. REv. 1399, 1412 (2000) (reviewing ALBERT CAMus, THE FALL (Justin O'Brien, trans.,
Vintage Books 1991) ("[T]he officer ... can be protected by the warning from many forms of sub-
sequent scrutiny .... ). By contrast, once the right to counsel has attached, any efforts by law en-
forcement to deliberately elicit incriminating statements from the defendant give rise to Sixth
Amendment claims, even if the defendant is not in custody. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 205-07 (1964) (defendant was not in custody); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401
(1977).
48. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-25 (1967) (lineup is a critical stage). But see
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688, 690 (1972) (declining to hold that all pre-trial identifications
conducted without a defense attorney are per se during a critical stage because some identifications
and lineups "[take] place long before the commencement of any prosecution whatsoever").
49. See D. Christopher Dearborn, "You Have the Right to an Attorney," But Not Right Now:
Combating Miranda's Failure by Advancing the Point of Attachment Under Article XII of the Mas-
sachusetts Declaration ofRights, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 359, 388-89 (2011) (noting that the United
States Supreme Court relies on language that is "susceptible to expansive interpretation" and "the
Court's proffered bright-line rule has become increasingly arbitrary because most suspects face
numerous trial-like confrontations long before the right to counsel attaches" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Hannah Misner, Comment, Maryland v. Shatzer: Stamping a Fourteen-Day Expira-
tion on Miranda Rights, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 289, 309 (2010) (noting that there is an "increasingly
blurred line between the critical and non-critical stage[s] of criminal prosecutions"); Amanda Myra
Homung, The Paper Tiger of Gideon v. Wainwright and the Evisceration of the Right to Appoint-
ment of Counsel for Indigent Defendants, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 495, 522 (2005)
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example, in United States v. Wade,o the seminal case defining "critical
stage," the Court merely identified as critical those proceedings in which
the "presence of counsel .. . operates to assure that the accused's interests
will be protected consistently with our adversary theory of criminal pros-
ecution."5'
In light of such ambiguity of definition, it is generally more helpful
to consider examples of proceedings that have been deemed "critical"
and contrast them with those that have been viewed as "non-critical." For
example, it is clear that all stages of a trial are critical stages;52 likewise,
arraignments,5 3 preliminary hearings, 54 post-charge corporeal identifica-
tions,55 police interrogations "occurring after the first formal charging
proceeding," 56 and sentencing proceedingS57 are all critical stages. By
contrast, it seems that non-corporeal identifications, 58 pre-sentence inter-
views 59 pre-initial appearance police investigations,60 and an array of
other proceedings, such as consolidation hearings and DNA hearings62
are not critical stages. There is no clear pattern or means of predicting
whether something will be deemed a critical stage beyond a case-by-case
inquiry into how important a particular proceeding is to the ultimate out-
come in a case. The best a lower court can do is to recognize as a critical
stage "any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out,
where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial."63
Despite the overall ambiguity as to what constitutes a critical stage,
the Court's analysis of plea bargaining has been surprisingly clear. The
("Because the Court has interpreted the attachment of the right to counsel at different stages under
the criminal procedure rules of different states, there is room for debate about what constitutes a
critical stage.").
50. 388 U.S. at 227-28.
51. Id. at 227.
52. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,64 (1932).
53. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 52-55 (1961) (applying Alabama law).
54. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (applying Maryland law).
55. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37.
56. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986). But see Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 171
n.2 (explaining that the right to counsel is offense specific and "there is no 'background principle' of
our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence establishing that there may be no contact between a defendant
and police without counsel present").
57. See, e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967).
58. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) ("[Tihe Sixth Amendment does not grant
the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by the Government for the purpose of allow-
ing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender.").
59. See, e.g., United States v. Hodges, 259 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Archambault, 344 F.3d 732, 736 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Washington, 11 F.3d 1510,
1517 (10th Cir. 1993).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 96 (3d Cir. 2002).
61. Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 315 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying Michigan law).
62. McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (8th Cir. 2010).
63. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967). Or as one federal circuit court recently
articulated the inquiry, "Whether it was a critical stage depends on whether there was a reasonable
probability that [the defendant's] case could suffer significant consequences." Van v. Jones, 475
F.3d 292, 313 (6th Cir. 2007).
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Court's post-Gideon right to counsel jurisprudence has consistently rec-
ognized the process of plea bargaining as a critical stage. As one com-
mentator recently concluded, "[p]lea bargaining is [a] critical stage, not
only because it is 'an essential component of the administration of jus-
tice,' but also because ninety-five percent of convictions end in plea bar-
gains."65 The view that plea bargaining is a critical stage is hardly a nov-
el conclusion, and instead rests on over thirty years of right to counsel
jurisprudence. In 1984, the Court announced in Strickland v. Washing-
ton6 6 the modem standard for evaluating whether counsel provided con-
stitutionally adequate or effective representation.67 Just one year later, the
Court applied this newly minted standard to the plea process in Hill v.
Lockhart.68
In Hill, the defendant alleged that his decision to plead guilty was
tainted by the ineffective assistance of his attorney in failing to adequate-
ly advise him as to his eligibility for parole.69 While the Court ultimately
rejected his claim on the merits, it recognized that a defendant would
satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland's ineffective assistance of coun-
sel test if he could establish that but for the errors or omissions by coun-
sel, there was a "reasonable probability that ... he would not have plead-
ed guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 70 The Hill decision,
therefore, explicitly identifies the process of pleading guilty as a critical
stage of the criminal case for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Moreo-
ver, the Court's decisions from this Term, Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v.
Cooper, explicitly extend the right to counsel protections to plea bargain-
ing even when the fair trial right is not implicated - that is even where
the defendant pleads not guilty.71 Accordingly, the plea process-
64. See e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (noting that the Court has
"long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel"). Even prior to Gideon, the Court
recognized the central role of plea bargaining to a fair justice system. See Williams v. Kaiser, 323
U.S. 471, 475 (1945).
65. David A. Perez, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During
Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J. 1532, 1539 (2011) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
260 (1971)).
66. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
67. Id. at 694 ("The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.").
68. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
69. Id. at 53-55.
70. Id. at 59. In some jurisdictions, the prejudice inquiry requires not only a showing that it is
reasonably likely that the defendant would have accepted the plea, but also that the trial judge would
have accepted the terms of the agreement. But see 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 21.3 (b) (3d ed. 2011) ("Under the majority view, this standard does not require a
defendant to prove that the trial judge would have accepted the plea agreement." (internal citations
omitted)).
71. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (noting that "[iun today's criminal justice
system . .. the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the
critical point for a defendant"). See also Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (noting that
the "criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.").
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whether it is a guilty or a not guilty plea-triggers a series of duties for
competent counsel, including, among others, to investigate the facts and
law surrounding the charges, to advise the client as to the risks associated
with a trial as compared to a plea, and to advise the client as to the con-
sequences of pleading guilty.7 2 The Court recently interpreted this latter
duty of competent counsel to hold that competent representation requires
the defense attorney to advise his client not only of the direct conse-
quences of a guilty plea, but also of at least some collateral consequenc-
OS73es. 7
To be clear, then, it is settled as a matter of Sixth Amendment law
that the process of evaluating a plea offer is a critical stage of the crimi-
nal proceeding for which the appointment and presence of counsel are
constitutionally required.74 Colorado law is equally clear on this point,
recognizing that the "entire plea bargaining process" is a critical stage to
which the full protections of the Sixth Amendment apply.75
C. Actual Incarceration
The third cognizability hurdle in the right to counsel realm is the ac-
tual incarceration rule. Although all felony prosecutions require the ap-
pointment of counsel,76 misdemeanor prosecutions only implicate the
right to counsel when the defendant is sentenced to actual incarceration.77
As a result, for misdemeanor prosecutions, even if the right to counsel
would have attached, and even if the proceeding in question is otherwise
a critical stage of the criminal process, if the defendant is not eventually
sentenced to incarceration, the right to counsel cannot be violated. Nei-
ther the incompetence of counsel, nor even the complete failure to ap-
72. 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 70, § 21.3(b) (cataloguing the duties and responsibilities of
counsel during the plea process).
73. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (requiring advisements regarding the
clear immigration consequences of one's guilty plea).
74. The United States Supreme Court recently announced that a defense attorney's errors
during plea negotiations leading to not guilty plea could constitute a Sixth Amendment violation of
the right to effective assistance of counsel, despite the fact that the defendant received a fair trial.
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) ("[Diefense counsel has the duty to communicate
formal offers from the prosecution . . . [and by] allow[ing] the offer to expire without advising the
defendant or allowing him to consider it, defense counsel did not render the effective assistance the
Constitution requires."); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012) ("If a plea bargain has been
offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept
it. If that right is denied, prejudice can be shown if loss of the plea opportunity led to a trial resulting
in a conviction on more serious charges or the imposition of a more severe sentence.").
75. See, e.g., Carmichael v. People, 206 P.3d 800, 805 (Colo. 2009).
76. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963). The Gideon case did not explic-
itly resolve the issue, but it is generally read as requiring the appointment of counsel for all felony
prosecutions. See, e.g., Lily Fu, High Crimes from Misdemeanors: The Collateral Use of Prior,
Uncounseled Misdemeanors Under the Sixth Amendment, Baldasar and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 77 MINN. L. REv. 165, 170 (1992) ("[Clourts widely interpreted the right to counsel
announced in Gideon to extend only to accused felons and not to accused misdemeanants.").
77. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
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point an attorney, constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation if the defend-
ant is not actually incarcerated.78
The Sixth Amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." 79 Despite this absolutist language, several states concluded that
the right to appointed counsel did not apply to petty offenses.o The Su-
preme Court clarified the scope of the Sixth Amendment in this arena in
Argersinger v. Hamlin8' by squarely rejecting the "premise that since
prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than six
months may be tried without a jury, they may also be tried without a
lawyer." 82 The Court noted that it was "by no means convinced that legal
and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to im-
prisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a
person can be sent off for six months or more"83 and thus held that "ab-
sent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for
any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless
he was represented by counsel at his trial."84 Moreover, the Argersinger
decision does not limit its discussion of the importance of counsel in
misdemeanor cases to trial. The Court explained:
Beyond the problem of trials and appeals is that of the guilty plea,
a problem which looms large in misdemeanor as well as in felony
cases. Counsel is needed so that the accused may know precisely
what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to
jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution.
In addition, the volume of misdemeanor cases, far greater in num-
ber than felony prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy dis-
positions, regardless of the fairness of the result.85
Thus, for both plea bargaining and trials, Argersinger made clear
that unless a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to
78. The mere possibility under the statute for a sentence of incarceration does not implicate
the Sixth Amendment. However, there is a split of authority as to whether a federal judge's failure to
make a finding during the initial appearance that incarceration is not permitted violates the federal
rules. Laurie L. Levenson, FEDERAL CRIMINAL RULES HANDBOOK FCRP 44 (2011). ("Under the
federal rules, the right to counsel extends to all offenses, petty and serious alike. However, if the
federal magistrate judge commits on the record prior to trial that any sentence will not include im-
prisonment, defendant need not be assigned counsel pursuant to Rule 44.").
79. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
80. See discussion infra Part 1.
81. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
82. Id at 30-31.
83. Id. at 33.
84. Id. at 37. As a leading treatise has observed, "The reference in this sentence and others to
a felony resulting in imprisonment might be taken to suggest that a felony which would not result in
imprisonment also would not require appointed counsel. However, . . . numerous subsequent opin-
ions . . . [establish] an absolute right to appointed counsel in all felony cases, making no reference to
the punishment imposed." LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 70, at § 11.2(a).
85. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 34.
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counsel, he could not be imprisoned unless he was appointed counsel.
The question left unresolved by Argensinger, however, was whether the
right to counsel existed in cases where there was no "loss of liberty"
86through incarceration.
In Scott v. Illinois, the Court resolved this issue by holding that
counsel is not required in all misdemeanor cases in which "imprisonment
is an authorized penalty."87 Instead, the Court held that the right to coun-
sel requires "only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assis-
tance of appointed counsel in his defense. In other words, non-
appointment of counsel does not violate the Sixth Amendment in misde-
meanor cases where a sentence of imprisonment is authorized, but not
imposed. In this way, the Court avoided what it regarded as an extension
of the Sixth Amendment that would threaten to "create confusion and
impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite di-
verse States."
In short, the scope of the right to counsel is limited by three distinct
requirements. First, the right to counsel is never implicated before the
attachment of the right. Second, even when the right to counsel has at-
tached, the right only requires the assistance of counsel at those stages
that are critical to the fairness and reliability of the criminal proceeding.
And third, even where the right would otherwise have attached and the
proceeding implicates the fundamental fairness of the criminal process,
the right to counsel does not apply if the defendant is not sentenced to
actual incarceration.
86. Id. at 37 ("We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the
right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, however, for here petitioner was in fact sen-
tenced to jail.").
87. 440 U.S. 367, 368-69 (1979).
88. Id. at 373-74. The Court also stated, "the central premise of Argersinger - that actual
imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment - is emi-
nently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional
right to appointment of counsel." Id. at 373. It warrants reiterating the obvious-State constitutions
and rules of criminal procedure may provide more robust protections. A state constitution might be
interpreted so as to recognize that Scott has no application as a matter of state law, and likewise
Federal Rule 44, regarding the appointment of counsel, might be construed to require a trial court's
finding that incarceration will not be imposed at the initial appearance if the defendant is to be
forced to proceed without counsel. To date, however, commentators have concluded that the Colora-
do courts have regarded both the state and federal right to counsel as co-extensive. See, e.g., ROBERT
J. DIETER, 13 COLO. PRAC., CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 13.5 n. I (2d Ed. 2011) (noting
that Colo. Const. art. II, § 16 is the state protection for the right to counsel and recognizing that
"Colorado has not chosen to interpret this right more expansively than the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tee").
89. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373. Another case relevant to whether the right to counsel applies is
Nichols v. United States, which holds that "an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under
Scott because no prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a
subsequent conviction." 511 U.S. 738, 749 (1994); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662-
65 (2002) (distinguishing Nichols in the context of a suspended sentence).
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Having described these three limitations on the right to counsel, the
next section of this Article explains the Colorado-specific procedures for
prosecuting misdemeanors, 90 before analyzing Colorado's system in light
of these three limitations.91.
II. THE COLORADO PROCEDURES FOR PROSECUTING MISDEMEANOR
CASES
A. Statutory Requirements
The Colorado legislature has adopted a simplified set of procedures
for commencing prosecution in misdemeanor and petty offense cases. 9 2
In contrast to the more robust processes required for felony prosecutions
(including the requirement of a preliminary hearing and information or a
grand jury indictment), 93 the misdemeanor procedures permit a prosecu-
tion to be conducted on the basis of a complaint alone. 94 Moreover, Colo-
rado has specific rules governing plea bargains. Most notably, Colorado
Revised Statute § 16-7-301 sets forth the specific duties and responsibili-
ties of district attorneys during plea agreements and discussions. 95 The
statute specifically limits the circumstances in which a prosecutor may
discuss a plea bargain with a defendant without the presence of counsel:
He should engage in plea discussions or reach plea agreements with
the defendant only through or in the presence of defense counsel ex-
cept where the defendant is not eligible for appointment of counsel,
or refuses appointment of counsel and has not retained counsel, or [if
it is a misdemeanor, petty, or traffic offense]. 96
For all felony cases, then, the prosecutor is affirmatively prohibited
from speaking with a defendant unless the defendant's attorney is pre-
sent, or the defendant specifically waives his right to counsel. By con-
trast, for misdemeanor prosecutions the rule is exactly the opposite-that
is, prosecutors are not just permitted, but specifically required to engage
in plea discussions with the defendant before the appointment of counsel.
Colorado Revised Statute § 16-7-301(4)(a) provides that:
In misdemeanors, petty offenses, or offenses under title 42, C.R.S.
[traffic offenses], the prosecuting attorney is obligated to tell the de-
90. See infra Part 1l.
91. See infra Part Ill.
92. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-2-101 (2011); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 4.1; see also, Robert J. Dieter,
Commencement of Criminal Proceedings-Introduction, 14 COLO. PRAC., CRIMINAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2.1 (2d ed. 2011).
93. See § 16-5-101 (2011); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 7; see also COLO. R. CRIM. P. 3.
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fendant any offer that can be made based on the facts as known by
the prosecuting attorney at that time.97
These statutorily mandated plea discussions must occur before the
appointment of counsel. The statute specifies "[t]he application for ap-
pointment of counsel and the payment of the application fee shall be de-
ferred until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken with the defendant"
about potential plea offers.9 8
Defenders of the statute, however, would likely be quick to point
out the codified protections that apply to misdemeanor defendants. Most
notably, during these pre-counsel plea negotiations prosecutors are re-
quired to "advise the defendant that the defendant has the right to retain
counsel or seek appointment of counsel," and that the defendant "is un-
der no obligation to talk to the prosecuting attomey." 99 These warnings
tend to understate the practical harm that results from exercising one's
right to counsel. Specifically, for a person detained in jail, conditioning
his immediate release on a guilty plea will oftentimes be too tantalizing
to pass up. Warnings or not, if he asserts his right to counsel, the prose-
cutor will inform him that he may have to remain incarcerated until his
second appearance. To be sure, foregoing counsel in order to forego an-
other night in jail will be a reflexive decision for many defendants. 00
If an agreement as to the proper disposition of the case is reached
between the prosecutor and the unrepresented defendant, the prosecutor
must "inform the court of the proposed plea agreement and the recom-
mended penalty."' 0 ' As with other plea offers, the court ultimately has
discretion to either accept or reject the agreed-upon disposition.102 Spe-
cifically, the court must "exercise an independent judgment in deciding
whether to grant charge or sentence concessions." 0 3 If the court rejects
the plea agreement, it must give the defendant the option to withdraw the
guilty plea.'1 Moreover, if a defendant does not accept the pre-counsel




100. See Nancy Amoury Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: The Limited
Influence of Sentence Concessions, 59 VAND. L. REv. 69, 147 (2006) ("[D]omestic defendants in
the main agree to self-convict because they expect to receive shorter sentences. Indeed, the fact that
sentence discounts motivate domestic defendants to plead guilty virtually goes without saying in the
plea-bargaining literature. It is simply understood that defendants prosecuted in Western criminal
justice systems seek to minimize their incarceration time.").
101. § 16-7-301(4)(a)(1).
102. See COLO. R. CIuM. P. 11(0(5).
103. Young v. People, 30 P.3d 202, 206 (Colo. 2001) (quoting COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11(f)(5)).
104. Id.; see also COLO. R. CRIM. P. 32(d) ("If the court decides that the final disposition
should not include the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by a plea agreement . . . the
court shall so advise the defendant and the district attorney and then call upon the defendant to either
affirm or withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo contendere."); People v. Wright, 559 P.2d 249, 251
(Colo. App. 1976).
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an absolute right to a court-appointed attorney unless the prosecutor pro-
vides a "written statement that incarceration is not being sought." 05 In
other words, in any misdemeanor case where a plea agreement is offered
before the initial appearance, but rejected by the defendant, the remain-
ing interactions between the parties resemble the interactions between
the defense and the prosecution in a felony case. In particular, when the
statutorily required un-counseled plea negotiation does not yield an
agreement, an indigent defendant is provided court-appointed counsel,' 0 6
and once counsel is retained or appointed, the prosecutor may only en-
gage in further plea discussions when defense counsel is present.107
On the other hand, if the court determines that the proposed plea
agreement is acceptable, a variety of Colorado statutes and rules require
the judge to advise the defendant, once again, of his right to a court-
appointed attorney before accepting the guilty plea. 08 For example, Rule
11 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the trial judge
to create a record demonstrating, among other things, that the defendant
understands the charges against him, that the plea is voluntary and know-
ing, and that he has the right to a jury and to counsel if he does not plead
guilty. 09 Only after these advisements and findings have been satisfied
may the court accept a guilty plea."l0
105. § 18-1-403 ("Except as provided in section 16-5-501, C.R.S., all indigent persons who are
charged with or held for the commission of a crime are entitled to legal representation and support-
ing services at state expense . . . ."); Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1255 (Colo. 2011)
(stating that a misdemeanor defendant has the "right to be represented by counsel, and if he is indi-
gent and faces incarceration, he has a right to court-appointed counsel"); People v. Garcia, 981 P.2d
214, 218 (Colo. App. 1998) ("[A]n indigent defendant is entitled to legal representation and support-
ing services at state expense."). If the defendant is convicted, but not actually sentenced to any
incarceration, there can be no Sixth Amendment violation. However, some federal courts have
recognized that the failure to make a pretrial determination as to whether incarceration is a possible
penalty requires the appointment of counsel-that is, if the penalty is not explicitly taken off the
table, then an attorney must be provided even if no incarceration ultimately results. See, e.g., United
States v. Downin, 884 F. Supp. 1474, 1479 (E.D. Cal. 1995); 2 BAILEY & FISHMAN,supra note 2, §
29:1 (noting the split of federal authority on this issue).
106. § 16-7-301(4)(a)(ll). It is also worth noting that under Colorado Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 5(c)(2), the court must advise the defendant that "an application for the appointment of counsel
shall not be made until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken with the defendant as provided in
C.R.S. 16-7-301(4)(a)." Thus, if the prosecution has not engaged in plea discussions prior to the
initial appearance, or informed the defendant that there is no pre-arraignment offer, the defendant
will be advised by the Court that the appointment of counsel must be deferred until after such meet-
ings occur.
107. See § 16-7-301(4)(a)(ll) ("If a plea agreement has not been reached and the defendant
chooses to retain an attorney, or the defendant meets the requirements [for appointment of counsel],
the court shall appoint counsel and all discussions with the defendant outside of the presence of
counsel shall cease."); see also § 16-7-301(4)(b) ("[I]f counsel is retained by the defendant, or if
counsel is appointed for the defendant, when it appears that the effective administration of justice
will thereby be served, the prosecutor may engage in additional plea discussions with the counsel for
the defense for the purpose of reaching a plea agreement.").
108. See § 16-7-301(4)(a) (requiring advisements in the context of the pre-counsel pleas);
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (requiring general advisements by the court when accepting a guilty plea); §
16-7-207 (2011) (requiring general advisements by the judge at a defendant's initial appearance).
109. COLO. R. CRIM. P. I1; see also People v. Wade, 708 P.2d 1366, 1369-70 (Colo. 1985).
110. COLO. R. CRIM. P. I 1(b); see also COLO. R. CRIM. P. 5(c)(2).
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B. An Example of Common County Court Practice: The City and County
of Denver
In order to place the Colorado rules for misdemeanor plea negotia-
tion in context, it is useful to consider the actual day-to-day practice in
Colorado's most populated county: Denver.
In all of the county courts of Denver, the plea process begins with
the defendant viewing a standardized set of recorded warnings."' All
defendants, whether in or out of custody, are required to either watch a
video advisement, listen to an audio advisement, or read a written ad-
visement of their rights before speaking to the district attorney. The ad-
visement, contained in the appendix, explains to the accused the proce-
dures of the forthcoming initial appearance and provides an overview of
the individual constitutional and statutory rights, including the right to
counsel, to which each defendant is entitled. Other rights described in the
advisement include the right to bail, the right to a jury trial, the right to a
speedy trial, and the right to remain silent.
After receiving the standard advisement, and before the initial ap-
pearance, a district attorney speaks directly with each defendant in the
manner required by CRS § 16-7-301. That is, the prosecutor meets with
the defendant and, after reiterating that the defendant has a right to coun-
sel if he does not wish to plead guilty, "tell[s] the defendant any [plea]
offer that can be made based on the facts as known by the prosecuting
attorney at that time." 1 2 This communication of a plea offer occurs be-
fore the initial appearance, but only moments before: the plea offer is
generally communicated to the defendant in the courtroom in the mo-
ments immediately prior the initial appearance and arraignment on the
complaint.
If the defendant agrees to the prosecution's pre-counsel plea offer,
then the defendant is given a written Rule 11 advisement form. One side
of the form sets out the proposed disposition that will be presented to the
court and contains the enumerated constitutional and statutory rights the
defendant waives by pleading guilty. The other side of the form includes
the statutory language describing the crime to which the defendant is
pleading guilty and the minimum and maximum penalties the court can
impose. Once the defendant signs the Rule 11 form, the district attorney
informs the court of the proposed disposition, including the agreed upon
penalty, and then tenders the signed form to the court. The judge then
gives an oral advisement of the Rule 11 warnings and makes several
findings on the record: first, that the defendant's plea is entered knowing-
111. This practice has been verified by the authors through discussions with attorneys practic-
ing in the District.
112. § 16-7-301(4)(a).
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ly, voluntarily, and intelligently; and second, that there is a factual basis,
or valid waiver of the establishment of a factual basis, for the plea." 3
In Denver County, then, any defendant who enters a pre-counsel
guilty plea at his arraignment is advised of his right to trial, including,
specifically, the right to counsel, no less than four times: (1) by a video,
audio, or written advisement before speaking with the district attorney;
(2) by the district attorney herself, when a plea is offered; (3) through the
written Rule 11 advisement; and (4) by the court, before a guilty plea is
accepted.
If the district attorney is unable to make a plea offer, or no agree-
ment is reached before the initial appearance, the court will arraign the
defendant on the complaint and proceed with the initial appearance in a
manner similar to a felony prosecution.1 14 Of course, the advantages of
taking an early, pre-counsel plea offer may be substantial for the defend-
ant. A defendant may only be able to obtain immediate release if he ac-
cepts the prosecution's offer; indeed, defendants not released on bail will
not even be appointed counsel until their next court appearance. Moreo-
ver, a defendant who refuses the initial plea, at the very least, risks the
possibility of higher penalties or charges if the initial plea offer is re-
voked or altered." 5
To date, there has only been one direct challenge to Colorado's sys-
tem of requiring misdemeanor defendants to talk with prosecutors about
possible plea options before the appointment of counsel, and the issue
was not resolved on the merits. The civil complaint challenging the sys-
tem was dismissed without prejudice on standing grounds, and only re-
cently has an amended complaint been filed.1 16 Consequently, the legal
113. The absence of a recording or transcript would likely render the waiver of counsel imper-
missible. As a general matter, the knowing and voluntary waiver of rights accompanying a plea must
be directly evidenced in a transcript or recording. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-
43 (1969); see also State v. Combs, No. 07CA009173, 2007 WL 4554241, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
28, 2007) (noting that it is "impossible to determine whether [a defendant] was advised of her right
to counsel and voluntarily waived that right in open court" when there is no record).
114. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-207(1) (2011).
115. Out of custody defendants will be given a new court date to appear before the trial court
judge and provided information on how to apply for a court-appointed public defender if they cannot
afford to retain counsel.
116. Courtroom Minutes, Colorado Criminal Defense Bar v. John W. Suthers, 10-cv-02930-
JLK (July 28, 2011); see also Jessica Fender, Judge Asks for New Complaint in Indigent Defense
Lawsuit, DENVER POST, July 28, 2011, http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_18568810
("[Judge] Kane dismissed the defense attorneys' complaint, giving them 60 days to re-file and possi-
bly to find indigent people who had been harmed by the state law that requires those charged with a
misdemeanor to discuss a plea with prosecutors before receiving counsel."). A second amended
complaint was filed on January 20, 2012. Second Amended Complaint, Colo. Criminal Def. Bar v.
Suthers, No. 10-CV-02930-JLK-BNB (D. Colo. Jan. 20, 2012). Of particular note, one factual alle-
gation in in the amended complaint is that "[i]ndigent defendants whose applications for counsel are
deferred . . . have already appeared before a judicial officer to learn the charges against them and the
potential restrictions on their liberty . .. [and therefore] [t]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel has
already attached." Id. at 38-39. To be sure, the timing of these discussions, and whether they occur
pre or post-attachment, could have Constitutional significance. The authors own observations and
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issues surrounding this unique Colorado practice remain largely unde-
veloped and much more the subject of media and public speculation than
precise legal analysis." 7 The following section comprehensively reviews
the viability of Sixth Amendment challenges to each aspect of Colora-
do's misdemeanor plea bargaining system both in anticipation of the
inevitable litigation on these questions, and in furtherance of a more
complete understanding of the limitations of claims arising under the
Sixth Amendment's right to counsel.' 18
III. COLORADO'S SYSTEM UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
MICROSCOPE
There are several features of the Colorado system for prosecuting
misdemeanors that raise important and novel questions of Sixth Amend-
ment law. Colorado provides a valuable test case for understanding the
limitations on the right to counsel in the pretrial context. Previous schol-
arship has tended to focus on pre-attachment interrogation as the most
compelling gap in the right to counsel doctrine's current protections, but
Colorado's pre-counsel plea system presents a scenario that is equally
daunting for the un-counseled defendant. For example, Sixth Amend-
ment scholar Brooks Holland has argued that there is no pretrial context
for which the "advice of counsel matter[s] more than during an interroga-
tion.""'9 But scholars like Holland have not considered procedures like
those in place in Colorado. The danger of an interrogation without coun-
sel has been identified as the risk of pitting an untrained, often nervous
conversations with prosecutors suggest that the vast majority of plea discussions with unrepresented
misdemeanor defendants pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-301(4) occur prior to their first appear-
ance.
117. See P. Solomon Banda, Colorado Lawsuit Challenges State's Public Defender Law,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.legalnews.com/detroit/860667 ("Doug Wilson, Colo-
rado's public defender, estimated it would cost up to $6 million to add 55 attorneys and support staff
to handle an estimated 15,000 to 17,000 additional cases to comply with the Supreme Court deci-
sion."); Felisa Cardona, Suit Argues All Defendants Deserve Counsel from the Start, DENVER POST,
Dec. 9,2010, http://www.denverpost.com/recommended/ci 16812574; Christina Dickinson, Lawsuit
Challenges Colo. Public Defender Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 30, 2011,
http://www.9news.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=178759&catid=222; Jessica Fender, Judge
Asks for New Complaint in Indigent Defense Lawsuit, DENVER POST, July 28, 2011,
http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci 18568810.
118. A class of individual defendants who suffered extended pretrial incarceration because of
the delayed appointment of counsel procedures would have standing to challenge the Colorado
procedures. Moreover, the Supreme Court has previously recognized that challenges to pretrial
detention procedures qualify for an exception to the mootness rule such that the issue could be fully
litigated even if the defendants' cases have been concluded. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111
n.1 1 (1975) ("Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any given indi-
vidual could have his constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or convict-
ed. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons
similarly situated will be detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, in
short, is one that is distinctly capable of repetition, yet evading review." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
119. Holland, supra note 13, at 384.
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defendant against a skilled prosecutor, which results in the defendant
making decisions that do not protect his interests. 120
Notably, however, at least as much is at stake when a defendant en-
gages in plea bargaining discussions without the assistance of counsel.
There is no portion of a non-capital case that is more important than the
process of formally and officially waiving all rights, including the right
to a jury, the right to counsel, and the right to contest one's guilt, and this
is a process that occurs dozens of times per day, without counsel, across
the state of Colorado. Colorado's rules requiring prosecutors to engage
defendants in plea discussions, while mandating that the appointment of
counsel be "deferred,"'21 presents a series of unresolved questions about
the scope of Sixth Amendment protections in the pretrial context.
A. Plea Bargaining Without Counsel as a Sixth Amendment Violation
If a proceeding is deemed critical whenever the proceeding has the
"inherent potential for prejudice .. . which the presence of counsel can
avert,"' 22 then plea negotiations, perhaps more than any single event,
other than the criminal trial itself, embody the characteristics of a pro-
ceeding that justify requiring the presence of counsel.123 Consistent with
this view, plea bargaining has been recognized as a critical stage of the
criminal process. In Padilla v. Kentucky,124 for example, the Court ob-
served, "the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel." 25 Accordingly, the Colorado rule providing that "the prosecut-
mg attorney is obligated" to make a plea offer to the defendant before the
appointment of counsel 26 raises the specter of a critical stage being rou-
tinely conducted in the absence of counsel.
The timing of the prosecution's plea offer to a pro se defendant is
potentially dispositive as to whether Colorado's statutorily mandated pre-
counsel plea bargaining is merely disconcerting or, instead, unconstitu-
tional. The applicable Colorado rules do not specify when the prosecutor
should negotiate with the defendant, but appear to anticipate that it will
happen, at least on occasion, after the initial appearance. The governing
Colorado statute is notably vague on timing, explaining only that for
120. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 180 n.l (1991) (citing Michigan v. Jackson,
475 U.S. 625, 633-34 (1986)).
121. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-301(4)(a) (2011).
122. Megan E. Bums, Note, The Presentence Interview and the Right to Counsel: A Critical
Stage Under the Federal Sentencing Structure, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 571 (1993) (citing
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967)).
123. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (stating that plea bargaining "is not
some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system" (quoting Robert E.
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
124. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
125. Id. at 1486.
126. § 16-7-301(4)(a).
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misdemeanor prosecutions, the "prosecuting attorney is obligated" to
make a plea offer to the defendant based on the facts known to the prose-
cution "at that time" and explaining that the application for defense
counsel must "be deferred until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken
with the defendant" regarding the plea offer. 127 Colorado Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 5, by contrast, specifically anticipates that some pre-
counsel plea discussions will occur after the initial appearance. 12 8 Rule 5
provides:
At the first appearance in the county court the defendant shall be
advised in accordance with the provisions set forth in subparagraphs
(a)(2)(I) through (VII) of this Rule, except that the defendant shall be
advised that an application for the appointment of counsel shall not
be made until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken with the de-
fendant as provided in C.R.S. 16-7-301(4)(a).12 9
In other words, the Colorado rule explaining the procedures for an
initial appearance specifically provide that a defendant must be advised
of his right to counsel, but with the caveat that this right does not apply
until after the statutorily required pre-counsel plea discussions have oc-
curred. If the rule anticipates the need for this proviso at the time of the
initial appearance, then it must also anticipate that at least in some cir-
cumstances the required plea discussions will occur after the initial ap-
pearance. To this extent, Colorado's procedures for pre-counsel plea
negotiations present a clear Sixth Amendment violation. Where an offer
and discussion of a plea occurs after the initial appearance has com-
menced, and without the presence of defense counsel, the right to coun-
sel is violated-the right has attached and the plea discussion is a critical
stage. This is a straightforward Sixth Amendment violation.
In many counties, however, the actual practice does not so clearly
conflict with established federal law on the right to counsel because the
timing of the prosecution's plea offer to a pro se defendant appears to
precede the attachment of the right to counsel.13 0 In Denver County, for
example, these pre-counsel plea negotiations, to the best of the authors'
understanding, always occur before the initial appearance, at which time
the right to counsel has not attached, at least not as a matter of clearly
established federal law.' 3' Moreover, the authors of this Article have
observed or spoken to prosecutors in other counties where the practice of
127. Id
128. See COLO. R. CRIM. P. 5(c)(2).
129. Id.
130. If the Colorado procedures do not violate existing Supreme Court precedent, then a Sixth
Amendment challenge on federal habeas review would likely fail. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) (1996)
(conditioning relief on the state court's deviation from "clearly established Federal law").
131. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 199 (2008) ("[Tlhe right to counsel attach-
es at the initial appearance before a judicial officer . .. [when] the magistrate informs the defendant
of the charge in the complaint, and of various rights in further proceedings, and determine[s] the
conditions for pretrial release . . . ." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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the trial court judge ensures that the defendant is not engaging in post-
initial appearance plea bargaining without the aid of counsel. For exam-
ple, it appears to be a routine practice for many judges, before commenc-
ing an initial appearance, to ask the misdemeanor defendant whether he
has had an opportunity to discuss possible plea offers with the prosecu-
tion. When the defendant states that he has not yet spoken with the pros-
ecution as required by statute, the judge delays the initial appearance and
demands that the prosecution promptly meet with the defendant to dis-
cuss plea options. 3 2 Based on observations by the authors and conversa-
tions with misdemeanor lawyers, the common practice, then, is for these
pre-counsel plea negotiations to occur exclusively pre-initial appearance.
This is not to say that defendants receiving such offers have suffi-
cient bargaining power to offset the extraordinary risks associated with
waiving all of their trial rights just because the criminal proceeding has
not formally commenced.133 But just as government efforts to deliberate-
ly elicit incriminating statements from defendants (perhaps through the
use of informants or recording devices) before attachment have been held
not to violate the Sixth Amendment, the weight of Sixth Amendment
precedent defining the outer temporal reaches of the right to counsel pre-
trial supports the view that defendants who engage in plea negotiations
prior to "the first appearance before a judicial officer" 34 are not covered
by the right to counsel.'35
Of course, not all commentators have recognized the implications of
the attachment issue in this context. For example, shortly after the
Rothgery decision was handed down in 2008, a note in the Harvard Law
Review concluded that in Colorado "Rothgery will significantly alter the
current practice: misdemeanor defendants' right to counsel will no longer
be conditioned on the defendant first speaking directly with the prosecu-
tor to discuss a potential plea."l36 This conclusion, however, appears to
132. The Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure require that an "arrested person shall be taken
without unnecessary delay before the nearest available county court." COLO R. CRIM. P. 5(c). The
routine aspects of booking a newly arrested defendant do not constitute an unnecessary delay. How-
ever, delay designed to further investigative goals is likely to violate Rule 5. Cf Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (recognizing that as a matter of federal law confessions obtained be-
cause of a failure to present the defendant without unnecessary delay are excluded). Delays to obtain
prosecutorial advantage in a plea negotiation are no more defensible than delays designed to elicit a
confession and should be regarded as unnecessary for purposes of Rule 5.
133. As one commentator has noted, Colorado's approach creates "troubling incentive struc-
ture . . . clearly constructed to encourage waiver of the right to counsel .. . [because a] defendant
who has already accepted such a bargain and stands before the judge ready to enter the plea is un-
likely to suddenly assert his newfound right to counsel." Roberts, supra note 5, at 367.
134. Id. at 194.
135. Scholars have urged an abandonment of the rigid attachment inquiry in favor of a fact
specific inquiry that would assess the importance of counsel in a given context. Under this standard,
whether adopted as a matter of federal or state law, the plea bargaining without counsel that occurs
in Colorado would likely run afoul of the right to counsel. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 16, at 1671,
1668 n.200.
136. Note, Sixth Amendment-Attachment of the Right to Counsel, 122 HARV. L. REV. 306,
312 (2008).
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assume that the plea negotiations required by statute in Colorado do not
occur until after the first appearance. In any county where the prosecu-
tor's duty to discuss potential plea offers with defendants is carried out
before the initial appearance, the note's conclusion that the Colorado
system is inconsistent with the existing Sixth Amendment strictures is far
from clear.
Stated more directly, although the denial of counsel resulting in a
guilty plea is generally grounds for relief under the Sixth Amendment,
there is no ground for relief before the formal attachment of the right. 3 1
Thus, an unwise guilty plea may not have a remedy in the right to coun-
sel if the harm occurs before attachment. By the same token, a defendant
who is offered and rejects an extremely favorable plea deal and realizes
after counsel is appointed that refusing the plea was a serious mistake,
will not be able to seek relief under the Sixth Amendment despite the
recent Frye and Lafler decisions. That is to say, neither the defendant
who unwisely pleads guilty, nor the defendant who unwisely refuses to
plead guilty, has an established claim under the Sixth Amendment.138
Only if the prosecutor waits to offer a plea deal until after the initial ap-
pearance, or if the prosecutor engages in further plea discussions with the
defendant after the initial appearance and before counsel is appointed, is
the path to Sixth Amendment relief well established.13 9
Consequently, in order to demonstrate a right to counsel injury for
State acts before an initial appearance, a court would need to adopt a
broader conception of attachment in this context. There are at least two
conceivable bases for arguing that attachment occurs before the initial
appearance under Colorado's misdemeanor prosecution procedures.
First, plea negotiations before the initial appearance could trigger the
right to counsel under a manifestly broad reading of Rothgery. On such a
reading, the video or audio warnings that defendants receive before the
pre-counsel plea discussions would constitute the point of attachment. In
support of this view is the fact that that once a defendant is required to
watch a video advising him of his rights and the limitations on his liber-
ties, he almost certainly understands his situation as one in which the
"adverse positions of the government and defendant have solidified."'1
4 0
137. Cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985) (recognizing the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel at time of a guilty plea).
138. Even in the context of felony an unwise or uncounseled not guilty plea may violate the
Sixth Amendment under recently decided decisions. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399
(2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). However, the protections extending to a not guilty
plea are, to be sure, no broader in scope than the protections for a guilty plea. Accordingly, if the
right has not attached, it cannot be violated.
139. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (noting that the Court has
"long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel"); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201, 204-415 (1964) (recognizing that a post-attachment critical stage-including mere interroga-
tion-requires the appointment of counsel).
140. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
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It is no answer that the prosecutor herself is not yet aware that the de-
fendant was arrested or charged, for the right to counsel attaches even in
the absence of assent by the prosecutor.141 On the other hand, the point of
attachment has traditionally been linked to formal charges or a "prelimi-
nary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." 4 2 A video played
on a courtroom or jailhouse monitor without the presence of counsel, a
judge, or any other judicial officers has little in common with a judicial
proceeding. Although Rothgery embraces a more functionalist assess-
ment of what constitutes the point of attachment for the right to counsel
by liberating attachment from the requirement of a formal charge, the
mere playback of a pre-recorded video is a far cry from an in-court ap-
pearance by the defendant. It may therefore be difficult to fairly conceive
of viewing the video as the point at which the "government has commit-
ted itself to prosecute." 43
A second, stronger argument for attachment before the initial ap-
pearance is that the prosecution's offer of a plea deal is itself the point of
attachment. To the extent that Rothgery reflects a movement toward a
functional analysis of pretrial Sixth Amendment rights,'" there may be
room to argue that efforts to negotiate with a defendant, particularly
when those negotiations happen in the courtroom just moments before
the initial appearance, are themselves sufficiently indicative of a "com-
mit[ment] . . . to prosecute" 4 5 as to give rise to Sixth Amendment at-
tachment. After all, the attachment inquiry is, as the Court explained in
Kirby v. Illinois,14 6 whether "the adverse positions of government and
defendant have solidified" such that a "defendant finds himself faced
with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the
intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law."l 4 7 Certainly some
misdemeanor plea offers present complexities and intricacies no less
compelling than the initial appearance itself. Indeed, the initial appear-
ance is a rather pro forma event if the defendant has already taken stock
of the "substantive and procedural" law and made the decision to plead
guilty.14 8 The negotiation of a plea offer suggests a level of formality and
finality far higher than when the police focus investigative energies in
the direction of a defendant by interrogating him, or plant an informant
141. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 194-95 (2008).
142. Id. at 198.
143. Id. (citing Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689).
144. The Rothgery Court reiterated the holding in Kirby, emphasizing that the attachment
inquiry is not to be understood as one of "mere formalism." Id. at 198 (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at
689). The Court also stated "the constitutional significance ofjudicial proceedings cannot be allowed
to founder on the vagaries of state criminal law, lest the attachment rule be rendered utterly 'vague
and unpredictable."' Id. at 199 n.9 (quoting Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008)).
145. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
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in his presence, such that the right to counsel might fairly be understood
to have attached. 149
In short, although the process of negotiating a plea is among the
most critical stages of a criminal case, if such bargaining occurs before
attachment, the Sixth Amendment is entirely inapplicable. To date, the
Supreme Court has extended the point of attachment back only as far as
the defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer. However, the
attachment of the right to counsel appears to be evolving in a functional-
ist matter, such that even initial appearances conducted without the con-
sent or knowledge of the prosecution trigger the attachment of the Sixth
Amendment. Attachment has become a proxy for the beginning of a
criminal prosecution in whatever form it may take. Consequently, at least
in circumstances such as those presented by a Colorado misdemeanor
prosecution, either the video playback or the actual plea offer and discus-
sion may suffice to trigger attachment.150 Notably, however, applying the
right to counsel to pre-initial appearance events would represent a break
from current Sixth Amendment attachment doctrine.
B. The Plea Colloquy and Entry ofa Plea Without Counsel as a Sixth
Amendment Violation
Assuming that the plea negotiations with unrepresented misde-
meanor defendants required by Colorado law do not violate the Sixth
Amendment, it is necessary to consider whether the plea colloquy con-
149. Scholars like Professor Metzger have proposed doctrinal revisions to the attachment rule
that would also encompass pre-counsel plea negotiations like those that occur in Colorado. Metzger,
supra note 16, at 1689 ("That challenge is best met by evaluating right-to-counsel questions with
reference to factual indicia that demonstrate the need for counsel. These indicia can be culled from
the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment cases and can be deemed the hallmarks of a case that re-
quires the 'guiding hand of counsel' to insure a fair process. The indicia a court should consider are:
(1) adversariness-in-fact between the individual and the prosecution ('adversariness-in-fact'); (2)
complexity in the procedural stage in question ('complexity'); and (3) potential prejudice to the
individual, which prejudice can be countered by providing counsel ('prejudice/benefit').").
150. The issue of pre-initial appearance plea negotiations arises primarily in misdemeanor
cases because only a misdemeanor defendant can plead guilty at an initial appearance. Persons
accused of felonies are entitled to either an indictment or preliminary hearing, and thus the assem-
bly-line plea process cannot be so easily front-loaded. Notably, however, one scholar has identified
the problem of pre-charge plea bargaining in the context of felony cases where a defendant bargains
for a particular sentence and then waives his right to indictment. See Metzger, supra note 16, at 1665
("Federal pre-charge bargaining is an entirely extra-judicial and unregulated process. Some pre-
charge bargaining occurs between prosecutors and unrepresented defendants because the execution
of a search warrant or the 'word on the street' suggests to the defendant that law enforcement wants
to talk to him. In white-collar cases, some pre-charge bargaining is initiated by attorneys."). Indeed,
there are instances of gross incompetence on the part of defense counsel that have greatly increased a
defendant's charges or sentences but for which there is no remedy because the errors of counsel
occurred pre-attachment. Id. at 1668 (noting that the "rigid critical stage doctrine means that there is
a blanket rule than no right to counsel inheres in these [plea] proceedings no matter how concretely
adversary they really are" and using United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 611 (6th Cir. 2000) to
illustrate). Professor Metzger's conclusions, if correct, could be a death knell to arguments that the
plea negotiations in Colorado are themselves a critical stage; however, Metzer's article predates the
more functionalist approach to defining adversary proceedings that was ushered in by the Rothgery
decision.
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ducted in the absence of counsel at the initial appearance is inconsistent
with the right to counsel. The right to counsel attaches no later than the
time when the initial appearance commences; thus, if the plea colloquy is
a critical stage, then conducting the proceeding without counsel seems to
constitute a Sixth Amendment violation.
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court emphasized that the "negotiation
of the plea bargain" was the relevant critical stage,"' and that it was the
failure of counsel to properly advise the client and "give correct advice"
during this stage that raised Sixth Amendment concerns.' 52 However, the
only question presented in Padilla was whether counsel's failure to cor-
rectly advise at the plea bargaining stage violated the Sixth Amend-
ment.'53 Where the Court has considered the entry of a plea itself (or the
colloquy), it has suggested that this is a freestanding critical stage. The
leading case is Iowa v. Tovar,154 in which the Court observed, "[t]he en-
try of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks
as a 'critical stage' at which the right to counsel adheres."' 5 5 Likewise,
in another context the Colorado Supreme Court has concluded that all
proceedings relating to plea bargaining-in fact, "the entire plea bargain-
ing process"'-are critical stages.156 Clearly, then, Colorado's initial ap-
pearance is a critical stage of proceedings, at least when it involves a plea
colloquy.
However, the fact that the initial appearance is a critical stage oc-
curring post-attachment does not, without more, mean that the absence of
a lawyer at this proceeding violates the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, the
quoted language from Tovar declaring that the entry of a plea is a critical
stage is mere dicta. The Court's ultimate holding is that heightened warn-
ings regarding the dangers of proceeding without counsel are not re-
quired when a defendant waives counsel and pleads guilty pro se.' In
essence, while obliquely concluding that the plea colloquy is a critical
stage requiring the presence of counsel, the Court in Tovar directly ap-
proved not only un-counseled guilty pleas, but also un-counseled guilty
pleas with limited elaborations as to the risks of waiving the right to an
attorney. Emphasizing that the Constitution "does not force a lawyer
151. 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
152. Id. at 1483.
153. Id. at 1478.
154. 541 U.S. 77 (2004).
155. Id. at 81 (emphasis added) (citing White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963)).
156. Carmichael v. People, 206 P.3d 800, 805 (Colo. 2009).
157. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 87-89.
158. Id. at 87-90. As to the plea in question, the Court summarized the facts as follows: "Some
hours after his arrest, Tovar appeared before a judge in the Iowa District Court for Story County.
The judge indicated on the initial appearance form that Tovar appeared without counsel and waived
application for court-appointed counsel. The judge also marked on the form's checklist that Tovar
was 'informed of the charge and his . . . rights and receive[d] a copy of the Complaint."' Id. at 82
(citation omitted).
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upon a defendant,"" 9 the Court explained that a waiver of the right to
counsel before a plea entry and colloquy does not require the full force of
warnings that are required under Faretta v. California160 when a defend-
ant wishes to waive counsel and proceed to trial pro se.161 The warnings
required to waive counsel for trial are, according to the Tovar reasoning,
more extensive than the warnings required to waive counsel and to plead
guilty pro se.16 2 In the guilty plea context, even if the defendant "lacked a
full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from
his waiver, it does not defeat the State's showing that the information it
provided to him satisfied the constitutional minimum."' 6 3
Read broadly, then, Tovar threatens to have serious import for ana-
lyzing the constitutionality of the Colorado misdemeanor plea process.
In Tovar, a unanimous Supreme Court concluded that truly "minim[al]
admonishments" suffice to render a pro se plea a valid waiver of the right
to counsel.'65 Tovar held that the Constitution does not require the trial
court to advise the defendant who is considering a pro se guilty plea of
the advantages that defense counsel might offer in such circumstances.16 6
Indeed, the unanimous Court emphasized that the standard advisements
during a plea colloquy-the right to counsel, the nature of the charges,
the other rights waived by a guilty plea, and the range of punishment that
the defendant could face-are sufficient to render a plea knowing and
voluntary, even where the defendant is pro se.167 Accordingly, although
the plea colloquy and entry of the plea is considered a critical stage, the
absence of counsel does not automatically, or even presumptively, give
159. Id. at 87-88.
160. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (holding that a defendant "should be made aware of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation so that the record will establish that he knows what he is
doing and his choice is made with eyes open" (internal quotations omitted)).
161. See Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1121 (2011) (con-
trasting the warnings required for a defendant to proceed pro se at trial and the warnings required by
Tovar to plead guilty pro se). "Before pro se defendants plead guilty, courts do not even have to ask
whether they are aware that consulting with an attorney might be a good idea." Id. Notably, the
Court has recognized a similar divergence in the protections of pro se defendants in the context of
competence to proceed to trial pro se and competence to plead guilty. A higher standard of compe-
tence is required for a defendant to proceed pro se at trial, Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177-79
(2009), than is required for a defendant to plead guilty, Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-01
(1993).
162. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88-89.
163. Id. at 92 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)) (noting that on a
collateral attack it is the defendant's burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently
waive his right to the assistance of counsel).
164. For a thoughtful and thorough critique of Tovar, see Hughes, supra note 161, at 1114-15
("Tovar provides an example of the Court falling prey to a binary vision of innocence because it
shows the Court prioritizing actual innocence above safeguarding constitutional protections.").
165. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 91-92; see also Hughes, supra note 161, at 1092.
166. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 91-92. As Professor Hughes points out, Tovar "does not require a trial
court to inform a pro se defendant that an attorney may provide an independent opinion of whether it
is wise to plead guilty," nor does it require the trial court to "tell a defendant that without an attorney
the defendant risks overlooking a defense." Hughes, supra note 161, at 1115.
167. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 90-93.
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rise to a constitutional injury.16 8 Stated more directly, if a defendant vol-
untarily and knowingly waives his right to counsel, even in the absence
of any heightened warnings about the risks of pro se plea agreements, the
prospect of a successful Sixth Amendment claim is in serious doubt.169
On the other hand, Tovar could perhaps be limited to its facts such
that in some prosecutions, even misdemeanor prosecutions, the pre-plea
waiver of counsel would be understood to require more robust warnings
to the defendant than are required at a normal plea hearing. Tovar was
characterized by the Court as a routine drunk driving plea based on evi-
dence of intoxication. 1o Significantly, the Court noted that Tovar never
"articulate[d] ... the additional information counsel could have provid-
ed, given the simplicity of the charge." 171 Perhaps in a more complicated
case, a case where the prosecution's evidence was not dispositive of guilt
(unlike the breathalyzer in Tovar), the Court would be willing to
acknowledge the critical role that defense counsel plays at the plea collo-
quy.
The Tovar decision suggested that the expansiveness of the plea
warnings may vary depending on the context such that more thorough
168. Arguably, the most damaging misstep that the defendant could make during a plea collo-
quy would be to make admissions as to new, not yet charged crimes and thus facilitate additional
criminal proceedings against himself. However, any error or omission by counsel in this regard may
be outside of the constitutional scope of the right to counsel insofar as the right to counsel is offense
specific-that is to say, errors of defense counsel contributing to the prosecution of an uncharged
crime, while lamentable and perhaps ethically unsound, do not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment as
currently interpreted. See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-68, 174 (2001).
169. In a felony, even the indictment can be waived (except in capital cases). FEDERAL
PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 22:725 (2011), available at Westlaw FEDPROC. Accordingly, if
Colorado's system of misdemeanor prosecutions is regarded as constitutional, it is possible that such
pre-plea, assembly-line style proceedings could become more prevalent in felony cases. As with a
misdemeanor, meeting with the defendant prior to the initial appearance might be considered pre-
attachment and outside the purview of the Sixth Amendment, and if the defendant was willing to
waive all of his rights at a judicial proceeding, including the right to counsel and the right to be
charged by an indictment or information, it is theoretically possible that persons charged with felo-
nies could appear without counsel and plead guilty during their initial appearance, all without the
appointment of counsel. There are practical and statutory reasons why this result seems unlikely in
the near future.
170. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 82, 92-93.
171. Id at 93. In Tovar, the Court specifically noted that the waiver of counsel was adequate in
view of the "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [this] case." Id. at 93 (quoting John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). As a practical matter, however, it seems that federal courts
agree that a defendant is entitled to waive his right to counsel at a plea hearing, without particularly
onerous warnings about the related risks from the trial court. See, e.g., Georgetown Law Journal
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, Guilty Pleas, 39 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 414, 449
n.1326 (2010) (compiling circuit court opinions applying Tovar). Particularly interesting is King v.
Bobby, 433 F.3d 483, 492-94 (6th Cir. 2006), which upheld a trial court's determination that the
defendant had waived counsel prior to pleading guilty to several theft related offenses even though
the defendant himself had never explicitly waived counsel. ("The facts of this case are atypical of
most waiver-of-counsel cases because King did not straightforwardly assert his right to self-
representation, and even told the trial court twice that he did not wish to represent himself. Nonethe-
less, by rejecting all of his options except self-representation, King necessarily chose self-
representation."); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. I 1(b)(1)(D) (refusing to require any detailed enunciation
of the costs associated with waiving counsel).
2012]1 355
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
warnings could be required in more complicated cases.1 72 Indeed, the
Court's reasoning in Tovar is grounded in the actual-innocence-centric
notion that the danger of appointing counsel is that "the defendant [may]
delay[] his plea in the vain hope that counsel could uncover a tenable
basis for contesting or reducing the criminal charge," thus causing the
"prompt disposition of the case" to be impeded. 173 Arguably, then, where
the crime at issue is more complicated and the facts more disputed, the
appointment of counsel would not have the same sort of attenuated con-
nection to innocence that undergirds the reasoning of Tovar-that is to
say, efforts to establish innocence may not be in "vain" when the crime
charged is more complicated and the facts more contestable. 174
Moreover, there are some potentially significant procedural distinc-
tions between the misdemeanor plea process in Colorado and the pro-
ceedings in Tovar. These differences suggest that the waivers given dur-
ing the Colorado plea colloquy are not sufficient to avoid concerns re-
garding the right to counsel. In Tovar, the defendant waived his right to
counsel at an initial appearance and then subsequently appeared at an
arraignment without counsel.17 5 At the second appearance, Tovar con-
firmed that he did not wish to have counsel appointed, rejected an offer
of an attorney by the court, and pled guilty.176 Tovar, then, presents a
scenario in which the defendant expressed his desire to proceed without
the assistance of counsel before a judicial officer on multiple occasions.
By contrast, in Colorado, a misdemeanor defendant waives counsel only
once before a judicial officer and does so at the same time that he pleads
guilty. The formal waiver of counsel under the Colorado procedures is
significantly more compressed and expedited, and these slight differ-
ences may prove constitutionally significant.17 7 In justifying its holding
172. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 92-93.
173. Id. at 93; see also Hughes, supra note 161, at 1117-20 (quoting this same language in
support of the critique that Tovar is overly focused on factual innocence to the detriment of legal, or
"unmodified" innocence).
174. At least one commentator has noted that, to date, "state courts-which also have an inter-
est in judicial expediency-have almost invariably followed Tovar rather than interpreting their own
state constitutions." Hughes, supra note 161, at 1118. However, some states appear to provide for
greater protections than those required in Tovar, such as requiring that the waiver of counsel be in
writing. See State v. Combs, No. 07CA009173, 2007 WL 4554241, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28,
2007) ("In petty offense cases, involving a penalty of no more than six months incarceration, all
waivers of counsel must be made on the record in open court. In serious offense cases, involving
penalties including more than six months of incarceration, any waiver of counsel must be made both
on the record in open court and in writing filed with the court." (citations omitted)). There are a
variety of misdemeanor offenses in Colorado that present issues that are far more complicated than
the questions of proof raised in an intoxication case. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111 (2011)
(harassment); § 18-6-803.5 (violation of protection order); § 18-4-401 (theft); § 18-4-501 (criminal
mischief); § 18-3-206 (menacing).
175. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 82.
176. Id.
177. It should be noted that persons facing misdemeanor charges in Colorado are effectively
advised of their right to counsel four times: once by video, once by the prosecutor, once on the Rule
11 form, and once on the record during the colloquy. Only one of these waivers is on the record and
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in Tovar, the Court specifically described the multiple levels of waiver
that were given and noted that this was not a situation in which the guilty
plea alone was deemed sufficient to waive all counsel rights:
[W]e need not endorse the State's position that nothing more than the
plea colloquy was needed to safeguard Tovar's right to counsel. Pre-
liminarily, we note that there were some things more in this case. To-
var first indicated that he waived counsel at his initial appearance, af-
firmed that he wanted to represent himself at the plea hearing, and
declined the court's offer of "time to hire an attorney" at sentencing,
when it was still open to him to request withdrawal of his plea .... 178
Consequently, the Colorado procedures for misdemeanor pleas dur-
ing the initial appearance raise an issue not decided in Tovar. Rather than
three distinct on-the record waivers of counsel, a Coloradan facing mis-
demeanor charges who wishes to take advantage of the pre-initial ap-
pearance plea offer is effectively given "nothing more than the plea col-
loquy" 79 in terms of a judicially supervised waiver of the right to coun-
sel. This appears to be the precise position that the Tovar Court refused
to endorse.
Furthermore, Colorado's one-shot approach to waiving counsel per-
haps implicates Sixth Amendment concerns unique from those decided
in Tovar. A strong argument can be made that the spirit and purpose of
the Sixth Amendment support a narrow reading of Tovar such that, when
the procedures vary from those approved in Tovar, the waiver of counsel
before a guilty plea requires warnings similar to those required under
Farretta. The fact that Tovar had at least three distinct opportunities to
assert his right to counsel before a judge certainly seems materially dis-
tinguishable from the one-shot plea colloquy waivers that occur in Colo-
rado misdemeanor cases. And arguably, in cases where the charges
against the defendant are more contestable because of a lack of definitive
proof of guilt, such as a breathalyzer exam, the waiver of counsel re-
quires more thorough and detailed warnings than those approved in To-
var.
In sum there are reasoned bases for concluding that Tovar does not
compel the conclusion that Colorado's procedures are constitutionally
sound. Presently, however, the best that can be said for defendants in this
context is that the law regarding the requirement for waiver of counsel
before a plea in a case more complicated than, or procedurally distin-
guishable from Tovar, remains unclear and undeveloped.
before a neutral judge. Nonetheless, like the circumstances in Tovar, there are multiple opportunities
for a defendant to invoke the right to counsel.
178. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 90-91 (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 90 (discussing Iowa law).
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C. Even if Colorado's System Otherwise Violates the Sixth Amendment,
Does the Absence ofAny Actual Incarceration Render a Conviction
Constitutional?
Even if Colorado's procedures for pre-counsel plea bargaining oth-
erwise violate the right to counsel, the absence of a sentence of actual
incarceration would render the misdemeanor convictions constitutional.
That is to say, regardless of whether the plea bargaining before the initial
appearance is a critical stage, and regardless of whether the waiver of
counsel during the plea colloquy is inadequate, if the defendant is not
sentenced to a term of incarceration, the Sixth Amendment is not impli-
cated.180 Actual incarceration is a necessary prerequisite of a Sixth
Amendment violation.' 8 1
There are three possible ways in which the actual incarceration rule
could apply to misdemeanor plea bargains in Colorado. First, if the sys-
tem otherwise violates the right to counsel and the defendant is sentenced
to a term of jail, even if only a single day, the Sixth Amendment is vio-
lated. Equally obvious, if a defendant is sentenced to no incarceration,
then the misdemeanor plea in that case did not violate the Sixth Amend-
ment, no matter how inadequate the waiver of counsel. The situation is
less tidy than this binary description suggests, however, because ques-
tions are raised by sentences of probation, time-served, and in-home de-
tention.
In Alabama v. Shelton,18 2 the Court held that the right to counsel is
violated when a defendant is denied counsel and sentenced to a suspend-
ed sentence without the assistance of counsel.183 The majority reasoned
that "[a] suspended sentence is a prison term imposed for the offense of
conviction" because "[o]nce the prison term is triggered, the defendant is
incarcerated not for the probation violation, but for the underlying of-
fense, [and thus] [t]he uncounseled conviction . . . results in imprison-
ment."' 84 In other words, even though the defendant is only subjected to
incarceration if he violates the terms of probation, because the suspended
sentence results in punishment for the prior un-counseled conviction, and
not for the probation violation, the Sixth Amendment is violated. 85
Shelton's clear rule that the right to counsel applies to suspended
sentences for incarceration does not, however, necessarily apply to un-
180. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-74 (1979).
181. Id.
182. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
183. Id. at 662.
184. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Id; see also id. at 667 ("Deprived of counsel when tried, convicted, and sentenced, and
unable to challenge the original judgment at a subsequent probation revocation hearing, a defendant
in Shelton's circumstances faces incarceration on a conviction that has never been subjected to 'the
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing."' (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656
(1984))).
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counseled convictions resulting in a straight probation sentence. In the
case of a suspended sentence, the defendant is actually sentenced to in-
carceration-with the sentence only activated by a subsequent probation
violation. In contrast, a defendant subjected to probation is not actually
sentenced to incarceration for the initial offense; instead, the sentence of
incarceration, if any, is punishment for contempt, in the form of the pro-
bation violation.' 8 7 Some courts have held that Shelton therefore does not
apply to straight sentences of probation, since the sentence of incarcera-
tion does not flow from the tainted (un-counseled) original conviction.'88
If the Court ultimately embraces such a formalist reading of Shel-
ton, then it would impose a very minimal limitation on states that utilize
straight probation. In theory, a defendant in Colorado could plead guilty
to straight probation without implicating the right to counsel. That is, so
long as the sentence was straight probation, such that the violation of
probation will result in punishment for contempt alone, as opposed to a
sentence linked to the crime of conviction, the Sixth Amendment would
not impose any limitations on the pre-counsel misdemeanor plea.'89 No-
tably, however, Colorado does not currently provide for sentences of
straight probation.'o Thus, unless the terms of a sentence of probation
are statutorily amended, sentencing a Colorado defendant to probation
implicates the right to counsel.
Finally, and most challenging for purposes of defining the scope of
the Sixth Amendment in this context, are sentences of in-home detention
186. Cf Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789-90 (holding that there is no absolute right to
counsel at a probation revocation hearing); id. at 789 (noting that although "the right of an accused
to counsel in a criminal prosecution" is beyond question, the right to counsel at probation revocation
is "more limited . . . because he has [already] been convicted of a crime" for which the right to
counsel applied).
187. See, e.g., 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 70, § 11.2(a) (discussing circuit court precedent
supporting this conclusion).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Macias, 335 U.S. 421, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Pollard, 389 F.3d 101, 104 (4th Cir. 2004).
189. See, e.g., Perez-Macias, 335 F.3d at 427 ("The Shelton Court expressly refused to address
whether its holding applies to a sentence of probation uncoupled with a suspended sentence.");
Joshua S. Stambaugh, Alabama v. Shelton: One Small Step for Man, One Very Small Step for the
Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 609, 651-52 (2004) (criticizing Shelton's
holding as arbitrary line-drawing, going against the "spirit of Powell and Gideon"); Adam D. Young,
An Analysis of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel As It Applies to Suspended Sentences and
Probation: Do Argersinger and Scott Blow A Flat Note on Gideon's Trumpet?, 107 DICK. L. REV.
699, 713 (2003) ("The concept of liberty in the American criminal justice system far exceeds the
single notion of actual imprisonment."). But see Harvard Law Review, Criminal Law and Proce-
dure, 116 HARV. L. REV. 252, 262 (2002) ("If state legislatures respond to Shelton by creating pro-
bation-only criminal penalties, Shelton may not yield the negative consequences that the dissent and
the amicus foresaw. Rather, courts will merely guarantee that, prior to serving actual jail time, a
criminal defendant will have the benefit of counsel at the proceeding directly responsible for the
incarceration.").
190. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-206(5) (2011) (allowing for any sentence that may have been
originally imposed when a defendant violates probation); see also Robert J. Dieter, Probation-
Sentence Following Revocation, 15 COLO. PRAC., CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 20.48 (2d
ed.) ("If the court revokes the probation, the court may then impose any sentence that the court had
authority to impose at the original sentencing.").
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and sentences of time served for persons charged with misdemeanor of-
fenses. Case law directly on point is scant. The case most directly on
point is an unpublished decision of the Montana Supreme Court, which
reasons that home arrest should be treated the same as imprisonment for
Sixth Amendment purposes insofar as it was "an alternative form of im-
prisonment rather than an alternative to imprisonment."' 9' Other cases,
addressing the issue less directly appear to conflict with this result. For
example, the double jeopardy prohibition on multiple punishments re-
quires that defendants receive credit for all time served in pretrial deten-
tion,192 and this requirement is codified in a federal statute requiring
credit for time served in "official detention" by federal court defend-
ants.193 Applying this statute, the Supreme Court has held that a defend-
ant released on bail but subject to onerous restrictions is not subject to
custody for purposes of the time served credit, 194 and numerous lower
courts have applied this reasoning and explicitly held that in-home deten-
tion is not custodial for purposes of accruing credits for time served. 95
Likewise, for purposes of calculating a defendant's criminal history un-
der the federal sentencing guidelines, circuit courts have held that in-
home detention is not "a sentence of imprisonment."' 96 Of course, these
cases from the federal sentencing context turn solely on questions of
statutory construction and do not preclude the conclusion, reached by the
Montana Supreme Court, that such punishments implicate the Sixth
Amendment. To be sure, sentences of home detention are designed to be
punitive and have an incarcerative quality to them. Nonetheless, the gen-
eral tenor of judicial hostility towards extending the privileges and enti-
tlements associated with incarceration to in-home detentions is, at the
very least, illuminating as to how courts might respond to a claim that a
sentence of in-home detention constitutes actual incarceration for pur-
poses triggering the protections of the right to counsel.
The question of whether a sentence of time served based on time
spent in pretrial detention can satisfy the requirement of actual incarcera-
tion is a similarly unresolved and creates an interesting Sixth Amend-
ment thought experiment. To illustrate the difficulty surrounding this
issue, imagine that a defendant is arrested late on Friday night in Denver
191. The Montana Supreme Court held that a defendant who was given a twenty day sentence
of "home arrest" was actually imprisoned for Sixth Amendment purposes. State v. Morigeau, No.
99-569, 2000 WL 898762, at *2 (Mont. Jul. 6, 2000) ("The State argues that home arrest, which
allows the arrestee considerably more liberty than exists in a prison environment, is not the equiva-
lent of imprisonment.").
192. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-19 (1969).
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2011).
194. Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1995) (refusing to consider a release from custody,
no matter how restrictive the conditions, an "official detention" as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion).
195. Georgetown Law Journal Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, Sentencing Guidelines,
39 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 699, 769 n.2238 (2010) (compiling cases on this point).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1165 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing United States
v. Phipps, 68 F.3d 159, 162 (7th Cir.1995)).
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for a drunk driving offense or an animal cruelty crime, and that the de-
fendant is held in the city jail until his initial appearance on Monday
morning.19' Imagine further that the prosecutor approaches this defendant
just before the initial appearance and offers him a plea deal of time
served plus community service or some classes if he pleads guilty at the
initial appearance.198 A sentence of community service (or classes) does
not require the appointment of counsel, but the question is whether incar-
ceration that is already complete at the time of the conviction can count
as actual incarceration that triggers the right to counsel. As with the in-
home detention issue, Colorado courts will have a relatively clean slate
insofar as there seems to be only a minimal amount of case law or aca-
demic literature on the relationship between a sentence of time served
and the Argersinger actual incarceration requirement.199
197. Both of these crimes are misdemeanors that carry a potential sentence of incarceration.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1307 (2011) (driving under the influence); § 18-9-202 (cruelty to or ne-
glect of animals). Some class one misdemeanors can carry jail sentences of up to two years. E.g.,
People v. Young, 859 P.2d 814, 817 (Colo. 1993) ("Class one misdemeanor offenses punishable by a
maximum sentence of two years in the county jail, include such offenses as assault in the third
degree; cruelty to or neglect of animals; jury tampering; criminal simulations; and possession of
contraband in the second degree." (citations omitted)).
198. A first DUI offense carries a sentencing range from a minimum of five days up to a max-
imum of one year in jail, as well as a fine and community service. However, the statute dictates that
both the jail time and fine may be suspended if the defendant agrees to classes and other probation
terms. COLo. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1307(3), (6) (2011). As a practical matter, the probation and drug
and alcohol classes are the most likely sentence for a first offense DUl. Notably, some other offens-
es, such as third-degree assault, also carry the risk of substantial jail time; however, the Colorado
Victim's Rights Statute, § 24-4.1-302.5(l)(e), requires the prosecution to consult with the victim
prior to the "disposition of the case." Paradoxically, the victim's rights statute has the effect of
providing misdemeanor defendants increased access to counsel insofar as the pre-counsel pleas
occurring at initial appearances appear to be impermissible under the plain terms of the victim's
rights statute.
199. The majority of courts that have considered the issue have held that sentences of "time
served" do not constitute "actual imprisonment" for Sixth Amendment right to counsel purposes.
See, e.g., Glaze v. Warden Ridgeland Corr. Inst., 481 F. Supp. 2d 505, 510 (D.S.C. 2007) (noting
that although defendant "spent ten days in jail ... he did so because he . . could not post bail" and
explaining that there is not any "[clearly] established federal law supporting his claim that a 'time-
served' sentence constitutes an imposition of a term of imprisonment such that it may not be im-
posed absent the benefit of counsel"); State v. Brown, 995 So. 2d 1034, 1037-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008) ("We reject the defendant's argument that by awarding him forty-eight hours of credit for the
time he spent in jail after his arrest and before entering his plea, the trial court necessarily imposed a
term of imprisonment on his conviction."); id. (distinguishing between jail time that was a result of
arrest, and jail time that was a result of one's conviction); McLaurin v. State, 882 So. 2d 268, 272
(Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (holding there was no Sixth Amendment violation where defendant "received
no further jail time after having pled guilty . . . and [p]retrial incarceration is of no consequence"),
Nicholson v. State, 761 So. 2d 924, 931 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (holding where defendant's sentence
included "48 hrs. in jail Time Served" court concluded that because defendant "did not received any
further prison or jail time" his "prior misdemeanor DUI did not result in a sentence of imprison-
ment").
However, a number of courts, including the Sixth Circuit (in an unpublished decision)
have come to the opposite conclusion. United States v. Cook, 36 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
that defendant's uncounseled conviction "for which he received one day (time served) . . . was not
valid under Scott and Nichols for purposes of sentence enhancement"); State v. O'Neill, 746 N.E.2d
654, 659 (2000) ("We thus hold that where an indigent misdemeanor defendant is not advised of his
right to or provided with counsel, the court may not sentence that defendant to incarceration. This is
true even if the defendant need not report to jail due to the credit he is given for time served."); see
also Roosevelt City v. Curry, 143 P.3d 309, 313 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing in dicta the
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This clean slate allows for several possible approaches. On the one
hand, a literal application of Argersinger suggests that if a defendant is
sentenced to time served, then a conviction obtained without either the
presence of counsel, or a valid waiver of counsel, would violate the Sixth
Amendment. A defendant in such circumstances would be sentenced to a
jail term, his criminal record would reflect this sentence of incarceration,
and any future sentences would potentially be aggravated by the defend-
ant's record of actual incarceration. As such, the right to counsel seems
to have natural application.
On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that a sentence of
time served does not implicate the right counsel. In misdemeanor cases
for which a sentence of time served is imposed, the amount of time
served will always be relatively short, almost always totaling less than a
week.200 More importantly, the "time served" will be exactly the same
whether the prosecutor (1) requests a sentence of time served; (2) merely
seeks a sentence of probation or community service; or (3) dismisses the
charges outright. That is to say, the duration of the actual incarceration is
neither enhanced nor aggravated by the inclusion of time served as part
of the sentence (or as the entire sentence) in the plea deal. Thus, to count
a sentence of time served as a sentence of actual incarceration is to raise
questions about whether a mere fine following a night in jail, or even an
outright dismissal of the case after spending a night in jail, implicates the
right to counsel just as strongly as a six-month jail sentence. Does a plea
bargain that does not specify any incarceration but follows a night of
pretrial detention implicate the right to counsel?201 Considered in this
light, it seems that pre-initial appearance incarceration may not implicate
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but rather, is more profitably con-
2012
sidered as a freestanding constitutional question.
danger of a "trial court routinely imprisoning minor offenders before trial, knowing full well that no
counsel would be appointed and that the ultimate sentence would be probation and time served. Such
a practice would effectively sidestep the requirements of the Sixth Amendment by allowing the
imprisonment of misdemeanor offenders convicted without the benefit of counsel"); id. (encouraging
"trial courts and counsel on both sides of criminal matters to consider the implications of pretrial
confinement in relation to the constitutional rights of defendants").
200. The Fourth Amendment requires that, at the very least, a probable cause determination be
made within 48 hours of all warrantless arrests, unless there is some "extraordinary circumstance."
See, e.g., Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991) ("[A] jurisdiction that pro-
vides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter,
comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein. . . . Where an arrested individual does not
receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours . . . the burden shifts to the government to
demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.").
201. Nicholson v. State, 761 So. 2d 924, 931 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) ("Nicholson would have
this Court find that if a defendant upon initial arrest for DUI spent some time in jail, any guilty plea
thereafter without counsel would be constitutionally unsound.").
202. Unfortunately for defendants, the constitutional propriety of pretrial detention, well be-
yond the brief period of time between an arrest and initial appearance, has been approved by the
United States Supreme Court. The Court has rejected arguments that pretrial detention violates the
presumption of innocence embodied by due process. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747-48
(1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979); see also Shari Lewis, United States v. Saler-
[Vol. 89:2362
THE COLORADO COUNSEL CONUNDRUM
In sum, even assuming Colorado's system otherwise implicates the
right to counsel, unless a misdemeanor defendant is sentenced to a term
of incarceration, the Sixth Amendment is not violated. There remains
considerable uncertainty, however, as to which misdemeanor sentences
constitute incarceration so as to trigger the right to counsel. Sentences of
time served and even a sentence of home detention potentially fall out-
side the well settled law in this area and provide litigation opportunities
for lawyers seeking to define the outer bounds of the actual incarceration
requirement. Such litigation is essential to efforts to flesh out the con-
tours of the right to counsel more generally, and it is critical to the con-
stitutionality of Colorado's specific misdemeanor plea bargaining rules.
D. Other Issues: Errors by the Prosecution, the Problem of Collateral
Consequences, and Retroactivity
The Colorado procedures for misdemeanor pre-counsel pleas pro-
vide a nearly inexhaustible and intractable set of constitutional questions.
Without attempting to identify every point of constitutional friction un-
der the current misdemeanor plea procedures, a few final issues that are
likely to arise warrant, at the very least, passing attention.
First, there is a range of prosecutorial errors or missteps that could
render an otherwise constitutional procedure impermissible. For exam-
ple, improper threats by the prosecutor during the negotiations without
counsel, such as threatening charges for which there is no good faith
basis to charge, would render the eventual plea involuntary.20 3 Likewise,
if the prosecutor suggests that he is a neutral or detached party who is
able to provide disinterested advice to a defendant, this would run afoul
of ethical obligations and justify a more exacting set of procedures for
waiving counsel.204 Moreover, if the defendant is given incomplete or
no: Destruction of the Presumption of Innocence?, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 573 (1987); Craig Ethan
Allen, Pretrial Detention and the Loss of Innocence, United States v. Salerno, 11 HAMLINE L. REV.
331, 347-48 (1988) ("Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Bell v. Wolfish, which stripped the presumption
of innocence away from pretrial detainees, was a devastating blow to the rights of accused per-
sons."); LeRoy Pernell, The Reign of the Queen of Hearts: The Declining Significance of the Pre-
sumption of Innocence-A Brief Commentary, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 393, 400 (1989) (concluding
that in Salerno the "Supreme Court dealt the death hand to the notion of a pretrial presumption of
innocence"); Harvard Law Review Association, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, 101 HARV. L. REV.
169, 175 (1987) ("The Salerno Court silently reduced the presumption of innocence to nothing more
than an allocation of the burden of proof at trial."). Likewise, the Court has held that pretrial deten-
tion does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 760-
61 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reacting against the assumption in the majority opinion that the
eighth amendment is a limit on the excessiveness of bail but not a substantive right to bail).
203. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) ("Of course, the agents of the
State may not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbear-
ing the will of the defendant."); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("In our system,
so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense de-
fined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.").
204. COLO. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4.3 (2008) (prohibiting a lawyer from pretending to be disin-
terested and barring a lawyer from giving legal advice to an unrepresented party with interests con-
trary to his own client's).
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misleading advisements before speaking with the prosecutor, a failure to
provide the defendant an attorney would implicate the right to counsel in
ways that likely could not be remedied by the standard plea colloquy
provided in Colorado.
In addition, the Colorado procedures for misdemeanor pleas also
raise concerns regarding proper advisements as to collateral consequenc-
es. Under Padilla, defense counsel has an affirmative duty to advise his
client of obvious immigration consequences that flow from a conviction,
whether the conviction is a felony or a misdemeanor.205 As discussed
above, when a defendant is facing felony charges or actual incarceration,
he is entitled to counsel unless he knowingly and voluntarily waives
counsel after proper advisements. A waiver of counsel that is adequate to
waive the benefits of an attorney's advice in deciding whether to plead
guilty would presumably also constitute a waiver of counsel as to advice
regarding the collateral consequences of a guilty plea. That is to say, if a
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the assistance of counsel for
purposes of deciding whether to plead guilty, then the defendant cannot
complain about the absence of reasoned advice as to either the direct or
collateral consequences of his pro se plea. On the other hand, where a
defendant is not entitled to counsel, for example, where the prosecution
agrees at the earliest stage of the case that she will not seek any incarcer-
ation,206 then it is conceivable that both the judge and the prosecutor will
inform the defendant that he does not have a right to appointed counsel.
And there is good reason for such an advisement as it reflects the current
state of Colorado and Sixth Amendment law. However, the Padilla case
may signal a new realm of right to counsel rights that are, as of yet, not
fully formed. Where, for example, a misdemeanor defendant never meets
with counsel, is advised that he does not have a right to counsel, and is
offered a plea of probation or community service that would likely lead
to direct immigration consequences, perhaps there is a right to counsel, 207
or at least specific, detailed warnings from the judge at the time of the
plea colloquy.20 8
205. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). Padilla was convicted of a felony,
transporting a large quantity of marijuana, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Id. at 1477,
206. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-501 (2011).
207. See John D. King, Beyond 'Life and Liberty': The Evolving Right to Counsel, 47 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) ("Although Padilla involved a felony charge ... the deporta-
tion consequences would have been the same if the defendant had been charged with [a misdemean-
or] . . . [and if] the prosecutor had agreed prior to trial not to seek jail time, the defendant would not
have had any federal constitutional right to counsel. Padilla seems to confer a right to the effective
assistance of counsel, then, on a class of defendant who has no right to counsel at all under the Scott
doctrine.")
208. Presently, the Colorado plea advisements-the Rule II form-include a general statement
that a conviction may carry immigration consequences. However, the warning is generic and, appar-
ently, not required by Colorado law. People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 526 (Colo. 1987) ("[A] trial court
is not required to advise a defendant sua sponte of potential federal deportation consequences of a
plea of guilty to a felony charge when accepting such plea."); People v. Nguyen, 80 P.3d 903, 905
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In Padilla, the Court stressed that "[t]he importance of accurate le-
gal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more im-
portant" and emphasized that legal advice regarding immigration conse-
quences is "an integral part-indeed, sometimes the most important part
of' representation for persons who are considering pleading guilty.2 09
The Court's explicit recognition that something other than the trial, and
something other than the criminal consequences, may constitute the most
important aspect of appointed counsel's duties, threatens to fundamental-
ly rework the orientation of the right to counsel.2 0 Whereas the prior
right to counsel cases suggested that the right was fundamentally orient-
ed towards ensuring a full and fair trial, Padilla suggests that certain
ancillary duties of counsel are equally, if not more, important. These
211Iduties are, then, on the brink of being recognized as critical stages.
Accordingly, a defendant who pleads guilty without the assistance of
counsel regarding collateral consequences, and without, at the very least,
thorough warnings from the judge as to potential collateral consequenc-
es, may have a claim under the Sixth Amendment or, more likely, the
Due Process Clause.2 12 To date the Court has only visited the collateral
consequences issue in the context of a felony conviction; however, the
requirement that defendants receive reliable warnings about collateral
consequences that are closely related to the criminal process seems more,
not less, important in the realm of misdemeanor convictions where the
immigration consequences will often be more severe than the actual sen-
213tence sanctioned by statute. Accordingly, although this issue is not
unique to Colorado, in considering the constitutional defects with its
current misdemeanor system, Colorado courts would be wise to address
the relationship between misdemeanor pleas and Padilla.214
(Colo. App. 2003) After Padilla, there is good reason to believe that warnings are required, and the
generic Rule II statements may not be adequate.
209. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.
210. Presently there is no scholarship on this question, and this is a gap in the literature that
needs to be filled.
211. But see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (concluding that the purpose of
counsel is simply to facilitate a fair trial).
212. Due process has a longstanding history as a supplementary provider of counsel rights; it
routinely applies to provide counsel-type protections where the Sixth Amendment does not apply.
See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963) (holding that due process requires the
appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant's "first appeal granted as a matter of right"); Evitts
v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (holding that an appeal "is not adjudicated in accord with due
process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney").
213. See King, supra note 207 ("Indeed, in the misdemeanor context, where amount of poten-
tial incarceration is quite low but the collateral consequences significant, the use of incarceration as a
proxy for seriousness is especially crude.")
214. Indeed, if counsel has an obligation to advise a defendant of collateral consequences when
the defendant is facing felony charges and substantial incarceration, then it seems that the im-
portance of advising a defendant of such collateral consequences is of even greater constitutional
concern when the only substantial consequence of the conviction is an immigration or other collat-
eral consequence. On the other hand, the budget constraints are such that Colorado legislatures,
without a directive from the courts, may fail to address this concern. The State of Colorado, through
its Republican Attorney General, joined an amicus brief warning that a decision in favor of Padilla
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Finally, it is worth noting that if Colorado's process for pre-initial
appearance plea bargaining is held unconstitutional under the Sixth
Amendment, it is arguable that this rule will be retroactively applica-
ble.215 Generally, new rules of constitutional law only apply prospective-
ly such that prisoners whose convictions are already final may not bene-
fit from the new rule.2 6 Where, however, the new rule is one of substan-
tive law or a watershed rule of procedure, the constitutional rule is given
retroactive effect.2 17 Although the concept of a watershed rule of proce-
dure defies easy definition, the Supreme Court has repeatedly admon-
ished that those rules worthy of being regarded as watershed rules are
218
generally defined by reference to right to counsel protections. Conse-
quently, new elaborations on the scope of the right to counsel enjoy a
presumption of retroactivity.29 Applying this principle to the present
context, if Gideon and Argersinger compel the conclusion that Colora-
do's misdemeanor procedures are incompatible with the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, then the new rule of procedure ought to apply ret-
roactively.220
"would likely break the back of the plea agreement system." Brief for the States of Louisiana, Ala-
bama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylva-
nia, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington & Wyoming and the
National District Attorneys Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at *1, Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2564713.
215. In light of the persuasive academic commentary concluding that the Supreme Court is less
likely to expand constitutional rights where the creation of the right will impose extremely large
systemic costs, the potential retroactivity of this rule may be a practical impediment to its legal
development. Cf John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J.
87, 90,98 (1999); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 20-
21 (2002).
216. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
217. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007). Recently the Court observed that "in the
years since Teague, we have rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied the requirements for
watershed status." Id. at 418.
218. Id. at 419 (recognizing Gideon as "the only case that we have identified as qualifying
under this exception"); see also David E. Johnson, Justice for All: Analyzing Blakely Retroactivity
and Ensuring Just Sentences in Pre-Blakely Convictions, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 875, 945 (2005).
219. Accordingly, in the wake of Alabama v. Shelton's elaboration on Argersiner, lower courts
were quick to recognize the rule's retroactive application. See, e.g., Talley v. State, 640 S.E.2d 878,
882 (S.C. 2007) ("We conclude the new rule announced by Shelton is a watershed rule of criminal
proceeding because the right to counsel undeniably implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy
of the proceeding."); Howard v. United States, 374 F.3d 1068, 1077 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Every exten-
sion of the right to counsel from Gideon through Argersinger has been applied retroactively to
collateral proceedings by the Supreme Court." (citing a compilation of retroactively applied right to
counsel cases)). Likewise, some courts have held that Padilla applies retroactively. See, e.g., Amer
v. United States, No. 1:06CRI 18-GHD, 2011 WL 2160553, at *3 (N.D. Miss. May 31, 2011) ("Both
the language of Padilla and the application of Teague's test indicate that the Padilla [holding]
should apply retroactively."). It seems, however, that most courts have concluded that "Padilla is not
as sweeping and fundamental as that of Gideon, and it does not, therefore, rise to the status of a
watershed rule that must be applied retroactively." People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, 899 (N.Y
Crim. Ct. 2010); accordUnited States v. Chang, 2011 WL 3805763, at *1 (10th Cir. 2011).
220. The fact that it is retroactive does not necessarily mean there is a procedure for vindicat-
ing the right. Bars on successive post-conviction petitions may still deprive some prisoners of the
benefit of the new rule.
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CONCLUSION
In Argersiner, the Supreme Court rejected as factually erroneous
claims that the social costs of providing attorneys to persons facing in-
carceration was too high.22' When the Colorado Supreme Court address-
es the question of whether the appointment of counsel is required for all
misdemeanor plea discussions, it will not enjoy this luxury. There is little
doubt that the appointment of counsel for all first appearances in misde-
meanor cases would require an enormous expenditure of resources.
Pragmatic costs aside, however, the pre-counsel plea procedures mandat-
ed by statute in Colorado raise a host of constitutional concerns. The
answers regarding how the right to counsel interacts with the Colorado
procedures is far from certain, but the need for litigation presenting these
questions is long overdue. This Article raises these questions and is in-
tended to serve as the first step in what promises to be a long discussion
about the scope of the right to counsel protections under the Colorado
procedures for misdemeanor plea bargaining. By considering Colorado's
specific procedures, this Article also provides a vehicle for exploring the
surprisingly under-examined and unresolved boundaries of the vital Sixth
Amendment concepts of attachment, critical stage, and incarceration.
221. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (1972) ("IT]he Nation's legal resources are
sufficient to implement the rule we announce today.").
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A NEW TAKE ON THE Top TEN RULES FOR COURT AND
PROFESSIONAL LIFE
MIMI E. TSANKOV AND JESSICA L. GRiMESt
INTRODUCTION
After the last brief is written, the final scrap of evidence considered,
and the list of witnesses prepared, every litigator would be well-served to
reflect on how his actions will impact him professionally and whether
they will strengthen or lessen respect for our legal institutions. To be
sure, the better nuanced his arguments and the more accurate his riposte,
the greater the chance of a favorable outcome for his client. And while
"favorable facts" and "favorable law" ultimately affect the success of a
litigator's case, what of the myriad exchanges which do not deal with the
legal issues per se, but with more ambiguous concepts like respect and
integrity? What function do an attorney's choices in this area of form and
procedure have on outcomes, if any, and what impact do they have on
respect for the rule of law? How do the carefully choreographed interac-
tions among the parties before and during the hearing influence our no-
tion of a fair legal system of law whereby "justice" is served? What lin-
gers beyond the particulars of the case at hand for the courtroom litigator
who will be defined in part by his reputation as a guardian of the rule of
law? Indeed, as the following discussion suggests, there is more than one
way to successfully walk out of a courtroom.
This Article offers ten rules for court and professional life. Succinct,
yet deceptive in their simplicity-the Article considers the hows and
whys of their formulation. It explores these rules through both conven-
tional and anecdotal research to examine the subtleties of courtroom rela-
tionships. While mastering these rules can take years, a concerted focus
on some of the basic elements can assist a recently admitted attorney to
command the focus of attention on the issues most advantageous to him
and divert the focus away from unhelpful distractions. Moreover, adher-
ence can build an enviable reputation for upholding the rule of law and
thereby strengthen the American legal system.
t Mimi E. Tsankov is an Immigration Judge and Jessica Grimes is an Attorney Advisor
with the Department of Justice (DOJ), Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). They write
in their personal capacities and the views expressed are not necessarily those of the Department of
Justice. The authors wish to thank U.S. Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix for developing the rules and
for permitting us to write about them. While we hope to have provided context for her succinct set of
directives, we have likely overstepped in some respects, and wish to absolve her from our verbose
and possibly imprecise efforts at elucidation. The thoughts expressed herein are not necessarily her
views. The authors also wish to thank Judge Russell E. Carparelli, Colorado Court of Appeals, and
Sarah M. Clark, Counsel to the Chief Justice, Colorado Supreme Court, for their valuable insights
and edits.
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Nine of these ten rules fall loosely into three general categories. The
first group emphasizes the importance of respecting the rule of law, our
legal institutions, and the specifics of how best to demonstrate that re-
spect to all the parties involved in the legal process. This group of rules
deals with the attorney's role in our legal system and how his actions and
the choices he makes influence whether the rule of law is upheld. They
embody the philosophy that by upholding the rule of law, one shows
respect for the court, one's colleagues, and ultimately all of those that are
subject to it. The rules focus on maintaining courtroom decorum, follow-
ing ordinary court rules and procedures, and refraining from conduct that
questions the authority of the judge. These rules challenge practitioners
to self-reflect.
The second group of rules focuses on the importance of effective
communication, both written and oral. These rules emphasize that hones-
ty, candor, and precision are critical components of effective communi-
cation. They suggest that attorney statements should tend to earn the trust
of those with whom one practices. They also indicate that compliance
supports respect for the rule of law.
The third set of rules focuses on how practitioners can exhibit re-
spect for the time and resources of all involved in the legal process. The-
se edicts acknowledge the value ofjudicial economy and evince the prac-
tical realities that many involved in the court system are today being
asked to do much more with much less.
The final maxim set forth in this Article explores how failure to
abide by the previous nine rules can result in a loss of professional repu-
tation. It emphasizes that loss of reputation can result in a diminution of a
lawyer's value in both professional stature and economic terms. It
acknowledges that once lost, it is difficult, if not impossible, to regain
one's professional reputation.
And now a word about how this Article came to be. United States
Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix sits on the bench of the District Court in
Colorado. As those who appear before her know, she is respected for her
competence, revered for her exacting standards, and admired for her cut-
ting wit. She sets forth her expectations unabashedly and demands ad-
herence to the high standards that she seeks to uphold. Judge Mix began
her legal career in the mid-80s and has witnessed a time of great upheav-
al in the legal profession, including the recent financial crisis, which has
drastically altered fundamental aspects of the legal profession. What led
her to set out written expectations reflected a very real concern that the
legal profession was undergoing a crisis, which manifests itself in very
concrete ways every day in court.
This Article offers Judge Mix's "Ten Rules" and explores each in
the context of what it may reveal about a legal system in crisis. It raises
threshold questions about whether the current crisis is really a new phe-
[Vol. 89:2370
A NEW TAKE ON THE TOP TEN RULES
nomenon, and if so, speculates as to how it might have come about. It
examines professionalism challenges in a variety of court contexts-
from federal district court and administrative hearings to state court mat-
ters and international court proceedings. The Article examines the rules
in the context of bar self-policing enforcement actions and considers how
some judges are able to institute measures that tend to increase civility
and decrease intemperate remarks. The Article concludes that careful
adherence to Judge Mix's rules in all bar activities, including court ap-
pearances, will not only enhance an attorney's effectiveness in represent-
ing his client and result in a greater and more effective impression on the
triers of law and fact. It will also enhance respect for our legal system as
a whole. By following the spirit of the Ten Rules, attorneys can develop
and maintain a high level of professional integrity amongst both their
colleagues and the general public. As Judge Mix says, "Keep your eye on
the prize: achieving a just, efficient and appropriate result."'
THE "RULE OF LAW" RULES
Judge Mix's first group of rules focuses on the importance of re-
specting the rule of law, our legal institutions, and the specifics of how
best to demonstrate that respect to all the parties involved in the process.
They calibrate the complexities of the attorney's role in the legal process,
and how his actions and the choices he makes influence whether the rule
of law is upheld. These rules embody the philosophy that by upholding
the rule of law, one shows respect for the court, one's colleagues, and
ultimately all of those that are subject to the rule of law.
United States District Court Judge Marcia S. Krieger has written
about the importance of the rule of law and its benefits to American soci-
ety.2 She asserts that "public confidence in the law and legal institutions"
is necessary if one is to break what she terms a "Cycle of Cynicism" that,
she argues, threatens to jeopardize "our individual rights and freedoms."3
She challenges attorneys to establish, as a core value, a reverence for the
rule of law and an "ethos" that transcends the subjectivity of any particu-
lar case or individual client's interests.4 Judge Mix's "rule of law" rules
feature the importance of maintaining courtroom decorum and following
ordinary court rules and procedures. They caution practitioners about
engaging in conduct that appears to question the authority of the judge,
because doing so undermines the integrity of the process and ultimately
the rule of law. These rules challenge lawyers to be self-reflective, and to
preemptively analyze how their conduct will be perceived by the judge.
I. Kristin L. Mix, U.S. Magistrate Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the District of Colo., Presenta-
tion on Professionalism and Ethics at the Meeting of the Colorado Intellectual Property Inn of Court
I (presentation on file with Denver University Law Review).
2. Marcia S. Krieger, A Twenty-First Century Ethos for the Legal Profession: Why Bother?,
86 DENv. U. L. REv. 865, 866-67 (2009).
3. Id. at 866.
4. Id. at 888-95.
2012] 371
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In essence, these rules support the notion that belief in the rule of law
serves to strengthen societal trust in our legal system as a whole.
Rule 1: Maintain Courtroom Decorum
The first step in maintaining courtroom decorum is being courteous,
prompt, and prepared. Judge Mix suggests that a lawyer's default posi-
tion should be to behave formally in the courtroom and any deviation
from formal behavior should be upon invitation of the presiding judicial
officer. Formality requires that a lawyer stand when addressing the court,
direct all comments to the court, and refrain from speaking directly to
opposing counsel. When addressing the court, she reminds practitioners
to use the more formal salutation of "Your Honor" rather than "Judge."
She cautions that one should not "interrupt the court" or repeat one's
self.6 Indeed, a casual approach to the courtroom can demean the respect
for the court and the professional integrity of its players. The informality
to which we may all become susceptible, between a judge, court staff,
and members of the bar, and which is a logical consequence of long
hours spent together over weeks, months, and years, can erode the digni-
ty of the proceedings for the parties that appear before it and who are
subject to its rulings.
What Judge Mix has identified through this first rule is a nationwide
and generalized trend of attorney behavior. Scholars write about the per-
ception of a general decline of professionalism in the legal professional.7
Professionalism has been considered a hallmark of the field, with Wil-
liam Shakespeare writing in the 1590s that one should "do as adversaries
do in law, [s]trive mightily, but eat and drink as friends."8 Proponents of
this view have indicated that of late lawyers "engage in too much postur-
ing and invective, too little cooperation and courtesy, too many unneces-
sary proceedings, and too much exaggeration or outright misstatement of
fact and law." 9 In the courtroom, this can translate into a lack of civility
among opposing attorneys and a lack of overall respect for both the legal
profession and the legal system. An excellent example of egregious un-
civil conduct was recounted by Bronson D. Bills in a recent article on
this topic.'0 In a brief, but illustrative colloquy, the witness, an attorney
being sued by a former client, employs profane language no less than
seven times, directed at the attorney conducting the deposition." District
5. Mix, supra note 1,at 1.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Elliot L. Bien, Toward a Community of Professionalism, 3 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 475, 493-95 (2001); William C. McMahon Ill, Declining Professionalism in Court: A
Comparative Look at the English Barrister, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 845, 847-56 (2006); Deanell
Reece Tacha, Training the Whole Lawyer, 96 IOWA L. REv. 1699, 1701-05 (2011).
8. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW act 1, sc. 2.
9. See Bien, supra note 7, at 475.
10. Bronson D. Bills, To Be or Not to Be: Civility and the Young Lawyer, 5 CONN. PUB. INT.
L.J. 31, 32 n.5 (2005).
11. Id.
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Court Judge Marvin E. Aspen relates another extreme example in a 1994
article in which he provides the following exchange regarding an eviden-
tiary document, which occurred between experienced trial lawyers:
Mr. V: Please don't throw it at me.
Mr. A: Take it.
Mr. V: Don't throw it at me.
Mr. A: Don't be a child, Mr. V. You look like a slob the way
you're dressed, but you don't have to act like a slob.
Mr. V: Stop yelling at me. Let's get on with it.
Mr. A: Have you not? You deny I have given you a copy of every
document?
Mr. V: You just refused to give it to me.
Mr. A: Do you deny it?
Mr. V: Eventually you threw it at me.
Mr. A: Oh, Mr. V, you're about as childish as you can get. You
look like a slob, you act like a slob.
Mr. V: Keep it up.
Mr. A: Your mind belongs in the gutter.12
Moreover, the decrease in decorum has not been confined to attor-
ney conduct. Scholars have observed that there is a general disrespect by
judges for practitioners,13 leading Chief Justice Warren to urge judges to
take special care to set the proper tone and to respond to every provoca-
tion temperately.14 He described the high standards of "truly great advo-
cates of the past one hundred years," and to which all advocates should
aspire:
[T]hey were all intensely individualistic, but each was a lawyer for
whom courtroom manners were a key weapon in his arsenal. Wheth-
er engaged in the destruction of adverse witnesses or undermining
damaging evidence or final argument, the performance was charac-
12. Marvin E. Aspen, The Search for Renewed Civility in Litigation, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 513,
513-14 (1994).
13. See, e.g., James A. George, The "Rambo" Problem: Is Mandatory CLE the Way Back to
Atticus?, 62 LA. L. REV. 467, 486 (2002).
14. Warren E. Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 FED. RULES DECISIONS 211, 215 (1971).
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terized by coolness, poise and graphic clarity, without shouting or
ranting, and without baiting witnesses, opponents or the judge.15
With these esteemed figures questioning the civility of courtroom
conduct, the question arises as to whether this perceived decline in civili-
ty is really a modem phenomenon, where scholars are falsely mourning
the loss of some fictional period of exemplary standards and conduct.
There may be a strong argument that our present concerns are not novel,
but rather reflect a phase significant only in terms of scale. Fifteen years
ago, in a seminal address to law students, Dean Anthony T. Kronman' 6
posed the question of whether the spirit of civility was declining in gen-
eral, and not just in the courtroom. 17 He defined civility as the temper-
ateness of speech, polite manner, and a "high-minded determination not
to descend from principles to personalities."
In fact, professionalism issues have haunted the legal profession
since its inception. The fact that lawyers have had difficulty living up to
the high standards expected of them has been a cause for complaint for
almost 2,000 years. Writing in the early first century, Tacitus, generally
considered Ancient Rome's greatest historian, states, "[i]f no one paid a
fee for lawsuits, . . . there would be fewer of them. Now, however, ha-
tred, strife, malice, and slander are fostered. Just as bodily sickness gives
fees to doctors, so also a diseased legal system enriches lawyers."' 9
Quintilia, an early Roman rhetorician, declared, "[a] bad advocate
can destroy a client's case just by arguing for it." 20 Apuleius even re-
ferred to lawyers as "vultures in a toga.', 2 1 Historian James A. Brundage
attributes the lengthy respite in criticism that spanned the period from the
early-fifth through the twelfth century not to any improvements in the
profession, but rather to its dismantling following the chaos that attended
the collapse of the West Roman Empire.22 These early advocates were
criticized for taking on more work than they could competently handle.23
Historians record the reemergence of references to lawyers in Western
literature during the mid-twelfth century, a time which coincides with a
15. Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills ofAdvocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certifi-
cation ofAdvocates Essential to Our System ofJustice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227, 236 (1973).
16. Dean, Yale Law School, (1994-2004). See Anthony T. Kronman, Curriculum Vitae,
YALE LAW SCHooL 1 (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.law.yale.eduldocuments/pdf/TKronman_cv.pdf.
17. Anthony T. Kronman, Civility, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 727, 727 (1996).
18. Id.
19. TAcITUs, ANNALES bk. XI, at 6 (n.p. 109 C.E.), translated in James A. Brundage, Vul-
tures, Whores, and Hypocrites: Images of Lawyers in Medieval Literature, I ROMAN LEGAL
TRADITION 56,62 (2002).
20. Brundage, supra note 19, at 63 (citing QUINTILIAN, INSTruTIO ORATORIA bk. XII, ch. 1,
at 13 (n.p. n.d.)).
21. APULEIUS, METAMORPHOSEON bk. X, at 33 (n.p. n.d.), translated in Brundage, supra note
19, at 61.
22. Brundage, supra note 19, at 64 (citing QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA bk. XII, ch. 7,
at 8 (n.p. n.d.)).
23. Id. at 63.
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revival in the study of Roman law. 24 With the emergence of law schools
in medieval Europe, lawyers quickly garnered the ire of the French monk
Bernard of Clairvaux, who complained, "These men have taught their
tongues to speak lies. They are fluent against justice. They are schooled
in falsehood."25
Nevertheless, there is a wealth of scholarly works expounding the
decline of the profession in every respect. As proof, the American Bar
Association's Center for Professional Responsibility lists more than 155
separate codes throughout the various legal systems in the United States,
specifically addressing professionalism,2 6 all of which were established
between the late 1980s and the present.27 He and others suggest that the
problem is a relatively new one, or at minimum, more pronounced in
recent decades.
Dean Kronman goes further, constructing a correlation between in-
creased television-viewing and an attendant decline in group participa-
tion. He argues that with an increased focus on the primacy of personal
needs, the result has been a general decrease of civility in America.2 8 Of
course, in the fifteen years since Dean Kronman's article was published,
the world has undergone a dramatic transformation with staggering ad-
vances in technology, which would undoubtedly fan the flames of his
discontent.29 Moreover, social media has caused attorneys, like the gen-
eral public, to become overly concerned with self-image and the portray-
al of that image to a public increasingly accustomed to salacious news-
feeds. For example, constant blogging or tweeting about courtroom suc-
cesses has become a tool of advertisement and a source of competition
for attorneys of the twenty-first century. 30 Indeed, there is a general per-
ception that a concern for the "bottom line" approach to law dominates
24. See Stephan Kuttner, The Revival of Jurisprudence, in RENAISSANCE AND RENEWAL IN
THE TWELFTH CENTURY 299 (Robert L. Benson & Giles Constable eds., 1982).
25. ST. BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX, DE CONSIDERATIONE bk. I, ch. X, at 13 (n.p., n.d.), trans-
lated in Brundage, supra note 19, at 68.
26. Professionalism Codes, AM. BAR Ass'N CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/resources/professionalism/professio
nalism codes.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
27. Id.
28. Kronman, supra note 17, at 746.
29. See Kim Severson, Seeing Social Graces as Waning in the South, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
2011, at Al8.
30. Bill Keller, executive editor of the New York Times articulated his concerns about social
media, the evidence of its affect on the brain, and its impact on social interactions in our society as
follows:
My own anxiety is less about the cerebrum than about the soul, and is best summed up
not by a neuroscientist but by a novelist. In Meg Wolitzer's charming new tale, "The Un-
coupling," there is a wistful passage about the high-school cohort my daughter is about to
join.
Wolitzer describes them this way: "The generation that had information, but no context.
Butter, but no bread. Craving, but no longing."
Bill Keller, The Twitter Trap, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2011, at MMI l.
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the profession today, where fierce competition to survive trumps ethical
considerations and any notion of the law as a public service.3 1
For sure, the chasm between "winning for our clients" and "being
nice to adversaries," lacks clarity, as does knowing when ardent repre-
sentation has crossed over into unprofessional conduct. But as Judge
Krieger comments, thoughtful reflection about one's actions has pro-
found repercussions about societal respect for the rule of law and belief
in the effectiveness of our legal institutions. 32 The difficulty in reconcil-
ing these conflicting objectives is likely compounded for new attorneys
who lack experience. Whether the lack of civility is a new or old phe-
nomenon-a reflection of the current decrease in the general standards of
conduct and discourse, or rather a newly found focus on improving what
has always existed-arguments in favor of civility before judges will
logically outweigh those to the contrary, in that they enhance respect for
our legal system as a whole. Civility enables cordiality with the bench
and permits the subtle benefits that it inures. Ultimately, at least pertain-
ing to practice before the court, "[i]t is enough for the ideas and positions
of the parties to clash; the lawyers don't have to."33
Rule 2: Follow Ordinary Court Rules and Procedures
Judge Mix advises that attorneys follow local court rules and proce-
dure because doing so enhances respect for the rule of law. When litiga-
tors fail to follow the rules, they seek to operate by exception, which
undermines the notion of an even and orderly dispensation of fair-
minded justice. In addition, any deviation from these norms may result in
an ineffective use of the court's time and can potentially garner the ire of
the court. Indeed, it stands to reason that the first tenet of courtroom
practice is "know your judge," which naturally extrapolates to "know
your court." The practice of law is a heavily regulated profession, with
complex and interwoven "rules" by which an attorney navigates his prac-
tice and the courtroom. Some of these rules are fairly uniform across
jurisdictions, e.g., the state rules of procedure, the Federal Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, or court-specific filing guidelines. These rules are
outlined in bar journals, accessible on court websites, and preached by
professors or practicing attorneys in law school courses and continuing
legal education seminars nationwide. However, other "governing" rules
are amorphous, ever-changing, and focus on the interplay of contempo-
rary mores and historical prestige. These rules, perhaps best classified as
courtroom etiquette and local custom, are reminiscent of yesteryear and
may bring to mind fictional attorneys such as Atticus Finch.
31. Sandra Day O'Connor, Professionalism, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 5, 6 (1998).
32. Krieger, supra note 2, at 894.
33. O'Connor, supra note 31 at 9.
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The system of codified rules is one with which the American-
trained attorney feels relatively comfortable. Indeed, almost every Amer-
ican law school teaches the very skills required for comprehension of
these rules in their first- and second-year curricula of civil and criminal
procedure. As such, within months after graduating law school, most
new attorneys are able to point to specific Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure as the guiding "rules" for federal court practice or their state version
of the Rules of Evidence for trial practice. Whether they are able to apply
those rules, however, is often contingent on the new attorney's participa-
tion in a clinical program or other practical legal writing courses while in
law school. Not surprisingly, Judge Mix identifies this as a key issue in
the effective presentation of a case before any court.
Today, law schools have embraced the practical gap in the legal ed-
ucation of their students by enhancing their legal writing curriculum and
supplementing courses on substantive issues with coursework in clinical
studies and requirements for pro bono work.34 It appears that law schools
have realized that, in the words of Deanell Reece Tacha, a former Tenth
Circuit judge, "lawyers are not, and should not be, simply an amalgam of
the law-school courses they have taken.""
Clinical coursework is often the initial contact that a soon-to-be-
attorney has with the more practical aspects of filing motions and briefs
or with oral argument preparation from a procedural standpoint. Students
in these courses are taught where to find local court rules or guidelines,
and then are given the opportunity to apply those very rules and guide-
lines with the supervision of a licensed attorney. The University of Den-
ver Sturm College of Law strategic plan for 2010 to 2015 has identified a
major objective of better integrating legal education and the practice of
law, and is modifying its curriculum to that end in both learning and as-
sessment.36 Although not every student is able to take advantage of this
guided tour of local practice, these very skills can be self-taught.
Generally speaking, each court has its own set of local rules. For
example, to practice before any immigration court across the country, an
attorney must make himself familiar with the Immigration Court Practice
Manual, which is available on the courts' web pages. 37 Similarly, the
United States District Court of Colorado posts its local rules on the
34. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 106-09, 138-39, 159-60 (2007). The Carnegie Foundation funded this study
for the Advancement of Teaching, following a two-year study of legal education in American and
Canadian law schools.
35. Tacha, supra note 7, at 1699.
36. Strategic Plan 2010-2015, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER STURM COLLEGE OF LAW 1, 4-5
(Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.law.du.edu/documents/about/SCOL-Strategic-PlanFinal.pdf.
37. Immigration Court Practice Manual, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCUPracManual/ocij_pagel.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
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court's webpage, as well as sample filings and fee schedules.38 Indeed,
the Internet has become a resource of undeniable and multi-tasked effi-
ciency, providing a medium for courts to communicate rules and guide-
lines to attorneys.
Conversely, etiquette rules and local custom, unlike their codified
counterpart, are learned not through study, but through observation,
questioning, and imitation. This is because, distinct from a procedural
regulation which clearly explains the proper technique and the sanctions
for violations, proper etiquette is not written in a book, and discipline
does not necessarily follow. In other words, one abides by the rules of
procedure because he knows the ramifications for failing to adhere to
them: for example, a rejected filing or a sustained objection in court. By
contrast, one abides by the rules of courtroom etiquette not because of a
potential sanction, but due to his respect for the court and for what it
stands. Although over sixty years old and referencing the South African
apartheid rather than the rule of law in the United States, Alan Paton
eloquently described the significance of etiquette in a court of law. In
Cry, the Beloved Country, the South African author observed that:
You may not smoke in this Court, you may not whisper or speak or
laugh. You must dress decently, and if you are a man, you may not
wear your hat unless such is your religion. This is in honour of the
Judge and in honour of the King whose officer he is; and in honour of
the Law behind the Judge, and in honour of the People behind the
Law. When the Judge enters you will stand, and you will not sit till
he is seated. When the Judge leaves you will stand, and you will not
move till he has left you. This is in honour of the Judge, and of the
things behind the Judge. 39
These "rules" that Paton references-appropriate dress, demeanor, and
respect-are exactly the types of norms that are difficult to learn from
paper, but easy to parrot.
Many courts across the country post courtroom etiquette guidelines
on their web pages. For example, the Superior Court of California in the
County of Alameda asks that observers "sit quietly and be respectful of
court proceedings."40 The Illinois Supreme Court reminds that attorneys
should be "timely," and that when the marshal announces the members
of court, all persons in the courtroom should "rise to their feet and re-
main standing until all members of the Court are seated."41 For example,
courts such as the Washtenaw County Court in Michigan instruct that
38. D. Colo. Civ./Crim. R., available at http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Documents/LocalRules/
2011 _Complete Local Rules-FINAL.pdf.
39. ALAN PATON, CRY, THE BELOVED COUNTRY 157 (1948).
40. Courtroom Etiquette, SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL., CNTY. OF ALAMEDA,
http://www.alameda.courts.ca.gov/Pages.aspx/pages-aspx-civil-tria-4 (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
41. Courtroom Etiquette, ILLINOIS COURTS, http://www.state.il.us/court/supremecourt
/Etiquette.asp(last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
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"inappropriate attire" is prohibited.42 However, even if written, these
rules are not necessarily clear; for example, what does it mean to be "re-
spectful of court proceedings" or to prohibit "inappropriate attire"? Thus,
in the reality of courtroom practice, the only way to truly learn court-
room etiquette is through observation and imitation.
The two most popular forms that early observation and imitation
take are through clinical programs at law schools and through mentorship
opportunities once a new attorney enters practice. Through observation
and parroting of one's mentor, an attorney can mimic appropriate attire
and conduct, respectful means of addressing the court, and reasonable
requests of courtroom staff.
The Colorado law schools combined offer fifteen clinics that help
students transition their skills from theory to practice under the mentor-
ship of professors who serve as legal supervisors.43 By participating,
students gain educational experience in client interviewing, witness ex-
amination, oral argument, field research, trial work, dispute resolution,
negotiation management, and many other practical areas under the su-
pervision of a seasoned attorney. Similarly, legal externships provide
student placements with practitioners, and offer a unique opportunity to
gain legal practice under supervision. In addition, some students meet
with success when they are afforded an apprenticeship-style training, in
which they are mentored by more-seasoned attorneys and from whom
they learn through observation."
Surprisingly, despite the immense value of these sorts of pro-
grams, 45 there is a growing concern for the lack of mentorship opportuni-
ties after graduation from law school.46 The general decline in mentoring
42. Courtroom Etiquette and Attire, WASHTENAW CNTY. TRIAL CT.,
http://washtenawtrialcourt.org/general/courtroom etiquette-attire (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
43. Examples of such clinics range from civil litigation and criminal law clinics to environ-
mental clinics. In addition to providing an excellent opportunity for law students, these practical
opportunities also serve an important public service need since the clinics provide free legal services
to many indigent community members.
44. See Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and
Certification of Advocates Essential to our System of Justice? 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227, 229-30
(1973).
45. The authors note that although there is a proliferation of clinical programs and the fact
that they provide in serving a previously unmet need, they do have their critics. Last year, the New
York Times reported that for the first time, clinics at universities across the country are finding their
funding challenged, as they take on powerful interests that resource-starved nonprofit groups have
not been able to pursue. See Ian Urbina, School Law Clinics Face a Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2010, at Al2.
46. Out of concern for this and a variety of issues facing the profession, Colorado Supreme
Court Chief Justice Michael L. Bender, in February 2011, convened a Commission on the Legal
Profession, comprised of leaders in academia, the legal bars, and state and federal courts. Chief
Justice Bender identified many issues facing the legal profession, and chief among these was a
concern about the lack of mentoring opportunities. Thus, the Commission on the Legal Profession is
studying various mentoring programs for future implementation. Chief Justice Bender plans to
institutionalize the Commission as a vehicle for developing ideas and policies that might lead to
legislation, new ethics rules, and change in law school curriculum.
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has curtailed the opportunity to learn through imitation.47 Similarly, it
has been acknowledged in the Colorado bar that gaining meaningful
mentorship opportunities is challenging in today's legal environment.
With the high debt that graduating law students often carry, coupled with
the limited employment opportunities given the recent economic down-
turn, many are choosing to hang out a shingle and engage in solo-
practice. Without adequate mentoring and supervision, and with the high
start-up costs of establishing a law practice, new lawyers can find them-
selves under pressure to accept cases that they might not otherwise have
chosen.
Similarly, local customs are also best learned through observation
and imitation, including the
systematic and persistent variations in local legal practices as a con-
sequence of a complexity of perceptions and expectations shared by
many practitioners and officials in a particularity, and differing in
identifiable ways from the practices, perceptions, and expectations
existing in other localities subject to the same or similar formal legal
regime.48
In other words, while one might logically assume that two similar juris-
dictions operating under similar local rules may conduct themselves in
similar ways, that assumption may not in fact be true. For example, an
empirical study of bankruptcy proceedings performed in two different
states concluded that local custom regarding attorneys' fees and debtor
incentives affected whether attorneys advised a debtor to file for bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.49 There-
fore, even though the federal law is the same (the Bankruptcy Code) and
the procedural system is the same (the Bankruptcy Courts) across the two
jurisdictions, local customs affected the case outcome.o
But how does an attorney learn local customs? Courtroom observa-
tion is an obvious starting point; by performing "fieldwork" as an an-
thropologist might, an attorney is able to observe courtroom interactions
and judicial impressions and interview the courtroom participants, i.e.,
staff and other attorneys.s" All of these methods of learning acknowledge
that new attorneys are "trained" and learn from experience.
47. See Jack W. Burtch, Jr., The Mentor Challenge in Changing Times, 15 EXPERIENCE 10,
10 (2004); see also Thomas R. Mulroy, Jr. Editorial, Civility, Mentors and the 'Good' Ole Days,
CHI. LAW., Sept. 1991, at 14.
48. Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evi-
dence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 804 (1994).
49. Andrea M. Seielstad, Unwritten Laws and Customs, Local Legal Cultures, and Clinical
Legal Education, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 127, 145-49 (1999).
50. Id. at 149.
51. Seielstad, supra note 49, at 168-73.
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Both types of rules, those relating to etiquette and local custom, as
well as those that are codified, are equally important to the day-to-day
operation of the American justice system, and therefore, attorneys are
well advised by Judge Mix to be aware of these local nuances. This con-
cept is illustrated by the broad powers of contempt held by the court and
the powers of sanction held by the Bar, specifically the ability to disci-
pline practitioners for offenses upon the court.52 It is also illustrated in
the significance that jurors place on perceived professionalism of the
attorneys in a trial, often resulting in predictive outcomes. One state
court judge observed that:
Most jurors have little in the way of background or experience to
draw upon in evaluating the work of judges, lawyers, or court staff
except through their service during trial. The appearance and perfor-
mance of all trial participants are [therefore] important to a jury's
perceptions as the unfamiliar, and often stressful, judicial process un-
folds before them.53
Venturing into the arena of social psychology, legal and psychology
scholars have examined nonverbal communication in the courtroom, and
determined that attorneys benefit by creating opportunities to send out
positive verbal and non-verbal communication about their case.54 Studies
have shown that when individuals, including jurors, are placed in unfa-
miliar situations, they tend to seek out and observe an authoritative and
experienced person.55 Thus, the manner in which an attorney conducts
his role in the proceedings has a significant impact on how the observa-
tions are perceived. This is known as the Rosenthal Effect, 56 and studies
have observed that individuals gauge the verbal and non-verbal commu-
nication and draw conclusions about that communication.57 Some suc-
cessful attorneys send out nonverbal cues that are calculated to persuade
and reflect an appearance of confidence. Indeed, newly admitted attor-
neys might choose to study the norms of attorney conduct in the tribunals
in which they appear so that they can mirror successful approaches in
that tribunal. In one court, an aggressive, adversarial approach might be
appropriate and expected, while in another court the opposite might be
52. See, e.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 107(a)(1) (Colorado courts have the power to hold in contempt
those who exhibit "[d]isorderly or disruptive behavior, a breach of peace, boisterous conduct or
violent disturbance toward the court, or conduct that unreasonably interrupts the due course ofjudi-
cial proceedings . . . ."); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(n) (2011) ("It is deemed to be in the public
interest for an adjudicating official or the Board to impose disciplinary sanctions against any practi-
tioner who . . . engages in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice or undermines
the integrity of the adjudicative process.").
53. Hon. Daniel A. Procaccini, First (and Lasting) Impressions, R.I. BAR J., Sept./Oct. 2010,
at 16.
54. Elizabeth A. LeVan, Nonverbal Communication in the Courtroom: Attorney Beware, 8
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 83, 94-97 (1984).
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appropriate. Similarly, in some tribunals, the parties may have shared
educational experiences that inform their behavior in court and have a
subtle effect on the proceedings. Over time, with careful attention to
courtroom behavior, attorneys may become aware of best practices in a
variety of courtroom settings.
For the practicing attorney, it seems that developing a mastery of
procedural requirements, ethical guidelines, and courtroom etiquette may
result in more wins and greater and more effective impression on triers of
law and fact. Albeit humorous, perhaps the best advice to attorneys is to
"[1]eave it to the opposing counsel to be rude, argumentative, sarcastic,
disrespectful, and inartful. Let the opposing counsel make it easy for you
to look good."5 8
Rule 3: Do Not Question the Authority of the Judge
Judge Mix advises that attorneys should take particular care to bal-
ance advocacy with improper questioning of judicial authority. Legal
practice is full of common sense idioms that rule the behavior of the var-
ious characters involved in any legal action. Perhaps the most significant
of these is that "there is a time and place for everything." Attorneys
would be well-served to remember that although judges must be subject
to scrutiny and criticism, actual court proceedings are not the appropriate
forum for such questioning.59 Not only is judicial scrutiny during pro-
ceedings disrespectful and likely to lead to sanctions, it also undermines
public confidence in the court system and the judge and diminishes re-
spect for the rule of law.60
As a practical matter, attorneys may engage in ardent advocacy on
behalf of their client. However, where one becomes over-ardent or oth-
erwise improper in his dealings in the courtroom, he opens himself up to
various consequences. Specifically, a showing of displeasure, disgust, or
anger at a judge's ruling or at a case outcome is both childish and unpro-
fessional and, more significantly, likely to be distasteful to the triers of
fact and law. Undoubtedly, "[1]awyers whose intonations drip with sar-
casm while saying, 'Thank you, Your Honor,' after a ruling against them
... do not go unnoticed by judges or jurors."6' Although this behavior
does not necessarily subject the attorney to ethical violations or bar sanc-
58. Leonard I. Frieling, Courtroom Etiquette: How to Set Yourself Apart, COLO. LAW., Dec.
1998, at 77, 77-78.
59. See Catherine Therese Clarke, Missed Manners in Courtroom Decorum, 50 MD. L. REV.
945, 964 (1991).
60. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The Court's
authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confi-
dence in its moral sanction.").
61. Clarke, supra note 59, at 999-1000 (quoting Richard B. Klein, A Dozen Ways to Anger a
Judge, LITIGATION, Winter 1987, at 62).
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tions,6 2 it may have an indirect effect on the course of the instant pro-
ceeding or future proceedings by the offending attorney before the same
judge.
Behavior that undermines the ability of the court to proceed effec-
tively or efficiently can be sanctioned harshly. For example, an attorney
was suspended for "one year or until further order of the court" for ac-
cusing the court of
collusion with the prosecution, cronyism, racism, permitting the pro-
ceedings to have a "carnival nature," conducting a kangaroo court,
prejudging the case, conducting a "cockamamie charade of witness-
es" and barring defense counsel from effectively participating in the
proceedings, conducting a sham hearing, acting outside the law, be-
ing caught up in his "own little dream world," and ex-parte commu-
nications with the prosecutor .... .
In the immigration court context, attorneys who engage in improper be-
havior can be disciplined or even disbarred from appearing in immigra-
tion court for instances of "obnoxious and contumelious" behavior. 4
Of particular concern to courts are suggestions that a judge has pre-
judged a particular case because such an accusation is antithetical to the
justice system.65 Of course, a hallmark of judicial ethics requires impar-
tiality.6 6 In the wide variety of tribunals in the United States, judges must
abide by these ethical responsibilities and can be disqualified for bias or
prejudice.6 7 Due to the sensitive nature of such issues, attorneys ought to
reflect on the advisability of lodging such a complaint if the decision to
do so is actually a litigation strategy rather than a good faith concern
about the extent to which judicial ethics are being upheld.
Those who are unfamiliar with courts and courtroom behavior fre-
quently look to attorneys for appropriate behavioral cues. Therefore, an
attorney's perception of respect for the authority and position of a judge
is essential to the shaping and re-shaping of judicial authority in the
62. See, e.g., Losavio v. Dist. Court, 512 P.2d 266, 267 (Colo. 1973) (overturning contempt
finding where a comment to opposition that "it must be nice to have [the judge] in your corner," was
not overheard by judge and therefore not direct contempt); Moffatt v. Buano, 569 A.2d 968, 969-71
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that comment that a judge was an "asshole" heard by court adminis-
trator in lobby and then repeated for the judge is both childish and unprofessional but because it did
not obstruct the administration ofjustice and did not support a conviction for contempt).
63. In re Vincenti, 458 A.2d 1268, 1269, 1275 (N.J. 1983).
64. See, e.g., In re De Anda, 17 I & N Dec. 54, 54-55, 58 (B.I.A. 1979); see also 8 C.F.R. §
292.3 (2011).
65. United States v. Meyer, 346 F. Supp. 973, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Attorney stated: "I am
afraid of making this system rotten by not being able to do my job, and that is representing people,
and that is what I am here for. I am not here to grease the wheels of the Court. I am terribly afraid
that you have made up your mind that you are going to dispatch this case as expeditiously as possi-
ble. I am not here to expedite it.").
66. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES CANON 2 (2011).
67. Randall J. Litteneker, Disqualification ofFederal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 236, 236 (1978).
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minds of the public. In other words, "[h]ow much respect [attorneys]
show for our judges is a fundamental concept upon which our entire legal
system was founded."68 One court specifically noted, "If trial lawyers by
their courtroom conduct state their own disrespect for judges in clearly
spoken words, no one can expect others to have respect for our judicial
system."6 9
Consequently, attorneys should note that the public perception per-
taining to judicial authority follows them beyond the doors of the court-
room. Not only are comments on judicial authority made in the court-
house influential on the minds of the public, but statements made beyond
the immediate reach of the court are becoming more frequent and signif-
icant with the use of social media.70 For example, an attorney was sanc-
tioned for referring to the judge presiding over a case she was trying as
"Judge Clueless" on her blog. 71 This attorney also referred to another
judge as "a total asshole."72 This attorney engaged in "conduct which
tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the
legal profession into disrepute, in violation of Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 770."" Another example is a Florida attorney who was fined
$1,200 for blogging that a judge he appeared before was an "Evil, Unfair
Witch."74
The takeaway for practicing attorneys is that an attorney can un-
dermine a judge and the legal profession in a number of ways, and even
though not all slights are actionable, every action and statement affects
public perception of judicial authority.
Rule 4: Ask Yourself "What Will the Judge Think?"
Judge Mix cautions that "[a] lawyer should avoid over-zealous ad-
vocacy." 7 5 Not all motions require opposition, especially if no prejudice
will result from the requested relief. She suggests employing sound
judgment and discretion in choosing when to fight and when to avoid
wasting client money, attorney time and energy, and the court's limited
time. For example, motions for reconsideration are very difficult to win
and, according to Judge Mix, are frequently over-used. Therefore, an
attorney should think carefully before filing one. A corollary to this re-
sponsibility is that lawyers should endeavor to keep their clients in-
formed about the cost of litigation, the cost of pursuing a particular mo-
68. E. Spencer Walton, Jr., Respect and Dignity, 44 RES GESTAE, Feb. 2001, at 5,5.
69. Meyer, 346 F. Supp. at 979.
70. Patricia E. Salkin, Social Networking and Land Use Planning Regulation: Practical
Benefits, Pitfalls, and Ethical Considerations, 31 PACE L. REV. 54, 83-84 (2011).
71. Complaint, In re Peshek (Hearing Bd. of Ill. Att'y Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n
Aug. 25, 2009) (No. 6201779), Sup. Ct. No. 23794, Comm'n No.09 CH 89.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Salkin, supra note 70, at 70.
75. Mix, supra note 1, at 1.
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tion or argument, and expectations regarding the amount of time, energy
and non-monetary resources it can require to complete a case in the fed-
eral court system. This discussion should also include a realistic assess-
ment of the likely outcome. It becomes a matter of setting realistic ex-
pectations early in a case and then managing those expectations through-
out the proceeding.
Sometimes an attorney makes a choice about proceeding that harms
his reputation before the judge, or, even worse, lands him on the receiv-
ing end of a bar ethics review. This can be, in some circumstances, an
all-consuming, career-altering activity, and can even cause irreparable
harm to one's reputation. Judge Mix's caution to think carefully about
how one's actions, in all of the complex professional and ethical deci-
sions one makes as an attorney, should be taken extremely seriously.
THE COMMUNICATION RULES
The second category of rules emphasize how written and oral com-
munication, to be effective, must be honest and precise. Statements that
fail to display a properly nuanced understanding of the issues can dimin-
ish trust in the communication.
Rule 5: Write with Precision and Clarity
Judge Mix joins a host of legal scholars, practitioners, and judicial
officers calling for strong writing skills. Indeed, attorneys are hired spe-
cifically for their skill in communication, both written and spoken. At its
best, legal argument is formal, clear, precise, and sensitive to nuance. A
misjudgment of lexical choice can subtly shift meaning, undercut accura-
cy, and belie the true meaning of a complex argument.
The University of Denver Sturm College of Law, along with most,
if not all, U.S. law schools, offers legal writing programs as part of the
required academic curriculum. Across the nation, these programs vary,
and can range from one to three years. The fact that the programs are
often a critical part of the curriculum indicates that law schools recognize
how skill in this area is essential not only to success in law school, but
also in the legal profession. Legal academics understand that mastery of
the analytic skills taught in substantive law courses must include articu-
lating that analysis in writing. In the words of Justice Antonin Scalia, the
skill of writing concisely, with precision and clarity, will assist the judge
in the following important ways: (1) to have a clear idea of what the at-
torney is asking the court to do; (2) to be assured that what the attorney is
asking is within the court's power to provide; and (3) to conclude that
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what the attorney is asking is best-both in the attorney's case and in
cases that will follow. 76
In spite of the clarity and simplicity of this precept, compliance in
the legal profession is often difficult. In the mid-1970s, Chief Judge Ir-
ving R. Kaufman convened a committee to "improve the quality of rep-
resentation" in the federal courts in the Second Circuit. After two years
of study, the committee released a report that concluded, "[t]here are
deficiencies in our educational system in the areas of writing and logic
which neither the law schools nor the courts can correct."77 In response,
law schools have used the past three decades to develop sophisticated
legal writing and moot court programs. They have added legal writing
instructors to their ranks and implemented, in some cases, year-long pro-
grams to assist students in honing their legal analysis skills.7 9 They sup-
port a wide variety of moot court competitions, which is thought to im-
prove communication so that it is more clear and persuasive.o However,
law schools recognize that the challenge still confounds the profession.
At a recent roundtable discussion of the current deans of the five Chicago
law schools, the deans expressed concern that students are graduating
without having acquired the writing skills they will need. 1 Judge Warren
Wolfson, Dean of DePaul University Law School stated, "I was on the
appellate court for 15 years, and the state of writing among new lawyers
and young lawyers is deplorable."82 John Corkery, Dean of the John
Marshall Law School, noted that law firms would like to see greater em-
phasis on legal writing.83
The significance of programs that improve legal writing has been
identified by Judge J. Clifford Wallace, who has documented the increas-
ing dependence of courts upon written argument.84 He notes that given
courts' ever-increasing workloads, judges rely increasingly on time-
saving methods to speed the decision-making process, which have in-
cluded a decrease in oral argument and a subsequent focus on written
advocacy. Judge Mark P. Painter of the Ohio First District Court of
Appeals summed up the challenge in his tome on improving legal writing
76. JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF
PERSUADING JUDGES, at xxi (2008).
77. Qualifications for Practice Before the U.S. Courts in the Second Circuit, 67 F.R.D. 159,
183 (2d Cir. 1976).
78. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 3 (2007).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Amanda Robert, Law School Deans Discuss the State of Today's Legal Education, CHI.
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by suggesting that lawyers front-load the document so that you can edu-
cate the reader about what is forthcoming. 6 Specifically, attorneys
should put information in context and relate each new piece of infor-
mation to what has been presented previously. He cautions that one
should not start writing until he is able to frame the issue in seventy-five
words or less, and that these words should serve as a roadmap at the be-
ginning of the written work, expanding on each point in the following
pages. It is essential that attorneys aim to improve their legal writing by
continually refining and practicing these skills. Consequently, Judge Mix
is not alone in her request that attorneys develop proper legal writing
skills and exercise those skills before the court.
Rule 6: Make Meaningful Efforts to Confer with Opposing Counsel
Judge Mix cautions that attorneys should take seriously the duty to
confer pursuant to District Court Local Rule 7.1(A), which provides in
pertinent part that "[t]he court will not consider any motion . . . unless
counsel for the moving party or a pro se party, before filing the motion,
has conferred or made reasonable, good faith efforts to confer with op-
posing counsel or a pro se party to resolve the disputed matter."87 How-
ever, a corollary result is that doing so fosters communication between
opposing counsel and encourages an atmosphere of civility and profes-
sionalism. This duty to confer is more generally about the effective use
of the court's time and can take many shapes beyond motions: for exam-
ple, joint stipulations or other less formal methods to narrow the issues in
dispute before the court.
Court motions are devices used in litigation to bring a specific issue
before the court and to request a ruling or other means to resolve contest-
ed issues. Because motions can be made at any time in a proceeding and
can be used tactically to shape the direction of a case, they can be used to
resolve many, if not all, issues. Joint "stipulations" or other manners of
narrowing the issues are also significant tools to be used. For example, in
the immigration court, a private attorney may confer with a government
attorney before a hearing about narrowing the issues. In an immigration
court cancellation of removal case, the government attorney may con-
cede that there is sufficient documentation in the file to establish that
deportation should be suspended because of ten years' continuous pres-
ence and good moral character, and inform the court that testimony need
only focus on the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" prong of
the analysis. Such a narrowing of the issues could mean the difference
86. Mark P. Painter, Legal Writing 201: 30 Suggestions to Improve Readability, or How to
Write for Judges, Not Like Judges 8 (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.plainlanguagenetwork.org/legal/legalwriting.pdf; see also STEPHEN V. ARMSTRONG &
TIMOTHY P. TERRELL, THINKING LIKE A WRITER: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE WRITING AND
EDITING 151 (3d ed. 2009).
87. D. COLO. Civ. R. 7.1(A). This rule has a state analogue in COLO. R. CIV. P. 121 § 1-15(8).
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between a four-hour hearing and a one-hour hearing. Moreover, in the
state court setting, tools such as trial management orders are required to
be filed with the court before a hearing and lay out the agreements made
between the parties.
Efficiency is essential to court life. As discussed later, court dockets
are at an all-time high and case receipts are growing.88 This problem is
compounded by the fact that judicial appointments to federal, state, and
administrative courts are frequently tied up in political and budgetary
battles, leaving a number of seats vacant on benches across the United
States. For example, as of June 20, 2012, there were seventy-four vacan-
cies in the Article IHl courts.89 Consequently, communication between the
parties before a hearing or trial is essential to the timely completion of
court matters, not only so that the parties are in compliance with the
rules, but also because pre-trial discussions assure that the court's time
will not be wasted.
Rule 7: Do Not Refer to an Unopposed Motion as a "Stipulation"
Judge Mix instructs that attorneys should be candid with the court
and particularly careful when informing the court that something has
been resolved subject to a stipulation. Specifically, she explains that at-
torneys should fairly and accurately represent opposing counsel's posi-
tion before the court on all pending matters. Black's Law Dictionary
defines a "stipulation" as a "voluntary agreement between opposing par-
ties concerning some relevant point."90 Stipulations as to fact are binding
on a court, absent an indication that the stipulation was not in accord
with the intent of the parties.9 ' Because of this binding nature, it is im-
portant to accurately and precisely reflect the nature of the motion or
other request before the court, so as to properly inform the court of its
ability to exercise its authority. Indeed, by referring to an unopposed
motion as a stipulation, an attorney could be viewed as trying to prohibit
the court from ruling on the dispute. For example, if an attorney moves
the court for an extension of time to file a brief and, in submitting the
motion reports to the judge that the motion is unopposed, this does not
equate to a stipulation-the judge has the authority to control the pro-
ceedings. By presenting the motion as a stipulation, the attorney attempts
to remove that authority.
Essentially, this seventh rule arises out of two competing underlying
concepts: the importance of being candid with the court and the opposing
attorney, and the avoidance of undermining the authority of the judge.
88. See discussion infra Rule 7.
89. These vacancies include sixteen seats on the U.S. Court of Appeals and sixty-seven seats
in the U.S. District Courts. See Judicial Vacancies, U.S. COURTS (Feb. 25, 2012),
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies.aspx.
90. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1455 (8th ed. 2004).
9 1. See id
[Vol. 89:2388
A NEW TAKE ON THE TOP TEN RULES
Moreover, this rule encapsulates the need not only to be honest with the
court concerning a legal position as it pertains to a client, but also to ac-
curately represent the other side's position. As Judge Mix's third rule
encapsulated the discussion on judicial authority, it is clear that by know-
ingly miscategorizing actions or case holdings before the court, an attor-
ney is demonstrating his lack of respect for the court, and, as such, un-
dermining the authority of the court.
Speaking honestly and candidly with the court and opposing coun-
sel is perhaps one of the most important roles of a practicing attorney.
Indeed, the ability to "call a spade a spade" is a primary skill for an at-
torney, not only because it earns the attorney respect as a "straight-
shooter," but also because to do otherwise opens the attorney to ethical
violations. For example, an attorney should not knowingly make a false
statement of fact or law to the court or offer evidence that the attorney
knows to be false. 92
In June 2011, the Ethics Committee of the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion published a decision on candor towards the tribunal and remedial
measures in civil proceedings. 9 3 That decision makes clear that the know-
ing making of false statements, whether privileged or unprivileged, is
sanctionable. Likewise, false exposition of the law to advance an argu-
ment is also actionable. 9 4 As an advocate navigates the line where ardent
representation ends and the duty of candor begins on a particular issue,
he may choose to engage a tactical position to advance a legal theory
which, if successful, would mitigate his client's liability. For example, in
litigation, a defense attorney might learn that the clearly precedential
authority on point in his jurisdiction is not favorable to his client's case.
If he ignores that line of authority and instead cites case law that has no
precedential authority before the tribunal tasked with deciding the case,
he would be in breach of his duty of candor. Litigation tactics must not
be used to misinform the judge. Doing so undermines the general pub-
lic's confidence in our court system of arriving at the truth by the ex-
change of logical arguments.9 5 Thus, we see that this rule has at its foun-
dation a need for respect for the rule of law.
Another illustration of this concept is in ex parte settings. These are
matters involving multiple proceedings before different tribunals involv-
ing related causes of action. The duty of candor requires that a lawyer
inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will
enable the tribunal to make an informed decision.9 6 Thus, an advocate
92. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2010).
93. Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 123 (2011).
94. See COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2008).
95. Robert J. Cindrich, The Lawyer's Duty of Candor to the Tribunal, JURIST (Oct. 23, 2000),
http://jurist.Iaw.pitt.edulbenchmark2.htm.
96. N.H. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Candor Toward The Tribunal: Duty to Inform The Court
ofRelated Proceedings, N.H. BAR ASS'N (Feb. 13, 1991), http://www.nhbar.org/pdfs/PEA2-9 .pdf
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must inform the court of any related causes of action if the existence of
such is a material fact and disclosure is mandatory for a judge to make an
informed decision.9 7
We see that underlying this rule is the notion that advocates should
not undermine the authority of the judge. In the immigration court con-
text, judges have a responsibility to decide matters of law and fact, and
then to determine whether a case should be granted or denied as a matter
of discretion. When the parties are able to reach a stipulation that the
facts support a favorable outcome under the law, they must still move the
court to exercise its discretion. Failure to do so would undermine the
authority of the court. Judges have an interest in an outcome that is just,
accurate, and reasonably expeditious. They control the procedures which
shape the institutional pressures that push lawyer conduct in certain di-
rections. In comparing our system of advocacy to that of the English
system, Chief Justice Burger wrote that the "English training in advocacy
places great stress on ethics, manner and deportment, both in the court-
room and in relations with other barristers and solicitors. The effective-
ness of this training is reflected in the very high standards of ethics and
conduct."98
THE "RESPECT FOR RESOURCES" RULES
Rule 8: Do Not Ask a Judge (or His/Her Staff) to Get You Coffee
Judge Mix instructs that an attorney should never make ridiculous
or inherently improper requests of the court. Court proceedings are for-
mal events.99 As such, both counsel and the parties should plan to abide
by certain formalities while within the courthouse. These formalities
include not only timely appearance and remaining until the matter is
concluded by the judge or until excused, but also remembering that
courts do not have the budget to accommodate certain requests. There-
fore, the parties should plan accordingly and always arrive prepared.
As we reflect on how a request for coffee could come to pass, we
are reminded that attorney preparation necessarily includes two types of
preparedness: being ready to conduct the scheduled proceedings and
informing clients of the process of being in court. For example, it is rare
to find oneself leaving court at the time one had expected. Indeed, if an
attorney has been told to anticipate a full morning of testimony, attorneys
would be well served to expect to spend a full day. Attorneys must make
97. Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Zimmerman, 354 N.W. 2d 235, 235, 237 (Iowa 1984) (lack of
disclosure evinces "indefensible irresponsibility"); Garcia v. Silverman, 334 N.Y.S. 2d 474, 476
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972) (the failure to disclose another proceeding involving related causes of action
constitutes "reprehensible conduct" and action that "cannot be countenanced or condoned").
98. Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills ofAdvocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certifi-
cation ofAdvocates Essential to Our System ofJustice?, 42 FoRDHAM L. REv. 227, 229 (1973).
99. See discussion supra Rule 1.
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appropriate arrangements with various competing commitments to other
clients, colleagues, and family. Otherwise, an attorney may become tense
as he watches the clock and fears for the impact of the delay on these
alternate responsibilities.
These authors respectfully suggest that since a significant portion of
your time may be spent waiting, consider the following: (1) bring a
snack, but do not eat it in the courtroom; (2) bring extra work, once
again, not for reviewing during courtroom proceedings; and (3) take care
to manage your affairs realistically. This preparation will show through
in terms of impression management.
Of course, while asking the court or court staff for coffee is an im-
proper request, certain requests are appropriate and within the guidelines
of the court. For example, good faith requests for a reasonable continu-
ance can be appropriate. In the immigration court context, moving the
court to provide a court-certified interpreter is appropriate. And, moving
the court for rulings on legal issues is certainly within the responsibility
of the court. However, neither requests that reflect a lack of preparation
nor last minute requests which threaten to contravene judicial economy
are ever well-received by the court. While a request for an interpreter
when made at a scheduling hearing will likely be well-received, the same
request made on the day of a merits hearing, for example, will likely not
be.
In recent years, most courts at the federal and state level have been
reporting severe underfunding at the same time that they have been see-
ing their dockets fill to unprecedented levels.100 While in earlier times,
where the judicial challenge to meet docket demands was not as dra-
matic, attorney requests that reflected lack of foresight and preparedness
might be excused, today, they can be summarily denied. This is a prob-
lem not only for the client who wishes to be successful on the merits of
his claim, but also for the attorney who may subject himself to a claim of
breach of professional ethics and legal responsibilities.
Rule 9: Do Not Bug Court Staff
Judge Mix reminds attorneys that court staff are not extensions of
the attorneys' law practices, but individuals whose goal is to ensure the
effective management of the court. Underlying this concept is the idea of
judicial economy. Judicial economy is a term that frequently gets men-
tioned in discussions about the efficiencies of the U.S. court system. In-
deed, it is an "umbrella" term that encapsulates both judicial and attorney
actions (or inaction) and abstractions such as capital, both monetary and
100. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n House of Delegates, Crisis in the Courtrooms: Defining the
Problem, AM. BAR ASS'N 3 (Aug. 8-9, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abal imag-
es/public education/pub-ed-lawday abaresolution crisiscourtsdec201 .pdf.
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human. Here, we focus on the human elements of judicial economy: spe-
cifically, the burden on court staff and security.
As an initial matter, it is clear that the number of court filings is
growing exponentially. For example, as of March 31, 2010, the federal
court system saw 76,748 pending criminal cases, 299,512 pending civil
cases, and 1,596,994 pending bankruptcy cases.10 In Colorado, 541,591
cases were filed in county courts during the 2010 fiscal year, nearly
100,000 more cases than 2001.102 That astounding number of cases does
not include those filed in Denver County Court.10 3 Similarly, the U.S.
Immigration Courts saw 392,888 receipts during 2010, roughly 110,000
more than ten years earlier.'1 While these numbers represent the sheer
number of new cases filed in 2010, they are not representative of the
number of evidentiary submissions, motions, briefs, and other requests
filed, nor of the numerous telephonic questions made to court staff per-
taining to each case. It is precisely these difficult-to-calculate strains
upon court staff which led Judge Mix to establish this rule.
Often, the difference between a "normal" request of the court and
"bugging" court staff is a question of simple preparation and common
sense. It is acceptable, for example, to make requests for necessities,
such as an interpreter, needed A/V equipment, or rescheduling issues. It
is inappropriate, however, to make those requests on the day of the hear-
ing. One Pennsylvania state judge opined that "[n]othing frosts me like
having everyone wait while they make copies of something that should
have been handed out weeks before. Or, worse yet, making my staff do it
while we all sit around! I ought to start charging them five bucks a
page!"105 Indeed, while staff often will perform certain courtesies, such
as making a copy or providing other assistance, those acts are just that:
courtesies.
Understanding the internal procedures of the courts in which the at-
torney normally practices is immensely important. For example, knowing
that a court closes its doors at 4 p.m., an attorney should not arrive five
minutes prior expecting to perform a lengthy file review without severely
annoying staff. Moreover, if a court assigns staff to a specific judge, an
attorney should seek to learn that information so he does not needlessly
burden a staff member assigned to a different judge. Additionally, learn-
ing local rules saves both the attorney and court staff tremendous
101. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. CTS., apps.
C, D & F (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederaliudicialCaseloadStatistics/
FederaliudicialCaseloadStatistics2l0.aspx.
102. Colo. Judicial Branch, ANN. STAT. REP.: FISCAL YEAR 2010, 2010, at 1, 102 tbl.24.
103. Id.
104. Office of Planning, Analysis & Tech., FY 2010 STAT. Y.B., Jan. 2011, at Al; Office of
Planning, Analysis & Tech., FY 2001 STAT. Y.B., Mar.2002, at Al.
105. J. Michael Eakin, What Really, Really Annoys Judges, 32 PA. LAW., May/June 2010, at
30,33.
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amounts of time. Among other lessons, an attorney should ensure that a
request of the court is not buried in a cover letter, but made abundantly
clear so that the court staff need not read an entire motion, for example,
to determine what it is that the attorney is seeking.
The reality of the matter is that courts across the country are making
significant cuts in staff due to strained state and federal budgets. In more
extreme cases, local courts are closing their doors and laying off hun-
dreds of competent employees, redirecting litigants to already over-
crowded dockets at other courts or into "holding patterns" of several
years.106 Moreover, these deep cuts are occurring at a time when the
number of yearly filings is soaring. Thus, attorneys should be schooled in
the differences between responsibilities of court staff owed to the attor-
ney and the public and courtesies that staff will perform if time permits.
THE CATCH-ALL RULE
Rule 10: Guard Your Reputation
Finally, Judge Mix explains that "a lawyer should vigorously pro-
tect his/her reputation in the courthouse and in the legal community."
Doing so requires careful and thorough preparation, including the prepa-
ration of thoughtful, concise, well-organized, well-edited, and proofread
written materials. She reminds firms that all filings bear the firm name,
and an errant filing by one associate will be attributed to the entire firm.
It is important to avoid frivolous disputes and arguments.
She cautions new lawyers that one way to avoid the chances of
damaging one's reputation is by practicing only in an area of expertise.
In order to develop the expertise, it is indispensable to have good men-
toring as one gains experience in the subject area. Experience can be
gained through the pro bono mentoring programs and through courtroom
observation. Dean Howard Krent of Chicago-Kent College of Law has
noted that law firms put too much "of a premium on having new hires
'get it quickly.' Whereas firms in the past might give associates three
years or so before deciding how they were doing in the law firm, now
that period may be as short as six months."107 With experience, a lawyer
can assist his client to appropriately weigh potential costs and benefits so
that he can make wise strategic decisions in litigation. Only then will a
lawyer have the confidence to be concerned when a client does not wish
to follow his legal advice, and know when to drop a problematic case.
In an intentionally cynical hypothetical regarding the importance of
diligently guarding one's reputation, consider what could occur if an
106. See, e.g., Julia Cheever, SF Courts Cut Hours, Lay Off 200 Employees, BAY CITY NEWS,
Aug. 3, 2011, http:sfappeal.com/news/2011/08/sf-courts-cut-hours-lay-off-200-employees.php.
107. Eric Lipman, Deans Roundtable: Law Schools Still Don't Teach Writing, LEGAL BLOG
WATCH (Sep. 17, 2010, 1:01 PM), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legalblogwatch/2010/09/
deans-roundtable-law-schools-still-dont-teach-writing.html.
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attorney attempted to forestall an unfavorable ruling by challenging, for
purely tactical reasons, the legal work product of a prior counsel. The
effect could be years of litigation and appellate review on the merits of
the client's case, as well as thorough review of the attorney's conduct.
Developing a record that is devoid of indicia of preparedness slips could
negate the chance of a professional responsibility challenge.
CONCLUSION
The legal profession is an extremely small, close-knit, and well-
informed community. All the major actors in the court system-opposing
counsel, presiding judges, and court employees-are people with feel-
ings, memories, and the ability to gossip. A misstep will be remembered
and a larger blunder never forgotten. However, some rules are so funda-
mental that failure to abide by them carries serious formal sanctions. An
attorney's behavior before a court is a reflection of his respect for the
judge, his profession, the U.S. legal system, and his client. Moreover, the
less experienced public observer takes cues from his behavior; therefore,
attorneys are in the unique position to help shape both public opinion of
and confidence in our legal system. Although these rules may seem hu-
morous and common-sensical, they provide a useful roadmap for suc-
cessful practice before the court wherein a new attorney can maintain his
professional integrity and help restore public confidence in American
courts. A courtroom victory does not only occur when the client "wins."
Indeed, leaving a courtroom after a genuine effort to maintain respect for
the court and with professional integrity intact is a victory in itself and
worthy of celebration within the profession. Therefore, attorneys would
do well to take Judge Mix's words to heart: "Tell the truth. Remain civil
and courteous. Forgive trespasses when possible. Keep your eye on the
prize: achieving a just, efficient and appropriate result."os
108. Mix, supra note 1, at 2.
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THE CASE FOR GREATER PUBLIC ACCESS TO ORAL
ARGUMENT RECORDINGS IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PETER J. KRUMHOLZ1
INTRODUCTION
The story of how Peter Irons, a professor of political science at the
University of California at San Diego, once incurred the wrath of the
United States Supreme Court makes for a riveting narrative. In the early
1990s, Professor Irons directed the Earl Warren Bill of Rights Project,
which developed teaching materials for high school and college classes
on the Bill of Rights.' In that capacity, he obtained access to audiotapes
of Supreme Court oral arguments in twenty-three historic cases, includ-
ing Roe v. Wade.2
Professor Irons's access to the recordings was conditioned on his
signing a document acknowledging that his use of the tapes was limited
to "private research and teaching," and that he was prohibited from du-
plicating or distributing the tapes to the public.3
At the time, Professor Irons considered the conditions a violation of
the First Amendment.4 He therefore could challenge the conditions in
court-a potentially costly and time-consuming exercise--or sign the
document and face any consequences for violating its terms. He chose
the latter course, and in 1993, the oral-argument recordings were pub-
lished by The New Press (a nonprofit publisher) together with a compan-
ion book entitled May It Please the Court.5
The Court's reaction was swift. In a press release issued just before
the recordings were released to the public, the Court stated that Professor
Irons's release of the tapes constituted a breach of contract, and that the
t Partner, Hale Westfall, LLP. Mr. Krumholz is an appellate practitioner in Denver and the
founder of the Rocky Mountain Appellate Blog, which was established in 2006. He would like to
thank Alexis Paich for her invaluable research assistance. He also would like to thank his wife Lyssa
for her support, and their children Katie, Peter, and Thomas, who gave up a few nights with their
father so that he could finish this article.
I. Cameras in the Courtroom: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (2005)
[hereinafter Irons Testimony] (statement of Professor Peter Irons, Univ. of Cal., San Diego), availa-
ble at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735
dalOc4fec&wit id=e655f9e2809e 5476862f735dalOc4fec-3-2.
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Irons Testimony, supra note 1.
4. Id
5. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT SINCE 1955 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993).
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Court was considering "legal remedies" against him.6 Eventually, the
Court backed down, but not before the matter generated national media
attention that was overwhelmingly critical of the Court's position.7
Twelve years after his run-in with the Court, Professor Irons testi-
fied to the Senate Judiciary Committee that the "resistance to public ac-
cess to the Court's proceedings has not only diminished, but has been
replaced with [the] understanding that allowing the American people to
hear the arguments in its chambers has not damaged the Court in any
way."8 Five years later, in September 2010, the United States Supreme
Court announced that beginning with the October 2010 term, the Court
would post to its website audio recordings of all oral arguments, with
each recording being posted at the end of the week in which the argu-
ment was held.9 Members of the public can now listen free of charge to
every Supreme Court oral argument Thus, in the span of fifteen years,
the Supreme Court went from threatening legal action against Professor
Irons for releasing audio of oral arguments from the most important cas-
es of the twentieth century, to embracing a fully transparent policy that
allows the public access to oral-argument audio in virtually every case
that comes before it.'0
Bizarrely, despite the enormous strides the United States Supreme
Court has made in embracing a more transparent policy on oral-argument
recordings," several federal courts of appeal, including the Tenth Cir-
cuit, remain stubbornly resistant to allowing public access to oral argu-
ment proceedings. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit's policy is far more con-
sistent with the attitudes reflected by the Supreme Court's confrontation
with Professor Irons in 1993. It is therefore not a stretch to say that the
6. Joan Biskupic, Marketer of Court Tapes Risks Supreme Censure, WASH. POST, Aug. 30,
1993, at A6.
7. Irons Testimony, supra note 1.
8. Id
9. Press Release, United States Supreme Court, Supreme Court to Make Available Audio
Recordings of All Oral Arguments (Sept. 28, 2010),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/viewpressreleases.aspx?FileName-pr 09-28-
10.html. For several years prior to the Supreme Court's announcement, the Court had been making
transcripts of oral arguments publicly available on its website.
10. Indeed, as Professor Irons noted, by 2005 the Supreme Court's bookstore sold a digital
video disc, or DVD, entitled The Supreme Court's Greatest Hits, containing sixty-two oral argu-
ments, along with pictures and text. Irons Testimony, supra note 1.
I1. The next step in the United States Supreme Court's evolving attitude on transparency-
broadcasting video of oral arguments-is likely still years away. See Robert L. Brown, Just a Matter
of Time? Video Cameras at the United States Supreme Court and the State Supreme Courts, 9 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 3 (2007) ("Despite the hopes of some-the media in particular-that a
new Chief Justice would lead the Supreme Court into an age of televised oral arguments, this has not
proven to be the case."); see also Access to the Court: Televising the Supreme Court: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. 6 (2011) (statement of Anthony J. Scirica, C.J. of the Third Cir.) ("A congressional mandate
that the Supreme Court televise its proceedings likely raises a significant constitutional issue."),
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/ll-12-6SciricaTestimony.pdf. This Article will
focus on the availability of audio recordings of oral arguments.
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policies of the Tenth Circuit, and the other circuits with similar policies,
are twenty years out-of-date.
This Article will survey the policies of all the federal courts of ap-
peal concerning oral-argument recordings in order to place the Tenth
Circuit's policy in context. It will then analyze the Tenth Circuit's local
rule concerning public access to oral arguments, which appears to be
entirely standardless and gives the court unconstrained discretion as to
whether and to whom it will release oral-argument recordings. Finally,
this Article will consider the underlying policy arguments for and against
allowing greater public access to oral arguments. There are arguments to
be made for the Tenth Circuit's current policy, but none of them is con-
vincing. The Tenth Circuit should follow the lead of the United States
Supreme Court, and the majority of its sister circuits, and make oral-
argument recordings easily accessible to the public.
I. THE FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS' POLICIES
Of the thirteen federal courts of appeal, eight circuits have aligned
themselves with the United States Supreme Court and have made audio
recordings of oral arguments readily accessible to the public through
their respective websites.12 Indeed, some of those circuits have put in
place policies that exceed the Supreme Court in terms of accessibility. In
contrast, the Tenth Circuit is solidly in the minority of circuits in terms of
its begrudging approach to transparency.
A. The Progressives
First Circuit
The First Circuit's policy is to make oral-argument recordings
available to the public on the court's website via an RSS feed.13 Alt-
hough the arguments are not streamed live, they typically are made
available by 4:00 p.m. on the same day the arguments are held.14 Howev-
er, the court provides only the most recent oral-argument recordings; it
stores audio recordings of oral arguments only from the past thirty days.
This thirty-day policy may be driven by how much data the court's serv-
ers can hold, but the upshot is that the recording for any oral argument
held more than thirty days ago is simply not available. Thus, the court's
thirty-day archive may be useful to litigants currently before the court, or
12. First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits.
13. See First Circuit Oral Arguments, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT,
http://www.cal.uscourts.gov/files/audio/audiorss.php (last visited Jul. 2, 2012). "RSS," or Really
Simple Syndication, is a formatted web feed used to publish frequently updated works, such as blog
entries, news headlines, or, in the case of courts, new opinions or oral arguments. See Seventh Cir-
cuit RSS, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/ca7_rss.htm (last visited Jul. 2, 2012). The First Circuit's website page
containing the RSS links is difficult, though not impossible, to find from the Court's home page.
14. First Circuit Oral Arguments, supra note 13.
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in high-profile cases in which oral argument is covered by the media. But
for most lawyers and individuals whose use of oral-argument recordings
is research-based, they inevitably will come across court decisions long
after the thirty-day window has closed; for those cases, oral-argument
recordings will not be available.
Third Circuit
The Third Circuit posts audio recordings of oral arguments dating
back to 2007 and, like the First Circuit, provides an RSS feed.15 Its re-
cordings are easily accessible from the court's home page.16 Although
the oral-argument files are not searchable, they are serially listed by case
number. 17
Fourth Circuit
In May 2011, the Fourth Circuit began posting oral-argument re-
cordings to its website two days following argument.' 8 The court's list of
available oral-argument recordings includes a helpful chart, listing not
only the case name and number, but also the names of the judges on each
panel and the attorneys presenting argument. 9 The Fourth Circuit also
provides an RSS feed for the most recent oral-argument recordings. The
court reminds attorneys that, in light of this new policy, they "should not
include in their arguments any sensitive personal information . . . or
sealed criminal information." 2 0 In recognition of the potentially sensitive
nature of the facts in some cases, the court further provides that a party
may move to seal argument in accordance with Fourth Circuit Local
Rule 25(c)(2).21 The Fourth Circuit has not posted oral-argument record-
ings for any oral arguments that occurred before May 2011. Those re-
cordings are available on compact disc from the clerk's office, but a $30
fee applies to each request.22
Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit allows public access to oral-argument recordings
released from May 21, 2008, to the present, and provides a searchable
database that allows users to search by date, docket number, case name,
15. See Oral Argument Files and RSS Feed, THIRD JUD. CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/OralArg.htm (last visited Jul. 2, 2012).
16. THIRD JUD. CIRCUIT, http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov (last visited Jul. 2, 2012).
17. See All Oral Argument Files, THIRD JUD. CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/ListArgumentsAll.aspx (last visited Jul. 2, 2012).
18. See 4th Cir. Internal Operating Proc. 34.3, available at Local Rules of the Fourth Circuit,
Internal Operating Procedures, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/pdf/rules.pdf (last visited Jul. 2, 2012).
19. Fourth Circuit Oral Argument Audio Files, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT, http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/OAList.asp (last visited Jul. 2, 2012).
20. Id.
21. 4th Cir. Internal Operating Proc. 34.3; see also 4th Cir. R. 25(c)(2).
22. See Fourth Circuit Oral Argument Audio Files, supra note 19.
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and attorney name. 23 It also provides an RSS feed, which returns the
most recently released day's worth of oral-argument recordings. 24 Re-
cordings are released on the same day as oral argument, usually within a
few hours.
Seventh Circuit
Oral-argument audio, dating back to May 2008, is posted to the
Seventh Circuit's website. 25 Recordings are made available on the same
day arguments are held. The court's audio files are searchable by case
number. The court provides an RSS feed returning the previous week's
worth of oral arguments, as well as an iTunes podcast to which listeners
can subscribe.26 In addition, the court provides a website link for
handheld devices so that members of the public can hear oral-argument
recordings on their cell phones.27 Like most circuits with progressive
oral-argument audio policies, the Seventh Circuit does not appear to have
a written policy concerning oral-argument audio; rather, the public is left
to glean the court's policy from what can be found on the court's web-
site.
Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit provides public access to oral-argument record-
ings via an iTunes podcast.28 As of early July 2012, the court had 281
oral-argument recordings, dating back to December 13, 2011, posted to
iTunes. The court also posts its oral-argument recordings to its website,
in a searchable database.29 The court's database includes oral arguments
from as early as January 2000.30 Generally, the court posts oral-argument
recordings within a few hours of the arguments.
Ninth Circuit
Alone among all federal appellate courts, the Ninth Circuit not only
provides oral-argument audio for every case in a searchable database, but
23. Oral Arguments Recording Page, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgumentRecordings.aspx (last visited Jul. 2, 2012).
24. RSS Feeds, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/RssFeeds.aspx (last visited Jul. 2, 2012).
25. Telephone Interview with Staff Member, Clerk's Office of the U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit (Nov. 2011).
26. See US. 7th Judicial Circuit: New Oral Arguments, ITUNES,
http://itunes.apple.com/podcast/us-7th-judicial-circuit-new/idl71536311 (last visited Jul. 2, 2012).
27. See 7th Circuit Mobile, SEVENTH CIRCUIT CT. OF APPEALS,
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/mobile.htm (last visited Jul. 2, 2012).
28. Oral Arguments from the Eighth Circuit US. Court of Appeals, ITUNES,
http://itunes.apple.com/podcast/oral-arguments-from-eighth/id274752609 (last visited Jul. 2, 2012).
29. Eighth Circuit Court ofAppeals and Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Oral Arguments Search,
U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/oralargs/oaFrame.html
(last visited Jul. 2, 2012).
30. Id.
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it also provides video of oral arguments in select cases. 3 ' The court pro-
vides live streaming audio for internal court use and posts audio of oral
arguments for public consumption one day after arguments are held.32
The court's database of oral-argument audio dates back approximately
five years.33 The Ninth Circuit is easily the most progressive of the fed-
eral circuits in the area of transparency. Indeed, in December 2009, the
Ninth Circuit Judicial Council approved experimental use of cameras in
the federal district courts within the circuit.3 4 It is commendable, and
somewhat ironic, that the circuit court whose decisions are most often the
subject of controversy and criticism 3 5 is also the circuit whose policy is
the most transparent in terms of allowing public access to an important
aspect of its deliberative process.
Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit posts audio recordings of oral arguments by
close of business on the same day that argument is held.36 The court's
website contains a search page that allows the public to search for oral-
argument recordings using case name, appellate case number, or argu-
ment date.37 The database of recordings includes oral arguments present-
ed as far back as 2006.
B. The Laggards
Second Circuit
An undated "Notice to the Bar" posted on the Second Circuit's
website advises that "[a]n audio tape" of an oral argument "may be pur-
chased for $26 per tape by written request to the Clerk."3 9 The use of the
phrase "audio tape" suggests that the notice is somewhat dated. Other
than this apparently outdated notice, the court does not address the issue
31. Audio and Video, U.S. CTS. FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/medial
(last visited Jul. 2, 2012). By contrast, nearly half of all state supreme courts offer live video
webcasts of their oral arguments. See Brown, supra note 11, at 2.
32. Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Some Reflections on Cameras in the Appellate Courtroom, 9 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 323, 324 (2007).
33. Audio and Video, supra note 31, at archive p. 179.
34. Steven M. Ellis, Ninth Circuit Approves Experimental Use of Cameras in District Courts,
METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE (L.A.), Dec. 21, 2009, at 3,
http://www.metnews.com/articles/2009/camel22109.htm; Press Release, Ninth Circuit Judicial
Council Approves Experimental Use of Cameras in District Courts (Dec. 17, 2009).
35. See, e.g., Jerome Farris, Judges on Judging: The Ninth Circuit-Most Maligned Circuit in
the Country-Fact or Fiction?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1465, 1472 (1997) (Ninth Circuit judge arguing that
the circuit's reversal rate is not because its judges are too "liberal," but because of its willingness to
take on controversial issues); Kevin M. Scott, Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth Circuit, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 341, 341 (2006) (discussing Ninth Circuit's reversal rate).
36. Oral Argument Search, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/search/audio.html (last visited Jul. 2, 2012).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Notice to the Bar, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Docs/News/Notice%20to%20the%20bar.pdf (last visited Jul. 2, 2012).
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of public availability of oral-argument recordings in its local rules or
internal operating procedures.4 0
Sixth Circuit
Oral-argument recordings are not made available on the Sixth Cir-
cuit's website, but the court advises attorneys on its website that audio
recordings of oral arguments are available for $26 "per tape."41 None of
the court's local rules or internal operating procedures addresses the is-
sue.
Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit is the only federal appellate court that requires
the formal filing of a motion to obtain access to oral-argument record-
ings. Tenth Circuit Local Rule 34.1(E) states that oral-argument record-
ings are for the court's use, but that "parties or others" may file a motion
seeking access to an oral-argument recording.4 2 If the motion is granted,
the oral-argument recording will be e-mailed to the movant at no cost. 43
The Tenth Circuit's rule on access to oral-argument recordings is fraught
with problems, which are discussed in further detail in Part II.
Eleventh Circuit
Even among the least progressive circuits, the Eleventh Circuit is a
curious outlier in terms of its unwillingness to embrace a transparent
policy. Eleventh Circuit Local Rule 344(g) provides:
Oral argument is recorded for exclusive use of the court. Neither
the recording nor a transcript thereof will be made available to coun-
sel or the parties. With advance approval of the court, however,
counsel may arrange and pay for a qualified court reporter to be pre-
sent to record and transcribe the oral argument for counsel's personal
use. Recording of court proceedings by anyone other than the court is
prohibited.4
One must almost admire the steadfastness with which the Eleventh
Circuit has adhered to this rule despite its demonstrated absurdity and the
40. On a somewhat incongruous note, however, the Second Circuit has been commended for
its policy of allowing oral arguments to be televised by news media and educational institutions. See
2d Cir. R. App. at pt. B (adopted Mar. 27, 1996), available at Local Rules Appendix Part B: Second
Circuit Guidelines Concerning Cameras in the Courtroom, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
CIRCUIT, http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/clerk/Rules/LRIAppendix B.htm (last visited Jul. 2, 2012);
Brown, supra note 11, at 5-6.
41. Oral Argument Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT, http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/court calendars/pdfloralargfaqspdf (last visited Jul.
2,2012).
42. 10th Cir. R. 34.1(E).
43. Id.
44. 11 th Cir. R. 34-4(g).
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pointed criticism it has received. 45  For example, in 2006, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed and remanded a case to a federal district judge in Flori-
da, and when the district judge subsequently requested a copy of the oral-
argument recording, the Eleventh Circuit denied the judge's request.46
Even more absurdly, in 2007, the Eleventh Circuit considered amending
its rule to provide that it would release recordings to the United States
Supreme Court if requested, but ultimately opted not to do so.47
District of Columbia Circuit
The D.C. Circuit adopted its policy regarding oral-argument record-
ings more than fifteen years ago.48 It provides that only "an attorney or
litigant in the case may listen to oral-argument tapes.'A 9 However, the
policy does allow "any person" to request that a transcript be made of
oral argument at his or her own expense, using a court reporter specified
by the court.50 Inexplicably, the court specifies that "[t]he cost will in-
clude the expense of preparing one copy of the transcript for the reques-
tor and four copies for the Court."5' The policy further provides that any
person may request a copy of an oral-argument recording "after the case
has been completely closed," and clarifies that "[t]his means that all ap-
peals, remands, or other additional proceedings must be concluded be-
fore the tape will be reproduced." 52 The circuit charges $30 for an oral-
argument recording. Finally, the D.C. Circuit's policy provides that
"[t]he Court will consider requests for a waiver" of its policy upon a
45. E.g., Howard Bashman, At 11th Circuit, What Happens at Oral Argument Stays at Oral
Argument, LAW.COM, (Sept. 3, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
ll88550954340&slretum=; Allison Torres Burtka, Court Policies on Sealed and Secret Infor-
mation Diverge, TRIAL, Feb. 2008, at 62, 62.
46. United States v. Williams, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305 n.9 (M.D. Fla. 2007) ("It is diffi-
cult to understand how or why the Court of Appeals concluded that the sentencing rationale I set out
was mere subterfuge. I thought perhaps something was said during oral argument on appeal that
influenced the panel's judgment. So I requested a copy of the transcript from the Court of Appeals.
My request was denied. Unlike the United States Supreme Court and most of the other courts of
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit maintains the transcripts of these
public hearings in secret.").
47. Burtka, supra note 45, at 62.
48. Court Policy on Recordings & Transcripts of Oral Arguments, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS, D.C.






52. Id. 1 4. This aspect of the court's policy is especially puzzling in light of the frequency
with which the D.C. Circuit's written opinions cite to statements made by counsel in oral argument.
A Westlaw search of D.C. Circuit decisions for the words "recording" or "tape" within five words of
the phrase "oral argument" turned up sixty-eight such instances. See, e.g., Artis v. Bemanke, 630
F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In Artis, the court cited to the oral-argument recording to support the
harsh conclusion that counsel for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System made a
misrepresentation to the court. Id. at 1038. Yet, because the decision resulted in a remand for further
proceedings before the district court, and the case is still pending, there is no way for anyone but the
litigants themselves to verify the court's citation without incurring the time and expense of hiring a
company to generate a transcript of the argument.
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showing of good cause." There does not, however, appear to be any
guidance from the court on what constitutes "good cause" for purposes
of obtaining a waiver of the court's policy.
II. CRITIQUE OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT RULE 34. 1(E)(1)
The Tenth Circuit's newly adopted policy on oral-argument record-
ings is at least a tentative step in the right direction. But it simply is not
enough, especially by comparison to the policies adopted by a majority
of the federal appellate courts. Moreover, an examination of the text of
the Tenth Circuit's Rule 34.1(E)(1) on its face shows it to be completely
standardless. The rule states:
Oral arguments are recorded electronically for the use of the court.
Parties or others seeking access to the recordings may, however, file
a motion to obtain a copy. The motion must state the reason or rea-
sons access is sought. Upon issuance of an order from the hearing
panel granting the request, the clerk will be directed to forward the
mp3 recording via email.54
The first sentence of the rule makes clear that the Tenth Circuit's
policy is that oral-argument recordings are for the court's, not the pub-
lic's, use. The Tenth Circuit will, however, permit members of the public
to request access to the recordings, 5 and the court may grant such access
under circumstances that remain entirely unspecified.
This latter point is especially troubling: the rule provides members
of the public with no notice of the standard that they must meet in order
for a request to be approved by the court. The court requires the public to
state the reason or reasons for the request without knowing what sorts of
reasons the court will find satisfactory. It is ironic that a federal appellate
court-which justifiably will not abide the exercise of standardless and
unconstrained discretion in other branches of government when present-
ed with such caseS56-would enact its own standardless rule that allows
unconstrained discretion in its application.
As a matter of practice, it appears to be the case that since May
2010, when the Tenth Circuit implemented the current rule,17 the court
53. Court Policy on Recordings & Transcripts of Oral Arguments, supra note 48, 15.
54. 10th Cir. R. 34.1(E)(1).
55. Id.
56. Cf Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) ("It is established that a law
fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it
leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits . . . "); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d
906, 920 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Allowing government officials to make decisions as to who may speak
on county property, without any criteria or guidelines to circumscribe their power, strongly suggests
the potential for unconstitutional conduct . . . .").
57. The court implemented its current policy on an interim basis in May 2010. See in re
Release of Oral Argument Recordings, U.S. CT. OF APP. 10TH CIR. add. V, 28 U.S.C.A. (2010). The
court formally adopted Tenth Circuit Local Rule 34.1(E)(1) effective January 1, 2012. See 10th Cir.
R. 34.1(E)(1).
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has granted all or nearly all motions that have been filed pursuant to Rule
34.1(E)(1). But if this is the case, it would appear that the Tenth Circuit's
requirement of filing a motion to obtain oral-argument recordings is
nothing more than a procedural hoop designed to deter members of the
public-the vast majority of whom lacks access to counsel, the resources
to hire counsel, or the sophistication to file a motion pro se-from ever
bothering to seek access to oral-argument recordings.
III. THE COMPETING POLICIES
There are, to be sure, policy concerns that might, taken by them-
selves, favor the minority position concerning public access to oral-
argument recordings. Those concerns are far outweighed, however, by
the persuasive policy reasons for the more transparent approach adopted
by the United States Supreme Court and the majority of federal appellate
courts.
A. The Policy Concerns Underlying a Less Transparent Approach
One of the concerns most frequently raised concerning the broad-
casting of oral arguments is the danger that it will lead to "grandstand-
ing" by appellate counsel (or, for that matter, the judges). For example, at
the time of the controversy caused by Professor Irons, some noted schol-
ars, including Professor Charles Fried of Harvard, dismissed the distribu-
tion of the tapes as "pure entertainment" that would "encourage grand-
standing.", 8
Grandstanding is one aspect of a broader concern. As Chief Justice
Roberts has observed, "[O]ral argument helps appellate judges learn
about a particular case in a particular way"-it is a "valuable tool" that
has served appellate courts well.59 Broadcasting oral arguments, either in
audio or visual form, may alter the dynamics of the arguments in a way
60that makes them less useful to the court.
This concern, while not one that should be lightly dismissed, has not
been borne out by the experiences of the many appellate courts that have
been broadcasting oral arguments, either live or on a delayed basis, for
the past several years.6' Indeed, even in the case of televised broadcasts
of oral arguments, federal appellate judges have observed that grand-
standing has not been an issue. As Judge O'Scannlain of the Ninth Cir-
cuit has observed, "My personal experience ... has been that as a general
rule my colleagues and practitioners have acted with the civility and de-
58. Biskupic, supra note 6.
59. Brown, supra note 11, at 3-4 (quoting John G. Roberts Jr., C.J., U.S. Supreme Court,
Remarks at the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference (July 13, 2006))..
60. See Daniel Stepniak, Technology and Public Access to Audio-Visual Coverage and Re-
cordings of Court Proceedings: Implications for Common Law Jurisdictions, 12 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 791, 808 (2004).
61. Id. at 802.
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corum appropriate to a federal appellate courtroom, by and large resist-
ing the temptation to play to the television audience." 62 Given that tele-
vised broadcasts have not resulted in a grandstanding problem, it seems
even less likely that audio broadcasting-which uses equipment that is
far less intrusive and noticeable in the courtroom-will result in grand-
standing by either counsel or the judges.
A second concern is that easy public access to oral-argument re-
cordings might result in the kind of public pressure that politicizes the
process of appellate decision making. 63 While this might be a legitimate
concern for those jurisdictions whose judges are elected, it is not (or at
least should not be) a concern for federal appellate judges who have the
benefit of life tenure.6 In addition, the measured and deliberate nature of
appellate decision making further insulates federal appellate judges from
whatever public pressure might be created by the broadcast of oral argu-
ments. If they were expected to issue a decision immediately upon the
conclusion of oral arguments, or even very soon thereafter, such public
pressure might arguably play a role. But this is not the case, as appellate
lawyers-who invariably find themselves having to explain to clients
"why it's taking so long"-know all too well.65
Finally, a third concern is that a question posed by a judge could be
taken out of context and misused to create an inaccurate impression of
what federal appellate judges do. This might be a legitimate concern giv-
en the kinds of hypothetical questions sometimes posed to probe the lim-
its of a party's legal position. The remedy, however, for potential public
misunderstandings concerning the workings of federal appellate courts is
not to continue keeping the public in the dark, but rather to give the pub-
lic greater access, which ultimately will lead to more informed public
commentary on the courts' deliberative process. The opposing view "ap-
pears to reveal an undesirable elitism and the existence of a concern,
similar to that expressed in the early twentieth century, that the lay public
62. O'Scanniain, supra note 32, at 327.
63. Id.
64. U.S. CONST., art. 111, § I ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour .... ").
65. On a related note, Judge O'Scannlain provides a final, somewhat cynical, reason why the
"public pressure" concern should not be a problem:
[A] normal day in the appellate courtroom rarely includes cases on the order of Hepting
or Al-Haramain, and it becomes clear that our docket is hardly the stuff that provides the
storylines for Law & Order. While every case is interesting and important in its own
right, especially to the parties, most cases are unlikely to engender a great deal of emo-
tion from spectators or from the public at large.
O'Scannlain, supra note 32, at 327. Unfortunately, I have discovered from my own personal experi-
ence that Judge O'Scannlain's observations are all too true. When I have presented oral argument to
the Colorado state appellate courts, which do make oral-argument recordings available for public
access, members of my own family have found the arguments too dry to listen to the entire argu-
ment.
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ought not to be permitted to become too involved or interested in judicial
matters."66
B. The Policies Supporting the Majority Position
Purely as a matter of logic, the most obvious reason why the federal
appellate courts should make oral-argument recordings publicly available
is that the oral arguments themselves are open to the public. As Professor
Laurence Tribe noted at the time of the Irons controversy, "We are not
talking about secrets and leaks. These [oral-argument tapes and tran-
scripts] are clearly public documents. . . . Why access should be limited
to the few who are lucky enough to sit in the courtroom is beyond me."6 7
Moreover, if a reporter can attend oral arguments and produce a news
report based on his or her furiously scribbled but invariably incomplete
notes, it is difficult to see how the court would not benefit from allowing
that same reporter access to the oral-argument recording so that questions
and answers can be accurately transcribed.
This is not to say that the issue should be framed in terms of media
rights or providing broader access to the press, especially in an age in
which citizens increasingly have the ability to become informed and ar-
rive at their own conclusions without the filtering lens of the news me-
dia. Rather, the real value of greater access to oral-argument recordings
is in its potential to help shape the public's perception of the work done
by the appellate courts. As Judge O'Scannlain observed, "I suspect that
many Americans may not understand the multi-tiered review that is pro-
vided by our judicial system, and I believe that it would improve confi-
dence in the judiciary as a whole if ordinary citizens were able to see [or
at least hear] appellate judges performing their daily job." 68 Numerous
surveys have borne out Judge O'Scannlain's suspicion.69
The Tenth Circuit itself, from time to time, holds oral arguments in
settings other than the courthouse in order to give certain audiences-a
large group of law students, for example 70 -exposure to appellate oral
arguments and a glimpse into an important aspect of appellate decision
making.71 There does not appear to be any principled distinction between
66. Stepniak, supra note 60, at 809.
67. Biskupic, supra note 6.
68. O'Scannlain, supra note 32, at 328.
69. See Stepniak, supra note 60, at 806 ("Surveys of public perception of the judicial process
carried out in common law countries have revealed low levels of public understanding of the role of
courts and ofjudicial processes, and correspondingly low levels of confidence in the judiciary.").
70. Events: U.S. Court of Appeals-Tenth Circuit, UNIV. OF DENVER STURM C. OF LAW
(MAR. 10,2011), http://law.du.edu/index.php/events/u.s.-court-of-appeals-tenth-circuit.
71. The Colorado appellate courts have been engaged in a similar educational outreach effort
for the last twenty-five years. As part of the "Courts in the Community Program," the Colorado
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have traveled to high schools throughout the state to hold oral
arguments in interesting and often high-profile cases. As the courts' website explains, the program
"gives high school students hands-on experience in how the Colorado judicial system actually works
and illustrates how disputes are resolved in a democratic society." Courts in the Community,
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those efforts and the efforts most federal appellate courts currently make
to give the public broader access to oral-argument recordings.
The value of a more transparent policy on the availability of oral ar-
guments is not just about educating the public, but about lending the
courts greater legitimacy as the public comes to understand the deliber-
ate, careful, and reasoned manner in which appellate courts go about the
decision-making process. Having personally witnessed more than one
hundred Tenth Circuit oral arguments over the years, I am confident that
no member of the public, if given the opportunity to listen to the Tenth
Circuit's oral arguments, would reach a conclusion other than that its
judges are "competent, careful and well-intentioned protectors of the
ideals of an independent judiciary." 72
CONCLUSION
More than a decade ago, I was privileged to present oral argument
to a Tenth Circuit panel in Schroder v. Bush,73 in which a group of farm-
ers had asserted claims against the President of the United States, the
Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of the Treasury, seeking an
order requiring the defendants and their agents to maintain market condi-
tions favorable to small farmers. The case was without merit, at least as a
legal matter, and the district court dismissed the claim in a three-sentence
order based on the political question doctrine.
The oral argument was held in the Tenth Circuit's ceremonial court-
room, and the room was packed with more than a hundred intensely in-
terested small farmers and their families, who had come to watch the
argument from all over the rural areas of the Tenth Circuit, including
Kansas and the eastern plains of Colorado and New Mexico. The panel
proceeded to ask questions designed, it appeared to me, to educate the
enormous crowd who had come to Denver to listen to the argument. It
was a masterful example of a panel of judges who were mindful of their
audience, and who, through their questions of me and my opposing
counsel, respectfully and delicately provided a thorough explication of
the important constitutional reasons for what would inevitably be a dis-
appointing decision for the audience.74
It was one of the Tenth Circuit's finest moments, of which there are
undoubtedly many in the course of every term of court. There is no per-
COLORADO STATE JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Education
/Community.cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2012); see also Courts in the Community, COLO. ST. JUDICIAL
BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/CourtProbation/EducationalResources/
currentbrochure.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
72. O'Scannlain, supra note 32, at 329.
73. 263 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2001).
74. The court's written opinion was equally respectful and sympathetic toward the plight of
the American small farmer. See, e.g., 263 F.3d at 1171 ("Every branch of the federal government has
recognized how difficult it is for small farmers to make a living by farming.").
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suasive reason why such moments should be witnessed only by those
lucky few who are actually present in the courtroom. The Court should
liberalize its policy and give the public greater access to its oral argu-
ments. Its reputation and standing in the public's perception will only be
enhanced by doing so.
LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SoME: DUE PROCESS FOR
PRISONERS IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT IN LIGHT OF TOEVS V.
REID
INTRODUCTION
Pro se prisoner Janos Toevs sued the Colorado Department of Cor-
rections and lost. Twice. Yet, the Colorado Attorney General's Office
and the United States Department of Justice requested that the three-
judge panel reconsider the judgment or rehear the case en banc.
Mr. Toevs's suit hardly seems irregular on its face. Mr. Toevs chal-
lenged his solitary confinement' on grounds that the Colorado Depart-
ment of Corrections unconstitutionally placed him in solitary confine-
ment for seven years, violating his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.
It is similar to the other roughly 700 prisoner cases-civil suits with
prisoner plaintiffs-heard by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
each year, which comprise approximately 30% of the cases considered
by the circuit.2 Like Mr. Toevs, many of the prisoners lose at both the
trial level and the appellate level. The decision in Toevs v. Reid stands
out, though, because in the process of affirming the lower court's deci-
sion, the Tenth Circuit clarified the term "indefiniteness" used in the due
process analysis. The Toevs panel also modified the judicial deference
employed by previous panels, a change that increased the viability of
prisoners' claims. These refinements precipitated the negative reactions
1. Although there is a technical difference between "administrative segregation" and "soli-
tary confinement," courts typically use the terms interchangeably. The Tenth Circuit in Toevs refers
to the penological scheme at issue as "administrative segregation," but I have chosen to refer to the
punishment as "solitary confinement." For more information on the differences between the two
types of confinement, see Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psycho-
logical Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477,
496-97 (1997) ("Amnesty International has used the term 'solitary confinement' to cover 'all forms
of incarceration that totally remove a prisoner from inmate society. It often means that the prisoner is
visually and acoustically isolated from all other prisoners, as well as having no personal contact with
them.' Yet, this general rubric subsumes many variations. For example, some American correctional
systems now are so crowded that even prisoners in 'solitary confinement' units are double-celled
and, therefore, not isolated from one another at all. In fact, by some definitions, these prisoners are
simultaneously and paradoxically isolated and overcrowded. Similarly, even when they are single-
celled it is impossible to completely curtail communication between prisoners in solitary confine-
ment units (under all but the most extreme architectural designs). In some of these units, sensory
overload rather than sensory deprivation adversely affects prisoners whose restricted confinement in
close quarters means they cannot escape the intrusive noise or presence of others. Moreover, some of
the special units that have been most soundly condemned by mental health experts and the courts
impose a regimen known as 'small group isolation' on prisoners in which a restricted number of
them are housed together but away from everyone else." (footnote omitted)).
2. U.S. Court of Appeals-Judicial Caseload Profile, UNITED STATES COURTS
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsa20l lJun.pi (last visited Feb. 10, 2012)
(dividing the sum of prisoner appeals from 2006 to 2011 by the sum of total cases filed between
2006 and 2011).
3. 646 F.3d 752 (10th Cir. 2011).
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of the Colorado Attorney General's Office and the United States De-
partment of Justice and the subsequent motions for reconsideration and
rehearing en banc.
Part I of this Comment explores the history of solitary confinement
and the case law prior to Toevs. Part II explains the facts, procedural
history, and opinions from Toevs. Part III explains three reasons why the
government opposes the Tenth Circuit's decision in Toevs. Finally, this
Comment concludes by opining that the holding from Toevs should stand
and that the Tenth Circuit should deny the motions to rehear and recon-
sider the case.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Background of Solitary Confinement
Solitary confinement prisons, known as supermaxes, differ from
general population prisons.4 While not every prison operates in the same
manner, characteristics of supermaxes generally include the following:
twenty-three hours a day in a small cell, limited opportunity to call or
visit with family, eating meals and recreating alone, and restriction or
denial of personal property.s Frequently, the lights remain on at all
times. 6 Although the goals of supermaxes vary from institution to institu-
tion, generally the purposes of these prisons are as follows: protecting
staff and other inmates from the most violent prisoners; normalizing gen-
eral population prisons, which allows for more vocational training and
psychological therapy; and modifying the violent inmates' behavior.
While concrete statistics are difficult to verify, one recent study estimates
8that at least 25,000 people are confined in state-run supermaxes.
These numbers are the result of a recent explosion in the use of soli-
tary confinement throughout the state and federal prison systems.9 Since
the 1980s, the use of solitary confinement and supermax prisons has
grown exponentially.10 For example, in 1984, only one supermax prison
4. See Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief
History and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 443 (2006); Myra A. Sutanto, Wil-
kinson v. Austin and the Quest for a Clearly Defined Liberty Interest Standard, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1029, 1031 (2006).
5. Sutanto, supra note 4, at 1031, 1038.
6. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 214 (2005).
7. DANIEL P. MEARS, EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPERMAX PRISONS 4-5 (2006).
8. Id. at 4.
9. See Leena Kurki & Norval Morris, The Purposes, Practices, and Problems of Supermax
Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 385, 387-93 (2001) (explaining the growth of supermax prisons).
10. See MEARS, supra note 7, at 31 ("In 1987, over 3,000 Texas prisoners resided in [solitary
confinement] and by 2001 the total had tripled to more than 9,000."); Haney & Lynch, supra note 1,
at 491 ("Notwithstanding this long history of criticism and heightened awareness among mental
health professionals about their harmful effects, long term solitary confinement and related practices
are now being used on an increasingly widespread basis in prison systems across the United
States."). See generally Roy D. King, The Rise and Rise of Supermax: An American Solution in
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existed: the federal penitentiary in Marion, Illinois." Two decades later,
over forty prisons across the country operate as supermax prisons.12 yet
even amidst the growth of solitary confinement in modem prisons, the
topic is not without great historical criticism.
3
American prisons began experimenting with solitary confinement as
early as the 1790s.14 Despite criticisms of the solitary confinement mod-
el-specifically, reports of insanity, suicide, and requests to be put to
death rather than live in solitary confinement-in 1826, Pennsylvania
opened the Western State Penitentiary, which held all inmates in solitary
confinement.15 The Pennsylvania model spread throughout the nineteenth
century.1 Legal criticism caught up with the practice by the turn of the
century, leading the Supreme Court to note in In Re Medley17 the inhu-
mane psychological toll imposed by solitary confinement:
A considerable number of the [solitary confinement] prisoners fell,
after even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from
which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and others became
violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those who
stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cas-
es did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent
service to the community.
Although the federal prison system continued to operate solitary
confinement prisons throughout the twentieth century-including the
infamous United States Penitentiary at Alcatraz and the aforementioned
Manon-many states discontinued the practice and instead housed pris-
oners in general population facilities. 9 General population units afford
inmates greater privileges, social interaction with other inmates, prison
jobs, educational classes, and the ability to independently leave the cell
for recreation or group meals.20
Search of a Problem?, I PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 163 (1999) (comparing European and American
punishments schemes).
I1. Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 489.
12. See MEARS, supra note 7, at 4.
13. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 558-67 (advocating limiting the use of solitary
confinement to prevent psychological harm and inhumane treatment); Smith, supra note 4, at 489-
94 (reviewing the negative psychological and physiological effects of solitary confinement).
14. Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 483.
15. Id.
16. Id at 484; see also Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 325, 328 (2006).
17. 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
18. Id. at 168.
19. Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 487; Smith, supra note 3, at 442.
20. JOHN BOSTON & DANIEL E. MANVILLE, PRISONERS' SELF-HELP LITIGATION MANUAL
318 (4th ed. 2010).
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In the 1980s, the rapid growth of prison general populations led to
overcrowding. 21 Prison gangs and violence followed the rampant over-
crowding.2 2 As a result, prison officials attempted to control these activi-
ties with supermax prisons.23
Cries of inhumanity sound as loudly today as they did 100 years ago
in the Supreme Court's Medley opinion. International human rights or-
ganizations and domestic groups concerned with the humane treatment
of prisoners have condemned the use of solitary confinement.24 Mental
health experts maintain prolonged solitary confinement imposes horrific
psychological burdens on inmates.25 These modem studies show inmates
experience "anxiety, panic, rage, loss of control, appetite and sleep dis-
turbances, self-mutilations, and other recurring themes and symptoms."
26
21. Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 491; Chase Riveland, Prison Management Trends,
1975-2025, 26 CRIME & JUST. 163, 179-80 (1999). See generally Craig Haney, Psychology and the
Limits to Prison Pain: Confronting the Coming Crisis in Eighth Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 499 (examining the connection between psychology and penological policies within the
context of cruel and unusual punishment).
22. Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 491-92; Riveland, supra note 21, at 179.
23. Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 491-92; Riveland, supra note 21, at 190-91; Scott
Tachiki, Indeterminate Sentences in Supermax Prisons Based Upon Alleged Gang Affiliations: A
Reexamination of Procedural Protection and a Proposal for Greater Procedural Requirements, 83
CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1131 (1995); Andrew J. Theis, The Gang's All Here: How the Supreme Court's
Unanimous Holding in Wilkinson v. Austin Utilizes Supermax Facilities to Combat Prison Gangs
and Other Security Threats, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 145, 148 (2006).
24. See, e.g., Elizabeth Vasiliades, Solitary Confinement and International Human Rights:
Why the U.S. Prison System Fails Global Standards, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 71, 98 (2005) ("While
solutions exist, the United States has carefully crafted jurisprudence and treaty reservations to pre-
vent interpretations of domestic prison practice under international standards. Numerous organiza-
tions, from Amnesty International to the U.N. Committee Against Torture, have condemned the use
of segregation techniques and the abrasive conditions in U.S. supermax prisons."); see generally
Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union to the United Nations Human Rights Council, Abuse
of the Human Rights of Prisoners in the United States: Solitary Confinement (2011), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ACLUSubmission-to HRC_16thSession onSolitaryConfinem
ent.pdf; U.N. General Assembly, Interim Report ofSpecial Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. DOC. A/63/175 (July 28, 2008); The Istanbul
Statement on the Use and Effects of Solitary Confinement, 18 TORTURE 63 (2008) (addressing the
increasing use of solitary confinement and its harmful effects and created by twenty-four
international experts).
25. Grassian, supra note 16, at 354 ("The restriction of environmental stimulation and social
isolation associated with confinement in solitary are strikingly toxic to mental functioning, produc-
ing a stuporous condition associated with perceptual and cognitive impairment and affective disturb-
ances. In more severe cases, inmates so confined have developed florid delirium-a confusional
psychosis with intense agitation, fearfulness, and disorganization."); Haney & Lynch, supra note 1,
at 529-39; Jeffery L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in US.
Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 104, 107 (2010) ("The
professional organizations should acknowledge that it is not ethically defensible for health care
professionals to acquiesce silently to conditions of confinement that inflict mental harm and violate
human rights."). See generally Bruce A. Arrigo & Jennifer Leslie Bullock, The Psychological Effects
of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners in Supermax Units: Reviewing What We Know and Recom-
mending What Should Change, 52 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 622 (2008)
(arguing long-term isolation causes devastating consequences on prisoners' mental health and the
lack of adequate medical and psychiatric care compounds these problems).
26. Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 530; accord Grassian, supra note 16, at 354; Metzner &
Fellner, supra note 25, at 104.
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In the summer of 2011, prisoners throughout California's Pelican
Bay State Prison, a supermax facility, started a hunger strike protesting
their solitary confinement and its deleterious effects. 27 The story gar-
nered national and international media attention. 28 Upwards of 6,600
inmates participated in the strike.29 In describing the Pelican Bay strike
and summarizing the use of solitary confinement in the United States,
The Guardian editorialized: "The widespread use and abuse of solitary
confinement in US prisons and jails is one of the nation's most pressing
domestic human rights issues, and also perhaps its most ignored."30
B. Due Process Case Law
Prisoners use the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause as one ve-
hicle for challenging prison conditions, including prolonged or indefinite
solitary confinement.3 1 The Constitution protects citizens from depriva-
tions of life, liberty, or property without the due process of law.32 fn or-
der to show a deprivation of liberty, a plaintiff must (1) possess a liberty
interest in the conditions of confinement, and (2) demonstrate the process
afford by the prison is insufficient.33 Prisoners' suits typically allege soli-
tary confinement unconstitutionally deprives them of the right to liber-
ty.34
1. Sandin v. Connor
Sandin v. Connor' describes the Supreme Court's modem jurispru-
dential approach to due process. 3 6 In Sandin, the prisoner alleged Hawai-
ian prison officials deprived him of procedural due process when refus-
ing to allow him to present witnesses during a disciplinary hearing. 37 The
disciplinary board consequently sentenced him to solitary confinement
for misconduct. 3 8 The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the prison officials. 39 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
27. Sam Quinones, 6,600 California Prisoners Refused Meals, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2011,
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/07/6600-califomia-prisoners-refuse-meals.html.
28. lan Lovett, California Inmates Fast to Protest Isolations Cells, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011,
at Al6; James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, A Hunger for Justice in Pelican Bay, THE GUARDIAN
(U.K.), July 25, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jul/25/pelican-
bay-prison-hunger-strike; Solitary Confinement Should Be a Last Resort, WASH. POST, Aug. 21,
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/solitary-confinement-should-be-a-last-
resort/2011/08/11/glQAxys 6UJstory.html.
29. Quinones, supra note 27; Ridgeway & Casella, supra note 28.
30. Ridgeway & Casella, supra note 28.
31. See BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra note 20, at 305-31.
32. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) ("The Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek
to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.").
33. Id. at 221-24.
34. See BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra note 20, at 305-31.
35. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
36. See id.
37. Id. at 475.
38. Id. at 475-76.
39. Id. at 476.
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versed, holding that the prisoner's "liberty interest in remaining free
from disciplinary segregation" properly invoked the Fifth Amendment
due process clause.40
In overruling prior Supreme Court precedent and the Ninth Circuit,
the Court explained that states "may under certain circumstances create
liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause," but
only in limited circumstances which "impose[] atypical and significant
hardship[s] on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life."41 After comparing the prisoners' immediate circumstances to Ha-
waiian "inmates inside and outside disciplinary segregation," the Court
determined that the State's actions in placing the prisoner in solitary con-
finement for thirty days did not qualify as a major disruption in his envi-
42ronment. Consequently, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and af-
firmed the district court's ruling.4 3
2. Wilkinson v. Austin
The Supreme Court next considered the issue of a liberty interest in
Wilkinson v. Austin." In Wilkinson, prisoners at the Ohio State Peniten-
tiary (OSP)-the state's only maximum-security facility-sued officials
within the Ohio Department of Corrections (ODOC), alleging violations
of their Fifth Amendment rights because "the [ODOC's] procedures for
reviewing an OSP inmate's classification do not provide the prisoner a
hearing or even access to the individual deciding the inmate's security
classification. [ODOC's] procedures for initially moving someone to the
OSP also suffer from the same lack of notice and opportunity for hear-
ing." 45 The Wilkinson Court reaffirmed the Sandin v. Conner "atypical
and significant hardship" standard.46 However, the Wilkinson Court not-
ed that since Sandin, ten years earlier, circuit courts had struggled to as-
certain the appropriate "baseline" from which to compare the presented
conditions of confinement.47 As the result, the Court identified a series of
48factors to aid in this process.
40. Id. at 476-77.
41. Id. at 484.
42. Id. at 486.
43. Id. at 487-88.
44. 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
45. Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 731 (N.D. Ohio 2002); accord Wilkinson, 545
U.S. at 214, 218.
46. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223.
47. Id. ("In Sandin's wake the Courts of Appeals have not reached consistent conclusions for
identifying the baseline from which to measure what is atypical and significant in any particular
prison system."); accord Michael Z. Goldman, Sandin v. Conner and Intraprison Confinement: Ten
Years ofConfusion and Harm in Prisoner Litigation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 423,441-42 (2004).
48. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223-24.
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First, the Court compared the conditions at OSP with other prisons
in Ohio, finding the former the most restrictive in the state. 4 9 The Court
described the conditions thusly:
Conditions at OSP are more restrictive than any other form of in-
carceration in Ohio, including conditions on its death row or in its
administrative control units. The latter are themselves a highly re-
strictive form of solitary confinement. In OSP almost every aspect of
an inmate's life is controlled and monitored. Inmates must remain in
their cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23 hours per day. A light
remains on in the cell at all times, though it is sometimes dimmed,
and an inmate who attempts to shield the light to sleep is subject to
further discipline. During the one hour per day that an inmate may
leave his cell, access is limited to one of two indoor recreation
cells.so
Next, the Court noted placement at OSP seemed indefinite because
officials offered no indication of release from these restrictive condi-
tions." Furthermore, the Court observed that placement in solitary con-
finement disqualified inmates from parole.52 The Court determined that
while "these conditions standing alone might not be sufficient to create a
liberty interest, taken together they impose an atypical and significant
hardship within the correctional context." 53 Since the conditions at OSP
exceeded the Sandin "atypical and significant hardship" standard, the
Court held the prisoners possessed a liberty interest in avoiding OSP. 54
The Court noted that while "OSP's harsh conditions may well be neces-
sary and appropriate in light of the danger that high-risk inmates pose
both to prison officials and to other prisoners[,] . . . [t]hat necessity ...
does not diminish our conclusion that the conditions give rise to a liberty
interest." 5 In other words, while prison officials deserved deference in
their decision to place certain inmates in solitary confinement, prison
officials deserved no deference in the liberty interest determination. 6
3. Estate ofDiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections
In Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit interpreted the Wilkinson "atypi-
cal and significant" standard for the first time.58 The plaintiff, an anatom-
ical man living as a woman, sued the Wyoming Department of Correc-
49. Id. at 214; accord Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (comparing conditions in
question to other conditions in Hawaii).
50. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214 (citation omitted).




55. Id (internal citation omitted).
56. See id.
57. 473 F.3d 1334 (10th Cir. 2007).
58. Id. at 1340, 1342.
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tions, alleging a violation of her constitutional right to due process.so
Unaware of the plaintiffs gender identity, Wyoming sent her to a wom-
en's correctional facility.60 During the standard body cavity search at
inmate intake, prison officials discovered her anatomical identity.61 Sub-
sequently, prison officials placed her in isolation for fourteen months.6 2
Prison officials justified her placement thusly:
Placement officials nonetheless recommended that she be kept apart
from the general population for three reasons: (1) DiMarco's safety
and that of the general female inmate population, (2) her physical
condition, and (3) the need to tailor programs for her condition. [The]
warden testified at trial that a primary concern was that other inmates
might try to harm DiMarco if they discovered her physical condition.
Furthermore, questions surrounded DiMarco's identity because of
DiMarco's use of multiple, unverifiable aliases. The warden felt that
she did not know enough about DiMarco to risk placing her in the
general population. 63
After placing her in solitary confinement, prison officials reviewed
Ms. DiMarco's confinement every ninety days.
Ms. DiMarco alleged the lack of opportunity to challenge the condi-
tions of her confinement violated her due process rights, asserting that
the 438 days she spent in solitary confinement "resulted in an atypical
and significant departure from ordinary incidents of prison life, giving
rise to a state-created liberty interest that required due process protec-
tion," which the state failed to provide.65 On appeal, the court considered
"whether Wyoming had a constitutional duty to provide her an oppor-
tunity to challenge the placement and conditions of confinement under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."66
In order to dissociate the "atypical and significant" from "the ordi-
nary incidents of prison life," the Tenth Circuit needed to determine an
"appropriate baseline comparison."67 Consequently, the panel articulated
four non-exhaustive factors to aid this analysis: "Relevant factors might
include whether (1) the segregation relates to and furthers a legitimate
penological interest, such as safety or rehabilitation; (2) the conditions of
placement are extreme; (3) the placement increases the duration of con-
finement . . . ; and (4) the placement is indeterminate .... ."68 Three of




63. Id. at 1337.
64. Id. at 1342.
65. Id. at 1339.
66. Id. at 1336.
67. Id at 1341.
68. Id. at 1342.
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these four DiMarco factors originated in Wilkinson.69 The DiMarco "ex-
tremeness of conditions" factor corresponds with the "conditions" factor
as described in Wilkinson.70 The DiMarco "indeterminacy" and "increas-
ing the duration of confinement" factors also correspond to factors from
Wilkinson.71
While the Wilkinson Court urged the first three factors used by the
DiMarco panel, the Supreme Court specifically ruled against the use of
the "legitimate penological interest" factor in the liberty interest determi-
72nation. Rather than consider penological interest in the first prong of
the due process analysis, the Supreme Court reserved this factor for the
second prong: sufficiency of process.73 In contrast, the DiMarco panel
considered penological interest in both prongs of the due process analy-
sis.74 This dramatic increase in judicial deference significantly impacted
the liberty interest analysis by making the existence of an individual's
rights at least partially conditioned on the impact on the government.
The Tenth Circuit then applied these factors to the facts of Ms.
DiMarco's case.76 The court found a legitimate penological interest in
Ms. DiMarco's safety and inadequate facilities in normal prison condi-
tions.77 Then, the court analyzed her conditions of confinement and de-
termined that "[s]he had access to the basic essentials of life, although
her access to certain amenities was more limited than the general popula-
69. Compare Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005), with DiMarco, 473 F.3d at
1342.
70. Compare Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223-24 ("For an inmate placed in OSP, almost all human
contact is prohibited, even to the point that conversation is not permitted from cell to cell; the light,
though it may be dimmed, is on for 24 hours; exercise is for I hour per day, but only in a small
indoor room."), with DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1342 ("Relevant factors might include whether ... the
conditions of placement are extreme; . . . the placement increases the duration of confinement, as it
did in Wilkinson; and , . . the placement is indeterminate .... ). Contra Appellants' Opening Brief
at 27-29, Rezaq v. Nalley, No. 11-1069 (10th Cir. May 31, 2011) (arguing that the Tenth Circuit
improperly imported Eighth Amendment and substantive due process language into a Fifth Amend-
ment analysis).
71. Compare Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224 ("[Blut here there are two added components. First is
the duration. . . . [P]lacement at OSP is indefinite and, after an initial 30-day review, is reviewed just
annually. Second is that placement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole considera-
tion."), with DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1342 ("Relevant factors include whether ... the placement in-
creases the duration of confinement .. . and the placement is indeterminate.").
72. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224 ("OSP's harsh conditions may well be necessary and appropri-
ate in light of the danger that high-risk inmates pose both to prison officials and to other prisoners.
That necessity, however, does not diminish our conclusion that the conditions give rise to a liberty
interest in their avoidance." (citation omitted)).
73. See id. at 225.
74. DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1342-45.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 1342-45.
77. Id. at 1342.
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tion."78 Next, the court noted that the confinement in no way impacted
the duration of Ms. DiMarco's confinement or her parole.7 9
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the indeterminacy of Ms.
DiMarco's confinement.80 The court noted that Ms. DiMarco eventually
left prison and received periodic reviews with prison staff while con-
fined.81 These two findings supported the court's holding that Ms.
82DiMarco's confinement was definite. In essence, the court eschewed a
common definition of "indefiniteness" by basing the concept of "defi-
niteness" on periodic reviews.8 3 In sum, the court found all four factors
worked in favor of the prison officials and, thus, found no liberty interest
in Ms. DiMarco's confinement. 84 The DiMarco panel's interpretation of
the Supreme Court's rulings in Sandin and Wilkinson critically altered
Tenth Circuit law with regard to the liberty interest analysis, the first
prong of the due process determination.
4. Mathews v. Eldridge
In Mathews v. Eldridge,86 the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered the second prong in the due process analysis: the sufficiency of the
process afforded.87 Specifically, the Court decided "whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to the termi-
nation of Social Security disability benefit payments the recipient be
afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing."88 The Court noted
that due process requires "the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner."' 89 To determine whether the govern-
ment afforded the plaintiff sufficient process when terminating his bene-
fits, the Court recognized the need to avoid setting a rigid set of rules. 90
Instead the Court offered three factors to determine process sufficiency:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
78. Id at 1343. Contra Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 70, at 27-29 (arguing that the
Tenth Circuit improperly imported Eighth Amendment and substantive due process language into a
Fifth Amendment analysis).
79. DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1343.
80. Id. at 1343-44.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id.; WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1147 (1993) (defining
"indefinite" as "having no exact limits").
84. DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1344.
85. Compare Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (using a plain-meaning under-
standing of "indefinite" and rejecting penological interest in the liberty interest determination), with
DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1342-44 (using a judicially-created understanding of "indefinite" based on
periodic reviews and factoring legitimate penological into the liberty interest determination).
86. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
87. Id. at 334-35.
88. Id. at 323.
89. Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
90. Id at 334.
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the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.91
These factors juxtapose the plaintiffs interest against the govern-
ment's burden of providing additional process. 9 2 The Mathews Court
ensured that deference to the government's interest impacted the due
process analysis at some level, but balanced this factor against other
competing interests.93 While Mathews applies to all due process cases,
solitary confinement prisoner cases present additional complexity; at
some point the plaintiff was convicted of a crime, resulting in the proper
deprivation of some liberty. 9 4 When a prisoner alleges due process viola-
tions and successfully proves a protected liberty interest, the question
becomes how to balance the prisoner's right to liberty against govern-
ment interests and what type of process is constitutionally mandated. 9 5
5. Hewitt v. Helms
In Hewitt v. Helms,9 6 the Supreme Court further developed the se-
cond prong of the due process analysis. 97 Specifically, the Court scruti-
nized the periodic review procedures employed by prisons to evaluate the
ongoing need to hold the prisoner in solitary confinement. 9 8 The plaintiff
in Hewitt, serving a life sentence in a Pennsylvania correctional facility,
sued prison officials, claiming that their actions-"confining him to ad-
ministrative segregation within the prison"-violated his due process
rights. 99
The Court evaluated the administrative reviews afforded to the
plaintiff to determine whether prison officials offered constitutionally
sufficient process.100 The Court established that while "administrative
segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement,"
91. Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)).
92. See id
93. See id.
94. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) ("Lawful incarceration brings about the
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the consid-
erations underlying our penal system."), abrogated on other grounds by McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467 (1991); see also Patrick J.A. McClain, Bernard F. Sheehan & Lauren L. Butler, Substantive
Rights Retained by Prisoners, 86 GEO. L.J. 1953, 1963 (1998) ("Even though lawful imprisonment
deprives convicted prisoners of many rights, prisoners do retain certain constitutional rights.").
95. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224-229 (2005) ("Although Sandin abrogated ...
Hewitt's methodology for establishing the liberty interest, these cases remain instructive for their
discussion of the appropriate level of procedural safeguards.").
96. 459 U.S. 460 (1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 483 (1995).
97. Id. at 472-74.
98. Id. at 477.
99. Id. at 462.
100. Id. at 473-77.
2012] 419
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
prison officials must only provide "some sort of periodic review of the
confinement of [solitary confinement] inmates."'o This vague standard
afforded prison officials great deference in determining the substance of
prisoner reviews.10 2 To pass constitutional muster some form of a review
must occur, but the substance of the review is determined by prison offi-
cials and outside the purview of the judiciary.' 03
II. TOEVS V. REID
Before Toevs v. Reid, the Tenth Circuit looked particularly desolate
for plaintiff prisoners wishing to challenge their solitary confinement. 104
The extreme deference implemented by the DiMarco panel created a
tough road for prisoners to hoe just to demonstrate a liberty interest, let
alone show a due process violation. 05 Toevs v. Reid helped level the
playing field, and in the process incurred the disapproval of the Colorado
Attorney General's office.
A. Facts
The Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) employed a pro-
gram at the Colorado State Penitentiary (CSP) called the Quality of Life
Level Program (QLLP). 0 6 The QLLP, a "stratified quality of life pro-
gram," used six levels of "privileges" to incentivize "appropriate offend-
er behavior and program compliance" and discourage anti-social behav-
ior.'07 The DOC classified levels one through three as administrative
segregation, known more commonly as solitary confinement.108
Pursuant to prison regulations, prison officials conducted periodic
reviews to determine whether the inmate's behavior warranted progres-
sion to the next level.109 Progression from one level to the next required
the inmate to meet certain behavior criteria."o After completing Level 6,
the inmate became eligible for transfer to a general population prison or
unit."' Progression through QLLP required a minimum of thirteen
months, but there was no maximum.
101. Id. at 477 n.9 (emphasis added).
102. See id.
103. See id
104. See Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334, 1342-44 (10th Cir. 2007)
(using a judicially-created understanding of "indefinite" based on periodic reviews and factoring
legitimate penological into the liberty interest determination).
105. See id.
106. Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752, 753 (10th Cir. 2011)..
107. Id at 754.
108. Id.
109. Id
110. Id. at 759 ("The QLLP specifies certain prerequisites for promotion to Level 4.").
111. Id at 754.
112. Id.
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On March 4, 2002, the DOC placed inmate Janos Toevs into QLLP
after a failed escape attempt." 3 In September 2005, Mr. Toevs reached
Level 6.114 During his time in Level 6, the DOC documented negative
behavior."' As a result, the prison officials regressed him to Level 1 on
October 7, 2005.' 16
Mr. Toevs reached Level 2 on October 13, 2005 and Level 3 on
January 14, 2006 and Level 4 in October 2007.H7 "From the record ... it
is impossible to determine when [Mr. Toevs] moved from Level 4 to
Level 5 and from Level 5 to Level 6 . . . ."'18 During the course of his
"re-progression," Mr. Toevs completed numerous educational programs
and received favorable reviews for the first three levels.'l 9 However, the
"reviews never informed [him] of the reasons why he was recommended
for or denied progression." 20 Furthermore, prison officials never con-
ducted reviews for Levels 4, 5, or 6.121 The DOC justified the lack of
reviews on the fact that Levels 4 through 6 "are classified as 'close cus-
tody' rather than 'administrative segregation."'l 22 On January 31, 2009,
Mr. Toevs completed QLLP and, in March, was transferred to a general
population prison.123
B. Procedural History
In his complaint, Mr. Toevs-a pro se litigant-alleged that his
confinement in QLLP from 2005 until 2009 "deprived [him] of a liberty
interest without due process." 24 He sued his case managers and the war-
dens of CSP in their official capacities and "requested compensatory and
punitive damages and declaratory relief." 2 5 The magistrate judge who
heard the case ruled not only that the "defendants were entitled to quali-
fied immunity," but also "that the review process was constitutionally
adequate." 26 Subsequently, Mr. Toevs appealed. 27
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Supplement to Response to Petition for Rehearing at 7, Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752 (10th
Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1535).
116. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 754.
117. Id. at 759 ("[H]e spent twenty-one months at Level 3 (eighteen more than the minimum)
before being promoted to Level 4."); Toevs v. Reid, No. 06-cv-01620-CBS-KMT, 2010 WL
4388191, at *8 (D. Colo. Oct. 28, 2010).
118. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 760.
119. See id. at 754, 760.
120. Id. at 759.
121. Id. at 760.
122. Id.




127. Id. at 755. The district court originally dismissed his case for failure to comply with Rule
8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Toevs v. Reid, 267 F. App'x 817, 818 (10th Cir. 2008).
The Tenth Circuit later reversed and remanded. Id at 820. The appeal referenced in the above sen-
tence refers to the second appeal.
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C. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge's decision on the
basis of the defendants' qualified immunity.128 Nevertheless, the Tenth
Circuit reevaluated the question of whether the defendants' actions vio-
lated Mr. Toevs's due process rights before affirming.12 9
1. Liberty Interest
The court first analyzed whether Mr. Toevs possessed a liberty in-
terest in his confinement at CSP.1 30 In order to determine whether a liber-
ty interest existed, the court applied the four DiMarco factors. '3  The
court found the "legitimate penological interest" factor in favor of the
defendants because of Mr. Toevs's repeated escape attempts and his re-
gression in QLLP for negative behavior.1 32 The court also found the "in-
creasing the duration of confinement" factor weighed against finding a
liberty interest because Mr. Toevs was serving a life sentence without the
possibility of parole.13 3
Based on conflicting descriptions of the conditions at CSP, the court
found a material issue of fact regarding the "extremeness of conditions"
128. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 761.
129. See id. at 756-60; accord Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) ("[A] court
can often avoid ruling on the plaintiffs claim that a particular right exists. If prior case law has not
clearly settled the right, and so given officials fair notice of it, the court can simply dismiss the claim
for money damages. The court need never decide whether the plaintiff's claim, even though novel or
otherwise unsettled, in fact has merit. And indeed, our usual adjudicatory rules suggest that a court
should forbear resolving this issue. After all, a 'longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires
that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.' In
this category of qualified immunity cases, a court can enter judgment without ever ruling on the
(perhaps difficult) constitutional claim the plaintiff has raised. Small wonder, then, that a court might
leave that issue for another day. But we have long recognized that this day may never come-that
our regular policy of avoidance sometimes does not fit the qualified immunity situation because it
threatens to leave standards of official conduct permanently in limbo. Consider a plausible but unset-
tied constitutional claim asserted against a government official in a suit for money damages. The
court does not resolve the claim because the official has immunity. He thus persists in the challenged
practice; he knows that he can avoid liability in any future damages action, because the law has still
not been clearly established. Another plaintiff brings suit, and another court both awards immunity
and bypasses the claim. And again, and again, and again. So the moment of decision does not arrive.
Courts fail to clarify uncertain questions, fail to address novel claims, fail to give guidance to offi-
cials about how to comply with legal requirements. Qualified immunity thus may frustrate 'the
development of constitutional precedent' and the promotion of law-abiding behavior." (citations
omitted)).
130. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 756-57.
131. Id. at 756 ("[Relevant factors might include:] whether (1) the segregation relates to and
furthers a legitimate penological interest, such as safety or rehabilitation; (2) the conditions of
placement are extreme; (3) the placement increases the duration of confinement . . . ; and (4) the
placement is indeterminate." (quoting Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334,
1342 (10th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
132. Id. ("Factor[] one ... work[s] against the existence of a liberty interest. The segregation in
this case certainly relates to and furthers a legitimate penological interest (Mr. Toevs originally was
committed to the QLLP because of an escape attempt, and he was regressed to QLLP Level I in
September 2005 due to behavioral problems).").
133. Id. ("[Gliven that he is serving a life sentence, the placement did not increase the duration
of his confinement.").
factor.1 34 Mr. Toevs described the conditions of his confinement in great
detail, while the DOC responded by vaguely contesting his description
without providing specific evidence of the conditions.135 The court ruled
"at a minimum there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
question." 1
With two of the factors weighing definitively against Mr. Toevs and
a third factor merely in genuine dispute, the court found the fourth factor
dispositive of a liberty interest: "Placement in the QLLP is indefinite.
Although there is a minimum time to complete [it], there is no maximum
.... Mr. Toevs ... had no knowledge of any end date ... ."'3 Conse-
quently, the court concluded that Mr. Toevs established a liberty interest
in his placement in the QLLP.13 1
2. Sufficiency of Process
Having found a liberty interest, the court next analyzed whether the
prison provided Mr. Toevs sufficient process.' 3 9 The court emphasized
that "the review must be meaningful; it cannot be a sham or a pretext."1 4 0
Meaningful reviews "consider[] whether the prisoner's conduct during
the period since the most recent security review warrants reclassifica-
tion" and "whether the prisoner is eligible to move to the next level or, if
the prisoner already is at the highest level, if he or she is eligible to grad-
uate from the program."41 When the goal of solitary confinement is be-
havior modification, then a meaningful review "should provide a guide
for future behavior."1 42 Furthermore, the court explained that meaningful
reviews "provid[e] a guide for future behavior" under the Mathews fac-
tors.143 The court concluded its analysis of the law by stating:
The value of requiring an explicit advisement of progress through the
QLLP program is high, in that it promotes the ultimate goal of a be-
havior-modification program. Moreover, the administrative burden
134. Id at 756-57.
135. Id
136. Id. at 756.
137. Id. at 757.
138. Id.
139. Id
140. Id (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995); Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1101
(3d Cir. 1986); McClary v. Coughlin, 87 F. Supp. 2d 205, 214 (W.D.N.Y. 2000)).
141. Id at 758.
142. Id. (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 226 (2005) (noting that Ohio's requirement
of a statement of reasons "serves as a guide for future behavior"); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb.
Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (noting that prisoners denied parole were told the
reason "as a guide to the inmate for his future behavior")).
143. Id. at 758-59; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) ("First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.").
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on the government should be relatively low, as the QLLP already re-
quires officials to track prisoners' progress and evaluate their pro-
spects for promotion to the next level.
This list of pronouncements about how the prison could achieve a
meaningful review foreshadowed the court's decision.145
Within this framework, the court found that the "evidence indicates
that the reviews focused on appropriate factors," and would have been
considered meaningful, "but for one serious omission-the reviews nev-
er informed Mr. Toevs of the reasons why he was recommended for or
denied progression, so that he would have a guide for his future behav-
ior." 46 Consequently, the court ruled that the first three levels lacked
meaningful review.14 7 Furthermore, the court relied on the trial court's
finding that no reviews occurred between Levels 4 and 6 to determine
that the entire review process lacked meaningfulness and, thus, failed the
sufficiency of process prong.148
3. Qualified Immunity
Despite finding that prison officials violated Mr. Toevs's due pro-
cess rights, the court nonetheless affirmed the trial court's decision grant-
ing summary judgment to the defendants because they possessed quali-
fied immunity from the plaintiffs claim.14 9 Qualified immunity, an af-
firmative defense, protects government officials from claims springing
from unsettled areas of law and attaches unless the law is "clearly estab-
lished."5 o "Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established,
there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the
clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found
the law to be as the plaintiff maintains." 1 In determining whether quali-
fied immunity applies, "[t]he 'salient question . . . is whether the state of
the law [at the time of the actions] gave respondents fair warning that
their [conduct] was unconstitutional."'l 5 2 The Tenth Circuit found that
the law governing meaningfulness and sufficiency of process was unset-
tled, thus entitling the defendants to qualified immunity. 153
144. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 759.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 760.
148. Id
149. Id. at 761.
150. Id. at 760.
151. Id. (quoting Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139,1151 (10th Cir. 2006)).
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III. ANALYSIS
Toevs v. Reid impacts due process law in the Tenth Circuit in three
fundamental ways. First, Toevs clarified the word "indefinite," comport-
ing the circuit's use of the word with the common usage. Second, Toevs
impacted other prisons operating within the circuit other than the Colora-
do State Penitentiary, vastly increasing the importance of the case. Third,
Toevs lessened the judicial deference afforded prison officials in the de-
termination of a liberty interest. All three outcomes support prisoner
Fifth Amendment claims. Thus, the Colorado Attorney General's Office
and the United States Department of Justice opposed the Toevs holding
and appealed the decision, despite winning the case.
A. A Clarified Interpretation oflndefiniteness
In evaluating Mr. Toevs's liberty interest, the Tenth Circuit found
the confinement to be indefinite because it had no set end date.15 4 The
court noted that while "there is a minimum time to complete [QLLP],
there is no maximum, and there is no restriction on how many times a
prisoner may be regressed to lower levels."'5 5 Furthermore, the court
found that "[w]hen Mr. Toevs was placed in the QLLP, he had no
knowledge of any end date, and as it turned out, he was in the QLLP for
nearly seven years."' 56 Based on these facts, the Tenth Circuit deemed
Mr. Toevs's confinement indefinite. 57
The Toevs court employed a plain-meaning definition of "indefi-
nite" in reaching this conclusion.' 58 The panel's use of the word adheres
to the standard dictionary definition of the word "indefinite," which is
"not precise" and "having no exact limits." 59 In other words, periodic
reviews and the existence of a step-down program do not make a place-
ment definite.160
A plain-meaning application of "indefiniteness" seemingly conflicts
with the Tenth Circuit's application of the word "indefiniteness" in
DiMarco.161 There, the Tenth Circuit found "definiteness" because of
periodic reviews.162 However, the duration of overall sentence distin-
guishes DiMarco from Toevs.'63 Ms. DiMarco served fourteen months of





159. WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 83, at 1147.
160. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 757; accord Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (find-
ing OSP's prisoners possessed liberty interest despite prison officials providing annual reviews).
161. See Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334, 1343-44 (10th Cir. 2007).
162. Id.
163. Compare DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1344 (noting Ms. DiMarco's stay in solitary confinement
was fourteen months), with Toevs, 646 F.3d at 756 (noting Mr. Toev's stay in solitary confinement
was nearly seven years).
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a two-year sentence in solitary confinement.16 Mr. Toevs served seven
years of a life sentence in the same conditions.'6 Ms. DiMarco knew that
her solitary confinement would end no more than two years after it began
based on the length of her sentence.166 Mr. Toevs could have legitimately
believed that he might spend the rest of his life sentence in solitary con-
finement. 167 Another way to understand the difference between Toevs
and DiMarco is the duration of the actual time spent in solitary confine-
ment. Mr. Toevs spent seven years in solitary confinement, while Ms.
DiMarco spent fourteen months.16 1
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit and districts courts within the circuit have
struggled with how to analyze duration of time spent in solitary confine-
ment and indefiniteness. 16 9 The Toevs panel considered the duration of
Mr. Toevs's time spent in solitary confinement in its discussion of "in-
definiteness," and concluded the "indefinite placement ... in the type of
conditions he alleged, established a protected liberty interest."170 Com-
bining duration of time in solitary confinement with indefiniteness fits
with the rulings of the sister circuits because many circuits find a liberty
interest on duration and conditions alone.17 1 Although difficult to tease
164. DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1344.
165. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 756.
166. See DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1344.
167. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 756.
168. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 756; DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1344.
169. See Payne v. Friel, 266 F. App'x 724, 728 (10th Cir. 2008) ("Nonetheless, the district
court dismissed his due process claim at the pleading stage without inquiring into whether the dura-
tion of his confinement in segregation alone constituted an atypical and significant hardship. This
was error."); Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Where, as here, the pris-
oner is subjected to a lengthy period of segregation, the duration of that confinement may itself be
atypical and significant."); Smith v. Ortiz, No. 05-1211, 2006 WL 620871, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 14,
2006) ("The duration of confinement may itself be atypical and significant."); Gaines v. Stenseng,
292 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2002) (remanding to determine whether the 75-day duration of
plaintiffs confinement in segregation was itself atypical and significant); cf Jordan v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 191 F. App'x 639, 652 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Clearly, we do not condone a murder investiga-
tion which takes almost five years, during which time an inmate is subjected to conditions which are
atypical or pose a significant hardship. However, in this case, we have already determined the condi-
tions or restrictions Mr. Jordan encountered did not pose the requisite Sandin atypical or significant
hardship. Even if we considered the five-year duration of the confinement alone, this court has held
certain prison actions which might impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights may be valid if they
are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."); Saleh v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 05-
cv-02467-PAB-KLM, 2010 WL 5464294, at *5 (D. Colo. Dec. 29, 2010) ("Finally, plaintiffs argue
that the magistrate judge did not properly consider the length of time they had been incarcerated at
ADX as relevant to the extremity of the conditions there, in part because she improperly allowed this
fact to be overridden by defendant's legitimate penological interest. However, in considering wheth-
er the duration of plaintiffs' confinement made such confinement extreme, the magistrate judge also
noted that plaintiffs had been incarcerated at ADX for approximately the same length of time as the
inmates in Jordan and Georgacarakos." (citations omitted)); Georgacarakos v. Wiley, No. 07-cv-
01712-MSK-MEH, 2010 WL 1291833, at *13 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2010) (finding indefinite solitary
confinement not rising to level of a liberty interest); Rezaq v. Nalley, 07-CV-02483-LTB-KLM,
2008 WL 5172363, at *9 (D. Colo. Dec. 10, 2008).
170. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 757 (emphasis added).
171. Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2009); Harden-Bey v. Rutter,
524 F.3d 789, 793 (6th Cir. 2008); Williams v. Norris, 277 F. App'x 647, 648 (8th Cir. 2008)
("[Plaintiff|-who is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole, imposed in 1981-has
continuously spent almost nine years in ad seg confinement in Arkansas, plus more than three years
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out precisely what swayed the panel to differentiate Toevs and DiMarco,
these two panel decisions accord with one another on the issue of indefi-
niteness.
The Toevs court's plain-meaning application of "indefiniteness"
makes the liberty interest determination not only more common sense,
but also less subjective, which makes the process fairer. 17 2 Plain-meaning
indefiniteness removes all subjectivity from the analysis: either the pris-
oner knew of the release date from solitary confinement or the confine-
ment is indefinite. 173 In this sense, solitary confinement intended for be-
havior modification becomes more like disciplinary segregation, which
holds prisoners for a set period of time.174 By refocusing the analysis
away from periodic reviews, the Tenth Circuit makes the finding of in-
definiteness clearer.175
B. Impact on the Federal Prison System in the Tenth Circuit
The Toevs ruling affects not only the Colorado DOC, but also the
federal prisons located within the Tenth Circuit.17 6 In the six states com-
prising the Tenth Circuit'77 the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) operates
nine facilities, with six in Colorado alone.'7 8 Those nine facilities house
approximately 6,200 inmates. 79 This population includes the most nota-
ble inmates in the entire BOP system: inmates housed in the United
in ad seg in Utah, and we agree with the district court that this constitutes an atypical and significant
hardship, considering the particular restrictions imposed on [PlaintiffJ in relation to his ad seg status
during this time, and thus he had a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause."); lqbal v.
Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 161 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Numerous cases in this Circuit have discussed the 'atypi-
cal and significant hardship' prong of Sandin. Relevant factors include both the conditions of segre-
gation and its duration."), rev d and remanded sub nom. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009);
Stephens v. Cottey, 145 F. App'x 179, 181 (7th Cir. 2005) ("In determining whether prison condi-
tions meet [the Sandin] standard, courts place a premium on the duration of the deprivation.");
Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Both the conditions and their duration must be
considered since especially harsh conditions endured for a brief interval and somewhat harsh condi-
tions endured for a prolonged interval might both be atypical." (citation omitted)).
172. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 757.
173. See id.
174. See BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra note 20, at 169.
175. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 757.
176. See id. at 760; Appellees' Amended Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at
4, Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752 (10th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1535) ("The Toevs published opinion is not
expressly limited to DOC inmates in the QLLP program but is seemingly applicable to any inmate
held in any penal institution anywhere within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit, including the
Federal Supermax facility in Florence, Colorado, the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth and
innumerable other Federal and state penitentiaries across the six states."); Brief of the United States
as Anicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 2, Toevs v. Reid,
646 F.3d 752 (10th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1535) ('The federal Government has a strong interest in the
correct disposition of this matter. . . . [T]he federal Government is the custodian of numerous prison-
ers within this Circuit, many of whom are subject to restrictive conditions of confinement.").
177. Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah, Wyoming, and New Mexico.
178. Weekly Population Report, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/locations/weekly report.jsp (last updated Feb. 12, 2012).
179. See id.
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States Penitentiary Administrative Maximum Facility, known more
commonly as the ADX. 80
Opened in 1994 outside of Florence, Colorado, the ADX "houses
offenders requiring the tightest controls."' 1 As the only administrative
maximum facility in the BOP, the ADX is "the only [federal] prison spe-
cifically designed to keep every occupant in near-total solitary confine-
ment." 82 Like the most restrictive levels of QLLP at CSP, the ADX in-
mates spend twenty-three hours per day in lockup, eat alone, and recreate
alone.' 83 One inmate described the conditions as "total sensory depriva-
tion,"l84 while a former ADX warden described the conditions as "a
cleaner version of hell."' 85 Some of the 442 inmates housed in ADX'86
include Theodore Kaczynski,187 Zacarias Moussaoui, Terry Nichols,189
Richard Reid,1 90 and Eric Rudolph.191
Toevs implicates these inmates in two very significant ways. First,
the finding of a liberty interest at CSP could bolster future prisoner litiga-
tion challenging the conditions of confinement at the ADX.1 92 Remarka-
bly, no Colorado district court has ever found a liberty interest based on
placement at the ADX. 19 3 Both the ADX and CSP operate as supermaxes
with substantially similar conditions of confinement.'94 A liberty interest
180. See Inmate Locator, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/Locateinmatejsp (last visited Feb. 12, 2012) (enter first and last name, for
example "Theodore Kaczynski," "Zacarias Moussaoui," "Terry Nichols," "Richard Reid," "Eric
Rudolph").
181. USP Florence ADMAX, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/flm/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
182. Michael Taylor, The Last Worst Place: The Isolation at Colorado's ADX Prison is Brutal
Beyond Compare. So Are the Inmates, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 28, 1998, at A3.
183. Id.
184. Chris Francescani, Emily Unger & Kasi Carson, How to Survive a Supermax Prison, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 2, 2007), http://abcnews.go.comffheLaw/story?id=3435989&page--1.
185. CBSNews, Supermax: A Cleaner Version of Hell, CBS NEWS (June 21, 2009, 8:48 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/11/60minutes/main3357727.shtml.
186. Weekly Population Report, supra note 178.
187. Inmate Locator, supra note 181 (the "Unabomber").
188. Id. (a conspirator in the September 11, 2011 attacks).
189. Id. (a conspirator in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing).
190. Id (the "Shoe Bomber").
191. Id. (a conspirator in the Atlanta Olympic Village bombing).
192. See Appellees' Amended Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note
176, at 5 n.5.
193. Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2011 WL 4552540, at
*12 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2011).
194. Compare Rezaq v. Nalley, No. 07-CV-02483-LTB-KLM, 2008 WL 5172363, at *1 (D.
Colo. Dec. 10, 2008) ("Plaintiff Omar Rezaq filed a federal lawsuit to address his incarceration at
the United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum Prison in Florence, Colorado ('ADX')....
As an inmate in the general population unit at ADX, Plaintiff claims that his freedom is severely
limited. He is confined alone to an 87.5 square foot cell for at least 23 hours per day. He eats his
meals alone in his cell, and when he is allowed recreation (usually around 2 hours per week), he
must recreate alone. For at least one two-month period, he claims that he was denied outdoor and
indoor exercise. When he is transported from his cell, he is handcuffed and shackled. Finally, the
location of Plaintiffs cell prevents him from experiencing direct sunlight." (citations omitted)), with
Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752, 756-57 (10th Cir. 2011) (analyzing the conditions alleged by Toevs,
including " the amount of time spent in his solitary cell, the provision of solid metal cell doors with
at CSP persuasively supports a finding a liberty interest at the ADX.195
However, finding a liberty interest is only the first step in the process.' 96
Second, the ruling in Toevs-requiring meaningful reviews and
guides for future behavior-supports the finding of insufficient process
and applies to the 6,200 inmates in the federal system in the Tenth Cir-
cuit, including the men housed in the ADX.197 In other words, as a result
of Toevs the government would be required to provide the nation's most
dangerous inmates with reasons for their continued solitary confinement
and ways in which it might improve the conditions.' 9 8
The BOP and the U.S. Attorney's Office contend Toevs directly and
negatively implicates federal inmates within the Tenth Circuit. 99 Ac-
cordingly, the U.S. Attorney's Office filed a petition requesting the
Tenth Circuit to rehear Toevs en banc in order "to prevent the unneces-
sary and erroneous creation of constitutional rules that may apply to non-
parties." 2 00 The BOP recognized that because of the ADX and other fed-
eral facilities within the circuit, "many of [which] . . . subject [inmates]
to restrictive conditions of confinement," the Toevs requirement has "the
potential to impose a significant new burden on the federal Government
to the extent that the ruling requires a 'guide for future behavior' . . .
every time a prisoner's restricted status is reviewed." 20 ' The Attorney
General's Office echoed this sentiment in its motion to reconsider and
rehear the Toevs ruling, stating, "there is no other jurisdiction within
which [reworking the prison administrative segregation systems in the
court] ... carries such important national security and penological impli-
,,202cations.
The logic behind these motions is faulty.20 3 The required guidelines
for future behavior need not evolve into a contract for release from soli-
metal strips on the sides and bottom to prevent communication, and the requirement that he eat all
his meals in his cell").
195. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 757.
196. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) ("A liberty interest having been estab-
lished, we turn to the question of what process is due an inmate whom Ohio seeks to place in
OSP.").
197. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 761; Appellees' Amended Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehear-
ing En Banc, supra note 176, at 5 n.5; Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 176, at 2.
198. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 759; Appellees' Amended Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehear-
ing En Banc, supra note 176, at 10; Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tion for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 176, at 2.
199. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing or
Rehearing En Banc, supra note 176, at 2.
200. Id.
201. Id
202. Appellees' Amended Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 176,
at 15.
203. See Response to Petition for Rehearing at 14-15, Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752 (10th Cir.
2011) (No. 10-1535).
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tary confinement.2 04 Merely providing inmates the reasons for their con-
finement should not supersede sound correctional judgment should the
inmate comply with the guidelines.20 5 In other words, compliance with
the guidelines does not become a "get out of jail free card." 2 06 The guide-
lines are not contractual or legally binding.207 Thus, in the event that
prisoners file suits demanding release from solitary confinement based
on these guidelines, courts should dismiss these suits under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. 208 The
Toevs panel ordered guidelines for future conduct, not contracts for re-
lease from solitary confinement.20 9
In addition to the procedural safeguards inherent in the judiciary,
prisoners face an additional burden from the Prisoner Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA).2 10 "Congress enacted the [PLRA] ... in 1996 in the wake
of a sharp rise in prisoner litigation in the federal courts. The PLRA con-
tains a variety of provisions designed to bring this litigation under con-
trol."211 One provision at the heart of the legislation is an exhaustion
clause requiring prisoners to exhaust all available remedies with prison
officials before filing suit.2 12 This added burden further prevents inmates
from suing on the basis of "breach of contract" springing from behavior-
al guidelines.2 13
C. Departure from the Deference Established by DiMarco
DiMarco imparted great judicial deference to penological expertise
within the liberty interest framework.2 14 Scholars refer to the hesitance of
204. See Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752, 759-60 (10th Cir. 2011); Response to Petition for Re-
hearing, supra note 203, at 14-15 ("I'm sure the court would refuse to entertain the notion that a
guide for future behavior constitutes some kind of binding contract that would mandate the worst of
the worst be released to [general population] despite there being every indication the inmate still
posed a threat.").
205. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 759-60; Response to Petition for Rehearing, supra note 203, at 14-
15.
206. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 759-60; Response to Petition for Rehearing, supra note 203, at 14-
15.
207. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 759-60; Response to Petition for Rehearing, supra note 203, at 14-
15.
208. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)
("While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do[.]" (first alteration in original) (citations omitted)); see also Response to Petition for Rehear-
ing, supra note 204, at 14 ("If an inmate in the future tries to misconstrue the Opinion as the Appel-
lees predict I am confident any court would recognize the arguments' lack of merit.").
209. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 759-60.
210. See Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing statistics giving
rise to the PLRA).
211. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006).
212. Id. at 84-85.
213. See id.
214. Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334, 1342 (10th Cir. 2007) ("[A]ny
assessment must be mindful of the primary management role of prison officials who should be free
from second-guessing or micro-management from the federal courts.").
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the courts to interfere with penological matters as the "hands-off doc-
trine." 2 15 Some scholars argue the hands-off doctrine stopped in the
1960s and 1970s--ostensibly with the Supreme Court's decision in Wolff
v. McDonnell:216 "[A] prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional
protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain
drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country." 2 17 Oth-
ers believe the doctrine still influences courts.218 Some even argue "rigid
due process requirements eviscerate prison officials' ability to segregate
prisoners for administrative reasons in an era when prison gangs pose an
increasing threat to institutional security." 2 19
The panel decision from DiMarco serves as evidence for the schol-
ars who believe the hands-off doctrine still applies. 22 0 Recall that the
DiMarco panel injected legitimate penological interest into the determi-
215. See, e.g., David M. Adlerstein, In Need of Correction: The "Iron Triangle" of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1684 (2001) ("Traditionally, the federal judiciary
was reluctant to address prisoner grievances because of concerns involving the separation of powers
doctrine, its lack of expertise in penology, and the possibility that judicial intervention might under-
mine prison discipline. This 'hands off' doctrine, long prevalent, eroded in the face of the social
ferment of the 1960s and 1970s. Armed with 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983), prisoners aired a host
of claims in federal court, and succeeded in obtaining some meaningful reforms. Yet litigation came
at a cost-states grew resentful of perceived federal micromanagement, and the federal docket
became increasingly choked with noncognizable or frivolous prisoner claims." (footnotes omitted));
Melissa Rivero, Melting in the Hands of the Court: M&M's, Art, and a Prisoner's Right to Freedom
of Expression, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 811, 817-18 (2008) ("The hands-off doctrine embodied the
Court's unwillingness to review prison administrators' decisions. Under the doctrine, federal courts
avoided addressing whether prisoners retained any constitutional rights. The primary function of the
courts was to ensure the freedom of illegally confined individuals, not to 'superintend the treatment
and discipline of prisoners.' Although the Court acknowledged some claims of racial discrimination
and unsafe prison conditions as egregious, the hands-off doctrine prevented the Court from address-
ing these claims. Because the Court believes prison administrators are better suited to make prison
regulations, it avoided any judicial interference in prison administrative decisions. Prison administra-
tors have to deal with inmates on a daily basis. Thus, there is a fear that judicial review may threaten
prison officials' authority." (footnotes omitted)).
216. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
217. Id. at 555-56.
218. Barbara Belbot, Where Can a Prisoner Find a Liberty Interest These Days? The Pains of
Imprisonment Escalate, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) ("The Supreme Court's recent decision
in Sandin v. Conner is testimony to the proposition that the 'hands-off doctrine never completely
expired." (footnote omitted)).
219. Theis, supra note 23, at 149; see also id. at 175 ("Prison administrators are charged with
one of the hardest jobs in our country. Limiting their ability to run prisons as they see fit is clearly
contrary to public policy. They have the task of overseeing entire populations of people who have
been convicted of felonies, some of whom will never return to public society because their crimes
were so egregious. As diverse as the crimes that brought the inmates to prison, so too are their per-
sonalities: some shrewd, some aggressive, some remorseful, and some incorrigible. The Supreme
Court's holding in Wilkinson v. Austin validates what should have been the obvious: prison officials
who oversee the day-to-day administration and procedures of specific, unique prisons are the best
situated and the best informed to make decisions that implicate the lives of prison staff and in-
mates.").
220. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995) ("We have repeatedly said both that prison officials
have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage and that
lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interests."); DiMarco,
473 F.3d at 1342 ("[A]ny assessment must be mindful of the primary management role of prison
officials who should be free from second-guessing or micro-management from the federal courts.").
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nation of a prisoner's liberty interest, which augmented the impact of
penological interest beyond the sufficiency of the process analysis, its
traditional realm. 22 ' The Supreme Court in Wilkinson specifically reject-
ed injecting penological interest into the liberty interest determination.222
Despite this directive from the Supreme Court, district courts within the
Tenth Circuit, prior to Toevs, applied the DiMarco "legitimate
penological interest" factor to situations analogous to the confinement
conditions and review procedures at CSP. 22 3 Of the three courts applying
the factor in summary judgment rulings or appellate reviews, all three
found a legitimate penological interest.224 Even in the four motion-to-
dismiss-rulings-with legal standards favorable to the plaintiff225-the
courts evenly split on this issue of penological interest.2 26
The Toevs court afforded the DOC less deference than previous
courts in two specific ways. First, the Toevs court found indefiniteness of
Mr. Toevs's confinement determinative in finding a liberty interest.227
Despite finding the government possessed an interest in keeping Mr.
Toevs in solitary confinement, the court found that his indefinite con-
finement overrode this deference. 22 8 In effect, the Toevs court shifted the
weight of penological interest back into the more appropriate analysis-
sufficiency of process or the outcome of the process-and out of the lib-
229erty interest determination.
Second, the Toevs court afforded the DOC less deference than pre-
vious courts by finding the government's reviews insufficient to pass
221. DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1342 ("Relevant factors might include whether ... the segregation
relates to and furthers a legitimate penological interest, such as safety or rehabilitation . . . .").
222. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) ("OSP's harsh conditions may well be
necessary and appropriate in light of the danger that high-risk inmates pose both to prison officials
and to other prisoners. That necessity, however, does not diminish our conclusion that the conditions
give rise to a liberty interest in their avoidance." (citation omitted)).
223. See, e.g., Saleh v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 05-cv-02467-PAB-KLM, 2010 WL
5464294, at *4-6 (D. Colo. Dec. 29, 2010) (analyzing the confinement at ADX).
224. Schmitt v. Rice, 421 F. App'x 858, 862 (10th Cir. 2011); Saleh, 2010 WL 5464294, at *4;
see also Thompson v. Rios, 07-CV-00025-PAB-KLM, 2010 WL 749859, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 2,
2010) (accepting judgment of magistrate judge founding no penological interest).
225. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004) ("A proposition that is at the heart of the application of
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and one that is of universal acceptance, . . . is that for purposes of the
motion to dismiss, (1) the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, (2) its
allegations are taken as true, and (3) all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the pleading
are drawn in favor of the pleader.").
226. See Stine v. Lappin, No. 07-cv-01839-WYD-KLM, 2009 WL 103659, at *9 (D. Colo. Jan.
14, 2009); Rezaq v. Nalley, No. 07-cv-02483-LTB-KLM, 2008 WL 5172363, at *8 (D. Colo. Dec.
10, 2008). Contra Matthews v. Wiley, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1171 (D. Colo. 2010); Powell v.
Wilner, No. 06-cv-00545-WYD-MEH, 2009 WL 840756, at *14 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2009).
227. Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752, 756-57 (10th Cir. 2011).
228. See id at 761.
229. See id. at 759-60; accord Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) ("OSP's harsh
conditions may well be necessary and appropriate in light of the danger that high-risk inmates pose
both to prison officials and to other prisoners. That necessity, however, does not diminish our con-
clusion that the conditions give rise to a liberty interest in their avoidance." (citation omitted)).
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constitutional muster. 230 DiMarco muddied the waters by placing gov-
ernment interest in the liberty interest determination.23 1 While the Su-
preme Court in Hewitt, Sandin, and Wilkinson all encouraged deference
to prison officials in the sufficiency of process determination, 23 2 Hewitt
stressed that "administrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for
indefinite confinement. Prison officials must engage in some sort ofpe-
riodic review of the confinement of such inmates."233 The Toevs court in
effect equated meaningless process with no process, which functionally
makes more sense than allowing literally any form of review to count
towards the second due process prong.234 By ordering prison officials to
explain the reasons and guidelines for future conduct for continued soli-
tary confinement, the Toevs court inserted judicial influence into
235penological matters. Increased judicial attention to prisoner matters
comports with the judiciary's "duty to protect the unpopular from irra-
tional persecution and to defend the rights of the marginalized." 2 36 As
one scholar notes, "despite being on the fringe of societal acceptance,
inmates do not check all of their constitutional rights at the prison
door."237 However, without judicial attention provided by the Toevs pan-
el, prisoners' rights remain in jeopardy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Solitary confinement is a dangerous penological tool because it
takes such a serious toll on inmates' mental health. Many American hu-
man rights organizations argue against the use of solitary confinement.
American allies abroad consider solitary confinement inhumane. Never-
theless, when inmates use the judicial system to challenge the inhumani-
ty, they face serious procedural hurdles. Before Toevs v. Reid, proving
that solitary confinement created a liberty interest or that behavioral re-
views failed constitutional muster were just two of many such hurdles.
Toevs, though, clarified due process law in the Tenth Circuit. Because
230. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 760.
231. See Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334, 1342 (10th Cir. 2007). But
see Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224.
232. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 228 ("[Clourts must give substantial deference to prison manage-
ment decisions before mandating additional expenditures for elaborate procedural safeguards when
correctional officials conclude that a prisoner has engaged in disruptive behavior."); Sandin v. Con-
ner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) ("[Fjederal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility
to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment."); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472
(1983) ("Prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security."), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin,
515 U.S. at 483.
233. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9 (emphasis added).
234. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 757-60.
235. See id at 759-60.
236. Maximilienne Bishop, Supermax Prisons: Increasing Security or Permitting Persecu-
tion?, 47 ARIZ. L. REv. 461, 462 (2005).
237. Id.
238. See id.
2012] TOE VS V. REID 433
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW
the ruling from Toevs clarified the term "indefiniteness" in a way unfa-
vorable to prisons, it implicates the due process procedures for the infa-
mous prisoners held at the ADX. Furthermore, Toevs tactfully shifts ju-
dicial deference to prison officials out of the liberty interest determina-
tion and back into the sufficiency of process analysis, its proper sphere.
Despite the fact that Mr. Toevs's appeal lost at the Tenth Circuit, the
holding nevertheless helps future prisoners' due process claims against
prison officials.
Not surprisingly, the Colorado Attorney General's Office and the
U.S. Department of Justice contest the ruling. However, the ruling in
Toevs improves due process jurisprudence by clarifying the legal stand-
ard and better protecting thousands of inmates across the Tenth Circuit.
Although requiring prison officials to conduct more meaningful reviews
seems onerous, the reviews provide guidelines for prisoner conduct, not
contracts for release from solitary confinement. Moreover, by removing
some judicial deference from the due process analysis, inmates receive
more reliable and fairer reviews. As a result, the Tenth Circuit should
deny the Attorney General's motions to reconsider and rehear en banc
and let Toevs stand.
Joseph Doyle*
* J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
the entire Denver University Law Review Board and staff, especially Andrew Brooks, for all of their
valuable edits and comments. I am indebted to Professor Laura Rovner for her time and input. I
would also like to thank my parents for always encouraging my writing. Finally, I am eternally
grateful for the unending support of Abigail Ray, without whom this article and law school generally
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PROST V. ANDERSON AND THE ENIGMATIC SAVINGS
CLAUSE OF § 2255: WHEN IS A REMEDY BY MOTION
"INADEQUATE OR INEFFECTIVE"?
INTRODUCTION
The writ of habeas corpus is a principle mechanism by which pris-
oners may collaterally challenge their convictions or sentences.' The
"Great Writ" has been a part of the American judicial system in one form
2or another since the birth of the nation. It is a right guaranteed by the
Constitution,' but one whose contours are ever-changing and ill-defined.4
The writ was first explicitly granted in the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
expanded by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, and statutorily revised mul-
tiple times in the twentieth century.' With every congressional revision
of the writ, courts have modulated the scope of habeas corpus review to
accommodate the perceived intent of Congress.6 As a result, the breadth
of the writ has changed over time, with periods of expansive application
and others of more restricted application.'
In the centuries that the writ has evolved, a labyrinth of procedural
complexities has evolved with it.8 The latest of these complexities in-
volves the savings clause9 of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The federal circuits are
split in regard to the proper application of this enigmatic clause. In Prost
v. Anderson,o the Tenth Circuit waded into the murky waters of savings
clause jurisprudence, and in doing so, widened an already prominent
split.
Part I of this Comment contrasts the relationship between two prin-
ciple mechanisms by which federal prisoners may bring collateral chal-
lenges: 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255 and 2241. Part I also examines the savings
clause of § 2255 and its interpretation across circuits. Part II summarizes
1. See Harvey Bartle, Comment, One Bite at the Apple: The Effect of Recharacterization on
Post-Conviction Relief Under 28 US.C. § 2255, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 613, 614 (2002).
2. Lyn S. Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of Successive Claims of Inno-
cence. A Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to Provide Individuals Convicted
ofNon-Existent Crimes with Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 78 (2005).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
4. See Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 78.
5. Id.at78-8 1.
6. See id at 80-81; see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996) (explaining that
the original writ of habeas corpus was "quite different from that which exists today").
7. See Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 80-81.
8. Id. at 78.
9. This "savings clause," consisting of the final twenty words of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, is so
termed because it may be used to validate certain petitions for relief otherwise prohibited by that
subsection.
10. 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011).
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the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Prost. Part III undertakes an analy-
sis that begins with a critique of savings clause jurisprudence and con-
cludes with a call for the Supreme Court to settle the ever-widening cir-
cuit split.
I. BACKGROUND
Federal prisoners have recourse to collaterally challenge their con-
victions and sentences through the two principle mechanisms of 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2255, but each of these remedial mechanisms may
be used only in particular circumstances. The following section details
these habeas and habeas-equivalent statutes. It focuses on the courts'
struggle to properly define the scope of § 2255's savings clause, which
allows petitioners access to § 2241 when the § 2255 mechanism is
deemed "inadequate or ineffective." As explained below, the circuits
were split three ways regarding proper application of this clause even
before Prost was decided.
A. Federal Collateral Challenges
This section compares the relationship between the federal habeas
corpus statute, § 2241, and the habeas-equivalent statute of § 2255. It
begins by tracing the origins of these two statutes and concludes by de-
scribing the revisions brought about by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act.
1. The Relationship Between § 2241 and § 2255
As the Great Writ evolved, the rate at which prisoners filed habeas
corpus petitions increased enormously." Many of these petitions were
"repetitious and patently frivolous," flooding the courts with an unending
quagmire of work.12 A series of administrative difficulties compounded
the volume problem, hindering even the meritorious petitions." Chief
among these difficulties was the requirement that habeas petitions be
filed in the district of confinement rather than the sentencing district.14
This left the districts containing federal prisons with an "inordinate num-
ber of habeas corpus actions."' 5 Furthermore, many times the districts of
confinement did not have easy access to witnesses and case records, re-
sulting in further delays and backlogs.16
11. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212 (1952).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Benjamin R. Orye III, The Failure of Words: Habeas Corpus Reform, The Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When a Judgment of Conviction Becomes Final for the Pur-
poses of28 U.S.C. § 2255(1), 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 441,447 (2002).
15. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 213-14.
16. Orye, supra note 14, at 447-48.
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Seeking to alleviate these difficulties, Congress in 1948 enacted a
statutory alternative to habeas corpus, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255.'1
The statute was enacted to provide "a remedy exactly commensurate"
with prior habeas corpus relief, but available in the sentencing district
rather than the district of confinement.' 8 It was intended to "minimize the
difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same
rights in another and more convenient forum."l 9 The statute provides, in
pertinent part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum au-
thorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence. 20
Upon enactment, the statute became the "exclusive remedy for testing
the validity of a judgment and sentence." 2 1
In contrast to the habeas-equivalent remedy afforded by § 2255,
federal court jurisdiction over actual habeas corpus petitions is codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the descendant of the 1789 provision.2 2 Motions
pursuant to § 2241 must be brought in the district of confinement and not
the district that imposed the sentence. 23 Like § 2255, this revision of ha-
beas was also enacted in 1948, but was made available only in narrow
circumstances. 24 The statute provides:
The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act
of Congress, or an order, process, judgment, or decree of a court or
judge of the United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States; or
17. Stephen 1. Viadeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 990 (2011)
(book review).
18. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,427 (1962).
19. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006).
21. Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Johnson v. Taylor, 347
F.2d 365, 366 (10th Cir. 1965)).
22. Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 79 (2011).
23. Story, 86 F.3d at 166.
24. See Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 81.
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(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in
custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right ...
claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any foreign state,
or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon
the law of nations; or
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial. 25
While § 2255 is the principle collateral mechanism through which
prisoners may challenge their convictions, § 2241 remains the mecha-
nism through which prisoners may challenge the execution of a sentence
rather than its validity.26 These complaints may involve prison condi-
tions, the administration of parole, or prison disciplinary actions, among
others.27 However, it may be used only in these narrow circumstances;
prisoners cannot utilize § 2241 to challenge unlawful detentions that may
be remedied by § 2255.28
2. The AEDPA Amendments
In 1996, Congress substantially revised the federal collateral chal-
lenge statutes when it enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA).29 One of the main goals of the revisions was to
"curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus." 30 To achieve this
goal, Congress placed severe limitations on second and successive col-
lateral challenges. 3 1 Post-AEDPA, subsection (h) of § 2255 provides:
A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in sec-
tion 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain-
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of
the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found
the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on col-
lateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavaila-
ble.32
Before this amendment, courts were free to hear successive peti-
tions even on grounds similar to previous § 2255 motions.3 3 The prior
version only provided that courts were not required to hear second and
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2006).
26. Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 83.
27. Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001).
28. Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 85.
29. Id. at 87.
30. H.R. REP. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
31. Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 87 88.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2006).
33. Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 88.
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successive motions.3 4 Under the revised statute, all claims presented in
prior motions must be dismissed, and new claims must fall into one of
the two "narrow exceptions."35 Thus, the AEDPA amendments "greatly
restrict[ed] the power of federal courts" to hear second and successive
collateral challenges and ushered in a new, much more restrictive era of
federal habeas corpus. 6
B. The Savings Clause
The following sections describe the savings clause of § 2255 and
the courts' inconsistent efforts to properly define it. As described below,
a majority of circuits have taken their respective turns interpreting the
clause, resulting in at least three different tests and a sharp split among
the circuits.
1. Text and Meaning
Notwithstanding the restrictions contained in subsection (h) of
§ 2255, several courts have interpreted subsection (e) as an alternative
means through which certain prisoners may bring a second or successive
collateral challenge. Subsection (e) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who
is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section,
shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to
apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that
such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the rem-
edy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.37
The legislative history contains few meaningful clues regarding the true
meaning of the "inadequate or ineffective" language of this savings
clause." However, in the "extremely limited circumstances" in which a
prisoner is able to prove that the § 2255 remedy is "inadequate or inef-
fective," courts have authorized a habeas corpus petition pursuant to
§ 2241 via the savings clause, even if a prior § 2255 motion has been
denied.39
34. Id.
35. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661 (2001).
36. Id.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006) (emphasis added).
38. See, e.g., Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1241 (1 lth Cir. 1999) (explaining that there is
nothing "in the legislative history explaining why the relevant language was changed or what the
new language means").
39. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Caravalho v. Pugh, 177
F.3d 1177, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999)).
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2. Inter-Circuit Jurisprudence
Despite the scant legislative history behind the savings clause, sev-
eral circuits have attempted to formulate a rule regarding its proper ap-
plication. These efforts have produced inconsistent results. 40 Although
the circuits are in general agreement that access to § 2241 via the savings
clause should turn on whether the petitioner has had an opportunity to
present his claim, the circuits are split as to what satisfies the requisite
"opportunity."41
a. The Second and Third Circuits' Constitutional Test
The Second and Third Circuits were among the first to interpret the
AEDPA-revised version of § 2255. Both circuits determined that the
savings clause may be available when constitutional issues would other-
wise arise.42 In each case, the courts allowed a second collateral chal-
lenge via the savings clause and § 2241 because the prisoner would have
had no other recourse to bring a claim of actual innocence.4 3 However,
neither circuit elaborated on which issues are of sufficient constitutional
dimension to trigger the savings clause.
b. The "Unobstructed Procedural Shot" Test
A number of circuits soon expanded upon the analyses of the Se-
cond and Third Circuits and adopted slightly more formulaic rules re-
garding proper application of the savings clause." Although the tests
have been articulated in slightly different ways, each involves common
ingredients of (1) actual innocence and (2) retroactivity.4 5 As the Seventh
40. See, e.g, id. at 594 (recognizing that the circuits have split "three different ways on how
best to read the savings clause").
41. See id. at 589-94 (discussing the different tests used across circuits).
42. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that the unavailability of
collateral review to a party claiming innocence would raise a "thorny constitutional issue");
Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the savings clause is
available when failure to provide collateral review would raise "serious constitutional questions").
43. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251 (holding that the savings clause applies because
Dorsainvil "does not have and . . .never had an opportunity to challenge his conviction"); Triestman,
124 F.3d at 380 (allowing resort to § 2241 because an attempt by Congress to preclude all collateral
review "would raise serious questions as to the constitutional validity of the AEDPA's amendments
to § 2255").
44. See Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 902-04 (5th Cir. 2001) (relying on the
analyses of its sister circuits to formulate a rule based on actual innocence and retroactivity); In re
Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the rationale of its sister circuits and
explaining its three-pronged test to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of § 2255); Wofford v.
Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1242-44 (11th Cir. 1999) (adopting the Seventh Circuit's test as "better rea-
soned" than those of the Second and Third Circuits); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611-12 (7th
Cir. 1998) (rejecting the tests of the Second and Third Circuits as "too indefinite" and instead hold-
ing that a "federal prisoner should be permitted to seek habeas corpus only if he had no reasonable
opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a fundamental defect in his conviction or sentence
because the law changed after his first 2255 motion").
45. Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 903 ("The standards that these courts have articulated for the
savings clause may not be framed in identical terms, but the following basic features are evident in
most formulations: actual innocence and retroactivity.").
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Circuit has most succinctly put it, these circuits will allow a second or
successive collateral challenge via the savings clause and § 2241 when
the petitioner has not had an "unobstructed procedural shot" at presenting
his claim. 4 6 Circuits adopting this test have generally held the requisite
"unobstructed procedural shot" to be absent when the petitioner faced
adverse circuit or Supreme Court precedent at the time of his initial §
2255 motion, and after that motion, the relevant law changed in such a
way that the conduct for which the petitioner was convicted is no longer
- - 47criminal.
c. The Ninth Circuit's "Novelty" Test
The Ninth Circuit has endorsed an expanded version of the "unob-
structed procedural shot" test, and in doing so has adopted the most lib-
eral test to determine the applicability of the savings clause to second and
successive collateral challenges.48 Ninth Circuit courts deciding whether
a petitioner was previously afforded an "unobstructed procedural shot"
will "consider (1) whether the legal basis for the petitioner's claim did
not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255
motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petition-
er's claim after that first § 2255 motion."4 9 Thus, Ninth Circuit petition-
ers have access to § 2241 via the savings clause when they present a
novel argument based on a material change in applicable law made effec-
tive after their initial § 2255 motion.o There is no explicit requirement
that petitioners faced adverse circuit precedent at the time of the initial §
2255 motion.
Before Prost v. Anderson, the Tenth Circuit was a bystander to the
tripartite circuit split regarding proper application of the savings clause to
second and successive collateral challenges. In Prost, the court analyzed
the savings clause and its associated inter-circuit jurisprudence.
II. PROST V. ANDERSON
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1998, appellant Prost was indicted in the Eastern District of Mis-
souri for his participation in a drug trafficking operation." Prost pled
guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and two
counts of conspiring to launder proceeds derived from a drug-dealing
46. See Davenport, 147 F.3d at 609 (rejecting the petition because the prisoner's initial § 2255
motion gave him "an unobstructed procedural shot at getting his sentence vacated").
47. See, e.g., In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000).
48. See Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2008).
49. Id. at 960 (quoting Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
50. See id.
51. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 580 (10th Cir. 2011).
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operation.5 2 After his conviction, Prost filed a collateral challenge pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to have his sentence vacated, citing inef-
fective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion, and
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.5 4
Nearly a decade after Prost's § 2255 motion was rejected, the Su-
preme Court's decision in United States. v. Santos55 lit a potential spark
in his otherwise extinguished appeals. In Santos, the Court interpreted
the term "proceeds" in the context of an illegal lottery operation as mean-
ing "profits" rather than merely "gross receipts."56 Relying on Santos and
arguing that the funds he laundered were merely the gross receipts of the
drug-dealing operation, Prost filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking to have his money laundering convictions
overturned. The petition was filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado, where Prost was imprisoned, due to the re-
quirement that § 2241 petitions be brought in the district of incarcera-
tion.
The district court dismissed the petition, holding that the proper
post-conviction remedy for prisoners challenging the legality of their
detention is 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than § 2241.59 The court explained
that § 2241 is available only when the remedy provided by § 2255 is
"inadequate or ineffective."6 0 The mere fact that Prost may be barred
from bringing a second § 2255 petition did not make the remedy inade-
quate or ineffective because his argument could have been included in
the initial § 2255 proceeding.61
B. Majority Opinion
In a 2-1 decision, a panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court decision.62 The court held that the appropriate
metric in determining § 2255's remedial adequacy in relation to second
or successive challenges is whether the petitioner's argument could have
been raised in the initial § 2255 motion.63 Because Prost could have
brought his statutory interpretation argument in his initial § 2255 pro-
52. Id.
53. Prost v. Wiley, No. 08-CV-02246-BNB, 2008 WL 4925667, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 13,
2008).
54. Prost, 636 F.3d at 580.
55. 553 U.S. 507 (2008).
56. Id. at 514.
57. Prost, 636 F.3d at 580-81.
58. Id. at 581.
59. Prost v. Wiley, No. 08-CV-02246-BNB, 2008 WL 4925667, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 13,
2008).
60. Id. at *1-2.
61. Id. at *2.
62. Prost, 636 F.3d at 598.
63. Id. at 584.
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ceeding, the court reasoned, he was barred from accessing § 2241 via the
savings clause.M
In support of its proffered metric, the majority gleaned five points
from the context, history, and precedent underlying § 2255.65 First look-
ing to the plain language of the statute, the court found that § 2255 guar-
antees petitioners an opportunity to test their arguments but does not
guarantee relief.66 So long as petitioners are afforded a remedy via an
initial motion, the court reasoned, the unavailability of a second motion
does not render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective. 6 7 The court found fur-
ther support for its holding by looking to the savings clause's "near
neighbor," § 2255(h), which limits second or successive motions to those
68concerning newly discovered evidence or new constitutional rulings.
The absence of "new statutory interpretations" from the list, the court
reasoned, was an intentional omission by Congress, necessary to further
its goal of limiting federal collateral review. 69 Next, the court found its
holding to be in harmony with the statute as a whole, which is ripe with a
repeated "emphasis on providing a single opportunity to test argu-
ments., 70 Viewed in the context of AEDPA, § 2255 limits prisoner ac-
cess to § 2241 only in circumstances where the initial "motion was itself
inadequate or ineffective to the task of providing the petitioner with a
chance to test his sentence or conviction." 7 1 The court went on to analyze
the history of the savings clause, finding that the congressional intent
behind § 2255 was merely to alleviate the administrative burdens that
had come to hinder habeas corpus proceedings, not to give prisoners
"multiple bites at the apple." 72 Finally, the court found its decision to be
consistent with past Tenth Circuit decisions, which have "recognized the
narrowness" of the savings clause and "allowed resort to § 2241 sparing-
ly, only when an adequate or effective means of testing a § 2255 petition
was genuinely absent."73
Applying its newly adopted rule to the circumstances of Prost's
case, the majority affirmed the district court and rejected Prost's mo-
tion. 74 The court found, and Prost offered, no evidence that he was pre-
cluded from bringing a statutory interpretation argument in his initial
§ 2255 proceeding.75 The lack of relief was therefore caused by his own
64. Id at 588.
65. See id. at 584.
66. Id. at 584-85.
67. See id
68. Id at 585.
69. Id. at 585-86.
70. Id. at 587.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 587-88.
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failures rather than inadequacy or ineffectiveness of the § 2255 remedial
mechanism as required to trigger the savings clause.76
The holding foreclosed from Tenth Circuit petitioners two alterna-
tive tests gleaned from other circuits and proffered by Prost to determine
whether the savings clause may allow a second or successive collateral
challenge. 77 The court first rejected the Ninth Circuit's "novelty test,"
which allows prisoners a second collateral petition when the initial
§ 2255 proceeding ends before the Supreme Court hands down a new
and relevant statutory interpretation. 78 The court acknowledged the diffi-
culty in imagining novel arguments, yet rejected the novelty test while
reiterating that the true test lies in the procedural adequacy of the initial §
2255 motion.7 9 Had Congress intended the savings clause to embrace the
novelty test, the majority argued, it would have included "novel statutory
interpretations" within subsection (h) rather than expressly limiting it to
newly discovered evidence and new constitutional rulings.o
Secondly, the majority rejected Prost's submission that petitioners
should be allowed a second collateral challenge when the substance of
that challenge was erroneously foreclosed under circuit law at the time of
the initial § 2255 motion.8 ' The court acknowledged that circuit prece-
dent may sometimes require judges to reject otherwise meritorious ar-
guments, but deemed such a possibility the result of legal error rather
than inadequacy in the § 2255 remedial mechanism. 82 Prost was free, as
the Santos defendant was, to include a statutory interpretation argument
in his initial § 2255 motion and challenge any existing adverse circuit
precedent all the way to the Supreme Court.83 The court noted the multi-
tude of "instances where the Supreme Court has rewarded litigants who
took the trouble to challenge adverse circuit precedent" as evidence
§ 2255 is an adequate remedial mechanism even when adverse law ex-
ists. 84
The majority concluded with an acknowledgment that the savings
clause may be available to petitioners when necessary to avoid "serious
constitutional questions."85 However, because Prost declined to pursue a
constitutional argument in his motion, the court declined to rule on the
-86issue.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 595.
78. Id. at 589.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 590.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 590-91.
84. Id.




Judge Seymour agreed with the majority on the result but vehe-
mently disagreed with its rationale.87 Rather than delving into an analysis
of inter-circuit law, Judge Seymour would have limited the opinion to a
conclusion that Prost faced no adverse circuit precedent at the time of his
first motion, and thus had an "adequate and effective opportunity to test
the legality of his conviction" with his initial § 2255 motion. Thus,
reasoned Judge Seymour, the savings clause plainly did not apply, and
Prost was precluded from accessing § 2241.89
The heart of the disagreement between the majority and concur-
rence lay in the merits of the erroneous circuit foreclosure test.90 In her
concurring opinion, Judge Seymour intimated that she would accept the
erroneous circuit foreclosure test in the context of an actual innocence
claim.9' She relied on the Supreme Court's position that claims of actual
innocence are worthy of careful scrutiny, even when brought in a second
or successive collateral attack.9 2 Instead, the court entered "uncharted
territory to reject any circuit foreclosure test . . . reaching a conclusion
contrary to every other circuit that has decided this question." 93 Thus,
claimed Judge Seymour, the majority decision created a circuit split.94
The concurrence also sharply contended that the majority violated
the "cardinal principal of judicial restraint . . . [that] if it is not necessary
to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more."95 Because rejecting
the erroneous circuit foreclosure test was not necessary to reach its ulti-
mate conclusion, the court should not have done so.96 She noted that
"[s]ignificantly . . . not even the government" asked the court to reject
the circuit foreclosure test.97 Furthermore, contended Judge Seymour, the
parties did not adequately present the circuit foreclosure test.98 Thus, the
majority opinion "[flew] in the face of judicial restraint."99
III. ANALYSIS
The court in Prost v. Anderson correctly concluded that Congress
did not intend for successive collateral challenges based on relevant
87. Id. at 598-99 (Seymour, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 599.
89. See id. at 598-99.
90. See id. at 599-603.
91. See id at 601 (recognizing that "every other circuit" has reached a similar conclusion, and
the Tenth Circuit had "favorably recognized this position" in a prior decision).
92. Id. at 600-01.
93. Id. at 603.
94. Id. at 599.
95. Id (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 431 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. See id. at 602.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 603.
99. Id at 599.
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changes in statutory law to be within the purview of § 2255's savings
clause. Contrary holdings of other circuits have relied on an incomplete
reading of the savings clause and the subsection in which it resides. To
alleviate the tripartite circuit split that has developed around this enig-
matic clause, the Supreme Court must step-in and overturn fifteen years
of erroneous savings clause jurisprudence across circuits.
A. Spirit and Purpose of the Current § 2255
Although Congress has provided few meaningful clues regarding
the intended application of the savings clause, the Tenth Circuit's analy-
sis is consistent with the history and context of § 2255 as a whole. The
language of the statute, both in what it does and does not state, leaves
little doubt that petitioners may reach the savings clause only in the nar-
rowest of circumstances. The restrictions placed on second and succes-
sive collateral challenges ensure that courts are not encumbered by the
administrative problems that led to § 2255's initial enactment and played
a role in the AEDPA amendments. In Prost, the Tenth Circuit correctly
analyzed the post-AEDPA statute as Congress intended it to apply. Its
reading conforms to the legislative intent from both a textual and practi-
cal standpoint.
1. AEDPA's Dramatic Changes
A comparison of the pre-AEDPA and post-AEDPA statutory lan-
guage illustrates that Congress intended the amendments to dramatically
limit second and successive collateral challenges. Before the AEDPA
amendments, § 2255 provided that courts "shall not be required to enter-
tain a second or successive motion for similar relief [on] behalf of the
same prisoner."100 The equivocal language of the statute lent substantial
deference to the judgment of courts. Even more, the wording of the stat-
ute in its previous form indicated that Congress's intended default at that
time was to allow second and successive collateral challenges on all po-
tentially meritorious grounds. This intention was recognized and carried
out by the courts. 0' In essence, the prior version of the statute created an
open pathway for second and successive motions that could be closed at
the discretion of the court, but, by default, would remain open. The draft-
ers could have easily avoided this result if they had simply instructed that
courts "may" hear second and successive challenges. This unchosen for-
mulation would have closed the door to such challenges but given courts
the power to open the door when justice so required. The "may" modifier
would have acted as justifiable cause for hearing motions that would, in
100. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 368 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1996)).
101. See, e.g., id. (explaining that second or successive collateral challenges brought under the
pre-AEDPA version of § 2255 should be heard "where the ends of justice would ... be served by
reaching the merits of the subsequent application." (quoting Barton v. United States, 791 F.3d 265,
266-67 (2d Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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normal circumstances, be denied. Instead, Congress drafted the previous
version of § 2255 in a way that allowed courts to liberally hear second
and successive collateral challenges.
With the AEDPA amendments, Congress dramatically altered the
circumstances in which courts may hear second or successive collateral
motions. In sharp contrast to the open-ended language of the previous
statute, Congress directed courts to specific and exclusive instances in
which such challenges may be heard. The statute now provides:
A second or successive motion must be certified in section 2244 by a
panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain-
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of
the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found
the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on col-
lateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavaila-
ble.102
The revised statutory language leaves little doubt that Congress in-
tended to allow second and successive collateral petitions only in the
most extraordinary of circumstances. Deference to the courts was largely
eliminated. Petitioners meeting neither of the two narrow criteria denoted
by Congress were limited to one, and only one, bite at the apple.
Nonetheless, some courts have re-captured a portion of that defer-
ence by way of the savings clause and its "inadequate or ineffective"
language. By allowing access to § 2241 via the savings clause, courts
have created alternative circumstances in which second and successive
collateral challenges may be heard. But this may be more latitude than
Congress intended. The entirety of the subsection in which the "inade-
quate or ineffective" language resides is as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who
is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section,
shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to
apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that
such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the reme-
dy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his de-
-103tention.
Two issues relating to this subsection cast doubt over courts' reli-
ance on it to allow second and successive challenges. First, the savings
clause is prefaced with the restriction that it applies only to "a prisoner
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2008).
103. § 2255(e) (2008) (emphasis added).
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who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section."
By the very restrictions contained in the statute, a prisoner who has al-
ready brought a § 2255 motion is not authorized to bring a subsequent
motion. Rather, the petitioner must appeal to a panel of the court of ap-
peals, which will then issue an order to "grant or deny the authoriza-
tion."'" The authorization will be granted only if there is a prima facie
showing that the application contains newly discovered evidence or a
new constitutional rule. 05 Therefore, utilizing the savings clause to allow
unauthorized successive petitions involves a circularity that contradicts
the plain language of the statute. The savings clause is impliedly being
used to authorize petitions that are otherwise unauthorized and outside its
reach. This cannot be what Congress intended. More likely, Congress
included the savings clause as a resort to § 2241 when the initial § 2255
motion is inadequate or ineffective, as when a military prisoner seeks to
challenge the result of a court martial that has since dissolved.'0 6 In these
circumstances, the petitioner is "authorized to apply for relief pursuant
to" § 2255, and the savings clause rightfully applies.
The placement of the savings clause in relation to the entirety of
§ 2255 also casts doubt over its use as an alternative mechanism by
which petitioners may bring a second or successive collateral challenge.
The savings clause resides in subsection (e) of § 2255, while the re-
striction on successive challenges is found in subsection (h). It seems
illogical that Congress would provide the exception before announcing
the rule. Congress could have just as easily, and with much less resulting
confusion, included the savings clause (or a duplicate thereof) within
subsection (h) if it intended for successive challenges to be within its
purview. Instead, Congress likely constructed the statute in its amended
form because it never intended to make the savings clause a back-door
escape from the restrictions on second and successive challenges.
2. The Choice to Omit Statutory Interpretations
As discussed above, the AEDPA-revised version of § 2255 allows
courts to hear second and successive collateral challenges only when
they pertain to newly discovered evidence or new constitutional rulings.
New statutory interpretations, like the one at issue in Prost, are conspic-
uously absent from this short list of allowable challenges. Thus, to square
the argument that the revised § 2255 allows for secondary collateral chal-
lenges in situations similar to Prost, one must first accept that Congress
chose to relegate changes in statutory law to the catch-all savings clause
rather than explicitly provide for them in subsection (h). Even setting
aside the contrary evidence discussed in the prior section, this is a diffi-
cult argument to accept. Congress is undoubtedly aware that it is the
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D) (2006).
105. § 2244(b)(3)(C).
106. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th Cir. 2011).
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courts' duty to interpret ambiguous statutes and that, as in Santos, the
Supreme Court will sometimes effect a change in law. Indeed, it pur-
posefully included the "constitutional" modifier rather than generically
allowing any "new rule of law" to trigger a second or successive chal-
lenge. The choice to omit changes in statutory law from the grace of sub-
section (h) is thus more likely an intentional act by Congress that should
be recognized by the courts.
But the question remains: why would Congress choose to intention-
ally deny secondary collateral challenges pertaining to relevant changes
in law, creating situations where prisoners may remain in jail for crimes
the Supreme Court has deemed non-existent? One likely reason involves
the indefinite nature of statutory law and the language upon which it is
composed. Unlike the supremacy of constitutional law and the definite
nature of DNA testing and other forms of newly discovered evidence,
statutory interpretations are amorphous and constantly evolving. The
circumstances surrounding Prost perfectly illustrate this point. While
defining the term "proceeds" in Santos, the Supreme Court recognized
the "inherent ambiguity" of the word, which Congress has sometimes
intended to mean "profits" and sometimes "receipts." 07 After failing to
find a definitive answer in the legislative history underlying the statute,
the Court, in a plurality opinion, based its decision on the rule of leni-
ty 0 8 But not long after the decision, Congress deemed the Santos plural-
ity's definition inaccurate and amended the statute's meaning of "pro-
ceeds" to specifically include "gross receipts."' 0 9
Notwithstanding the speed at which Congress moved to correct the
Court's erroneous interpretation, Prost and similar cases still fell under
the previous version of the statute, the Santos decision, and the incorrect
definition of "proceeds."" 0 One must pause to consider the ultimate re-
sult of Prost had Congress included statutory interpretation arguments
within the purview of the savings clause: after admitting to, being con-
victed of, and exhausting all other available appeals for his role in the
drug trafficking and money laundering scheme, Prost likely would have
been exonerated by a short-lived and erroneous interpretation of the word
"proceeds." Congress presumably deemed such results unacceptable and
crafted the revised § 2255 in a way that prevents opportunistic criminals
from gaining a fortuitous and unwarranted escape from their criminal
conduct.
107. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 511-12, 514 (2008) (explaining that, when a statute
may reasonably be interpreted in two different ways, the "tie must go to the defendant").
108. Id. at 514. ("The rule of lenity requires that ambiguous criminal statutes be construed in
favor of the defendant."); see also Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2045, 2055 (2011).
109. Prost, 636 F.3d at 580 n.1.
110. Id.
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B. Propagation ofError Across Circuits
Without exception, the circuits have ignored the textual evidence
that Congress intended second and successive collateral challenges to be
wholly outside the purview of the savings clause while focusing on the
circumstances in which § 2255 might be "inadequate or ineffective" in
relation to such challenges. This fatal error originated concurrently in the
Second and Third Circuits soon after the AEDPA amendments were en-
acted. Masked by the otherwise thorough and logical holdings of these
decisions, the error gradually infiltrated the law of other circuits as those
courts looked to helpful precedent when faced with the same issue. This
error is a main cause of the state of savings clause jurisprudence today: a
sharp split between circuits centered around the meaning of "inadequate
and ineffective" that ignores the remainder of the subsection. To alleviate
the split, the original error must be confronted and corrected.
1. An Incomplete Reading of the Savings Clause
Shortly after the § 2255 AEDPA amendments were enacted, the Se-
cond Circuit decided Triestman v. United States,"' and the Third Circuit
decided In re Dorsainvil.1 12 The issue in both cases, as in Prost, was
whether § 2255 allows a petitioner a secondary collateral challenge after
a relevant change in law.' 13 A number of other circuits had confronted
precisely the same issue, but limited their holdings to denial of the sec-
ondary collateral challenge because the change in law was not of consti-
tutional dimension as required by § 2255(h).'1 4 The Second and Third
Circuits went further, and in doing so became the first courts to consider
whether the savings clause might afford petitioners a second or succes-
sive collateral challenge. 15
The majority in Triestman held that petitioners may access the sav-
ings clause when § 2255 is unavailable and the failure to provide collat-
eral review would "raise serious constitutional questions." 1 l6 Although
this test may very well be the correct criteria by which to apply the sav-
ings clause, the court based its holding, in part, on an incomplete reading
of the statute. By focusing exclusively on the final twenty words of sub-
section (e), in which the "inadequate or ineffective" language resides, the
court erroneously extended access to the savings clause to any prisoner.
The court failed to recognize that the savings clause is explicitly limited
to prisoners who are "authorized to apply for relief pursuant" to
§ 2255.117
111. 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997).
112. 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997).
113. See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 363; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 246.
114. Triestman, 124 F.3d at 369.
115. See id. at 370.
116. Id. at 377.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2008) (emphasis added).
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As the Second Circuit considered the Triestman case, the Third Cir-
cuit analyzed precisely the same issue in Dorsainvil.18 There, the court
opined that it would face "a thorny constitutional issue" if a prisoner
claiming innocence based on a relevant change in law was left with no
judicial recourse.' 19 The court reasoned that these potential constitutional
issues could be avoided by resort to the § 2255 savings clause. 12 0 Like
the Second Circuit did in Triestman, the court reached its conclusion by
focusing exclusively on the final clause in subsection (e) while complete-
ly ignoring its explicit limitation to authorized prisoners.' 2 1
The courts in both Triestman and Dorsainvil began their analyses
by concluding that the respective petitioners met neither of the two crite-
na denoted in subsection (h), thereby indirectly recognizing that the peti-
tioners were not authorized to bring a second § 2255 motion.122 By the
plain language of subsection (e), this would preclude the petitioners from
accessing the savings clause. But the courts failed to connect the dots.
Instead, their holdings laid the foundation for fifteen years of erroneous
savings clause jurisprudence.
2. Cause and Effect
The incomplete reading of the Second and Third Circuits appears to
have been caused by their overreliance on prior Supreme Court decisions
that analyzed the pre-AEDPA version of § 2255. Both Triestman and
Dorsainvil extensively cite Hayman 23 and Davis,'24 two Supreme Court
cases that analyzed the savings clause in its pre-AEDPA form. For ex-
ample, the Triestman Court found it "highly significant that the [Su-
preme] Court noted that, because of the habeas-preserving language of
§ 2255, it did not need to, and so would not, reach the constitutional is-
sues presented to it."l 25 But at the time Hayman was decided, § 2255
contained no restrictions on second and successive challenges, and thus
the "habeas-preserving language," i.e. the savings clause, was available
in a much greater capacity. The court also relied on Davis to suggest that
"both habeas and § 2255 had always been available" to petitioners faced
with an intervening change in law.' 26 That may very well have been true
before 1996. But the post-AEDPA statute contains first-of-its-kind re-
strictions on second and successive collateral challenges, rendering the
118. Triestman, 124 F.3d at 370 n.10.
119. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 248.
120. See id. at 251.
121. See id. at 249-52.
122. Id. at 248 ("Dorsainvil has failed to satisfy either prong of § 2255 as amended.");
Triestman, 124 F.3d at 371 ("Triestman does not appear to have shown the existence of newly dis-
covered evidence or of a new rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to his case . . .
123. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
124. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974).
125. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 378 n.20 (2d Cir. 1997).
126. Id. at 374.
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Triestman court's reliance on decades-old rationale misleading and erro-
neous.
The Dorsainvil court erred in a similar way. It analogized to Davis
and reasoned that, because the circumstances of the two cases were sub-
stantially similar, "[t]here is no reason why § 2241 would not be availa-
ble." 27 However, although the facts of the cases may have been similar,
the statutes under which the cases were analyzed were significantly dif-
ferent. Thus, the court plucked an analysis of the savings clause conduct-
ed in one era of the statute and inserted that rationale into an entirely
different era. But the statute, by then, had dramatically changed. The
rationale used by the Supreme Court before the AEDPA is no longer
compatible with the modem version of § 2255 and the savings clause.
In the years since the Second and Third Circuits put forth their in-
complete readings of the savings clause, their error has propagated
throughout the circuits. Shortly after Triestman and Dorsainvil were de-
cided, the Seventh Circuit entered the fray and analyzed the savings
clause under similar facts.128 There, the court cited both Triestman and
Dorsainvil in interpreting the "inadequate or ineffective" language.12 9
Unlike its sister circuits, the Davenport court acknowledged subsection
(e)'s limitation to authorized petitioners but dismissed this language as
referring to all federal prisoners.130 This explanation is plausible if the
"authorized" modifier was meant to differentiate § 2255 from § 2254, its
companion statute for state prisoners. But the contradiction in the stat-
ute's plain language was still either ignored or not recognized. Federal
prisoners bringing second and successive collateral challenges not per-
taining to new evidence or constitutional rules are, by the statute's own
restrictions, not authorized to do so.
From there, the decisions in Triestman, Dorsainvil, and Davenport
spread to other circuits. The Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits all for-
mulated rules pertaining to the savings clause based, at least in part, on
an analysis of these prior cases.'31 Regardless of whether this incomplete
reading has been a simple oversight or an intentional re-scoping of the
savings clause, the result is contrary to the plain language of the statute.
Indeed, in its Triestman holding, the Second Circuit acknowledged the
"cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that courts must give effect,
if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." 32 But in the years
since the incomplete reading was first put forth, no court has done pre-
127. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251.
128. See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1998).
129. Seeid at 610-11.
130. Id. at 608.
131. See In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000); Reyes-Requena v. United States,
243 F.3d 893, 902-03 (5th Cir. 2001); Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1242-44 (11 th Cir. 1999).
132. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 375 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cisely that. In all likelihood, the error will continue to propagate unless
and until the Supreme Court steps in to quash it.
C. The Supreme Court's Time
As the majority pointed out in Prost, the Tenth Circuit's decision
was the latest in an "already messy field" of savings clause jurispru-
dence.13 3 The Supreme Court should capitalize on this opportunity to
clean up the mess and resolve the circuit split. If it does so, it must ad-
dress three lingering issues. First, it must decide whether petitions lack-
ing constitutional arguments and newly discovered evidence are within
the purview of the savings clause. Second, it must determine the proper
breadth of the savings clause's "inadequate or ineffective" language.
Third, depending on its analysis of these first two issues, the Court
should address the constitutionality of the AEDPA's severe limitations
on second and successive collateral challenges.
1. Whether Otherwise Unauthorized Petitions May Properly Be
Heard Via the Savings Clause and § 2241
As discussed above, subsection (e) of § 2255 begins with the quali-
fication that it applies only to petitioners "authorized to apply for relief."
If the Supreme Court reads the entirety of this subsection literally, there-
by precluding application of the savings clause to non-authorized second
and successive petitions, the lower courts' years of savings clause juris-
prudence will have been an exercise in futility. The Court may very well
settle the circuit split by concluding that all circuits thus far have been
wrong: the savings clause is not applicable to second and successive col-
lateral challenges that do not pertain to new constitutional rules or newly
discovered evidence because, by the plain language of the statute, those
challenges are not authorized to be saved.
However, the Court may avoid this result by concluding, like the
Seventh Circuit did in Davenport, that the preamble to the savings clause
was only meant to differentiate between federal and state prisoners. 134
Although this interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the stat-
ute, the Court could get around the issue by declaring the language am-
biguous. Depending on its analysis of the constitutionality of successor
limits, the Court may reach this result. If an unconstitutional reading of
the statute can be avoided by construing the phrase "prisoner who is au-
thorized" to refer simply to federal rather than state prisoners, the Court
may do just that. 35
133. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 594 (10th Cir. 2011).
134. In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1998).
135. See, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 378 n. 11 (1977) (discussing the "cardinal
principle" of statutory construction that the "Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided").
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But this is an improper course. The canons of statutory construction
should not be used as justification for judicial statutory re-construction.
When, as here, a statute plainly says one thing, the Court must read it
that way, regardless of potential constitutional conflict. Failure to do so
would violate the separation of powers and make the Court de facto
drafters of legislation.
2. Under What Circumstances Is § 2255 Inadequate or Ineffective
to Test the Legality of a Prisoner's Detention?
The Supreme Court should rule on the proper application of the sav-
ings clause regardless of how it decides the first issue. If the Court inter-
prets the plain language of the statute as advocated above, it could con-
ceivably skip to the constitutionality of that interpretation and wholly
avoid this issue. But post-AEDPA savings clause jurisprudence has fo-
cused almost solely on the proper interpretation of the savings clause,
and the Court's failure to address the issue would leave a cloud of uncer-
tainty hanging over the circuit courts.
The circuits are in general agreement that the proper test involves
whether the petitioner has had an unobstructed procedural shot at pre-
senting his claim, or as the Tenth Circuit put it, whether the petitioner
could have presented his claim in a prior § 2255 motion. The Court
should affirm this test as proper. In doing so, the Court should
acknowledge that petitioners can bring unobstructed statutory interpreta-
tion arguments in initial § 2255 motions regardless of established law at
the time of those proceedings. The nature of statutory interpretation re-
quires that someone present the argument before the courts can define the
law. If petitioners were in fact precluded from presenting these argu-
ments, Congress would have exclusive ability to modify the law. As ex-
emplified by Santos, Bailey,136 and others, this is not the case. Petitioners
may challenge any aspect or interpretation of a statute, regardless of pre-
existing law. Hence, the successor limits of subsection (h), paired with
the "authorized petitioner" preface to the savings clause, do not establish
an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Congress undoubtedly recognized this fact when structuring the
AEDPA amendments to § 2255, and structured the statute in such a way
to preclude statutory interpretation arguments from second and succes-
sive collateral petitions. Harshness aside, that is the prerogative of Con-
gress. However, whether such a construction violates any principles em-
bodied in the constitution is another matter. And it is the prerogative of
the Court to decide this question.
136. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
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3. Whether the Unavailability of Collateral Review to Prisoners
Confined for Actions Subsequently Deemed Non-Criminal Ren-
ders § 2255 Unconstitutional
Regardless of the textual evidence provided by Congress that the
savings clause was not intended to apply to second and successive collat-
eral challenges, such a construction may conflict with the constitution.
Thus far, lower courts have made a presumption of constitutionality
based upon Supreme Court decisions that found § 2255 to be constitu-
tional due, in part, to the saving function of the "inadequate or ineffec-
tive" language. 37 As a result, a focus has been placed on proper applica-
tion of the savings clause, while the constitutional questions inherent in
its availability have been examined only superficially. 3 8 But the reliance
on pre-AEDPA decisions like Hayman is misplaced. In those decisions,
the Court held that the savings clause avoided any potential constitution-
al issues that might have otherwise existed with the pre-AEDPA version
of § 2255. The AEDPA amendments dramatically altered both § 2255 as
a whole and the savings clause's function in it. The Court must therefore
determine whether the post-AEDPA statute is unconstitutional if it finds
that the savings clause does not apply to second and successive collateral
challenges based upon either of the two issues discussed above.
The resolution of this issue should coincide closely with the Court's
holding in respect to the second issue above. If the Court holds, as advo-
cated above, that petitioners are unobstructed from presenting arguments
contrary to established law with an initial § 2255 motion, the statute
should necessarily be found constitutional. The multiple layers of direct
and collateral review upon which the judicial system is structured guar-
antee petitioners an opportunity to present all arguments they deem po-
tentially meritorious. The constitution guarantees no more.13 9 The onus is
on petitioners to find and put forth those arguments.
If, however, the Court finds that (1) § 2255 as amended by the
AEDPA prohibits successive challenges based on changes in non-
constitutional law, and (2) that such petitioners have not had an unob-
structed procedural shot at presenting the claim, it must strike the statute
down as unconstitutional. The implications of such a finding would mean
that petitioners, having exhausted their sole § 2255 motion, would re-
main incarcerated for non-existent crimes without judicial recourse
through no fault of their own. Although the Supreme Court generally
137. See, e.g., In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-50 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing the Supreme
Court's analysis of the savings clause in United States v. Hayman and Swain v. Pressley).
138. See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 593-94 (10th Cir. 2011) (recognizing the constitu-
tional issues, but "declin[ing] to pursue [them] in this particular case").
139. See Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1244 ("All the Constitution requires, if it requires




lends deference to Congress in controlling the scope of habeas corpus,
it must intervene if it finds these two conditions satisfied.
CONCLUSION
When § 2255 proves to be an inadequate or ineffective mechanism
by which petitioners may collaterally challenge their convictions and
sentences, its savings clause allows petitioners resort to the habeas relief
afforded by § 2241. However, the textual evidence provided by Congress
casts a dark shadow over courts' reliance on this savings clause to allow
second and successive collateral petitions. In Prost v. Anderson, the
Tenth Circuit reached the correct result, even if its analysis was incom-
plete. It is now up to the Supreme Court to settle the circuit split and de-
cide whether the savings clause is applicable to second and successive
collateral challenges, and if not, whether § 2255's prohibition on such
challenges conflicts with the Constitution.
Bryan Florendo*
140. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996).
* J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Marceau for guiding me through the complex realm of habeas corpus and the Denver
University Law Review editors for their diligent efforts in turning my writing into a publishable
Comment. Thanks also to my loving family for the tireless support and for showing genuine interest
in my endeavors, even when those endeavors pertain to abstract legal topics that have no bearing on
their lives. Finally, and most importantly, thank you to my beautiful and patient wife for providing
the late-night meals, clean home, and caring arms that have made the pursuit of this legal education
immeasurably easier.
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THOMAS V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE Co.:
SEMANTICS, FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND AN OUTDATED
DISTINCTION
INTRODUCTION
In times of market volatility, financial crises, and increasingly un-
certain economic prospects, it is vital that individuals and families make
the right personal investment decisions. As the costs of basic needs such
as education and healthcare have increased, many financial responsibili-
ties have shifted from government and employers to individuals.' Conse-
quently, individual investors must now manage a dizzying array of com-
plex investment and insurance options.2 Although a large body of regula-
tion prevents the world of retail finance from approaching anything like a
Hobbesian state of nature,3 investing is not for the faint of heart. Termi-
nology can be arcane and confusing. Brokers and advisers who appear
to offer the same services may have vastly different fee and compensa-
tion structures, and may be held to vastly different standards of care.
These distinctions are neither obvious nor meaningful to the average
retail investor seeking to insure his or her family against disaster, invest
for retirement, or prepare for the costs of a child's higher education.6
1. See METLIFE, THE METLIFE STUDY OF THE AMERICAN DREAM: AGAINST THE BACKDROP
OF THE FINANCIAL BURDEN SHIFT 1 (2007), available at, http://www.hirmemphis.com/
PDF/2007%2OData/MetLifeAmericanDreamStudyFinal012507.pdf; see also Onnig H.
Dombalagian, Investment Recommendations and the Essence of Duty, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1265, 1275
(2011). Two of the most significant trends are the replacement of defined benefit plans with defined
contribution plans and declines in quality and subsidization of employer-sponsored health insurance.
These trends may not be entirely unwelcome to MetLife and its brethren.
2. See METLIFE, supra note 1, at 1; see also Dombalagian, supra note 1, at 1276.
3. Chapter 13, titled "Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, As Concerning Their Felicity,
and Misery," describes the "nasty, brutish, and short" lives of men living without government or
law. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 82, 84 (J. C. A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998)
(1651).
4. See, e.g., Glossary of Investment Terms, RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL,
http://www.raymondjames.com/gloss.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2011) ("Keeping up with the increas-
ing number of investment products and services . .. can be confusing."); News Release, ING Direct,
ING DIRECT USA's ShareBuilder Launches New "Touch The Ball" TV Campaign That Turns
Online Investing Perception Upside Down (Feb. 17, 2011), available at
htp://multivu.pmewswire.com/mnr/sharebuilder/48620/ ("When it comes to investing, technical
jargon, confusing trading tools and a blizzard of data can leave many investors feeling over-
whelmed.").
5. See, e.g., ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INVESTOR AND
INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 89-90, 109 (2008),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-lrandiabdrepon.pdf; STAFF OF U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND
BROKER-DEALERS, at i, 95, 98-100 (2011) [hereinafter SEC STUDY],
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
6. See Gary A. Varnavides, The Flawed State of Broker-Dealer Regulation and the Case for
an Authentic Federal Fiduciary Standard for Broker-Dealers, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203,
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Much of the regulation of financial services arose in the 1930s and
1940s, when investment services were more bifurcated: brokers7 execut-
ed securities transactions for customers in return for a commission, while
investment advisers dispensed advice and managed customer accounts in
return for a fee that was typically a percentage of assets under manage-
ment.8 As a result, brokers are regulated by the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act)9, while investment advisers are regulated by the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA)'o. Further complicating matters,
some broker activities are regulated by both acts, while others are ex-
empted from the IAA.
In Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.," the Tenth Circuit
held that the broker exemption of the IAA applied to the activities of a
Metropolitan Life (MetLife) representative. 12 Although the court's analy-
sis was couched as an exercise in statutory interpretation, its plain lan-
guage analysis of the statute was flawed and created an overly-broad
exemption that will result in the improper exclusion of broker activities
from the requirements of the IAA.
Part I of this Comment provides background information on Met-
Life, the insurance industry and its products, and the regulatory struc-
tures governing brokers and investment advisers. Part II summarizes the
facts, holdings, and procedural history of Thomas. Part III analyzes the
decision in Thomas and focuses on the court's analysis of the IAA's bro-
ker exemption, concluding that the court's interpretation of the phrase
"solely incidental" was flawed, unduly broadening the broker exemption
and leading to less investor protection. This Comment concludes that the
court should have adopted a narrower interpretation of the exemption,
proposes such an interpretation, and finally notes that in light of recent
developments in the regulatory framework, the negative effects of the
Thomas decision may be short-lived.
216 (2011) (citing HUNG ET AL., supra note 5) ("[M]ost investors do not understand general distinc-
tions between broker-dealers and investment advisers . . . .").
7. For simplicity and concision, this Comment uses the term "broker" rather than "broker-
dealer" throughout. In addition, the term may refer to an individual licensed broker or the brokerage
firm for which he or she works.
8. See Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-012 I-F, 2009 WL 2778663, at *7 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 31, 2009) (citing Fin. Planning Ass'n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 485 (D.C. Cir. 2007)), affd,
631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011). The crucial distinction with respect to compensation is that the
broker-dealer is compensated per transaction, while the investment adviser is compensated via a fee
schedule.
9. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-nn (2006).
10. See generally investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21(2006).
I1. 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011).
12. Id. at 1166-68.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. MetLife and Insurance Products
MetLife exemplifies the late twentieth-century ideal of a "financial
supermarket,"13  a horizontally-integrated 4 behemoth offering a full
range of financial services and products.'5 Like most such entities, Met-
Life relies on a holding company structure. Subsidiaries include Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, Inc., which underwrites various types
of insurance, and MetLife Securities, Inc., a registered broker and adviser
that sells both investment products and advisory services.' 6
MetLife employs financial services representatives (FSRs) to sell its
products and services to the general public.' 7 FSR compensation is com-
mission-based and representatives are incentivized to push proprietary
MetLife products.' 8 These products include not only traditional insurance
policies, but also securities, mutual funds, variable universal life insur-
ance policies (VULPs), and annuities.19 In addition, MetLife Securities
also employs financial planners who offer fee-based planning and advi-
sory services. 20
A VULP allows policy-holders to buy insurance and invest the cash
value of the policy in securities. 21 Return on these investments is not
immediately subject to taxation, providing customers with tax-deferred
13. A financial supermarket is "[a] company offering a wide range of financial services (e.g.
stock, insurance and real-estate brokerage)." Financial Supermarket, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financialsupermarket.asp (last visited on Oct. 20, 2011).
14. Horizontal integration refers to the process by which "a company expands its business
into different products that are similar to current lines." Horizontal Integration, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/horizontalintegration.asp (last visited on Oct. 20, 2011).
15. See Joseph A. Smith, Jr., Retail Delivery of Financial Services After the Gramm-Leach
Bliley-Act: How Will Public Policy Shape the "Financial Services Supermarket"?, 4 N.C. BANKING
INST. 39, 40 (2000) (defining "financial services supermarket" in the context of Gramm-Leach
Bliley); Contact MetLife, METLIFE, http://www.metlife.com/about/corporate-
profile/contact/metlife/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (demonstrating corporate structure).
16. See MetLife Securities, METLIFE, http://www.metlife.com/about/corporate-
profile/contact/metlife-securities/index.htmI (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). MetLife is also an umbrella
for a number of other subsidiaries not directly relevant to this case, including MetLife Bank, N.A.
and a number of specialized insurance-related companies.
17. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1157; New Financial Services Representatives, METLIFE,
http://www.metlife.com/careers/sales-jobs/new-financial-representatives/index.htm (last visited Oct.
20, 2011).
18. The incentives include both carrots and sticks: FSRs are compensated for selling proprie-
tary products as well as subject to termination for not meeting quotas of such products. Thomas, 631
F.3d at 1157, 1167.
19. See, e.g., Insurance, METLIFE, http://www.metlife.com/individual/insurance/index.html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2011); Investment Products, METLIFE, http://www.metlife.com/individual/
investment-products/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
20. See Financial Planning, METLIFE, http://www.metlife.com/individual/planning/financia/
index.html#overview (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
21. See Hugh D. Berkson, Variable Universal Life Policies: Can They Be Sold Without Mis-
leading the Customer?, 1686 PRAC. L. INST. 421, 424 (2008); Bruce W. Fraser, VUL: Pros and
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growth. Policy-holders, however, also assume substantial investment
risk, are subject to limited investment choices, and incur expenses that
may not be obvious.22 The marketing of VULPs has been criticized for
featuring unrealistic rates of return and burying fees and costs in fine
print.23 An average investor may have difficulty understanding the dif-
ferences between, and the relative strengths and weaknesses of, various
life insurance options, including VULPs.24 Significantly, because the
purchaser bears investment risk with a VULP, the product is regulated as
a security, and can only be sold by a registered broker.25
B. Regulation of the Securities Industry
In response to the loss of public faith in capital markets that arose
from the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression,
Congress enacted a series of federal securities laws.26 The Securities Act
of 1933 regulated the primary distribution of shares; the Exchange Act,
enacted in 1934, created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC
or Commission) and regulated the secondary markets, including the ac-
tivities of brokers; and the IAA, enacted in 1940, established rules for the
regulation of investment advisers.2 7
Brokers are required to be members of a self-regulatory organiza-
tion.28 The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) performs
this task.29 FINRA and its predecessors developed rules that require in-
vestments recommended by a broker to be "suitable" for a customer. 30
Under this standard, a broker must have reasonable grounds for believing
a recommendation is suitable for a customer based on that customer's
financial situation.31 Notably, this standard does not require a broker to
disclose any conflicts of interest.3 2
In contrast, the IAA does not delegate regulation to SROs; instead,
regulatory oversight remains with the SEC. Investment advisers (who
22. See Fraser, supra note 21.
23. See Berkson, supra note 21, at 423. The hypothetical sale of a VULP by a fast-talking
insurance agent in the introduction of Berkson's article illustrates both the optimistic bias of a typi-
cal sales pitch and the possible negative consequences of a market downturn to a policy-holder.
24. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Robert S. Stillman, The Law and Economics of Vanishing
Premium Life Insurance, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (1997) ("Even financially sophisticated consumers
may lack a detailed understanding of the different types of insurance products.").
25. Berkson, supra note 21, at 425-26 .
26. See Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advis-
ers, 65 Bus. LAW. 395, 402 (2010).
27. Id.
28. This requirement was put in place in 1983. See SECO Programs, Exchange Act Release
No. 20409, 29 SEC Docket 275 (Nov. 22, 1983).
29. Varnavides, supra note 6, at 205.
30. See id. at 206.
31. Id. The broker must take into account customer's financial status, tax status, and objec-
tives when analyzing suitability.
32. See id. at 206-07. For examples of such conflicts, see infra text accompanying note 128.
33. Varnavides, supra note 6, at 209-10.
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are compensated for providing advice about buying or selling securities)
are held by the IAA to a fiduciary standard, which requires that an agent
observe the duties of loyalty and care in its dealings with a principal.3 4
This is a much higher standard than mere suitability; the duty of loyalty,
in particular, requires an adviser to "subordinate [his] interests to those of
the principal."3  Both Congress and courts have recognized that undis-
closed conflicts of interest are antithetical to this duty.36
While brokers providing investment advice fall under the general
statutory definition of investment adviser, they are exempted from regu-
lation under the IAA if the advice they give is "solely incidental to" their
broker activities and they receive "no special compensation" for the ad-
vice. The exempt brokers are thus held to the lower suitability standard
established by FINRA under the Exchange Act, not the fiduciary stand-
ard under the IAA.
Many commentators have noted that the traditional differences be-
tween brokers and investment advisers have diminished, with both
providing nearly identical services to retail customers.38 The SEC, not
unaware of these concerns, in 2008 commissioned the RAND Institute to
review the current state of the investment business, including the regula-
tory framework, broker and advisor business practices, and investors'
understanding of the business.3 9 The ensuing report indicated, among
other things, that retail investors made little distinction between brokers
and advisers.40
Also recognizing the overlapping roles of these entities were the
drafters of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).4 1 Section 913 of Dodd-Frank gave the SEC
authority to make rules establishing a uniform fiduciary standard for bro-
34. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties and the Impact of the Dodd-
Frank Act, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 47, 50-51, 64-67 (2011).
35. See Dombalagian, supra note 1, at 1285 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §
8.01 cmt. b (2006)). As a simple example of the difference in practice, consider a broker who sells
two investment products, SI and S2, that have similar risk and return characteristics. S2 is more
expensive than SI, and the broker receives a higher commission or other financial incentive for
selling S2. Under the suitability standard, as long as S2 is considered suitable for a customer, the
broker may advise that customer to purchase S2. Under the fiduciary standard, the broker may not
advise the customer to purchase S2, because the customer's interests are best served by purchasing
Sl.
36. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963) ("The
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a congressional recognition 'of the delicate fiduciary
nature of an investment advisory relationship,' as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at
least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline a[n] investment adviser-consciously or
unconsciously-to render advice which was not disinterested." (quoting Louts LOSS, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1412 (2d ed. 1961))).
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (2006).
38. See, e.g., Vamavides, supra note 6, at 215 (referencing a speech by SEC commissioner
Elisse B. Walter).
39. See id. at 216.
40. See HUNG ET AL., supra note 5, at 112-13.
41. See Hazen, supra note 34, at 48.
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kers and advisers. 4 2 Dodd-Frank also mandated that the SEC produce a
study of the regulation of advisers and brokers; the ensuing report rec-
ommended "a fiduciary standard no less stringent than currently applied
to investment advisers" under the IAA.43 At the time of this writing,
however, the SEC had not engaged in any rulemaking based on this rec-
ommendation.
II. THOMAS V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
In 2001, Robert and Amanda Thomas met with Jeffrey Laxton, a
MetLife FSR, to discuss their finances." Laxton, following company
procedures for new clients, conducted a suitability analysis, advised the
Thomases on asset allocation for their retirement fund (which was not
managed by MetLife), and recommended several proprietary MetLife
investment products.45 At that time, the Thomases did not purchase any
products or pay a fee for investment advice.46
In 2003, the Thomases met with Laxton following the birth of their
child.47 Laxton, again following company procedures, reviewed the
Thomases' then-current financial situation and his 2001 analysis. Based
on this review, he recommended a proprietary MetLife VULP to serve as
a savings vehicle for the child's college education.4 8 The Thomases fol-
lowed Laxton's advice, both by purchasing the VULP and by allocating
assets as he recommended. MetLife reserved 2.25% of the VULP's
$91.00 monthly premium for the compensation of FSRs such as
Laxton.49
In 2007, Mr. Thomas brought an individual and putative class-
action complaint against MetLife in federal district court alleging various
claims under state law, the Exchange Act, and the IAA.50 The trial court
dismissed the state law and securities claims and granted summary
judgment for MetLife on the IAA claim.5' The Thomases appealed on
two grounds: (1) that the district court's refusal to allow them to amend
their second amended complaint to add named plaintiffs with standing to
42. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1824-27 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o).
43. See SEC STUDY, supra note 5, at v-vi. Two commissioners effectively dissented from the
study. See infra text accompanying notes 147-48.




48. Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-0121-F, 2009 WL 2778663, at *2 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 31, 2009), affd, 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011).
49. See Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1157.
50. Id. at 1156, 1158.
51. Id. at 1157-58.
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bring securities claims was an abuse of discretion; and (2) that the district
court's grant of summary judgment on the IAA claim was in error.5 2
B. Holding
1. Abuse of Discretion
The Tenth Circuit first considered the Thomases' appeal of the dis-
trict court's ruling on the motion for leave to amend. 3 Although neither
party had raised the issue of standing, the court considered it sua sponte
and held that the Thomases lacked standing to appeal the ruling.54
At trial, the Thomases sought to add plaintiffs who had purchased
securities from MetLife (and thus had standing for a federal securities
claim) to their second amended complaint, a request that the district court
denied.5 5 Relying upon precedent, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that, be-
cause the Thomases lacked standing to bring securities claims them-
selves, they were not aggrieved by the district court's refusal to allow
them to add third parties (who did have such standing) to their com-
plaint.56 In addition, the court held that the fact that the suit was a puta-
tive class action was irrelevant because no class had been certified, and
the Thomases were the only appellants before the court on appeal.
2. Summary Judgment
The bulk of the Tenth Circuit's opinion was spent reviewing the
summary judgment order on the IAA claims.58 The court began by noting
that, for an appeal of summary judgment, (1) the standard of review was
de novo, (2) the evidence would be viewed in the light most favorable to
the Thomases, and (3) the judgment was appropriate when there was no
genuine dispute of material fact and the appellee was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. 5 9 The matter of law at issue, according to the
court, was the IAA's definition of "investment adviser." 60
The court's first task was one of statutory interpretation. It noted
that the IAA "[g]enerally . . . imposes fiduciary duties on 'investment
advisers,'" 6 defined as persons who "advis[e] others ... as to ... invest-
52. Id.at1156-57.
53. See id. at 1158-60.
54. See id. ("[W]e have an independent duty to examine our own jurisdiction." (quoting
Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
55. See id. at 1158-59.
56. See id. at 1159 (citing Howard v. Mail-Well Envelope Co., 150 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th
Cir. 1998)) ("[P]arties generally do not have standing to appeal . . . to protect the rights of third
parties.").
57. See id.
58. See id. at I160-68.
59. See id. at 1160.
60. See id.
61. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006)).
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ing in, purchasing, or selling securities" 62 for compensation. But, the
court continued, the IAA explicitly exempted from this definition brokers
or dealers whose performance of advisory services was "solely incidental
to" the conduct of their business and who did not receive "special com-
63
pensation" for those services.
a. "Solely Incidental to"
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's interpretation of
the phrase "solely incidental to" as simply indicating a relationship be-
tween investment advice and sale of a security rather than the importance
of that advice relative to the sale. 4
After first noting that the IAA did not define the phrase, the court
turned to the dictionary. 65 Based on its reading of multiple definitions in
Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's Dictionary, the court declared
that a secondary object was "incidental" to a primary object when (1) the
secondary object occurred only in relation to the primary object; and (2)
the secondary object was of lesser size or importance than the primary
object.66 Although the definition was conjunctive, the court rejected the
second prong, noting that an inquiry into relative size would create an
uncertain test and be an exercise in "line-drawing." 67 Further, the adjec-
tive "solely" could not meaningfully modify the word "incidental" if the
definition of the latter included such a relative-size component.6 ' Thus,
the phrase "solely incidental to" meant "only. . . in connection with." 69
The Tenth Circuit then turned to various SEC releases70 related to
the IAA.n It began by noting that it would defer to a rule or regulation
interpreting the IAA, but none had been supplied, leaving only the per-
62. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (2006)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
63. Id. (quoting § 80b-2(a)(11)(C)).
64. See id. at 1161 (quoting Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-0121-F, 2009 WL
2778663, at *6-7 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2009), af'd, 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
65. See id at 1162. In fact, the court consulted several dictionaries, including two different
editions of Black's Law Dictionary. See id. at 1162 n.2.
66. See id at 1162 & n.2 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 830 (9th ed. 2009); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 942-43 (3d ed. 1933); WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1257 (2d
ed. 1956); WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 966 (2d ed. 2001)).
67. Seeid.atll62.
68. See id The trial court's reasoning on this issue was slightly different; the court apparently
assumed that the definition of "incidental" could be either "attendant to" (MetLife's argument) or "a
minor ... or . . . insignificant part of' (Thomases' argument) and concluded that "[t]he modifier
'solely' does not fit well with" the latter definition. See Thomas, 2009 WL 2778663, at *4.
69. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1162.
70. As part of its rulemaking process, the SEC typically produces three types of informational
releases: concept releases, rule proposals, and rule adoption. See The Investor's Advocate: How the
SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2011)
[hereinafter The Investor's Advocate].
71. See Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1162-63.
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suasive positions of the SEC's releases on the subject.72 The court high-
lighted three such releases. First, a 1946 release stated that brokers typ-
ically provided "a certain amount of advice to" customers, and that
amount was not sufficient to regulate them under the IAA.7 Second,
releases from 2005 and 2007 indicated that advice was "solely incidental
to" a broker's business when the former was "in connection with and
reasonably related to" the latter. The court concluded that the SEC's
position in these releases was that "solely incidental to" was a question
of mere connection, not relative importance.
The Tenth Circuit then turned to the legislative history of the IAA.77
The court noted that Congress passed the IAA to regulate a class of pro-
fessionals that purported to provide, for a fee, unbiased investment ad-
vice as a "distinct product."78 Because brokers were already regulated
under the Exchange Act, they were not the target of the legislative pro-
posals that eventually became the IAA (notwithstanding any advice they
might provide as part of their business). 79 The court concluded that this
historical distinction between brokers and advisers supported its interpre-
tation that the key inquiry was whether a broker was acting in an adviso-
ry capacity connected to the traditional broker activity of buying or sell-
ing securities, not the relative importance of the activities.80
b. "Special Compensation"
The court analyzed the second prong of the exemption, "special
compensation," using a similar framework: plain-language, SEC releas-
es, and legislative history.81 The Thomases had maintained that the
phrase referred to any economic benefit received by a broker from a
transaction that involved investment advice. 82 The Tenth Circuit, howev-
er, concluded that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the
statutory language because it would obviate the need for the word "spe-
cial," which, in turn, would render the entire prong superfluous.
Like "solely incidental to," "special compensation" was not defined
in the IAA.84 Rather than consulting a dictionary, the court instead
looked at the statutory context.85 First, the court determined that "com-
72. Id.





78. Id at 1163-64.
79. See id.
80. Seeid.atil64.
81. See id. at l 64-65.
82. Id at 1166.
83. Id.
84. Id.atll62,1164.
85. See id. at 1164.
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pensation" must refer to an economic benefit received because of adviso-
ry services.86 Second, the court highlighted that the word "special" nec-
essarily modified "compensation" in a way that distinguished it from
both the general "compensation" referred to in the statutory definition of
"Investment Adviser" and the normal transaction-based compensation
(i.e., commission) given to brokers for buying and selling securities. 8 7
Thus, based on the statutory language, "special compensation" was (1)
compensation other than a commission or commission analog; that was
(2) specifically received for investment advice. 8
The court then examined SEC releases related to the IAA's broker
exemption.89 A 1978 release referred to charges "specifically" and
"clearly definable . . . for investment advice."90 A 1989 action letter dis-
tinguished "a commission, mark-up, mark-down or similar fee for bro-
kerage services" from "special compensation." 91 The court concluded
that these positional statements from the SEC were consistent with its
interpretation of the phrase.9 2
Finally, the court examined the IAA's legislative history.93 Again,
the court noted that Congress passed the IAA not in reaction to the be-
havior of brokers, who were regulated by the Exchange Act, but to a
growing class of professional investment advisers who were not other-
wise regulated.94 As the legislation made its way through Congress, both
the House and Senate had clearly distinguished brokers who "receive[d]
only brokerage commissions" from those who received compensation
specifically for advisory services. 5 Thus, the historical context supported
the court's interpretation of "special compensation" as something more
96
than a brokerage commission.
c. Application
Having interpreted the statutory language, the court turned to the
facts of the case.97 That Laxton's primary business was as a broker of
financial products, and that he had provided advice to the Thomases in
order to sell them a financial product, was not disputed. 9 8 The advice was
a secondary action in support of Laxton's primary action and objective:
86. Id.







94. See id.at 1166.
95. Id. at 1165.
96. Id. at 1166.
97. Id. at 1166-67.
98. See id.
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selling the policy. 99 Thus, under the court's interpretation, Laxton's ad-
vice was "solely incidental to" his sale of securities; the relative amounts
of advice and sales in the transaction were irrelevant.' 00
Laxton's compensation was tied to the sale of the policy; he re-
ceived a "production credit" of $500 from MetLife after selling the poli-
cy and did not receive any compensation specifically tied to advice.' 0'
Further, his quotas were based on selling investment products, not ad-
vice.102 This compensation did not meet either of the "special compensa-
tion" prongs established by the court: it was not received specifically in
exchange for advice, and it was not distinct from a commission. 0 3 Thus,
under the court's interpretation, Laxton's compensation was not "special
compensation." Because Laxton's activities met both the "solely inci-
dental" and "special compensation" prongs of the IAA's broker exemp-
tion, they were not regulated under the IAA.'0
III. ANALYSIS
Thomas was a case of first impression in the federal circuit courts
and thus has the potential to be quite influential; the Tenth Circuit's in-
terpretation has already been cited in cases in the Ninth and First Cir-
cuits. 05 The court chose to establish a narrow interpretation of "solely
incidental" that led to a broad broker-dealer exemption from the IAA,
but the foundations of this interpretation were tenuous, and the policy
implications mixed. The holding, if widely followed in other circuits,
could diminish protection of retail investors, at least until the SEC fulfills
its Dodd-Frank mandate to harmonize the regulation of brokers and ad-
visers.
A. A Close Call
At first glance, the Thomas decision seems relatively straightfor-
ward: a simple, almost textbook exercise in statutory interpretation. But
upon closer examination, the court's interpretations were not as clear-cut
as they appeared. Specifically, the court's plain language analysis of the
phrase "solely incidental" was logically suspect.
99. See id.





105. See Wiener v. Eaton Vance Distributors, Inc., No. 10-10515-DPW, 2011 WL 1233131, at
*10 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2011) (holding that an investment fund's l2b-1 fees were not "special com-
pensation" for investment advice under the broker-dealer exception of the IAA); Bronzich v. Persels
& Associates, No. CV-10-0364-EFS, 2011 WL 2119372, at *6 (E.D. Wash. May 27, 2011) (apply-
ing the Tenth Circuit's plain language interpretation of "solely incidental" to a similar phrase in the
Washington Debt Adjusting Act).
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The strongest section of the Tenth Circuit's analysis was its inter-
pretation of "special compensation." The Thomases argued that any
compensation given to a broker as part of a transaction that involved
advice was "special compensation."' 06 In rejecting the Thomases' inter-
pretation, the court focused on the fact that it would eliminate any dis-
tinction between "special compensation" and "compensation," rendering
the former superfluous. 0 7 The court was, predictably, unwilling to attrib-
ute that intention to Congress.
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the phrase "solely incidental to"
meant "in relation to," and thus had no comparative aspect, was less ob-
vious. The court began by explicitly providing a conjunctive definition of
an "incidental" object: one that occurs only in relation to a primary ob-
ject and is comparatively smaller in size or importance.108 The court then
noted that the Thomases' interpretation of "incidental" focused on the
comparative component "without regard" to the relational.1 09 This was
not strictly true: the Thomases claimed that Laxton's advice was not
solely incidental to his brokerage activities because it was a "central
component" of his sales of MetLife products.o10 Thus, the Thomases'
interpretation implicitly encompassed both the relational and compara-
tive aspects, and comported with the definition the court had just estab-
lished."'
Immediately after remonstrating the Thomases for their lack of re-
gard to one part of the definition of "solely incidental," the court com-
mitted the very same sin.1 12 Noting that the word "solely" meant "exclu-
sively or only" and, in the statutory exemption, "compl[e]ment[ed] the
relational aspect of 'incidental,"' the court leapt to the conclusion that
"solely" could not meaningfully modify the comparative aspect of the
definition." Because it was unwilling to adopt an interpretation that
would render the word "solely" superfluous, the court declared that the
plain-language definition it had just taken pains to establish was inappli-
cable and the district court's definition-which only included the rela-
tional component-was correct.l14
106. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1166. The Thomases' reasoning appeared to be that if a broker
performed two activities, A and B, as part of a compensated transaction, then some part of the com-
pensation must have been for each activity. It is not clear, however, why this would have to be the
case.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1162 ("[A]ll definitions establish that the word 'incidental' has two components.
To be considered incidental, two ... objects must be related ... [and] ... the incidental ... object . .
must be secondary in size . . .
109. Seeid.at1162.
110. Id.atll61.
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There are several possible responses to this argument. First, the
word "solely" is not better suited to modify "occurring in relation to"
than it is to modify "secondary to." The mere fact that the word modifies
each aspect differently does not imply that it is better suited to modify
one or the other: the salient point is that it can meaningfully modify
both." 5 Furthermore, when "solely" limits "occurring in relation to," the
result is absurd: the statute exempts a broker only if her advice was relat-
ed to the sale of securities and not related to anything else. This makes
little sense, as the advice given would presumably stem from, and be
related to, any number of other things (e.g., macroeconomic conditions
and the broker's analysis of the client's financial situation). Perversely,
such a reading specifically exempts any broker whose advice is related
only to his desire to sell a specific security, and is thus entirely self-
serving.
Even if one accepts the court's assertion that "solely" can only
meaningfully modify the relational aspect of the definition, this does not
imply rejection of the comparative. The modifier is not superfluous if it
can meaningfully modify at least one element of the definition; one
might deconstruct the phrase "A is solely incidental to B" as "A is only
related to B, and A is a small part of B." This maintains both elements of
the definition and still allows the modifier to inform its meaning.
In sum, the Tenth Circuit's plain language analysis, established a
two-part definition of "incidental," wrongly criticized the Thomases for
disregarding one part, and then discarded the other part based on ques-
tionable parsing of the surrounding language. The Tenth Circuit also
failed to mention how close a call the district court had considered the
issue. In contrast to the Tenth Circuit's conjunctive, two-part definition
of "incidental," the district court had considered the relational and com-
parative aspects of "incidental" as separate, mutually exclusive defini-
tions; in deciding to adopt the relational aspect, it stated "[a]t the risk of
parsing the statutory language too closely, . . . analysis of the language of
the legislation cuts in favor of MetLife, but not compellingly so." 6 Any
such doubt was lacking in the Tenth Circuit's holding.
Leaving aside the logical and linguistic gymnastics,1 7 the court
found somewhat better support for its position by examining SEC com-
ments and legislative history. But even these persuasive sources were
less than overwhelming in their support for the court's position. The
court cited a 1946 SEC Release for its recognition that the fact that bro-
115. To say that A only occurs in relation to B provides no particular information about the
relation itself, but merely serves a limiting function: "A occurs in relation to B, and not in relation to
anything else." In contrast, when modifying "secondary to," it serves an emphasizing function: "A is
secondary to B, and no greater."
116. Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-0121-F, 2009 WL 2778663, at *4 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 31, 2009), aff'd, 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011).
I 17. Perhaps "contortionism" would be more apt.
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kers "commonly give a certain amount of advice" would not "bring them
within the scope of the [IAA].""' But the phrase "a certain amount of
advice" fits with the comparative component of "incidental" discussed
above, with the phrase "a certain amount" indicating a small amount of
advice relative to the broker's primary business." 9
The Tenth Circuit asserted that the SEC has consistently interpreted
the broker-dealer exception, but this conclusion is less than clear. The
court cited a 2005 SEC Release that interpreted "solely incidental to" as
"in connection with and reasonably related to"; however, the same doc-
ument contained a provision stating that advice is not solely incidental if
it is in connection with financial planning.120 The 2005 interpretation was
struck down in a 2007 case,121 after which the SEC came back with yet
another proposed interpretation, this time dropping the financial planning
2 1 23
provision.12 The purported interpretive consistency remains elusive.
The combination of ambiguities in the plain language and inconsist-
encies in the SEC guidance might argue for a conservative approach that
embodies all reasonable facets of the term's meaning, which would ef-
fectively err on the side of investor protection. But perhaps the key to the
court's interpretation lies in this declaration, buried in the middle of the
plain-language analysis: "Plaintiffs' proposed reading ... [would create]
a difficult problem of line-drawing-how much advice is too much, and
how could we measure the importance of the advice?" 2 4 This is a valid
point: embracing an interpretation that involved weighing the relative
importance of the advice in a security sales transaction would have re-
quired the court to leave the issue to a more fact-intensive inquiry, and
perhaps establish a set of guidelines or factors. In contrast, eliminating
the need for such an inquiry created a cleaner and more predictable legal
rule. It seems plausible that ultimately the court justified its analysis with
a decision (conscious or not) to elevate the policy goal of certainty and
predictability over a competing policy goal of investor protection.
118. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1163.
119. See Certain, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/
american/certain 20 (defining "a certain" as "some, but not very much") (last visited January 29,
2012).
120. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1163 (citing Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2340, 70 Fed.Reg. 2716, 2726 (proposed Jan. 14,
2005)). The release was a reproposal ofa rule first proposed in 1999, Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(1 I)-
1; that rule would have extended the broker exclusion to certain brokers even if they did receive
special compensation for advice. See Laby, supra note 26, at 408-12.
121. Fin. Planning Ass'n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the SEC's
attempt to broaden the exclusion violated both the letter and intent of the IAA).
122. See Interpretive Rule Under the Advisers Act Affecting Broker-Dealers, Investment
Advisors Act Release No. IA-2652, 72 Fed. Reg. 55126, 55127, 55129 (proposed Sep. 28, 2007).
123. Compare Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1163 ("Since ... 1946, the SEC's position has been con-
sistent . . . ."), with Varnavides, supra note 6, at 208 ("Over the last decade, the SEC has repeatedly,
and unsuccessfully, tried to provide a clear interpretation of the ... broker-dealer exception."). See
generally Laby, supra note 26, at 408-11 (detailing "The Rise and Fall of Advisers Act Rule
202(A)( 1)-I").
124. Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1162.
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B. Implications for Brokers: A Broad Exemption
By choosing to create a more predictable legal rule, the court creat-
ed a broad exemption such that, absent any "special compensation" tied
to investment advice, a broker would only be regulated under the IAA if
the advice had no relation to the sale of securities. 125 The perverse result
is that the IAA's fiduciary standard and requirements for disclosure of
conflicts of interest would only be effective in cases where the broker
would be almost certain not to have such conflicts. 126
In practice, then, Thomas provides a near-roadmap for how a bro-
kerage may incentivize its salespeople to push proprietary products with-
out disclosing the incentive to customers. As illustrated by the
Thomases' interactions with Laxton, so long as the product being sold is
suitable and the incentive is tied to its sale, a broker may quietly put his
or her own interests above those of the customer. To be sure, the sales-
person is subject to other rules of conduct related to conflicts of interest,
such as those related to excessive prices, churning, and undisclosed own-
ership of the security being sold, but the holding leaves considerable
room for brokers to put their own interests above those of their custom-
TS127ers.12
C. Implications for Investors: Less Protection
On the other side of the table, Thomas allows more room for bro-
kers to put their own interests first and leave conflicts undisclosed, which
results in less protection for investors. As noted above, most investors
are not aware of the legal distinctions between brokers and advisers, and
even more sophisticated investors are subject to disadvantages stemming
from information asymmetry and cognitive biases. 12 8 To the extent that
investor protection is a social good, the Thomas holding reduces its
availability.
Despite the predictable complaints of paternalism, protection of re-
tail investors is desirable for a number of policy reasons.1 29 From an eco-
nomic standpoint, hidden conflicts prevent investors from properly dis-
counting for those conflicts, creating an inefficient market.1 30 In addition,
125. Under the court's interpretation, it seems that any relationship at all between advice and
security sales would satisfy the "solely incidental to" prong.
126. In such a case, the broker has no incentive, via special compensation or the potential
commission from the sale of a security, to give conflicted advice.
127. See Hazen, supra note 34, at 61-63, for a discussion of regulations that brokers are sub-
ject to. The issue of undisclosed ownership of a security being sold (scalping) is in principle quite
similar to that of an undisclosed compensation incentive, at least from the point of view of the inves-
tor.
128. See Dombalagian, supra note 1, at 1279-80.
129. See id. at 1272-83. The author lays out several policy justifications for regulating invest-
ment recommendations, including risk allocation, asymmetries in information and bargaining power,
asymmetries in sophistication, and conflicts of interest.
130. Id. at 1282. The author argues for an explicit recognition of the value of this discount,
advocating a scheme wherein financial services providers are subject to fiduciary duties unless they
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many economists consider the assumption of substantial investment risk
by an unsophisticated individual investor purchasing a product such as a
VULP to be socially costly.13' Finally, the idea that a firm presenting
itself as a loyal, trusted adviser might give-without notice or disclo-
sure-self-serving advice runs counter to expectations of fair play.132
Although wider consumer awareness of this practice arguably al-
lows consumers to discount products accordingly or demand more exten-
sive information from brokers, such awareness also decreases the level of
trust in the marketplace.' 3 3 As District Court Judge Friot noted in his
decision in Thomas: "Where the product being sold is a sophisticated
financial product . . . the need for unbiased advice--or at least for the
disclosure of those things that might tend to skew the salesman's 'ad-
vice'-would seem to be every bit as great as in a conventional advisory
relationship."' 3 4
D. A Proposal for a Narrower Interpretation of the Broker Exemption
In Thomas, the Tenth Circuit, like most courts, framed the conclu-
sions of its statutory analysis as logical inevitabilities; once the terms
were defined, the outcome was more or less predetermined.13 1 Yet the
court did make debatable interpretive choices. Although it arguably
would have had some difficulty stretching the statutory meaning of "spe-
cial compensation" to cover Laxton's commissions, the court could have
defensibly adopted a narrower definition of "solely incidental to."' 3 6
Such a definition might not have changed the ultimate outcome for the
Thomases,'17 but it would have allowed the Tenth Circuit to maintain a
higher level of investor protection.
Alternatively, the court might have adopted a test in which advice
would be solely incidental to the sale of a security if it was not a substan-
tial factor in the customer's decision to buy that specific product from
that broker. Factors would include whether the advice was specifically
offer customers a put option on the product (i.e. the ability to sell it back within a certain period); his
assertion that this would convey significant and useful information "to even the least financially
literate customer" seems debatable. Id. at 1327-35.
131. See id. at 1274-75 (noting a number of possible negative externalities stemming from
widespread assumption of risk by investors).
132. MetLife is well-known for featuring a certain lovable (and presumptively loyal) pet as its
spokes-canine and dirigible-eponym. The company's television advertising segments emphasize
concepts such as protection and guidance. See TV Advertising, METLIFE,
http://www.metlife.comiabout/advertising/consumer/television/index.html (last visited on Feb. 11,
2012).
133. Again, whether average consumers can receive all of this information and engage in such
rational discounting is an open question.
134. Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-0121-F, 2009 WL 2778663, at *9 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 31, 2009), afd, 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011).
135. See, e.g., Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1167 (10th Cir. 2011).
136. See supra Part Ill.A (discussing the "close call" of the court's interpretation of the
phrase).
137. Perhaps the narrower definition would have led to a remand.
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related to the security sold, whether the broker provided information on
competing options, and whether the customer reasonably relied upon the
broker to select the security. Advice merely related to a class of securi-
ties would not be a sufficient factor, nor would a mere suitability analy-
sis.'38 Such a test-or one similar thereto-would still allow brokers to
provide a "certain amount" of unremunerated advice 3 9 and remain ex-
empt from the IAA, but once that advice crossed the line into steering a
customer to a specific product, the exemption would be lost. 140
Such a test would require a deeper inquiry into the nature of the
broker-investor transaction in question and thus place a slightly higher
burden on the courts. In addition, the narrowing of the broker exemption
(at least compared to the Tenth Circuit's interpretation thereof) would
create at least the theoretical possibility of more litigation. Finally, one
can argue that reading such a test into the straightforward (at least on its
face) language of the IAA is overstepping, and the clarification of the
exemption should be left to the legislature.
Any increase in the broker's burden, however, seems relatively
small when weighed against the need to afford investors greater protec-
tion from conflicts of interest. Furthermore, it is somewhat reductive to
argue that interpretations that create the possibility of more litigation are
inherently bad; litigation is simply a mechanism through which the legal
rights defined by such interpretations are protected. Ultimately, the task
of the courts is to interpret the language of the IAA in light of its over-
arching purpose-investor protection-and adopt any reasonable tests or
factors that make sense. The proposed test affords investors protection
from one of the most prevalent conflicts of interest, while maintaining a
reasonable exemption for brokers who are not steering customers to par-
ticular securities for their own benefit. From a practical standpoint, it
leverages the IAA's existing fiduciary standard to bridge the gap until a
legislative or rules-based solution emerges.
E. Dodd-Frank: A New Hope
In fact, Congress may ultimately dictate the solution. Dodd-Frank,
passed in 2010, recognized that the services offered by brokers and ad-
visers have become nearly indistinguishable.14' The legislation delegated
to the SEC the authority to make rules establishing a uniform fiduciary
138. As an example, under this proposal, a broker would be exempt from the IAA when rec-
ommending life insurance, or even VULPs generally, but would not be exempt when recommending
a specific MetLife VULP.
139. This would fulfill at least one of the SEC's early expressions of the exemption's purpose.
See Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1163.
140. Another way to look at this is that there would be two cases where brokers' advice would
be regulated by the IAA because it is not "solely incidental to" a sale: when they provide advice that
has no relation at all to a sale, and when they provide advice that is a substantial factor in a sale.
141. Cf Varnavides, supra note 6, at 215 (quoting a speech by SEC commissioner Elisse B.
Walter).
473
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
standard for brokers and advisers, but it also required the Commission to
conduct a study on the business and regulation of brokers and advisers
before implementing any rules in the area. 142
On January 21, 2011, the SEC delivered to Congress the mandated
study on advisers and brokers. 14 3 Among its recommendations were "a
fiduciary standard no less stringent than currently applied to investment
advisers" under the IAA, and "[a] uniform standard of conduct [that] will
obligate both investment advisers and broker-dealers to eliminate or
disclose conflicts of interest."'" Although the recommendations them-
selves do not have legal force, the message is clear: advisers and brokers
should be held to the same (fiduciary) standard when providing invest-
ment advice. 145
How soon-or indeed whether-the SEC will embody these rec-
ommendations in new rules, or interpretations of existing rules, is anoth-
er matter. On the same day the SEC Study was delivered to Congress, the
two Republican SEC Commissioners released a statement distancing
themselves from it, asserting that the study did not "adequately justify its
recommendation [to change] the regulatory regime for broker-dealers
and investment advisers."1 4 6 In particular, they claimed the study did not
"appropriately account for the potential overall cost" of recommenda-
tions and was merely a "starting point for further research and considera-
tion."1 47 At the same time, House Republicans have been pushing to des-
ignate FINRA as an SRO for investment advisers as well as brokers, and
task it with the enforcement of a uniform fiduciary standard, a process
that may further muddy the waters. 14 8 Finally, the SEC, which is respon-
142. See Hazen, supra note 34, at 48. As Hazen observes, Congress "punted" by granting the
SEC authority to harmonize the standard and mandating that the Commission conduct a study, as
opposed to writing a standard into Dodd-Frank itself. Id. at 53-54.
143. Interestingly, the SEC study was delivered less than two weeks before Thomas was decid-
ed.
144. SEC STUDY, supra note 5, at vi-vii.
145. The SEC Study explicitly rejected eliminating the IAA's broker-dealer exclusion (thus
subjecting brokers to the full body of IAA requirements), reasoning that such an approach would be
inflexible compared to "tak[ing] the best of each regulatory regime." Id. at 140-41, 143.
146. See Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Statement by SEC Commissioners: Statement
Regarding Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Jan. 21, 2011, 6:11 PM), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch01221lklctap.htm. The SEC is
composed of five commissioners appointed to five-year terms by the President of the United States;
no party may be represented by more than three commissioners. At the time the SEC Study was
released, the Commission had two Democrats, two Republicans, and an Independent..
147. Id. Calling for additional economic analysis of a regulation is a common strategy to stall
its implementation. See, e.g., Mark Schoeff, Jr., Senate Republicans Prod SEC Nominees on Dodd-
Frank, INVESTMENT NEWS (June 19, 2011), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20110619/
REG/306199978. See Robert S. Adler, Op-Ed, Safety Regulators Don't Add Costs. They Decide
Who Pays Them, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/opinion/safety-
regulators-dont-add-costs-they-decide-who-pays-them.html, for a counterpoint to arguments railing
against the economic costs of regulation. Adler also notes that cost-benefit analyses are already part
of virtually all agency studies and recommendations. Id.
148. See, e.g., Melanie Waddell, Draft Bill Calling for SRO for Advisors Introduced in House,
ADVISORONE (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.advisorone.com/2011/09/08/draft-bill-calling-for-sro-for-
advisors-introduced. See generally Spencer Bachus, Discussion Draft, THE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS.,
[Vol. 89:2474
2012] THOMAS V METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.
sible for many regulatory activities, is perennially resource-constrained
and must prioritize among a number of competing duties; there is no
guarantee that a unified fiduciary standard for brokers and advisers will
be a top priority in the near future.149 Given the variety of options on the
table, likely opposition from Republicans, and the internal constraints of
the SEC, it is difficult to predict the direction and timeline for the pro-
posed reforms.5 0
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decision to dismiss the claim in Thomas estab-
lished a clear and predictable legal rule exempting brokers from regula-
tion under the IAA when they provide advice connected to the sale of a
security. In doing so, the court favored predictability over the protection
of investors, choosing to shield brokers when they provide customers
with advice that is not in the latter's best interest. Although the court
seemed at pains to provide an uncontroversial analysis based on tradi-
tional canons of statutory interpretation, its unnecessary reliance on a
confused parsing of the language of the IAA's broker-dealer exemption
undermined the clarity of that analysis.
With the SEC poised to make new rules unifying the regulation of
brokers and advisers, the effects of Thomas may be relatively short-lived.
However, it is unclear when these new rules will be proposed and enact-
ed, and what shape they will take. In the meantime, an interpretation of
the broker exemption that implements the proposed "substantial factor"
test may provide less predictability, but will capture the full meaning of
"solely incidental to." In doing so, it will afford courts more opportunity
to address each case on its own merits, ensuring that investors do not fall
victim to self-serving recommendations from those they trust with their
very financial futures.
Jeremy Liles*
http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/BACHUS 017 xml.pdf(last visited Oct. 21, 2011)
(a discussion draft of a house bill discussing the amendment of the investment Advisers Act of 1940
to provide for the registration and oversight of national investment adviser association).
149. See generally The Investor's Advocate, supra note 70, for a discussion of the Commis-
sion's numerous responsibilities.
150. Commissioner Casey stepped down in August; her seat remained open until the confirma-
tion of Republican Daniel M. Gallagher on Oct. 21, 2011. Mr. Gallagher has already telegraphed his
concerns for regulatory costs. See Schoeff, supra note 147.
* J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I thank Professor J.
Robert Brown for his insight, guidance, and stylistic suggestions; the Denver University Law Review
Board and editorial staff for their hard work and invaluable input; and my wife, Diana Merrill-Liles,
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UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON: WHY COUNSEL'S ADVICE
AND PRESENCE AT PRESENTENCE INTERVIEWS IS
NECESSARY TO PREVENT SENTENCING SUICIDE
INTRODUCTION
Courts have long agreed that to ensure a fair and just judicial sys-
tem, defendants have a right to counsel in certain criminal proceedings.'
However, courts have struggled to form a consensus over the exact pro-
ceedings to which this right attaches.2 Before the implementation of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), courts did not consid-
er presentence interviews a "critical" stage requiring a right to counsel.3
The Guidelines expanded the influence that a presentence report plays in
a defendant's sentence and likewise expanded the influence of probation
officers as authors of the report.4 Although courts maintain that routine
presentence interviews conducted under the Guidelines are not a "critical
stage" under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence,' some courts have argued
that the stage requires constitutional protection because of the increased
potential for prejudice, as well as the ability of counsel's presence at the
presentence interview to avoid or mitigate that prejudice.6
The Tenth Circuit has held that a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
does not apply to presentence interviews with probation officers.7 How-
ever, recently the Tenth Circuit re-examined the issue in United States v.
Washington, and held that while defendants do not have the right to
counsel's presence at a presentence interview with a probation officer,
they do have the right to counsel's advice about the nature, purpose, and
legal consequences of the interview.9 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit
acknowledged the importance of the proceeding, but refused to extend
I. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1932).
2. See, e.g., Megan E. Bums, Note, The Presentence Interview and the Right to Counsel: A
Critical Stage Under the Federal Sentencing Structure, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 550-54
(1993); Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97
Nw. U. L. REv. 1635, 1679-81 (2003).
3. See, e.g., Bums, supra note 2, at 530 (citing Brown v. Butler, 811 F.2d 938, 941 (5th Cir.
1987); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 578 (9th Cir. 1982)).
4. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1672.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 96 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[N]o court has found the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to routine presentence interviews.").
6. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., When the Right to Counsel Begins, in CRIM. PROC.
§ 6.4(e) nn.106-09 (3d ed. 2011).
7. United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1571-72 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Smith,
929 F.2d 1453, 1458 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 981 82 (10th Cir.
1990).
8. 619 F.3d 1252, 1263 (10th Cir. 2010).
9. Id. at 1261.
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the constitutional guarantee and instead created an unworkable rule that
fails to protect the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
When conducted pursuant to the Guidelines, presentence interviews
with probation officers are a "critical" stage under Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence. This is due to the grave potential for prejudice that is in-
herent in presentence hearings with a probation officer and the ability of
counsel's presence to mitigate or avoid the prejudice.o Too often, unrep-
resented defendants commit sentencing suicide" by making unnecessary
admissions during a presentence interview that result in additional
months or years added to their sentence. 12 Counsel's presence at, in addi-
tion to advice about, a presentence interview, is necessary to protect
against the potential for prejudice. 3 If counsel is absent from the inter-
view, it is difficult for a defendant to meaningfully challenge findings in
a presentence report. Counsel's presence at a presentence interview
would significantly reduce the likelihood that a defendant would make
such unnecessary and incriminating admissions. 14
Part I of this Comment discusses the historical evolution of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, including the right to effective coun-
sel. It also examines changes in sentencing after the Guidelines were
adopted and provides an overview of previous decisions concerning the
critical nature of presentence interviews. Part II of this Comment de-
scribes the majority and dissenting opinions in Washington, which both
advocate for the Tenth Circuit to re-examine United States v. Gordon.15
Part III analyzes why the Tenth Circuit's holding created an unworkable
rule that fails to protect the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and argues
that presentence interviews with probation officers are a "critical" stage
of criminal proceedings under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Right to Counsel Doctrine
The right to counsel was constitutionalized in the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, which provides that "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."16 However, belief in the rights guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment predated the constitutional amendment.17 Since first settling
10. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1676-80.
11. See In re Carter, 848 A.2d 281, 296 (Vt. 2004) ("The facts of this case are a clear example
of the importance of the presentence investigation and a criminal defendant's participation in the
development of the report. It is not an overstatement to say that petitioner committed sentencing
suicide in his [presentence] interview.").
12. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1679.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1678.
15. 4 F.3d 1567 (10th Cir. 1993).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
17. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-65 (1932).
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in this country, Americans have rejected the English system that prohib-
ited the assistance of counsel in most criminal cases.' 8 Instead, early
American colonists adopted protections to ensure defendants procedural
fairness in criminal proceedings.'9 Colonists recognized that "if a de-
fendant were forced to stand alone against the state, his case was fore-
doomed," 2 0 and this view is reflected in the right to counsel guaranteed in
the Sixth Amendment. 21 The Framers sought to level the playing field
between an experienced and powerful prosecutor22 and a criminal de-
fendant who lacks the "skill in arguing the law or in coping with an intri-
cate procedural system."23
In Powell v. Alabama,24 the Supreme Court held that the defendants,
nine young African American men accused of rape, were deprived of
their right to a fair trial "in any substantial sense," because the defend-
ants' counsel lacked the opportunity to investigate or prepare for the tri-
al.25 Justice Sutherland's opinion in Powell was the foundation of the
Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment right to counsel doctrine.26
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good
or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare for his defense, even though he
have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him.27
Although Powell's holding was limited to capital cases with an in-
digent defendant who lacks the ability to defend himself,28 the Supreme
Court has continued to refine and re-examine the guarantee in light of
18. Id. at 64-65.
19. Id. ("[I]n at least twelve of the thirteen colonies the rule of the English common law ...
had been definitely rejected and the right to counsel fully recognized in all criminal prosecu-
tions...."); Metzger, supra note 2, at 1638-39 (discussing methods colonies used to secure the
right to counsel, including by constitutional protection and right-to-counsel legislation).
20. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
21. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1640.
22. Id. at 1639-40.
23. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307 (1973).
24. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
25. Id. at 57-58.
[Diuring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that
is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when con-
sultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally important, the de-
fendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense.
26. Bums, supra note 2, at 533.
27. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
28. Id. at 71 (describing the defendant as "incapable adequately of making his own defense
because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like").
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"changing patterns of criminal procedure and investigation." 29 The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is an evolving doctrine,3 0 and in expanding
it, the Supreme Court uses a "real-world," factual assessment of the
criminal proceeding asserted to be unfair." Under this assessment, the
Supreme Court expands the right "only when new contexts appear pre-
senting the same dangers that gave birth initially to the right itself."32 The
Supreme Court has expanded the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
all criminal prosecutions where imprisonment may result. Additionally,
the Court has expanded the right to counsel to include proceedings both
before and after the actual trial,34 recognizing that the right to effective
assistance at trial is meaningless if that right is limited only to the formal
trial.35 Now, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists at all "critical"
- - 36stages of a criminal prosecution.
The Supreme Court has announced several elements that must be
present in a "critical" stage: (1) the stage must occur after the initiation
of adversarial proceedings; (2) the defendant must confront an adver-
sary; 37 and (3) the presence of counsel must be necessary to preserve the
defendant's right to a fair trial.3 ' To satisfy the third element, there must
29. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973).
30. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (noting the differences in "today's
law enforcement machinery" compared to the lack of organized police forces when the Bill of Rights
was adopted).
31. See Ash, 413 U.S. at 313 ("This review of the history and expansion of the Sixth Amend-
ment counsel guarantee demonstrates that the test utilized by the Court has called for examination of
the event in order to determine whether the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or
assistance in meeting his adversary.").
32. Id. at 311.
33. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40
(1972).
34. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977) (postindictment interrogation);
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (preliminary hearing); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,
137 (1967) (sentencing); Wade, 388 U.S. at 237 (1967) (pretrial lineups); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52, 53 (1961) (arraignment).
35. Ash, 413 U.S. at 310.
36. Wade, 388 U.S. at 224 ("[O]ur cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to
apply to 'critical' stages of the proceedings.").
37. Ash, 413 U.S. at 310; Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-90 (1972).
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings . . . is the starting point of our whole sys-
tem of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has committed
itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant
have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forc-
es of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural
criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the 'criminal
prosecutions' to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applica-
ble.
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-690.
38. Wade, 388 U.S. at 226-27 ("In sum, the principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding
cases requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine whether the
presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial . . . .").
UNITED STATES V WASHINGTON
be "potential substantial prejudice" in the stage and counsel's presence
would help the defendant mitigate or avoid the prejudice. 3 9
B. Right to Effective Counsel
Although the Powell Court intimated that the right to counsel in-
cluded a right to "effective" counsel,40 the right to challenge the quality
of counsel's assistance was not formally recognized until thirty years
after the Supreme Court's decision in Powell.4 1 In McMann v. Richard-
son,42 the Supreme Court affirmatively stated, "the right to counsel is the
right to the effective assistance of counsel."43 In Strickland v. Washing-
ton," the Supreme Court acknowledged that effective assistance is neces-
sary to ensure that criminal proceedings produce a just result 45 and an-
nounced standards for determining whether counsel's assistance amounts
to constitutionally deficient performance requiring the judgment's rever-
sal.46 Under Strickland, a defendant must show that counsel's perfor-
mance fell below the "objective standard of reasonableness,"47 meaning
below the range of "professionally competent assistance.""8 Counsel's
performance is measured against "prevailing professional norms."4 9 Ad-
ditionally, a defendant must also "show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense."50 The prejudice element requires a showing of
reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance, the
proceeding's result would have been different.5 ' Courts presume that
counsel's conduct is reasonable and afford considerable deference when
scrutinizing such conduct. 5 2 However, a lawyer's mere presence at trial is
insufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective coun-
sel.
39. Id. at 227 (analyzing "whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres
in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice").
40. Powell v. Alabama, 278 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (describing the court's duty to give "effective
aid in the preparation and trial of the case" (emphasis added)).
41. Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise ofthe Constitu-
tional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 629 (1986) ("[Bly
1964, the right to effective assistance in the qualitative sense was firmly imbedded in case law."
(citing Ion R. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction
Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L. REV. 289, 289-91 (1964))).
42. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
43. Id. at 771 n.14.
44. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
45. Id. at 685-86.
46. Id at 687.
47. Id. at 688.
48. Id at 690.
49. Id at 688.
50. Id at 687.
51. Id. at 694.
52. Id at 689 ("Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.").
53. Id at 685 ("That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the




By the end of the twentieth century, the federal criminal justice sys-
tem experienced significant changes, including the adoption of mandato-
ry minimum sentences and the Guidelines.5 4 Mandatory minimum sen-
tencing requires that courts impose specific mandatory terms of incarcer-
ation when a defendant is convicted of a crime that carries a mandatory
sentence. In 1984, Congress enacted mandatory sentencing, prescribing
mandatory sentences for certain drug- and gun-related offenses. 6 Since
the enactment of mandatory sentencing, Congress has expanded the
number of charges that carry mandatory sentences.57
Also in 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act,58 which
established the United States Sentencing Commission to generate an
effective and fair sentencing system that would better combat crime by
ensuring "honesty," "reasonable uniformity" and "proportionality" in
sentencing. 59 The Sentencing Commission developed and adopted the
Guidelines, and on November 1, 1987, the Commission's Guidelines
went into effect, introducing determinate sentencing to the federal sys-
tem.60
The prior system of indeterminate sentencing gave judges consider-
able discretion to impose tailored sentences based on a variety of factors,
including the defendant's background and likelihood of rehabilitation.6 1
Both mandatory sentencing and the Guidelines sought to remedy criti-
cisms that the old indeterminate sentencing scheme gave judges too
much discretion, creating disparate sentences for similar offenses, and
focusing too much on rehabilitating defendants without any means of
knowing whether a defendant was effectively rehabilitated.62 Under that
63
system, judges were only bound by maximum sentences, and the
presentence investigation report was merely a supplement used by the
judge in determining a sentence.64 Judges were not required to rely on
information contained in the report, and, if the defendant gave consent,
54. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1657-58.
55. Id. at 1658.
56. Id.
57. Id
58. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006).
59. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, subpart 1 (2004) (Original Introduc-
tion to the Guidelines Manual).
60. Id at subpart 2 ("[T]he guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987, and apply to all
offenses committed on or after that date."); see also Metzger, supra note 2, at 1659.
61. Bums, supra note 2, at 537-39.
62. See id at 539; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's
Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 84 (2003).
63. See Bums, supra note 2, at 537 (citing Keith A. Findley & Meredith Ross, Comment,
Access, Accuracy and Fairness: The Federal Presentence Investigation Report Under Julian and the
Sentencing Guidelines, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 837, 840 (1989)).
64. Id. (citing Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal,
36 UCLA L. REv. 83, 89 (1988)).
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the judge could impose a sentence without a presentence report.6 ' The
report contained both parties' accounts of the crime, as well as a psycho-
logical profile of the defendant and information about the defendant's
66
background, such as family and education.
In contrast, the Guidelines impose fixed sentencing ranges, which
are calculated according to specific instructions and based on the defend-
ant's offense level and criminal history.67 Offense level is calculated by
determining the appropriate Guideline section and the base offense level
within that section and then by taking into consideration the severity of
the offense and offender conduct. 69 The Guidelines only allow for certain
adjustments.7 0 Although the Supreme Court has held that the Guidelines
are merely advisory,7 ' in practice, federal judges have continued to view
the Guidelines as authoritative, and rarely select a sentence that falls out-
side the Guideline's prescribed range.7 2 Judges must make additional
fact-finding to justify a sentence ordered outside of the Guideline's
range,7 3 so despite the "advisory nature" of the recommendation, "[f]rom
a practical standpoint, district judges must give considerable weight to
presentence reports; the system could not function efficiently other-
- ,74wise.
Under the Guidelines, "[t]he probation officer must conduct a
presentence investigation and submit a report to the court before it im-
poses a sentence."75 The presentence report is now mandatory and, un-
like the reports taken under the indeterminate sentencing scheme, it con-
tains minimal information regarding the defendant's background. 76 Fur-
thermore, the report only contains a single version of the facts, which the
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing Findley & Ross, supra note 63, at 841).
67. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1659.
68. Bums, supra note 2, at 542.
69. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1659.
70. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § B1.1 (2004); see also id at § 3Al-3Cl
(describing adjustments based on actual relevant conduct, including: harm to the victim, the defend-
ant's role in the offense, obstruction of justice by the defendant, whether the defendant has accepted
personal responsibility, acts in furtherance of the offense, and other criminal activity related to other
charges).
71. See Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 200, 246 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting in part).
72. Steven G. Kalar & Jon M. Sands, (Not So) Lovely Rita: A Non-Binding Presumption, for
Non-Binding Guidelines, for Our Non-Binding Constitution, 31 CHAMPION 32, 36 (2007).
73. Id. ("[A] trial judge will find it far easier to make the appropriate findings and sentence
within the appropriate Guideline, than to go through the unorthodox factfinding necessary to justify
a sentence outside the Guidelines range ..... (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 391
(2007))).
74. United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1435 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing the
substantial role that presentence interviews will continue to play in determining a defendant's sen-
tence).
75. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6Al1 (Presentence Report (Policy State-
ment)); see also id at § I B 1.1 (Application Instructions).
76. Bums, supra note 2, at 543-44.
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probation officer arrives at based on both parties' accounts.77 The proba-
tion officer then calculates the defendant's base offense level and crimi-
nal history category to arrive at the applicable sentencing range recom-
mendation and then provides the recommendation in a report to the
court.8 Under the Guidelines, judges rely heavily on the presentence
report's sentencing recommendation, in part because of the complexity
of the Guidelines, 79 and in part because of the additional fact-finding
required to justify a sentence ordered outside of the Guideline's range.so
2. The Debate over Whether a Right to Counsel Exists at a Presen-
tence Interview
Courts generally agreed that under the old indeterminate sentencing
system, presentence interviews were not a "critical" stage within Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence.81 Under the Guidelines, no federal court has
affirmatively applied a Sixth Amendment right to counsel to a routine,
non-capital presentence interview.82 However, the issue is not settled, as
some courts have expressed the view that presentence interviews con-
ducted under the Guidelines have become a "critical" stage under Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence. The Ninth Circuit has held that a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel exists at a presentence interview in a capital
case.84
Primarily basing their decisions on the non-adversarial role of the
probation officer, the Fourth, Fifth, 6 Sixth,8 Seventh," Ninth," and
77. Id. at 544 (citing Susan K. Grunin & Jud Watkins, The Investigative Role of the United
States Probation Officer Under Sentencing Guidelines, 51 FED. PROBATION 43, 44 (1987)).
78. Id.
79. Id; see also infra Part 11I.B.
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Bums, supra note 2, at 530 (citing Brown v. Butler, 811 F.2d 938, 941 (5th Cir.
1987); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 578 (9th Cir. 1982)).
82. See United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 96 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[N]o court has found the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to routine presentence interviews."); see also United
States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1571 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Of the circuits that have directly addressed
the issue, all have held that a criminal defendant does not enjoy a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
at the presentence interview state. No circuit has explicitly adopted the contrary position."). But see
In re Carter, 848 A.2d. 281, 301 (Vt. 2004) (declaring that a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
applies to presentence interviews with probation officers).
83. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 6, § 6.4(e) nn. 106-09.
84. Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 540 (9th Cir. 2001).
85. See United States v. Dingle, Nos. 90-5083, 90-5084, 1991 WL 217017, at *3 (4th Cir.
Oct. 28, 1991); United States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hicks,
948 F.3d 877, 885-86 (4th Cir. 1991).
86. See United States v. Woods, 907 F.2d 1540, 1543 (5th Cir. 1990); Brown v. Butler, 811
F.2d 938, 941 (5th Cir. 1987).
87. See United States v. Tisdale, 952 F.2d 934, 939-40 (6th Cir. 1992).
88. See United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 1989) ("A federal probation
officer is an extension of the court and not an agent of the government. The probation officer does
not have an adversarial role in the sentencing proceedings.").
89. See United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v.
United States, 692 F.2d 565, 578 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Tenth 90 Circuits have all held that no constitutional right to counsel exists
at routine, presentence interviews in non-capital cases.9 ' For example,
the Seventh Circuit held in United States v. Jackson,92 decided after the
adoption of the Guidelines, that no Sixth Amendment right to counsel
exists at a presentence interview because that interview is not adversarial
in nature, and therefore is not a "critical stage of the prosecution" in
which the defendant confronts the prosecutor or an agent of the prosecu-
tor. Many cases after Jackson adopted this reasoning.9 4
Despite the fact that no federal court has applied a Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel to presentence interviews, several circuits have
acknowledged the increased importance of the presentence interviews
under the Guidelines. 9 5 Still, these circuits declined to acknowledge a
constitutional right to counsel. The Ninth Circuit previously held that a
right to counsel did not exist at a non-capital presentence interview, 9 6 but
it has more recently exercised its supervisory power to require that pro-
bation officers permit attorneys to attend the presentence interview.97 The
Sixth Circuit, agreeing with the Ninth Circuit's solution, also declined
to extend the constitutional right.
90. See United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1571-72 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Because the proba-
tion officer does not act on behalf of the government, we join those circuits that have concluded that
the presentence interview is not a critical stage of the proceeding within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment." (citing Tisdale, 952 F.2d at 939-40; Jackson, 886 F.2d at 843-44)); United States v.
Smith, 929 F.2d 1453, 1458 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 979-82 (10th
Cir. 1990).
91. The Eleventh Circuit has not yet ruled directly on the issue. See United States v. Simpson,
904 F.2d 607, 611 (1Ith Cir. 1990) ("[TJhree circuits have rejected this argument on the ground that
a presentence interview by a probation officer is not a critical stage of the criminal proceedings at
which the Sixth Amendment ensures representation.").
92. 886 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1989).
93. Id. at 843.
94. See, e.g., Rogers, 912 F.2d at 979-81; Tisdale, 952 F.2d at 940 ("We agree with the
prevailing analysis and, in particular, with Judge Kanne's well-reasoned opinion in United States v.
Jackson."); United States v. Dingle, Nos. 90-5083, 90-5084, 1991 WL 217017, at *3 (4th Cir. Oct.
28, 1991); see also Burns, supra note 2, at 553 (describing how other circuits have addressed the
issue of whether a presentence interview is a critical stage requiring the right to counsel by adopting
Jackson's reasoning).
95. The First, Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have expressed an inclination to apply a right
to counsel to presentence interviews with probation officers, but have not directly ruled on the issue.
See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 98 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Ocasio-Rivera, 991
F.2d 1, 3 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993) (declining to rule on the constitutional issue because it was not timely
raised, but opting to "leave the question open"); United States v. Cortes, 922 F.2d 123, 127 (2d Cir.
1990) (noting that, although under the Guidelines a "presentence interview may now be a 'critical
stage' of the proceedings necessitating the participation of counsel, . . . [w]e need not decide this
issue . . . because . . . Cortes's right was not violated"); United States v. Saenz, 915 F.2d 1046,
1048-49 (6th Cir. 1990) ("[Wie would be inclined to reject the view of some courts that a defend-
ant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel at his sentencing does not extend to the presentence inter-
view because the interview is not a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. . . . However, we need not
finally decide this issue because . .. the defendant's right was not violated in the instant case.").
96. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985); Bau-
mann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 578 (9th Cir. 1982).
97. United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1433 (9th Cir. 1990).
98. Tisdale, 952 F.2d at 939-40.
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The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Gordon, "join[ed] those cir-
cuits that have concluded that the presentence interview is not a critical
stage of the proceeding within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment." 99
The defendant in Gordon alleged that due to his counsel's ineffective
assistance at the presentence interview, he attempted to minimize his role
in the offense, and therefore did not receive the two-level downward
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.'00 The court reasoned that a
presentence interview with a probation officer is not a critical stage un-
der Sixth Amendment jurisprudence because probation officers have "no
adversarial role in the sentencing proceedings; rather, the officer acts as a
neutral information gatherer for the judge."' 0 The court noted that while
the Guidelines have changed the sentencing process, the Guidelines have
not changed the probation officer's role as a non-adversarial agent of the
court.102
It was against this backdrop that Mr. Washington appealed to the
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Washington, alleging that his trial coun-
sel was constitutionally deficient for his failure to sufficiently advise Mr.
Washington about the nature and purpose of the presentence interview.' 03
II. UNITED STA TES V WASHINGTON
A. Procedural Posture
In May 1991, a jury convicted Mr. Patrick E. Washington on three
counts of possessing and distributing 61.98 grams of cocaine base, a vio-
lation of 21 U.S.C. § 83 1(a)(1).'0 Mr. Washington had retained attorney
Gary Long, II, to represent him throughout the trial.'0o
Mr. Long was not present at Mr. Washington's presentence inter-
view with the probation officer and did not advise Mr. Washington about
the purpose of the interview or the potential legal consequences of the
report that it generates.' 06 At the presentence interview, Mr. Washington
admitted to an increased drug distribution sales pattern of cocaine
base.10 7 Because of this incriminating admission, and additional infor-
mation from a confidential government informant who reported that Mr.
Washington possessed and distributed additional cocaine base, the proba-
99. 4 F.3d 1567, 1572 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Tisdale, 952 F.2d at 939-40; United States v.
Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 1998)).
100. Id. at 1571 (noting the defendant claimed his counsel failed to inform of his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during his presentence interview with a probation
officer).
101. Id. at 1571-72 (citing Jackson, 886 F.2d at 844).
102. Id. at 1572.




107. Id (noting Mr. Washington admitted to distributing between 0.5 and 1.0 kilograms of
cocaine base every three weeks during three months in 1990).
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tion officer's presentence report recommended a base offense level sig-
nificantly higher than it would have been without the incriminating ad-
missions.1os The district court relied on the presentence report and agreed
with the probation officer's base offense level recommendation.'0 9 The
court also imposed two two-level enhancements"o and sentenced Mr.
Washington to a total of 120 years."'
Mr. Washington appealed his conviction and sentence to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals with the assistance of a public defender. 2 Mr.
Long failed to properly prosecute the appeal and was disbarred, during
the course of the appeal, from practicing before the Tenth Circuit."' The
Tenth Circuit affirmed Mr. Washington's conviction and sentence."14
In 1994, Mr. Washington filed the first in a series of post-conviction
motions seeking various types of relief from the district court's judg-
ment.' 15 Mr. Washington's last motion, a pro se § 2255 habeas motion,
alleged that his sentence was improper due to Mr. Long's deficient per-
formance. Mr. Washington claimed that Mr. Long's performance was
constitutionally deficient when he advised Mr. Washington to proceed to
trial rather than accept a plea deal for a ten-year sentence."'7 In 2008, the
district court appointed Mr. Schweiker as counsel to represent Mr. Wash-
ington.' The district court then held an evidentiary hearing on Mr.
108. Id. at 1253-54 (stating that the probation officer added an additional 2.5 kilograms of
cocaine base attributable to Mr. Washington because of his admissions at the presentence hearing,
and then added the additional 4 kilograms of cocaine base because of the informant's statement, for
a total distribution of 6.5 kilograms of cocaine base, and therefore recommended an applicable base
offense level of 40 pursuant to the USSG).
109. Id. at 1254.
110. Id. (noting that one enhancement was for obstruction of justice-before trial, Mr. Wash-
ington attempted to kill the informant-and one was for Mr. Washington's role in the offense as a
leader or organizer of a group with more than five participants).
111. Id. ("The district court sentenced Mr. Washington to three forty-year terms of imprison-




115. Id The district court recharacterized Mr. Washington's first post-conviction motion,
seeking information under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C § 552, as a habeas petition
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and then denied it. Id. In 1997, Mr. Washington filed a § 2255 motion,
which the district court treated as a request to file a second or successive § 2255 motion and trans-
ferred it to the Tenth Circuit, who denied authorization. Id. Then, Mr. Washington filed a Rule
60(b)(6) motion seeking relief from the district court's recharacterization of his first post-conviction
motion, which the district court denied, and the Tenth Circuit vacated and denied authorization to
file. Id. In 2002, Mr. Washington filed a motion seeking a sentence reduction due to amendments to
the sentencing guidelines. Id. The district court granted Mr. Washington's motion and reduced his
sentence to thirty years for each count, served concurrently. Id. Mr. Washington renewed his Rule
60(b)(5) motion seeking relief from the district court's recharacterization of his first post-conviction
motion, which the district court denied for failure to meet the statutory requirements. Id. at 1255.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, permitting Mr. Washington to start anew and file a § 2255
motion because its recharacterization of his first post-conviction motion as a § 2255 motion prevent-
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Washington's § 2255 motion.19 During that hearing, Mr. Schweiker al-
leged ineffective assistance of counsel for Mr. Long's failure to accom-
pany Mr. Washington to the presentence interview or advise Mr. Wash-
ington of the consequence of the interview.12 0 Despite objections from
the government as to the claim's untimeliness, the district court issued an
order allowing Mr. Washington to proceed with his new ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim.121 The court held a second evidentiary hearing
on Mr. Washington's § 2255 claim and, in November 2008, issued an
order denying Mr. Washington's ineffective assistance of counsel claims
as to the plea deal and presentence interview.122 In denying Washington's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the district court said it was in-
clined to grant the motion because "the consequences of [the presen-
tence] meeting had more impact on the defendant's sentence than the
trial itself" 23 and because of Mr. Long's "complete lack of understand-
ing of the federal sentencing structure." 24 The district court ultimately
upheld Gordon while suggesting the need to re-examine its holding.125
Mr. Washington appealed the district court's decision.12 6 The Tenth
Circuit granted Mr. Washington a Certificate of Appealability (COA)
and expanded the COA's scope after oral arguments to allow Mr. Wash-
ington to proceed on the second question presented in his brief.127 The
Tenth Circuit considered two contentions raised by Mr. Washington: (1)
whether Mr. Washington's trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for
failing to properly advise Mr. Washington about the government's plea
offer; and (2) whether Mr. Washington's trial counsel's representation
was constitutionally deficient for his failure to understand the importance
of relevant conduct on Mr. Washington's potential sentence and for his
failure to advise Mr. Washington about the nature and purpose of the
presentence interview.' 2 8 The court also asked the parties to address





123. Id. at 1258 (alteration in original) (quoting District Court Order at 35-36 n.4, United
States v. Washington (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 2008)).
124. Id. at 1257 (quoting District Court Order, supra note 123, at 35-36 n.4).
125. Id. at 1257 ("[G]iven the clarity of the Tenth Circuit Court's pronouncement in Gordon,
this court cannot in good faith distinguish the facts to reach a different result. With respect, perhaps
it may be time to reexamine Gordon." (quoting District Court Order, supra note 123, at 35-36 n.4)).
126. Id. at 1256.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1256-57.
129. Id. at 1256.
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B. The Tenth Circuit's Decision
1. Majority Opinion
In a 2-1 decision, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the dis-
trict court's order denying Mr. Washington's § 2255 motion. 130 The
Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Mr. Washington failed to
show that Mr. Long's performance was constitutionally deficient for
improperly advising Mr. Washington about the government's plea of-
fer.'3 1 However, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Mr. Washington that Mr.
Long's performance was constitutionally deficient under Strickland v.
Washington when Mr. Long failed to understand the basic mechanics of
the sentencing guidelines and failed to advise Mr. Washington about the
purpose and legal significance of the presentence interview.' 32 Further,
the court found that Mr. Washington was prejudiced by this deficient
conduct because it was reasonably probable that, but for Mr. Long's de-
ficient performance, Mr. Washington would have received a lower sen-
tence. 133
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the district court opinion, which
stated an "inclination," but inability to grant Mr. Washington's motion
because of Gordon.134 The majority distinguished Gordon from Wash-
ington, holding that Gordon dealt with counsel's miscalculation of the
impact of relevant conduct on defendant's sentence, while the present
case dealt with counsel's failure to inform Mr. Washington about the
impact of relevant conduct on his sentence.135 Disagreeing with the dis-
trict court's interpretation of Gordon,13 6 the Tenth Circuit held that fail-
ure to "understand the mechanics of the sentencing guidelines," unlike
ordinary errors in applying sentencing guidelines, may rise to the level of
constitutionally deficient performance.137
The court reasoned that "[e]ven though the Court has limited the
necessity for counsel's presence as the spokesman for the defendant to
critical stages where defendant's expert adversary is present, the Consti-
tution's guarantee of counsel's guiding hand and advice regarding every
130. Id at 1263.
131. Id. at 1256-57 (noting that Mr. Washington failed to show that his counsel's allegedly
deficient performance prejudiced him because there was ample support in the record for the district
court's finding that the government never made a firm plea offer).
132. Id at 1253.
133. Id at 1263 (noting that without Mr. Washington's voluntary admissions during his presen-
tence interview, he would have qualified for the 2004 Crack Cocaine Amendment, resulting in a
two-level downward adjustment).
134. Id. at 1257 (citing United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1571-72 (10th Cir. 1993)).
135. Id. at 1258-59 (arguing that Gordon merely held that counsel's performance cannot be
constitutionally deficient in miscalculating the impact ofrelevant conduct upon sentencing).
136. The district court interpreted Gordon as foreclosing the possibility that counsel's failure to
understand the basic structure of the sentencing guidelines could rise to the level of constitutionally
deficient under Strickland v. Washington. See id
137. Id at 1259 (citing United States v. Contreras-Castellanos, 191 F. App'x 773, 776 n.1
(10th Cir. 2006)).
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step of his defense proceedings remains intact."1 3 8 Accordingly, the court
held that while Mr. Washington did not have a right to the presence of
counsel at the presentence hearing, he had a right to counsel's advice
about the purpose of the presentence interview and the potential impact
of statements made about relevant conduct.' 39
2. Dissent
Judge Tacha dissented in part, and argued that Gordon foreclosed
Mr. Washington's claim because in that case the court held that a
"presentence interview is not a critical stage of the [criminal] proceeding
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment."l 40 Judge Tacha further
argued that the majority's attempt to attach this holding solely to the
"precise moment of the presentence interview" itself, and not to the ad-
vice from counsel before the presentence interview, creates an arbitrary
distinction.141 Judge Tacha concluded by remarking, "the propriety of
[Gordon's] holding may be worthy of review."l 42
III. ANALYSIS
Although Washington's holding recognizes the increased im-
portance and the potential for prejudice of presentence interviews under
the Guidelines, in refusing to overturn Gordon, the court failed to ade-
quately protect defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Further-
more, Washington's holding created an unworkable rule that fails to en-
sure the long sought-after fairness in judicial proceedings. Under the
Guidelines, presentence interviews with probation officers are a "criti-
cal" stage under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. As such, the Tenth
Circuit should overturn Gordon and extend the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel to presentence interviews with probation officers.
A. Implications ofUnited States v. Washington-An Unworkable Rule
that Fails to Protect a Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Tenth Circuit has held that in non-critical stages of criminal
proceedings, the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee criminal defend-
ants a right to counsel's presence.143 However, in Washington, the court
held that the Sixth Amendment does guarantee criminal defendants a
right to counsel's guidance and advice at every stage of the proceed-
ing,' 4 including "counsel's advice regarding the impact of the relevant
138. Id. at 1260 (citations omitted).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1263 (Tacha, J., dissenting in part) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1572 (10th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1264.
143. Gordon, 4 F.3d at 1571-72; United States v. Smith, 929 F.2d 1453, 1458 (10th Cir. 1991);
United States. v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 981-82 (10th Cir. 1990).
144. Washington, 619 F.3d at 1260.
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conduct on the sentencing process, as well as the nature and purpose of
the presentence interview."1 4 5
Washington's holding places the Tenth Circuit into the category of
courts that have acknowledged the increased importance of presentence
interviews with probation officers under the Guidelines, but have de-
clined to extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel's presence at the
proceeding, and in doing so, fall short of protecting defendants' constitu-
tional right to counsel.146 Both United States v. Herrera-Figueroa,47
where the Ninth Circuit exercised its supervisory power to require that
probation officers permit attorneys to attend the presentence interview,148
and United States v. Tisdale,149 where the Sixth Circuit agreed with the
Ninth Circuit's solution,5 o illustrate this short-coming. The courts' rea-
soning-that because defense counsel is permitted at the presentence
interview, it is unlikely that issues would arise from counsel's failure to
attend15 '-fails to adequately protect defendants' right to counsel be-
cause "extending the courtesy to counsel does nothing to extend a right
or even a voice to the truly interested party, the defendant." 5 2 Similarly,
Washington's holding fails to adequately protect a criminal defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel because counsel's guidance and ad-
vice before a presentence interview, in addition to counsel's presence at
the interview itself, are necessary to ensure the integrity of criminal pro-
ceedings.
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Washington will be challenging to
administer. This is because the rule only works retrospectively, and be-
cause it will be difficult to determine whether counsel's advice was suf-
ficient. Courts will only be able to apply Washington's holding after a
criminal defendant challenges his counsel's assistance as to a completed
stage in the criminal proceeding."' A court will then have to undergo a
retrospective inquiry into whether the defendant received sufficient guid-
ance and advice about that stage,1 54 a determination that will be more
challenging than merely identifying whether counsel was present at a
stage.
145. Id at 1261.
146. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
147. 918 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1990).
148. Id. at 1433.
149. 952 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1992).
150. Id. at 939-40 ("[R]equiring probation officers to honor a defendant's request that his
attorney be permitted to accompany him to the presentence interview will do much to ensure fairness
at a minimal cost to the system." (quoting Herrara-Figueroa, 918 F.2d at 1434) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
151. Id.
152. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1681.
153. See United States v. Washington, 619 F.3d 1252, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 2010) (describing
the process of Mr. Washington's post-conviction motions).
154. See, e.g., id at 1259.
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Administered pursuant to the Guidelines, presentence interviews
with a probation officer are a critical stage under the Sixth Amend-
ment.155 The Tenth Circuit's refusal to extend the right to counsel to this
increasingly important stage of criminal proceedings undermines the
protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment which seek to preserve
the integrity of the judicial process,' 6 and undoes the consistency and
fairness sought by the enactment of the Guidelines.' 57 Both the majority
and the dissent called for Gordon's re-examination, and the Tenth Circuit
should heed these calls158 and extend the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to both the presentence interview and to counsel's advice before
the interview.
B. Presentence Interviews Are a Critical Stage of Criminal Proceedings
Under Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence
A presentence interview with a probation officer is a critical stage
under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence because: (1) it occurs after the
initiation of adversarial proceedings; (2) the defendant confronts an ad-
versary; (3) substantial prejudice is inherent in presentence interviews
conducted under the Guidelines; and (4) counsel's presence at the stage
would help the defendant mitigate or avoid the prejudice. Indeed, the
adoption of the Guidelines has created "new contexts . . . presenting the
same dangers that gave birth initially to the right itself."l 5 9 For example,
the same characteristics the Court relied on in holding that pretrial line-
ups and sentencing are critical stages under the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment are present in presentence interviews with probation offic-
ers.
In United States v. Wade,160 the Supreme Court expanded the right
to counsel to pretrial lineups after determining that counsel's presence
was necessary to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial.16 ' In reach-
ing this decision, the Court noted the prejudice that inheres to pretrial
lineups because pretrial lineups are "riddled with innumerable dangers
and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from
a fair trial." 62 Additionally, the Court noted that the absence of counsel
would undermine the defense's ability to meaningfully cross-examine
155. Id. at 1258; Metzger, supra note 2, at 1676-77.
156. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("The benchmark for judging any
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.").
157. See Bums, supra note 2, at 568-69.
158. See Washington, 619 F.3d at 1257 ("[Pjerhaps it may be time to reexamine Gordon."
(quoting District Court Order, supra note 123, at 35-36 n. 4)); see also id at 1264 (Tacha, J., dis-
senting) (noting that the "continued propriety of [Gordon's] holding may be worthy of review").
159. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 311 (1973).
160. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
161. Id. at 227.
162. Id. at 228-29 (describing the numerous instances of misidentification and the potential for
biased identification because of the manner in which the prosecution presents the accused in a pretri-
al line-up).
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witnesses and provide effective assistance at the trial itself.163 Further, the
Court considered as relevant the inability to cure potential prejudice that
exists in pretrial lineups. The Court noted that the defendant's "inability
effectively to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred at the
lineup may deprive him of his only opportunity meaningfully to attack
the credibility of the witness' courtroom identification."'6 Lastly, the
Court noted the ability of counsel's presence at a pretrial line-up to avoid
such prejudice.165
Similarly, in Mempa v. Rhay,'66 the Supreme Court expanded the
right to counsel to federal sentencing.' 6 7 In defining sentencing as a "crit-
ical" stage, the Court was persuaded by the potential prejudice that is
inherent in sentencing, noting the extreme influence the sentencing
judge's recommendation has in determining the defendant's ultimate
sentence.168 Additionally, the Court considered as relevant the inability to
cure prejudice: an unrepresented defendant will lose certain rights, such
as the right to appeal, if not exercised at sentencing, and an unrepresent-
ed defendant will be unaware of opportunities to cure defects.'6 9
Presentence interviews with probation officers are a "critical" stage
under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. First, presentence interviews
occur after the initiation of formal adversary proceedings.170 Presentence
interviews occur after the trial's completion and before the court imposes
its sentence. 7 1
Secondly, in presentence interviews, the defendant confronts an ad-
versary. The Guidelines have changed the role of probation officers, 172
shifting probation officers away from their non-adversarial role.173 The
expanded discretion afforded to probation officers contributes to the ad-
versarial nature of presentence interviews.174 Probation officers have
been called the "guardians of the guidelines" because of their role in col-
lecting the relevant factual information relating to the sentencing range,
and in making sentencing recommendations to the judge. 75 Probation
officers are required to make subjective determinations to arrive at a sin-
163. Id. at 230-32.
164. Id. at 23 1-32.
165. Id. at 236.
166. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
167. See id. at 137.
168. See id. at 134-35.
169. Id at 136.
170. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1668 (describing various points where adversary proceed-
ings commence: formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment).
171. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A 1.1(a) (2004).
172. See supra Part I.C.
173. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1675.
174. See id; see also Bums, supra note 2, at 544.
175. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits
on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1721-22 (1992) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Metzger, supra note 2, at 1673.
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gle version of facts to include in the presentence report, and then use that
determination to recommend a sentencing range.17 6 It is widely known
that the judgment calls that probation officers must make may be influ-
enced by the general attitude of the defendant.177 Accordingly, crucial
sentencing decisions previously made by judges acting under their expe-
rience and training in the law are now left to the discretion of probation
officers. 78 Even one "single finding by the probation officer can signifi-
cantly affect the ultimate sentencing range." 79
Despite numerous cases holding that a presentence interview is not
a "critical" stage due to the probation officer's neutrality as an agent of
the court, rather than an arm of the prosecution, 80 an examination of
presentence interviews compels the opposite conclusion.' 8' Critics of the
view that probation officers are neutral agents contend that probation
officers' bias and familiarity with the prosecution have led to too many
instances of upward adjustments in sentencing.' 8 2 Although the Guide-
lines permit a downward departure for acceptance of responsibility,'83
most of the adjustments provided for in the Guidelines are upward depar-
tures.184 Because of this, the majority of questions probation officers ask
a defendant at a presentence interview only can have an adverse impact
on the defendant, dictating the probation officer's role not as a "neutral
fact gatherer," but rather as an adversary.'8 ' The probation officer's role
as an adversary is underscored by the practice of probation officers sit-
ting at the prosecutor's table in court, giving the impression that the pro-
bation officer is a "surrogate prosecutor[]."' 86 When taken together, these
176. See, e.g., United States v. Saenz, 915 F.2d 1046, 1048 n.2 (6th Cir. 1990) ("The probation
officer's recommendations, which are based on his exercise of his judgment, become the point of
departure for disputes concerning the underlying facts of an offense as well as sentencing determina-
tions . . . ."); Bums, supra note 2, at 544; Donald A. Purdy, Jr. & Gustavo A. Gelpi, Federal Sen-
tencing Advocacy: Tips for Beginning Practitioners, 11 CRIM. JUST. 26, 30 (1997) ("[E]xplain to
your client the probation officer's role as a key player in the sentencing process and that the proba-
tion officer's perceptions of the client during the presentence interview may ultimately result in a
given recommendation to the court. . . .").
177. See, e.g., Purdy & Gelpi, supra note 176, at 30 ("Instruct your client to always be courte-
ous towards the [probation] officer.").
178. See Bums, supra note 2, at 545 ("[U]nder the Guidelines ... many of the crucial judgment
calls in sentencing are now made, not by the court, but by probation officers . . . ." (quoting United
States v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1223 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part))).
179. United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1990).
180. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
181. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1673; Burns, supra note 2, at 561 (discussing the "faulty
assumption that probation officers do not operate as adversaries").
182. See Bums, supra note 2, at 562-65.
183. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (2004) ("If the defendant clearly
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.").
184. Bums, supra note 2, at 564 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3).
185. Id.
186. United States v. Turner, 203 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that a separate
table could be placed in the courtroom to ensure the probation officer appears equally available to
the judge and both parties).
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circumstances suggest that probation officers are part of the prosecution
team. 187
Third, substantial prejudice is inherent in presentence interviews
conducted under the Guidelines because of (1) the increased importance
of presentence interview; (2) the technical complexity of the Guidelines;
(3) the trial-like nature of presentence interviews; and (4) the inability to
cure potential prejudice.
1. Increased Importance
Under the Guidelines, presentence interviews have an expanded im-
portance. The probation officer uses the interview to create a presentence
report, which plays a central role in determining a defendant's sentence.
Additionally, judges are increasingly relying on the substance and rec-
ommendations contained in the report."8 Further, the presentence report
continues to impact the defendant after sentencing.189 For example, the
Bureau of Prisons relies on the presentence report for many of its deci-
sions. 190 Also, the presentence report is required to be part of the record
on appeal.1 91
2. Technical Complexity
Additionally, the technical complexity present in the Guidelines in-
creases the likelihood that an unrepresented defendant will commit sen-
tencing suicide, and make unnecessary admissions that can result in up-
ward adjustments to his sentence. An unrepresented defendant is unlikely
to understand the implications of his admissions at a presentence inter-
view,' 9 2 which can result in upward variations of months or years in the
defendant's sentence.' 93 The technical complexity of the Guidelines can
be illustrated by providing a few examples of how a defendant's admis-
sions, non-admissions, or conduct during a presentence interview can
have a significant effect on the defendant's sentence.
For example, during a presentence interview with a probation of-
ficer, if a defendant provides "materially false information to a probation
officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the court,"
187. See Bums, supra note 2, at 561-64.
188. See id. at 545.
189. See THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING & PRACTICE § 6Al.1 cmt. 3
(2012 ed.)
190. See id (explaining the Bureau of Prisons' reliance on the presentence report as the key
and sometimes exclusive source of information about the defendant for decisions such as a defend-
ant's assignment to a correctional facility, assessment of the incarceration fee, and eligibility for
early release from a drug treatment program).
191. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1676 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d)(2) (2003)).
192. See id. at 1679 ("[A] defendant's 'casual, ill-considered or inaccurate answers, offered [at
the presentence interview] without a full understanding of the potential consequences, may result in
a substantial increase in the recommended period of incarceration."' (quoting United States v. Herre-
ra-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1436 (9th Cir. 1990))).
193. Bums, supra note 2, at 528.
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the defendant can receive an increase in the offense level by two levels
for obstructing or impeding the administration of justice.19 4 Two Ninth
Circuit cases demonstrate the gravity of a defendant's admission during a
presentence interview, in which a mischaracterization of the defendant's
criminal record to a probation officer resulted in the two-level increase
for obstruction of justice.' 95
Additionally, in arriving at a sentencing recommendation, a proba-
tion officer may consider criminal conduct for which the defendant has
not been convicted.196 The Guidelines give the court considerable discre-
tion to "consider, without limitation, any information concerning the
background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise
prohibited by law." 97 Accordingly, an unrepresented criminal defendant
may admit, as Mr. Washington did, to crimes for which he was not con-
victed, and such admissions may result in an increase in his sentencing
recommendation. Furthermore, an unrepresented defendant may admit to
other background information relating to the character and conduct of the
defendant that can influence the probation officer's sentencing recom-
mendation.
3. Trial-Like Nature
Furthermore, the "trial-like" nature of the presentence interview
supports the conclusion that the presentence interview, upon which the
result of the sentencing proceeding truly rests, is a critical stage requiring
counsel. 98 Because of the potential harm resulting from the presentence
interview, defense attorneys are often encouraged to treat a presentence
interview as if it were a trial.'99 The defense attorney has two weeks to
object to the probation officer's presentence report, and the court will
resolve any remaining dispute by hearing arguments from both parties.2 00
Such hearings often turn on the word of one party against the other, and,
unfortunately, the court's familiarity with the probation officer as an
194. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1, cmt. 4(H) (2011).
195. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d at 1435 (citing United States v. Christman, 894 F.2d 339,
342 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1083, 1084 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that the
defendant received a two-point increase in offense level for mischaracterizing his record even
though the probation officer had access to the defendant's record while the defendant did not)).
196. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IBI.3, cmt. 1 (2010) ("The principles
and limits of sentencing accountability under this guideline are not always the same as the principles
and limits of criminal liability. Under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), the focus is on the specific acts
and omissions for which the defendant is to be held accountable in determining the applicable guide-
line range, rather than on whether the defendant is criminally liable for an offense as a principal,
accomplice, or conspirator.").
197. See id. §B 1.4 (2004).
198. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 314 (1973).
199. See Purdy & Gelpi, supra note 176, at 29 ("[C]onduct yourself as a professional in your
dealings with the probation officer . . ; convey an image of informed, prepared professionalism, and
supply written documentation of your position on guideline application (and dispute resolution) with
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.").
200. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1674-75.
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agent of the court can lead the court to credit the probation officer's tes-
201timony.
4. Inability to Cure Defects
Lastly, the "irrevocable consequences" of admissions made and
conduct at a presentence interview further add support to the critical na-
ture of this stage of proceedings. 202 It is difficult for defendants to chal-
203
lenge the contents of the presentence report, increasing the potential
for prejudice in presentence interviews. In United States v. Ash,204 the
Supreme Court emphasized as important the extent to which an oppor-
tunity exists to "cure defects" caused by counsel's absence.20 5 A defense
attorney who was not present at the presentence interview will have a
difficult time successfully challenging information contained in the
presentence report at a hearing, given the deference to probation officers'
206testimony. Additionally, because probation officers often make subjec-
tive determinations in the presentence report, it is difficult for a defense
attorney who was not present at the interview to effectively challenge
these determinations. 207 The inability to cure defects caused by the ab-
sence of counsel at a presentence interview illustrates why merely ex-
tending the right to counsel's advice before the interview, as the Tenth
Circuit did in Washington, fails to adequately remedy the possibility of
prejudice inherent in presentence interviews.
Fourth, the ability of counsel's presence at the presentence inter-
views to help the defendant mitigate or avoid the prejudice illustrates the
critical nature of the proceeding. The presence of counsel at a prcsen-
tence interview can significantly reduce the risk of the defendant com-
mitting sentencing suicide,208 or prejudicing himself by making state-
ments or acting in a manner that leads to upward adjustments in the sen-
tencing range. Case law demonstrates that "an uncounselled defendant
runs the risk of unwittingly increasing his or her sentence."2 09 Washing-
ton illustrates this point effectively. It is difficult to imagine that with
201. Id. at 1678, 1696 (questioning "how counsel could effectively rebut claims about state-
ments her client made, or the demeanor her client had, at a presentence interview that counsel did
not attend").
202. Id. at 1663.
203. See id at 1674.
204. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
205. Id. at 315-16 (noting that if such an opportunity to cure defects caused by counsel's
absence exists, despite the fact that the risks inherent in a particular confrontation will still remain,
the stage is not critical).
206. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1696.
207. Id. at 1678 n.275 (discussing the difficulty that a defense attorney, who was not present at
a presentence interview, will have in effectively cross-examining the probation officer to undermine
his description of facts or conduct included in the report).
208. In re Carter, 848 A.2d 281, 296 (Vt. 2004) (discussing petitioner's statements at his
presentence interview where "in a single paragraph he ensured that he would spend virtually all of
his adult life in jail").
209. Id. at 298; see also United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir.
1990).
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counsel present at his presentence interview, Mr. Washington would
have admitted to his previous drug dealing. Indeed, Washington "had
absolutely nothing to gain and a great deal to lose by volunteering the
information."210
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is an evolving doctrine, and
the changes in federal sentencing due to the adoption of the Guidelines
compel the right to counsel be expanded to presentence interviews with
probation officers. In Washington, the Tenth Circuit recognized the im-
portance of presentence interviews and the potential for prejudice inher-
ent in post-Guideline presentence interviews. However, in refusing to
overturn Gordon, the court created an unworkable rule that fails to en-
sure the long sought-after fairness in judicial proceedings and fails to
adequately protect defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Elizabeth Phillips'
210. United States v. Washington, 619 F.3d 1252, 1257 (2010) (quoting District Court Order,
supra note 123, at 32).
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POLICING THE POLICE: PROTECTING CIVI REMEDIES IN
CASES OF RETALIATORY ARREST
For over two hundred years, the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution has served as the bedrock of our democratic system
of government. The First Amendment has long been viewed as the quin-
tessential guarantee of freedom, enabling individuals to voice contrary
and unpopular opinions without fear of reprisal. It is these most funda-
mental American rights-the right to free speech, to free press, and to
free assembly-that we associate with the greatness of our nation. These
freedoms hold an elevated place not only in our system of government
and political discourse, but also in our everyday lives. Accordingly, as a
nation we have long sought to protect these fundamental rights against
encroachment from both external and internal threats. In seeking to pro-
tect these rights, Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1983,' granting the federal
courts jurisdiction over constitutional tort actions. Congress's intent in
passing § 1983 was to utilize the federal courts to protect the constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights of individuals in the face of governmental op-
2
pression. Over time, the judicially created doctrines of absolute and
qualified immunity have narrowed the ability of individuals to gain re-
dress against governmental actors for constitutional violations.
Reichle v. Howards4 a case recently heard by the Supreme Court-
on appeal from the Tenth Circuit-provided the Court with the oppor-
tunity to decide whether law enforcement officials should be immune
from civil suits for arrests made in retaliation against an individual exer-
cising free speech.5 In an earlier case, Hartman v. Moore,6 the Court
ruled that probable cause did bar civil actions alleging retaliatory prose-
cution.' Varying interpretations of the Hartman decision have resulted in
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) provides that any person who, under color of law, deprives
another of his constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities can be held liable in a suit of law or
equity. Enacted by Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment as part of the
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, the original purpose of the legislation was to provide protection to black
citizens who were being discriminated against, abused, and murdered, oftentimes at the hands of, or
with the permission of local government and police officials. This protection has, over time, been
expanded to provide all individuals the ability to seek civil redress against governmental actors who
violate their constitutionally guaranteed rights. See infra Part L.A.
2. See Michael T. Burke & Patricia A. Burton, Defining the Contours of Municipal Liability
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Monell Through City of Canton v. Harris, 18 STETSON L. REV. 511, 512-
13(1989).
3. See James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort
Claims for Nominal Damages, Ill COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1602 (2011); see also David Rudovski,
Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricting Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
1199,1213 (2005).
4. 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012).
5. Id at 2091.
6. 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
7. Id. at 252.
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some courts applying Hartman to retaliatory arrest cases, while others
limit Hartman's application to cases of retaliatory prosecution.8 Instead
of either explicitly extending or restricting Hartman, the Reichle's Court
held only that the arresting officers were entitled to qualified immunity
because at the time of arrest the arrestee did not have a "clearly estab-
lished right."9 In doing so, the Court punted on the more important legal
issue, 0 thereby insuring a continued circuit split, and continued debate as
to the role that probable cause should play in civil suits for retaliatory
arrests.
Prior to the case reaching the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit in
Howards v. McLaughlin," provided a definitive statement of its treat-
ment of probable cause in retaliatory arrest cases. Because the Supreme
Court decision fails to reach this important legal question, this Comment
will analyze the Tenth Circuit's holding, and argue that while probable
cause should be a consideration, it should not axiomatically provide of-
ficers with immunity for arrests executed with the intention of quelling
free speech. Part I of this Comment will examine the genesis of constitu-
tional tort law, the evolution of retaliatory case law, and the current split
among the federal circuits as to whether the absence of probable cause is
a requirement in retaliation cases. Part II summarizes the facts, procedur-
al history, and opinions of the Tenth Circuit case Howards v. McLaugh-
lin. Part III argues that the Tenth Circuit was correct, and probable cause
should not be a bar to retaliatory arrest claims because the existence of
probable cause does not preclude retaliatory causation. Part III also ad-
dresses the current circuit split by distinguishing Howards from the Su-
preme Court's earlier holding in Hartman. Lastly, Part 1V analyzes the
arguments presented to the Supreme Court, and gives insight into how
the Court should ultimately rule on this issue.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Constitutional Tort Law
Section 198312 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents ofFeder-
al Bureau of Narcotics1 3 provide civil remedies when any person acting
8. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
9. See Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093.
10. See id. ("We granted certiorari on two questions: whether a First Amendment retaliatory
arrest claim may lie despite the presence of probable cause to support the arrest, and whether clearly
established law at the time of the Howards' arrest so held. If the answer to either question is 'no,'
then the agents are entitled to qualified immunity. We elect to address only the second question."
(citations omitted)).
I. 634 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2011), rev'd sub nom. Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088
(2012). The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in denying Agents Daniels and McLaugh-
lin's motion for qualified immunity and for judgment as a matter of law, as neither took any action
that demonstrated a retaliatory intent. Therefore, the case name was changed on petition to the Su-
preme Court to Reichle v. Howards.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (creating a private right of action for violations of an individual's
rights under the color of state law).
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under color of law deprives another of his constitutional rights, privileg-
es, or immunities. Together, § 1983 and Bivens serve as the basis of what
legal commentators have labeled "constitutional tort litigation." 4 Consti-
tutional tort litigation gives individuals the ability to bring actions against
police and other governmental actors outside of the limited confines of
state law tort systems." Section 1983 was initially passed by Congress as
§ I of Civil Rights Act of 1871, and was intended to enforce the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment.16 The legislation originally sought
to provide protection to black citizens against discrimination from gov-
ernment and police officials by giving them access to the federal court
system to seek redress for constitutional violations committed under the
color of state law.17
The modem interpretation of § 1983 was articulated by the Supreme
Court's 1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape,' where, for the first time, the
Court held that § 1983 did not require an action taken under an express
state law or custom.19 Instead, the Court held that § 1983 provides reme-
dies when an official acting based on the power afforded them by state
law violates an individual's rights under the Constitution or federal law.20
This decision significantly expanded the scope of actions that could be
brought under § 1983, thereby extending the expansive remedies availa-
ble in constitutional tort cases. The Court's 1971 decision in Bivens fur-
ther expanded constitutional tort law by recognizing the existence of an
implied cause of action for individuals whose constitutional rights were
violated under the color of federal law.2 1
While the Court's decisions in Monroe and Bivens significantly ex-
panded constitutional tort law, the Court's actions over the past half cen-
tury in restricting remedies have dramatically limited the practical appli-
cation of these rights.22 The language of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 had
no provision for absolute or qualified immunity.2 3 However, the judicial-
ly created doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity have, over time,
carved out numerous exceptions to the statutory liability of § 1983. The-
se immunity doctrines limit who can be sued under the statute, while at
the same time providing defendants with ever more expansive tools to
13. 403 U.S. 388, 392-97 (1971) (recognizing an implied cause of action for individuals
whose constitutional rights are violated under the color of federal law).
14. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 643-44 (1987).
15. Id. at 645 ("In cases involving government officials and constitutional rights, section 1983
actions supplement, if not replace, traditional state law tort systems.").
16. See Burke & Burton, supra note 2, at 512.
17. Id. at 513.
18. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruledby Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
19. Id. at 173-75, 192.
20. Id.
21. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392-97 (1971).
22. See Rudovski, supra note 3, at 1206.
23. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 502 (1978).
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deflect liability. 24 Today, judges and prosecutors enjoy absolute immuni-
ty,25 and other government agents (including law enforcement) are af-
forded qualified immunity. 26 The Court has placed further restrictions on
remedies by only recognizing municipal liability in very narrow circum-
stances, and by putting in place extensive exhaustion of remedies re-
27quirements. Recent decisions indicate the Court's continued deference
to governmental actors in all but the most egregious cases of miscon-
duct.28
B. Retaliatory Framework: Mt. Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle
The framework for proving retaliatory claims for violations of con-
stitutional rights was established by the Supreme Court's 1977 decision
in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle.29 The
case involved a public school teacher who was fired by the local school
board after leaking the contents of an internal memorandum to a local
radio station.3 0 The teacher brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claim-
ing that the board terminated him in retaliation for exercising his rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.3 1 The lower court found
that the teacher's speech was a "substantial factor" in him not being re-
hired, and thereby held that the Board had violated his First Amendment
rights.32
The Supreme Court did not overturn the lower court's holding;
however, it did articulate a two-part burden shifting analysis for proving
retaliatory claims.33 First, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating a
prima facie case of retaliation by showing that his conduct was constitu-
tionally protected, and that the constitutionally protected conduct was a
"substantial factor" in the action taken against him.34 Once the plaintiff
demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant, who
must show that in the absence of the protected conduct, it would have
taken the same action. 35 While this burden shifting test continues to hold
24. See David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the
Search for the Legislative Will, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 497, 500-02 (1992) (explaining the many differ-
ent approaches the Court has used to formulate the doctrine of qualified immunity).
25. Id at5ll-12.
26. Butz, 438 U.S. at 508 ("[Q]ualified immunity from damages liability should be the general
rule for executive officials charged with constitutional violations . . .
27. See Rudovski, supra note 3, at 1213-29.
28. Id. at 1254-55; see also Thompson v. Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1365-66 (2011) (holding
that neither a district attorney nor a municipality can be held civilly liable under § 1983 when a
prosecutor intentionally withholds evidence that leads to eighteen years of wrongful incarceration).
29. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
30. See id. at 281-82.
31. Id at 276.
32. Id. at 283.
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sway over most retaliatory claims, subsequent court decisions have
carved out exceptions to this framework. Often these exceptions are
plagued by circuit splits, as evident in prisoner cases, where some courts
continue to apply Mt. Healthy, while other courts have abandoned the
framework.3 6 Similarly, cases involving retaliatory counterclaims are
treated differently depending on the circuit in which they are decided.37
Recently, the conflicting analysis between circuits regarding retaliatory
prosecution cases forced the Supreme Court to address the issue.
C. The Pre-Hartman Split
Outside of the above noted exceptions, the Mt. Healthy framework
for retaliatory claims continues to be largely applied by the courts.
However, there is a split among the circuits as to the required pleading
standard for claims against law enforcement officers for retaliatory ar-
rest.4 0 Before the Court's decision in Hartman v. Moore, the Second,
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits had clearly articulated decisions that
required a plaintiff to prove that the arrest occurred in the absence of
probable cause.41 However, the D.C. and the Tenth Circuits expressly
permitted claims for retaliatory arrests to be brought irrespective of the
absence of probable cause.42 The Court's decision in Hartman, articulat-
ing the pleading standards for retaliatory prosecution cases, has prompted
new debate as to what standards should be applied in retaliatory arrest
cases.4 3
36. See John Koerner, Between Healthy and Hartman: Probable Cause in Retaliatory Arrest
Cases, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 764-65 (2009) (citing McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir.
1979) (noting that the plaintiff has a substantial burden to prove that the transfer was motivated by
retaliatory animus)); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying the Mt. Healthy
burden shifting analysis to a prison case).
37. See Koerner, supra note 36, at 766-67 (citing Greenwich Citizens Comm., Inc. v. Cnty. of
Warren Indus. Dev. Agency, 77 F.3d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs were "neverthe-
less required to persuade the jury that the counterclaims were filed, not as a legitimate response to
litigation, but as a form of retaliation")). But see Venable v. Keever, 263 F.3d 162, 2001 WL
803565, at *2 (5th Cir. June 12, 2001) (unpublished table decision) (dismissing claim as frivolous).
38. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 252 (2006).
39. See Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1146 (10th Cir. 2011), rev d sub nom.
Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012).
40. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *13, Reichle v. Howards, 634 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2011),
cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3114 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2011) (No. 11-262), 2011 WL 3809375.
41. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Carl Junction, 480 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 2007); Wood v.
Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 883 (11th Cir. 2003); Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 2002);
Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1179-80 (2d Cir. 1992).
42. See, e.g., Poole v. Cnty. of Otero, 271 F.3d 955, 961 (10th Cir. 2001), abrogated by
Hartman, 547 U.S. 250; Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1256-57 (D.C. Cir. 1987), abrogat-
ed by Hartman, 547 U.S. 250.
43. See, e.g., Colin P. Watson, Limiting a Constitutional Tort Without Probable Cause: First
Amendment Retaliatory Arrest After Hartman, 107 MICH. L. REV. 111, 111 (2010) ("Hartman neither
requires nor supports a rule that the presence of probable cause for effectuating the underlying arrest
precludes a claim for First Amendment retaliatory arrest."); Koerner, supra note 36, at 777 ("Hart-
man and its requirement of no-probable-cause pleading should apply only to a subset of retaliatory
arrest cases-cases of complex causation where a retaliating government official induces the police
offer to arrest the plaintiff.").
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D. Hartman v. Moore
In 2006, the Supreme Court in Hartman v. Moore resolved a long-
standing circuit split regarding whether plaintiffs were required to plead
and prove the absence of probable cause when bringing a claim of retali-
atory prosecution." The Hartman Court addressed this question in the
context of a dispute between a private business and the United States
Postal Service. 45 During the 1980's, William Moore, the CEO of Recog-
nition Equipment Incorporated (REI), was aggressively urging the Postal
Service into using REI's multi-line scanning equipment.46 At that time,
top officials within the Postal Service were advocating for the continued
use of single-line scanners. 47 In seeking to advance the cause of his busi-
ness, and despite requests by the Postmaster General to be silent on the
issue, Mr. Moore hired a public-relations firm to lobby Congress for the
adoption of a multi-line scanning standard.48 These efforts proved suc-
cessful, and in 1985 the Postal Service adopted multi-line technology.49
Following the Postal Service decision, REI was not awarded any of
government contracts, and instead became the subject of two separate
investigations by Postal Service inspectors.50 Ultimately, the United
States Attorney's office prosecuted Moore and REI.5 ' The Court, citing
what it called a "complete lack of direct evidence," granted defendant's
motion for judgment of acquittal.52 Following the criminal trial, Moore
brought a civil action for liability under Bivens,53 claiming, inter alia,
that the prosecutor and postal inspectors had prosecuted him in retalia-
tion for his criticism of the United States Postal Service, thereby violat-
ing his First Amendment rights.54
In seeking to resolve the existing circuit split on the probable cause
issue, the Court held that in a retaliatory prosecution action, the plaintiff
must plead and prove an absence of probable cause.55 The Court's deci-
sion rested on three grounds: (1) the analysis of the causation require-
ment necessary to prove discriminatory animus; (2) the uniqueness of the
causation chain in retaliatory prosecution cases; and (3) the strong pre-
44. 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
45. Id at 254.
46. Id at 252-53.
47. Id at 252.
48. Id at 253.
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id at 253-54.
52. Id. at 254.
53. For the purpose of retaliatory claims, courts draw no distinction between analyzing a
claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.30
(1982) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500 (1978) ("[I]t would be 'untenable to draw a
distinction for the purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials § 1983 and
suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials."')).
54. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 254.
55. Id. at 265-66.
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sumption of prosecutorial regularity that has long existed in our common
law jurisprudence.5 Stating that the "presumption that a prosecutor has
legitimate grounds for the action he takes is one we do not lightly dis-
card," the Court held that plaintiffs must prove the absence of probable
cause to overcome the presumptive deference given to prosecutorial de-
cisions.57
E. Post-Hartman Split
While the Hartman Court articulated a clear rule regarding the need
to plead the absence of probable cause in retaliatory prosecution cases,
the impact of its decision on retaliatory arrest cases remains unclear."
The Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted Hart-
man's heightened pleading standard as being applicable to all retaliatory
constitutional tort claims.5 9 The Tenth Circuit, interpreting Hartman as
only applicable to cases of prosecutorial retaliation, continues to allow
retaliation claims to be brought even when there is evidence of probable
cause.60 The confusion, however, does not end there. The Ninth Circuit,
which prior to Hartman had no precedent addressing this issue, has since
adopted the Tenth Circuit's view that the existence of probable cause is
not a barrier to First Amendment retaliation claims.61 The Sixth Circuit,
which prior to Hartman had not required plaintiffs to prove an absence of
probable cause, initially reversed itself, applying Hartman to all retalia-
tory claims (not simply retaliatory prosecution claims).62 However, more
recent decisions show the Sixth Circuit may be moving away from this
bright-line rule.63
56. Id at 260-63.
57. Id. at 263, 265-66.
58. Koerner, supra note 36, at 775 ("Retaliatory arrest case law is a mess, with some courts
siding entirely with Hartman, others rejecting Hartman outright, and still others having yet to take a
position.").
59. See, e.g., McCabe v, Parker, 608 F.3d 1068, 1075 (8th Cir. 2010) ("Lack of probable
cause is a necessary element of all the claims McCabe and Nelson brought arising from the allegedly
unlawful arrest."); Phillips v. Irvin, 222 F. App'x 928, 929 (1 Ith Cir. 2007) (requiring a showing of
no probable cause); Williams v. City of Carl Junction, 480 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding
that retaliatory arrest falls under Hartman); Curley v. Vill. of Suffem, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001)
("[B]ecause defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, an inquiry into the underlying motive
for the arrest need not be undertaken.").
60. Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1148 (10th Cir. 2011) ("[W]e are not persuaded
Hartman applies to the circumstances here."), rev d sub nom. Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088
(2012).
61. See Skoog v. Cnty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[W]e conclude
that a plaintiff need not plead the absence of probable cause in order to state a claim for retalia-
tion.").
62. Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 720 (6th Cir. 2006).
63. See Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 355 (6th Cir. 2007); Kennedy v. City of Villa
Hills, 635 F.3d 210, 217 n.4 (6th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that an "ordinary retaliation claim may not
need to demonstrate a lack of probable cause to succeed on his claim or wrongful arrest").
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II. HO WA RDS V. MCLAUGHLIN
In Howards v. McLaughlin, the Tenth Circuit sought to determine
the bounds of qualified immunity for law enforcement officials in a retal-
iatory arrest context.64 Steven Howards initiated a civil action against
four Secret Service agents (the Agents) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or alter-
natively under Bivens, claiming, inter alia, violations of his First and
Fourth Amendment rights. 65 The Fourth Amendment claim was dis-
missed as settled law and, therefore, will receive only cursory treatment
in this Comment.6 6 The court found that, because the Agents had proba-
ble cause to arrest Howards, the arrest and subsequent search of Mr.
Howards was lawful and not in violation of Mr. Howards's Fourth
Amendment rights.
The more complex and interesting question before the court was
whether the existence of probable cause, at the time of the arrest, provid-
ed the Agents with immunity from civil liability for arresting Mr. How-
ards in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. While the
court recognized the existence of probable cause for the arrest, it held
that a plaintiff bringing an action for violation of his First Amendment
rights under § 1983 or Bivens need not plead the absence of probable
cause.68 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit made clear that it will construe the
Supreme Court's decision in Hartman as applicable only in cases of re-
taliatory prosecution. 6 In following this interpretation, the Tenth Circuit
allows plaintiffs in retaliatory arrest cases to pursue civil remedies de-
spite the presence of probable cause and ensures a continued circuit split
on this issue.70
A. Facts
On June 16, 2006, Mr. Howards was attending a piano recital at the
Beaver Creek Mall in Beaver Creek, Colorado.7 At the same time, Vice
President Dick Cheney was also at the mall with a full Secret Service
security detail.72 Agent Gus Reichle was in charge of the Secret Service
Protective Intelligence Team that included Agents Dan Doyle, Adam
Daniels, and Daniel McLaughlin.73 While on his way to the piano recital,
Mr. Howards saw the Vice President and stated into his cell phone, "I'm
going to ask him [the Vice President] how many kids he's killed to-
64. Howards, 634 F.3d at 1147.
65. Id. at 1138.
66. Id. at 1143.
67. Id.
68. Id at 1148.
69. Id. ("We decline to extend Hartman's 'no-probable-cause' requirement to this retaliatory
arrest case.").
70. Id. at 1148-49 ("Accordingly, our prior precedent permits Mr. Howards to proceed with
his First Amendment retaliation claim notwithstanding probable cause existed for his arrest.").
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day."74 Agent Doyle overheard this comment and subsequently relayed
the content of Mr. Howards's statement to Agent McLaughlin, directing
Agent McLaughlin to "pay particular attention to [Mr. Howards]."
Agent McLaughlin then relayed this information, including the directive
to monitor Mr. Howards, to Agent Daniels. Agent Doyle later admitted
that Mr. Howards's statement "disturbed" him, and that he found it "not
quite right."76
After waiting in a gathering crowd, Mr. Howards approached the
Vice President and told him that his "policies in Iraq are disgusting." The
Vice President responded, "thank you," and Mr. Howards departed the
area.7 7 While leaving, Mr. Howards made physical contact with the Vice
President's right shoulder.78 The parties dispute the nature of the contact,
but all parties concede that Mr. Howards did make physical contact with
the Vice President.79 Agents Daniels, McLaughlin, and Doyle did not
hear Howards's statement to the Vice President, but did observe Mr.
Howards touch the Vice President.8 0 Agents Daniels and McLaughlin
both testified that they did not believe the touch of the Vice President
provided the probable cause necessary to arrest Mr. Howards.81 Two
other agents, Mike Lee and Andrew Wurst, were close enough to hear
the verbal exchange between Mr. Howards and the Vice President, and
together decided to dispatch the Protective Intelligence Team to speak
with Mr. Howards.82
Although he had neither heard Mr. Howards's statements nor wit-
nessed the touching of the Vice President, Agent Reichle, as the intelli-
gence coordinator, had the responsibility of interviewing Mr. Howards.
Before reaching Mr. Howards, Agent Doyle briefed Agent Reichle on the
situation and the statements made by Mr. Howards. 84 Agent Reichle then
approached Mr. Howards and presented his badge.85 At that time Mr.
Howards refused to speak to Agent Reichle and attempted to step away.
Agent Reichle then stepped in front of Mr. Howards and a heated con-
versation ensued. Upon hearing Mr. Howards's opinion on the Iraq
War, Agent Reichle became "visibly angry."88 Agent Reichle then asked
74. Id. at 1136 (stating that Mr. Howards later clarified that this comment was in reference to
Vice President Cheney's role in the ongoing war in Iraq).
75. Id.
76. Id.at1145.
77. Id. at 1136.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1136 n.2.
80. Id. at 1136.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Mr. Howards if he had touched the Vice President, to which Mr. How-
ards responded that he had not.89 Upon receiving confirmation from
Agent Doyle that Mr. Howards had in fact touched the Vice President,
Agent Reichle arrested Mr. Howards for assault on the Vice President.90
Agents Doyle, Daniels, and McLaughlin assisted in the arrest, and sub-
sequently turned Mr. Howards over to the Eagle County Sheriff's De-
partment where Mr. Howards was charged with harassment under Colo-
rado state law.9' Mr. Howards was later released from custody, the state
charges were dropped, and no federal charges were ever filed. 92
B. Procedural History
Mr. Howards filed a civil action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or alter-
natively, under Bivens, in federal district court, charging, that the Agents
deprived him of his constitutional right to free speech by arresting him in
retaliation for his comments to Vice President Cheney regarding the war
in Iraq.9 3 Mr. Howards further charged that the arrest violated his Fourth
Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure.9 4 The defendants
moved for summary judgment, claiming that because the arrest was sup-
ported by probable cause, they were protected by qualified immunity. 95
The probable cause arose not out of the verbal exchange between Mr.
Howards and the Vice President, nor out of the physical touch of the
Vice President by Mr. Howards.96 Instead, the Agents argued that by
stating that he had not touched the Vice President, Mr. Howards made a
false statement to a federal official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.9
C. Majority Opinion
In addressing the Fourth Amendment claim, Judge Seymour, writ-
ing for the majority, held that "there is no doubt that Agent Reichle pos-
sessed probable cause to arrest Mr. Howards for lying to a federal agent
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001."9' Based on this finding, the court
unanimously held that because the Agents had probable cause for the
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1137-38.
91. Id. at 1138.
92. Id.
93. Id. (§ 1983 creates a cause of action against federal officials who violate an individual's




97. Id. at 1141. Section 1001 provides that "whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of
the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and
willfully . . . makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement ... shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years ... or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
98. Howards, 634 F.3d at 1142.
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arrest, there was no violation of Mr. Howard's Fourth Amendment
rights.99
The court then addressed the First Amendment claim. The Agents
argued that the Tenth Circuit's prior holding that plaintiffs are not re-
quired to demonstrate a lack of probable cause in First Amendment retal-
iation cases had been overruled by the Court in Hartman.'00 Judges Sey-
mour and Lucero were not persuaded, holding plaintiffs are not required
to demonstrate a lack of probable cause in retaliatory arrest cases.' 0 ' The
court distinguished Howards from Hartman by recognizing the narrow
applicability of Hartman to the unique circumstances of retaliatory pros-
ecution cases.102
By holding that Hartman applies only in the retaliatory prosecution
context, the Tenth Circuit drew a clear distinction between "ordinary"
retaliation claims and retaliatory prosecution claims. 0 3 The court articu-
lated two ways in which cases of prosecutorial retaliation differ from
other retaliatory claims. First, there will generally be substantial circum-
stantial evidence to prove or disprove probable cause, and therefore, re-
quiring plaintiffs to demonstrate the absence of probable cause does not
impose a significant burden.10 Second, the complexity inherent in the
causation analysis is vastly different.'05 In a prosecutorial retaliation case
"the causal connection required . .. is not merely between the retaliatory
animus of one person and that person's own injurious action, but be-
tween the retaliatory animus of one person and the action of another."'0 6
That is, in a case of retaliatory prosecution, the plaintiff is not required to
prove the prosecutor was retaliating against him, but rather, that a third-
party who harbored retaliatory intent induced the prosecutor into filing
the charges.10 7 It is this additional link in the causation chain that sets
retaliatory prosecution cases apart from other retaliation cases, including
retaliatory arrest cases. In looking to these two differences, the Howards
court cast the decision in Hartman as a heightened pleading standard,
necessary only in cases that require the more complex causation analy-
sis.108
99. While the court was divided on the First Amendment issue, the court was unanimous in its
dismissal of the Fourth Amendment issue. Id at 1143.
100. See DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990).
101. Howards, 634 F.3d at 1148.
102. Id. (holding that "extending the 'no-probable-cause' requirement to this ordinary retaliato-
ry arrest case and dismissing Mr. Howards' suit, would result in the Court's limited exception de-
vouring the rule" (emphasis added)).
103. Id. ("In light of the care the Supreme Court took to distinguish between complex and
ordinary retaliation claims, we are not persuaded Hartman applies to the circumstances here.").
104. See Howards, 634 F.3d at 1147 (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260-61
(2006)).
105. Id at 1146.
106. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 262.
107. Id.
108. Howards, 634 F.3d at 1148.
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D. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Kelly's dissent argues that all of the Agents were entitled to
qualified immunity based on the presence of probable cause for the ar-
rest.1 09 The dissent argues that the Supreme Court's holding in Hartman
not only requires a pleading of the absence of probable cause in retaliato-
ry prosecution cases, but also in retaliatory arrest cases. 0 In supporting
this view, Judge Kelly articulates three arguments. First, he argues that
"[p]robable cause evidence will be readily available and relevant in most
retaliatory arrest cases."'' Second, Judge Kelly argues that while the
causation chain may not be as complex in retaliatory arrest cases as it is
in retaliatory prosecution cases, this alone should not eliminate the con-
sideration of probable cause as an element of the claim. 1 12
Lastly, the dissent argues that the Agents were entitled to qualified
immunity because the law was unclear at the time of the incident.113 The
Supreme Court has long held that public officials are entitled to qualified
immunity when their actions violate a constitutional right that is not
clearly established at the time of violation.' 14On this point, Judge Kelly
argues that due to the current circuit split, and the absence of a ruling
from the Tenth Circuit following Hartman, it would be unreasonable to
expect that the Agents knew that probable cause was insufficient to es-
tablish qualified immunity in a retaliatory arrest case."' It is this third
rationale that is ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court, and provides
the basis for the Court to avoid answering whether probable cause cuts
off liability for retaliatory arrests. 116
III. ANALYSIS
The Howards decision illustrates the Tenth Circuit's continued ad-
herence to its view that probable cause does not, in and of itself, defeat a
retaliatory arrest claim.'" There are two principal reasons that the Tenth
Circuit was correct in not applying heightened pleading standard from
Hartman in a retaliatory arrest context. First, the existence of probable
cause-while probative-does not prove that the contested action by the
arresting officer was not taken for retaliatory reasons. Second, retaliatory




113. Id. at 1152.
114. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("We therefore hold that government
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.").
115. Id.
116. See Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2097 (2012) ([W]hen Howards was arrested it
was not clearly established that an arrest supported by probable cause could give rise to a First
Amendment violation. Petitioners Reichle and Doyle are thus entitled to qualified immunity.").
117. Howards, 634 F.3d at 1148 (majority opinion).
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arrest cases can be distinguished from retaliatory prosecution cases be-
cause both the complex causation chains and assumption of prosecutorial
regularity inherent in prosecutorial retaliation cases are absent from most
retaliatory arrest cases.
A. Probable Cause Does Not Preclude Retaliatory Causation
The existence of probable cause does not demonstrate a lack of re-
taliatory causation because probable cause is an objective standard,
viewed independent of the arresting officer's intent.' 18 Perhaps a simple
way to understand the idea of probable cause as an objective standard is
through a hypothetical. In this hypothetical, John Doe, a law abiding
citizen becomes outraged after seeing video on the local news of police
beating peaceful protestors. In response, John organizes a protest at the
local police station. The next day, several hundred protestors arrive at the
local police station carrying signs and singing protest songs. John is soon
identified as the leader of the protests and is asked by the local police
chief to put an end to the protest. John refuses to end the protest, which
incenses the police chief and the multitude of police officers observing
the peaceful protest. After walking away from the police chief, John at-
tempts to cross the street to rejoin the protest. However, John crosses
against the light. There are no cars on the road when John crosses the
street; nonetheless, John is immediately arrested by the police, who
charge him with jay-walking, disrupting traffic, and causing a public
disturbance. While placing the handcuffs on John, the arresting officer
remarks, "I hope this teaches you and your friends to keep your mouths
shut and stay at home."
After reviewing the police report, the district attorney determines
that there is insufficient evidence to pursue a conviction and subsequent-
ly drops all charges. Once John receives the news that all criminal charg-
es have been dropped, he quickly hires an attorney and files a § 1983
action against the arresting officer, the Police Chief, and the city. Unfor-
tunately for John, he lives in New York, where the federal courts are
bound by Second Circuit precedent, which requires pleading the absence
of probable cause in retaliatory arrest cases brought under § 1983."9 Be-
cause John was crossing against the light, a statutory violation, the police
possessed probable cause at the time of his arrest. Unable to demonstrate
a lack of probable cause, John's claim is defeated on summary judgment.
While the police technically had probable cause to arrest John, the
arrest was clearly in retaliation for his leadership of the protest. This hy-
pothetical illustrates two distinct problems associated with requiring
plaintiffs to plead the absence of probable cause in retaliatory arrest cas-
es. First, the existence of probable cause provides only one possible ra-
118. See id.
119. See Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1179-80 (2d Cir. 1992).
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tionale for the challenged arrest and in no way demonstrates that the ar-
rest was not motivated by retaliatory intent. 120 Second, the standard for
probable cause is minimal, falling below even a prima facie showing of
- * 121criminal activity.
By arguing that probable cause should bar civil actions for retaliato-
ry arrest, the Agents are essentially asking the Court to abandon the legal
principal of causation. 122 This argument is logical if one believes that
arrests are only motivated by a single factor: that factor being the exist-
ence of probable cause. In such a simplified world there would be no
need for courts to examine an officer's motivation because probable
cause would be the only causal factor for arresting an individual. How-
ever, we do not live in a simple, single-factor world. While probable
cause is a legal requirement to arrest an individual, in many cases it is
not the only factor motivating the arresting officer's decision, thereby
creating a multiple-factor causation problem.12 3 This problem can be
illustrated by returning to the earlier hypothetical. Imagine that John is
not immediately arrested, but instead leads a peaceful crowd of 200 peo-
ple on a march through town. After several blocks, the police stop the
march and tell the protestors that they are violating a city ordinance by
marching without a permit. The police then begin arresting protestors;
however, they don't arrest all of the protestors, instead arresting only
those who were leading the chants and protest songs. While there were
200 people participating in the protest-all in violation of the statute-
only the four leaders are arrested. Identical probable cause existed for the
arrests of all members of the protest, yet the police clearly targeted the
four individuals who were the most vocal in their opposition to police
brutality. Under the Hartman heightened pleading standard, the arrested
protestors would be barred from bringing a civil action against the police
because they cannot plead a lack of probable cause.' 24 This example il-
lustrates that even in a situation where probable cause is present; it may
not be the determinative causal factor in an arrest.
120. See DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Matzker v. Herr, 748
F.2d 1142, 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) ("An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally
protected right is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would
have been proper.")).
121. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
96 (1964) ("[O]nly the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard
of probable cause....")).
122. See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 517 (2011) ("Under the Restatement, in order for a
plaintiff to recover damages, a defendant's negligence need not be the sole cause or factor contrib-
uting to the injury, or even the primary factor in bringing the injury about, but need only have been a
substantial factor in bringing it about. If the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in pro-
ducing the plaintiff's injuries, the defendant will not be relieved from liability for those injuries even
though another force concurred to produce them." (citations omitted)).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (emphasis added)).
124. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 252 (2006).
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The multiple-factor causation problem is not unique to retaliatory
arrest cases, and other areas of the law can shed light on how to best ap-
proach this issue. 12 Multiple-factor causation is often present in Title VII
employment discrimination cases where the employer articulates a legit-
imate nondiscriminatory reason for taking action against an employee.126
This assertion of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is akin to the
existence of probable cause in a retaliatory arrest context. While both
probable cause and a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason may demon-
strate that the defending party was justified in its action, it does not fore-
close the possibility that the action taken-by the employer or police
officer-was not motivated by other factors. 127 While there continues to
be much debate as to which causal framework should be applied in Title
VII actions,' 2 8 all of the frameworks utilized by the courts provide plain-
tiffs with some ability to demonstrate that an employer's stated legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory purpose is actually a pretext to discrimination.12 9
Similarly, in a retaliatory arrest context, the existence of probable cause
should place the burden of proof on the plaintiff to demonstrate a dis-
criminatory animus was a motivating factor in the arrest, but should not
serve as a complete bar to suit.130
Multiple-factor causation is also an inherent problem in traditional
tort litigation, forcing states to enact comparative negligence statutes to
address the problem.'13 To date, forty-six states have abandoned the tra-
125. See id. at 258 ("As for the invitation to rely on common-law parallels, we certainly are
ready to look at the elements for common-law torts when we think about elements of actions for
constitutional violations . . . .").
126. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-42 (1989).
127. Id. at 241 ("[W]e also know that Title VII meant to condemn even those decisions based
on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations.").
128. My discussion of the causation standards in Title VIl actions is at best cursory. It is only
designed to demonstrate the analogous relationship between a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose
in a challenged employment action, and the existence of probable cause in a retaliatory arrest con-
text. For an in-depth discussion of Title VIl causation, see Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell
Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 109-37 (2007).
129. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (articulating a
three-part burden shilling test which provides that after the plaintiff has proven a prima facie case
and the defendant has demonstrated a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose, the plaintiff has an
opportunity to demonstrate that the articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose is pretextual).
McDonnell Douglas was called into question in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 261-79
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (articulating a two-part test which provides that after the plaintiff has
proven a prima facie case, the defendant can be relieved of all liability by showing that it would have
made the "same decision" irrespective of the protected status of the plaintiff). Congress, rejecting
Price Waterhouse, passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which provided that plaintiffs need only
show that a protected trait was a "motivating factor." Upon such a showing, the employer can seek
to prove that it would have made the "same decision" even in the absence of the protected trait. Such
a showing does not bar liability, but can limit damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
130. See Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1148 (10th Cir. 2011), rev'd sub nom.
Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012).
131. See Peter Nash Swisher, Virginia Should Abolish the Archaic Tort Defense of Contributo-
ry Negligence and Adopt a Comparative Negligence Defense in Its Place, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 359,
360-61 (2011) (arguing that Virginia's contributory negligence standard is outmoded and does not
"fairly recognize and apportion damages according to the bedrock underlying tort legal principles of
accountability, deterrence, and distribution of loss").
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ditional concept of contributory negligence, which held that any culpabil-
ity on the part of the plaintiff was a complete bar to recovery, and instead
have adopted a comparative negligence standard.13 2 At first glance the
analogy between comparative negligence and probable cause in a retalia-
tory arrest case may not be clear. The concept of comparative negligence
recognizes that one's liability for a tortious act that injures another
should not be excused simply because the injured party may be partially
at fault.'33 Comparative negligence recognizes the need to analyze and
weigh multiple causal factors by assigning fault to each party on a frac-
tional basis.13 4 Similarly, a claim for the violation of an individual's civil
rights due to a retaliatory arrest should not be dismissed simply because
the plaintiffs actions created probable cause.13 5 This would be akin to
not imparting liability to a driver who runs a red light simply because the
car he hit was missing a tail light cover.
In a § 1983 claim for retaliatory arrest, the injury occurs not because
of the arrest itself, but by the suppression of a constitutionally guaranteed
right through means of an arrest.136 If courts were to apply the same theo-
ry that underpins comparative negligence to cases of retaliatory arrest, it
would require an examination of the relative weight of causal factors not
of the arrest itself, but of the arresting officer's motivation. Under such a
formulation, probable cause would create a strong presumption that the
arresting officer's motivation was within legal parameters, while still
providing plaintiffs with an opportunity to demonstrate, based on specific
facts, that other causal factors should be given more weight.
The argument that the presence of single causal factor should bar
plaintiffs from recovering in retaliatory arrest cases is even more trou-
bling when the single factor being advocated for as determinative is
probable cause. 137 The standard for probable cause is extremely low,
allowing police officers the ability to detain virtually any person at any
time, simply by alleging a minor violation or infraction.' Courts that
have held that the existence of probable cause forecloses the arrestee's
ability to recover civil damages in retaliatory arrest cases have adopted a
rule that assumes probable cause is the only causation of the arrest. Such
a default is problematic because the low standard for establishing proba-
132. Id. at 360.
133. Id. at 365-67.
134. Id.
135. See Howards, 634 F.3d at 1148.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
137. See Howards, 634 F.3d at 1141.
138. See Brian J. Foley, Policing From the Gut: Anti-Intellectualism in American Criminal
Procedure, 69 MD. L. REV. 261 (2010) ("In many cases, these people were not arrested because of
investigations; rather, they were swept off the street by a modem police force that has at its disposal
a multiplicity of minor offenses, a low standard of probable cause, and broad search and arrest
powers. In fact, anybody driving a car is subject to arrest and at least a limited search, either by
committing a minor offense or by being accused by the police of committing a minor offense."
(citations omitted)).
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ble cause will almost always provide an arresting officer with immunity,
regardless of what truly motivated the arrest.
B. Distinguishing Retaliatory Prosecution from Retaliatory Arrest
1. Lack of Complex Causation Chains
The Hartman Court held that because prosecutors are absolutely
immune from liability for decisions to prosecute,13 9 proving a retaliatory
prosecution claim does not require a showing by the plaintiff that the
prosecutor was retaliating in violation of his constitutionally guaranteed
rights. 14 0 Instead, the plaintiff must prove that a third-party actor was
successful in inducing the prosecutor to prosecute based on a retaliatory
animus. 14 1 It is because of this complex causation chain that claims for
prosecutorial retaliation require the plaintiff to plead and prove a lack of
probable cause. Returning to the earlier hypothetical, to prove a retaliato-
ry arrest John would not need to overcome a complex causation chain.
To show that his constitutionally guaranteed rights were violated, John
does not have to demonstrate that the arresting officer's retaliatory ani-
mus motivated the prosecutor to pursue criminal charges; instead John
need only prove that the arresting officer's action in arresting him was
based on a retaliatory motive.142
This is not to say that probable cause-or the absence thereof-is
not a relevant consideration in a retaliatory arrest context.14 3 There are
many cases in which the absence of probable cause would significantly
rebut the plaintiffs contention that he was arrested based on the retalia-
tory animus of the officer."'4 However, the standard for proving retalia-
tion is not foreclosed by the probable cause. Based on long established
case law, plaintiffs need only prove that the retaliatory animus was "a
substantial factor."14 5 By adding the requirement that plaintiffs plead and
prove the absence of probable cause, courts have implemented a new
heightened pleading standard. While this may be appropriate in retaliato-
ry prosecution cases, no court has articulated a compelling policy reason
for such a heightened standard in retaliatory arrest cases.14
139. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
140. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261-62 (2006).
141. Id. at 262.
142. Baldauf v. Davidson, 2007 WL 2156065, No. 1:04-cv-1571-JDT-TAB, at *2 (July 24,
2007) ("[Nlo such complex causation problems are present when a person brings a retaliatory arrest
claim that focuses entirely on an officer's bodily seizure of a plaintiff through the power of arrest.").
143. See Howards, 634 F.3d at 1149-50 (stating that Agents Daniels and McLaughlin were
entitled to summary judgment because they had probable cause for the arrest and Howards presented
no evidence of a retaliatory motive on their part).
144. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265 ("[Sihowing an absence of probable cause will have high
probative force . . . .").
145. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
146. See Watson, supra note 43, at 128 ("Neither existing legal doctrine nor controlling prece-
dent recommend imposing the no-probable cause rule in actions for retaliatory arrest, and no court or
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2. Prosecutorial Presumption
The Hartman Court held that the long-recognized presumption of
regularity attached to prosecutorial decisions was a key factor in requir-
ing plaintiffs to prove a lack of probable cause in retaliatory prosecution
cases.147 This deference is grounded in the fact that courts are reticent to
regulate the decision making process of a prosecutor. 148 With this defer-
ence in mind, the Supreme Court has held that those wishing to pursue
claims based on selective prosecution have a heightened standard of
proof.14 9 Also inherent in the assumption of prosecutorial regularity is the
belief that prosecutors-as legal professionals and officers of the court-
have an intimate understanding of individual rights.o Based on this
knowledge, and the ethical standards that hold them to account, prosecu-
tors are presumed to make informed and ethical decisions when moving
forward with a prosecution."'
This rationale logically applies to retaliatory arrest cases because
these claims carry with them the implicit accusation that the prosecutor
abused his authority in bringing the case. In such cases it is reasonable to
require plaintiffs to overcome the heightened standard of proof to
demonstrate that a prosecution was in fact motivated by a retaliatory
animus."5 However, the differences of retaliatory arrest cases provide at
least two compelling arguments as to why a presumption of regularity
should not be extended to retaliatory arrest cases. First, in a retaliatory
arrest case, there is no accusation of misuse of prosecutorial power. In-
stead, the claim is based on the misuse of law enforcement power in vio-
lation of an individual right. 15 3 Not only is there no presumption of regu-
larity regarding law enforcement, but our criminal justice system has
gone to considerable lengths to restrict police power. In most circum-
stances police are required to have warrants before arresting or searching
a person or property. 154 Police must read suspects Miranda rights when
they are arrested, and must follow strict rules when interrogating sus-
scholar has yet articulated sufficiently persuasive policy argument in favor of applying the rule to
retaliatory-arrest claims.").
147. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263.
148. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) ("This broad discretion [afforded
the Executive] rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited
to judicial review.").
149. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) ("Be-
cause such claims invade a special province of the Executive-its prosecutorial discretion-we have
emphasized that the standard for proving them is particularly demanding. . . .").
150. See Andrew Horwitz, Police Prosecution in Rhode Island: The Unauthorized Practice of
Law, 54 R.I.B.J. 5, 31 (2006).
151. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1361-62 (2011) (holding that all licensed
attorneys are "subject to an ethical regime designed to reinforce the profession's standards" and that
"[t]raining is what differentiates attorneys from average public employees").
152. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265-66.
153. Id. at262.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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pects.'" All of these protections are in place to serve as an independent
check on the decision making authority of law enforcement officials. 56
The second reason why the presumption of prosecutorial regularity
should not be extended to law enforcement officials in retaliatory arrest
cases is that prosecutors receive far more expansive training in the legal
system than their law enforcement counterparts.157 As discussed above,
due to this lack of training, law enforcement officials are confined by
more rigid rules and do not enjoy the same level of discretion as prosecu-
tors in discharging their duties. Taken together, these two fundamental
differences between prosecutors and law enforcement officials serve as
further support that the presumption of prosecutorial regularity should
not be extended to law enforcement officials. Absent this presumption,
the argument for requiring a pleading of no probable cause in a retaliato-
ry arrest claim is further weakened.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT
In December 2011, the Supreme Court granted Agents Reichle and
Doyle's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.' 58 In their petition, Agents
Reichle and Doyle advance four arguments as to why the Court should
reverse the Tenth Circuit Court's decision: (1) the ongoing circuit split
on the issue of probable cause in the retaliatory arrest context is an issue
that requires a judicial resolution that only the Supreme Court can pro-
vide; (2) the issue is one of great national importance, and that Secret
Service agents deserve special protection; (3) the presumption of regular-
ity which the Supreme Court cites prominently in Hartman should be
applicable not only to prosecutors, but also to Secret Service agents; and
(4) at the time of the incident the law concerning retaliatory arrest was
unclear, thus the agents were reasonable in assuming that Hartman
would be applied to retaliatory arrest cases.159
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas states that "at the time of
Howards' arrest it was at least arguable that Hartman's rule extended to
retaliatory arrest."l 6 0 In support of this holding, Justice Thomas notes that
"Hartman was decided against a legal backdrop that treated retaliatory
arrest and prosecution claims similarly," and "[a] reasonable official also
could have interpreted Hartman's rationale to apply to retaliatory ar-
155. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("Prior to any questioning, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or ap-
pointed.").
156. Id. at 447 ("Unless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved-such as
these decisions will advance-there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be eradi-
cated in the foreseeable future.").
157. See Horwitz, supra note 150, at 5.
158. Reichle v. Howards, No. 11-262, 2011 WL 3812626, at *1 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2011).
159. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at *11-12.
160. Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2096 (2012). .
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rests."' 6 1 However, at the time of the incident, the established law in the
Tenth Circuit did not require a showing of the absence of probable cause
in retaliatory arrest cases.162 In fact, no Tenth Circuit opinion regarding
retaliatory arrest had ever applied the Hartman test. Because Hartman
was clear in distinguishing prosecutorial retaliation cases from "ordinary
retaliation" cases, the Tenth Circuit's precedent in reference to the latter
was undisturbed.163
Although the Supreme Court ultimately found for the Agent's based
on the lack of a clearly established right, it is worth examining the
Agents' other arguments in the larger conversation of what role probable
cause should play in a retaliatory arrest analysis.
The Agents' characterization of the current circuit split is neither
correct nor accurate. The Agents argue that the Tenth Circuit holding that
probable cause does not bar a retaliatory arrest claim "conflicts with the
majority rule established in several other circuit court decisions, includ-
ing decisions by the Eighth, Eleventh, Sixth, and Second Circuits.",6
This assertion is misleading in its entirety, and plain wrong on at least
one point. In seeking to cast the Tenth Circuit as a lone wolf in allowing
retaliation claims irrespective of the presence of probable cause, the
Agents ignore similar opinions issued by the Ninth and D.C. Circuits.'65
More troubling is the Agents' assertion that the Sixth Circuit has imple-
mented a no probable cause pleading requirement.16 6 As discussed above,
the Sixth Circuit's treatment of retaliatory arrest cases is far from clear,
as Sixth Circuit courts have at times applied Hartman broadly to all retal-
iatory claims, while at other times held that "ordinary retaliation" claims
are not barred due to the presence of probable cause.167 The Agents also
attempt to cast dispersion on the Howards court, by implying the deci-
sion was based exclusively on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Skoog v.
County of Clackamas.168 While the Howards court does look to Skoog, it
is important to note that unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit has
161. Id. at 2095.
162. See DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990).
163. See Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1148 n.12 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Unlike the
Ninth Circuit, our circuit has prior binding precedent that a plaintiff need not plead the absence of
probable cause to bring a retaliatory arrest claim."), rev'd sub nom. Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct.
2088 (2012).
164. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at * 16.
165. See Skoog v. Cnty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006). It should be noted
that the D.C. Circuit has yet to decide a retaliatory arrest claim post-Hartman, and therefore, it is
still bound by the precedent set forth in Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1256-57 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
166. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at *18-19.
167. See Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 355 (6th Cir. 2007); Kennedy v. City of Villa
Hills, 635 F.3d 210, 217 (6th Cir. 2011) ("[A]n ordinary retaliation claim . . . may not need to
demonstrate a lack of probable cause to succeed on his claim of wrongful arrest.").
168. Skoog, 469 F.3d at 1232; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *14, Reichle v. Howards, 2011
WL 3809375 (2011) (No. 11-262).
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long-established precedent stating that probable cause is not a bar to re-
taliatory arrest cases; therefore, absent a clear ruling from the Supreme
Court on this issue, the Howards court was bound to apply the Tenth
Circuit rule.' 6 9
The Agents also argued that their case deserved consideration from
the Supreme Court because it is an issue of "great national im-
portance."170 They are correct in stating that this issue does have national
implications; however, the faulty basis of their argument is that Secret
Service agents deserve special legal protection.' 7' While it would be easy
to impart special legal protection to the agents who risk their lives to
defend our elected leaders, such protections are inconsistent with the
stated purpose of § 1983 and Bivens, which is to ensure that an individu-
al's constitutional rights are not intruded upon by those acting under col-
or of the law.172
Unfortunately, it appears that Justice Ginsberg agrees with this ar-
gument. In her concurrence, she states that "[w]ere defendants ordinary
law enforcement officers, I would hold that Harman v. Moore, does not
support their entitlement to qualified immunity." 7 3 Justice Ginsberg is
quick to differentiate retaliatory arrest from retaliatory prosecution based
on the lack of a complex causation chain. 74 However, she voted with the
majority in its grant of qualified immunity to the officers based on her
belief that "[o]fficers assigned to protect public officials must make sin-
gularly swift, on the spot, decisions whether the safety of the person they
are guarding is in jeopardy."175 Pursuant to this rationale, Justice Gins-
berg believes that the Agents were justified in arresting Mr. Howards.176
On the narrow facts of this case such a determination appears ra-
tionale; however, a blanket protection afforded to all officers tasked with
protecting public figures could open the door to a more insidious type of
action on the part of governmental actors, giving political leaders the
opportunity to exploit their protective services to squash unpopular
speech. While the prospect of the President or Vice Presdient of the
United States using the Secret Service as mechanism to root out political
dissenters may seem far-fetched, Justice Ginsberg's recognition of a spe-
cial rule for Secret Service agents places this scenario squarely within the
realm of possibility.
169. See DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990).
170. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at *21.
171. Id. at *22.
172. See supra notes 1, 12.
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In reality, the Agents presented a false choice by framing the argu-
ment as a contest between insulating Secret Service agents against litiga-
tion versus protecting an individual's right to recover for retaliatory ar-
rest. Nothing in the Howards decision should or would prevent any law
enforcement official from fulfilling his duty to protect any member of the
public, including elected officials. However, the Howards decision does
provide redress for individuals who can prove that their constitutional
rights were infringed upon based on a retaliatory animus.17 7 Such a rule
would not prevent Secret Service agents from taking action to prevent an
assassination attempt or other threat, but will encourage agents to take
pause to ensure that arrests of individuals are not based on a discrimina-
tory intent. Further, while the Tenth Circuit's decision in Howards
opened the door to claims of retaliatory arrest irrespective of probable
cause, the reality is that the presence of probable cause creates a strong
presumption in favor of the arresting officer. 78 Such a presumption in
and of itself provides a strong measure of protection to arresting officers,
as it will not easily be overcome.
In briefs before the Supreme Court, the Agents also argued that Se-
cret Service agents should be entitled to the same presumption of regu-
larity that the courts have extended to prosecutors. 17 9 It is this presump-
tion that the Court cites in Hartman as one of the factors leading to its
holding that probable cause forecloses the right to bring suit for retaliato-
ry prosecution.180 The Agents argue that Secret Service officers are spe-
cifically trained to deal with potential threats to public officials and,
therefore, should enjoy a presumption of regularity in their actions.'
While on its face this argument is plausible, it fails to take into account
the underlying reasons why prosecutors have long enjoyed this presump-
tion. The case law is clear that there is a "longstanding presumption of
regularity accorded to the prosecutorial decisionmaking."' 82 The pre-
sumption of prosecutorial regularity is grounded in the "recognition that
the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review," due
to the myriad of factors that a prosecutor must consider when deciding to
bring charges.1' Despite the Agents' arguments to the contrary, there is
no history of such deference being extended to law enforcement officials,
and their roles as peace officers should not entitle them to such defer-
ence. Prosecutors are charged with representing the interest of the people
and prosecuting those who commit crimes against the people or the state.
In contrast, law enforcement officials are charged strictly enforcement
177. See Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1148 (10th Cir. 2011), rev'd sub nom.
Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012).
178. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250,267 (2006).
179. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at *25-27.
180. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263.
181. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at *26-27.
182. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263.
183. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985).
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and do not require, nor enjoy, the latitude to determine when to exercise
their authority and when to withhold it.
CONCLUSION
Congress's purpose in enacting § 1983, as well as the public policy
rationale underpinning the Supreme Court's holding in Monroe, was to
protect the constitutional rights of individuals from infringement by
those acting under color of law. In order to maintain public faith in law
enforcement officials, citizens must have a mechanism for seeking re-
dress when police power is used to quash individual rights. This is how a
civilized society holds accountable the law enforcement agents to whom
it granted special powers, explicitly for the purpose of providing society
protection. If by simply establishing probable cause, law enforcement
officials are allowed to act with impunity in suppressing the rights of
individual citizens, then the fundamental purpose of § 1983-protecting
individual rights against the power of the state-will be rendered mean-
ingless. Allowing law enforcement officials to suppress an individual's
right to free speech, while hiding behind a shield of probable cause, will
directly erode the public confidence in the very people who are sworn to
protect us. In holding that probable cause does not bar civil liability in
retaliatory arrest cases, the Tenth Circuit has recognized the importance
of protecting individual rights; we can only hope that one day soon the
Supreme Court will do the same.
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RECOGNIZING TRIBAL JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL COURTS
THROUGH THE LENS OF COMITY
INTRODUCTION
In January 2010, on the sparsely populated Uintah and Ouray Res-
ervation in northeastern Utah, a man was charged with assaulting his
domestic partner.' Little did he know that, because this was his third do-
mestic assault charge, he will not appear before a Ute judge in tribal
court. This is his third strike. The full force of a federal recidivist statute
strikes him out-for up to five years.2 His name is Adam Shavanaux and
he is a member of the Ute Indian Tribe. Because he is a tribal member
and the crimes he committed were on the reservation, his previous con-
victions were in Ute tribal court. Tribal courts, however, are bound nei-
ther by the United States Constitution nor the Bill of Rights3 and conse-
quently provide different protections than domestic American courts.4
Tribal members, for example, do not have the right to free legal counsel.'
This is particularly important to Mr. Shavanaux because he cannot afford
an attorney.6 His two prior misdemeanor domestic assault convictions
were made while Mr. Shavanaux was unrepresented.7 The recidivist stat-
ute commands that he be charged in federal court, and his federal public
defenders assert that his prior convictions should not be allowed as pred-
icate offenses because they were handed down without the benefit of
professional legal representation.8
Because tribal courts do not provide the same procedural protec-
tions as state and federal courts, there is a debate as to how state and fed-
eral courts should handle tribal judgments that come across their dockets.
Should tribal judgments be entitled to full faith and credit under the Full
Faith and Credit Act 9 or be analyzed using principles of international
comity?10 This Comment argues that tribal judgments should be treated
1. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 995 (10th Cir. 2011).
2. Domestic Assault by an Habitual Offender, 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006).
3. The Constitution and Bill of Rights do not apply because Indian tribes were, before the
American Republic, viewed as co-equal sovereign states. See discussion infra Part lB.
4. See discussion infra Part I.C.2. Throughout this paper, I will use "American courts" to
refer to federal and state courts. This is in contrast to "tribal courts," which do not fall within the
same structure.
5. See UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 3(1)(b) ("[B]ut no Defendant shall have the right to have
appointed professional counsel provided at the Tribe's expense."), available at
http://www.narforg/nill/Codes/uteuocode/utebodytl2.htm.
6. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 996.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
10. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (noting that comity is "complex and elusive-[it considers] the degree of deference that a
domestic forum must pay to the act of a foreign government not otherwise binding on the forum.").
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as foreign judgments and be recognized using international comity prin-
ciples" because the relationship between tribes and American jurisdic-
tions does not mirror the state-federal relationship, which is based on full
faith and credit between judgments from different jurisdictions. Although
Congress retains ultimate control, tribes have much leeway to exercise
their sovereignty in internal affairs.12 Because they are not fully within
the federal framework and are not bound by the same rules as state and
federal courts, the principles of international comity are the best means
for American courts to recognize tribal judgments.
Part I frames how Indian tribes are treated in the United States. It
briefly explores the history of legal relationships with Indian tribes, from
equal treatment as sovereign states when Europeans first crossed the At-
lantic, through a century of pulling tribes under the federal domain, to
eventual federal legislative supremacy over Indian tribes. This Comment
also analyzes the circuit split regarding the use of un-counseled tribal
convictions to prove predicate offenses. Part II discusses United States v.
Shavanaux'3 and summarizes Mr. Shavanaux's Fifth Amendment and
Sixth Amendment claims. Part III explores the difference between a full
faith and credit approach and a comity analysis of tribal judgments, and
concludes by finding that international comity principles are more ap-
propriate for Indian tribes. Part IV analyzes Shavanaux using the princi-
ples of international comity and explores whether the right to counsel is a
fundamental due process requirement for the comity analysis.
I. BACKGROUND: THE TRIBAL-FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP
The foundation for understanding United States v. Shavanaux
comes from understanding the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and tribal governments. This story is a long and, at times, ugly
one.14 From initial European contact with Native Americans, tribal sov-
ereignty has been chipped away. In the early years of the United States,
the federal government began to bring tribes within its administration
and under its protection.'5 Now, tribes are neither part of the United
States because they still retain many aspects of sovereignty nor are they
foreign states because Congress retains ultimate authority over them.
This state of limbo creates difficulties when American and tribal legal
systems interact.
11. For a thorough discussion of comity, see discussion infra Part IlIl.A.I.
12. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
13. 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011).
14. See Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REV.
841, 841-43 (1990).
15. See DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 7 (2001).
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A. United States' Treatment ofIndian Tribes
By the time the United States declared independence, there was a
well-established framework for dealing with Native American tribes.
Spanish theological jurists in the 1600s recognized the sovereignty of
Indian tribes and treated them as they would other colonial powers-that
is, as sovereign states.' 6 This sovereign equality, however, began to
erode in the mid-1700s as the British took over some tribal administra-
tive responsibilities.' 7 By 1781, the Articles of Confederation asserted
that the national government had authority over Indian tribes.' 8 The Con-
stitution, however, continued to recognize that Indian tribes are "distinct
from the United States"' 9 in the express language of the Commerce
Clause.20 Early American interactions with Indian tribes were made
through treaties. 2 1 In 1784, George Washington recommended that a trea-
ty resolving a territorial dispute with the Six Nations be submitted to the
22same formal ratification process as a treaty with a foreign sovereign.
Subsequent peace,23 trade, 2 4 and land acquisition25 treaties began to dis-
favor tribal interests as the United States pushed westward. Congress
eventually ended the practice of making treaties with tribes, but it left
tribal sovereignty intact.2 6
After the Constitution was ratified, the limits of tribal sovereignty
were predominantly shaped by three Supreme Court decisions, referred
to as the "Marshall Trilogy."2 7 These cases established that although
tribes were not quite foreign states,28 they were certainly not part of the
United States. 29 Chief Justice Marshall noted that because federal and
state governments "plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a [foreign]
state . . . the courts are bound by those acts" affirming tribal sovereign-
ty.30 However, recognizing Indian tribes "as distinct, independent politi-
16. See CHARLES WILKINSON, THE AM. INDIAN RES. INST., INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN
GOVERNMENTS 4 (2d ed. 2004).
17. See id.
18. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4 ("The United States in Congress
assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of . .. regulating the trade and
managing all affairs with the Indians . . . .").
19. See WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 15, at 5.
20. Indian tribes are separate from foreign and domestic states. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
3 ("[The Congress shall have power] [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes.").
21. See WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 4-8.
22. See id. at 93.
23. See, e.g., Treaty with the Choctaw, U.S.-Choctaw, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333;
WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 96-97.
24. See, e.g., Treaty with the Sioux, U.S.-Sioux, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635; WILKINSON,
supra note 16, at 93-94.
25. See, e.g., Treaty with the Creeks, U.S.-Creek, Aug. 9, 1814, 7 Stat. 120; WILKINSON,
supra note 16, at 96.
26. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006); WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 97.
27. See WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 5.
28. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1831).
29. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559, 561 (1832).
30. "State," in this context, refers to foreign states. See Cherokee Nalion, 30 U.S. at 16.
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cal communities, retaining their original natural rights" does not mean
tribal sovereignty is absolute. 3 ' Tribes are "domestic dependent na-
tions ,,32 "distinct communit[ies] occupying [their] own territory."3 3 Alt-
hough the Court did not determine that tribes are within the federal
framework, the extent of tribal sovereignty depends on the will of the
federal government. 3 4
Given that tribes retain a level of independence, the question be-
comes how does Congress justify its authority over tribes? The federal
government justifies its control over Indian tribes as an inherent "plenary
power,"35 which means that Congress has "full and complete power" to
regulate tribal affairs. 3 6 The source of the plenary power stems 37 from the
Indian Commerce Clause, 38 the Treaty Clause, 39 and a principle in inter-
national law granting conquerors sovereignty and ownership over con-
quered land.4 0 Although Congress abolished the power to make treaties
with Indian tribes in 187141 and conquest has lost favor as an acceptable
tool for advancing national interests, 42 the Commerce Clause remains as
justification for federal supremacy over tribes.43 Regardless of the origi-
nal justification, Congress's power is very broadly interpreted."
B. Effect of Congressional Power over Tribes
Until Congress acts to limit tribal authority, Indian nations have
many of the powers of a sovereign state.45 By being brought within the
administrative protection of the United States, "Indian tribes have not
31. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
32. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
33. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
34. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 ("[Tribes'] relation to the Unites States resembles that
of a ward to his guardian.").
35. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 397-98 (1986 ed.).
36. See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998); STEPHEN L. PEVAR,
THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 59 (3d ed. 2002).
37. See PEVAR, supra note 36, at 58-59; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200-04
(2004) (explaining the sources of Congress's plenary power over Indian tribes).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("[The Congress shall have power] ... to regulate Commerce
... with the Indian Tribes. . . .").
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
40. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 589 (1823) ("The title by conquest is acquired and
maintained by force. The conqueror prescribes its limits."); see also Robert N. Clinton, Comity &
Colonialism: The Federal Courts' Frustration of Tribal Federal Cooperation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. I,
26-27 (2004).
41. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006); WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 97.
42. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (outlawing the use of force as a tool of foreign poli-
cy).
43. See Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 257-58 (1992); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974).
44. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200-03 (2004) (describing congressional power
over tribes); PEVAR, supra note 36, at 59.
45. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 n.7 (1978) (discussing federal court
decisions which "exempt[] Indian tribes from constitutional provisions addressed specifically to
State or Federal Governments"); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
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given up their full sovereignty."4 And because tribes are sovereign states
that existed before the Constitution, they "have historically been regard-
ed as unconstrained" by constitutional limitations. 4 7 Of particular im-
portance to United States v. Shavanaux because of Mr. Shavanaux's un-
counseled convictions, the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian
tribes.48 However, Congress's plenary powers allow legislative action to
strip tribes of independent authority. 49 As the Court articulated in Talton
v. Mayes,50 "all such rights are subject to the supreme legislative authori-
ty of the United States."
As an exercise of this plenary power, Congress passed the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).52 ICRA grants Bill of Rights-like pro-
tections to tribal members53 and gives federal courts broad authority to
review and overrule tribal decisions that violate ICRA protections. 54 Im-
posing the Bill of Rights itself was not done because it would not take
into account the unique needs of Indian tribes. 5 One right that was not
fully exported was the right to counsel-ICRA only guarantees defend-
ants the right to counsel at their own expense.56 Recognizing that requir-
ing tribes to provide public defenders would impose "undue financial
hardship," Congress acquiesced to tribal leaders. 7 Some tribes, however,
provide counsel for indigent defense5 or, as Mr. Shavanaux's Ute Tribe
does, allow non-lawyer "advocates" to represent defendants. 5 9 But be-
cause tribes are not subject to the Bill of Rights, any measures that are
more protective than IRCA are left to the tribe's discretion.60
46. United States v. wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
47. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56 ("As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitu-
tion, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions . . .
48. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1896).
49. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 ("In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sover-
eignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent
status.").
50. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
51. Talton, 163 U.S. at 384.
52. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006).
53. See id. § 1302.
54. See PEVAR, supra note 36, at 278. For a discussion of ICRA's legislative history, which
emphasizes the federal government's interest in maintaining tribal integrity and self-governance, see
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66-70 (1978).
55. PEVAR, supra note 36, at 280 (explaining that full Bill of Rights protections were not
conferred because some protections, for example the Establishment Clause, would be detrimental to
ICRA's purpose of protecting individual rights while maintaining tribal integrity and identity).
56. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6).
57. See PEVAR, supra note 36, at 280, 282.
58. See CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 319-
20(2004).
59. See UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 3(l)(b), available at
http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/uteuocode/utebodytl2.htm ("The Defendant may ... be represented
by an adult enrolled Tribal member. . . .").
60. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
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C. Circuit Split on Recognizing Tribal Convictions: Ant v. Spotted Eagle
Various courts have approached the question of whether an un-
counseled tribal conviction, obtained in compliance with ICRA, may be
used as a predicate offense to prove guilt in a subsequent federal three-
strike prosecution. Two schools of thought have arisen. The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Ant,6 ' determined that prior un-
counseled convictions could not be used as predicate offenses. The
Tenth62 and Eighth63 Circuits, however, adopted the Montana Supreme
Court's reasoning in State v. Spotted Eagle," which allows courts to rec-
ognize un-counseled tribal convictions as qualifying predicate offenses. 6 5
Although not explicitly mentioned, both results, though different in out-
come, draw heavily from comity principles. In analyzing whether un-
counseled tribal convictions should be recognized, the courts determine
whether the conviction meets fundamental due process requirements
needed to justify enforcing a judgment from a jurisdiction with different
procedural protections.
1. Ant: Would the Conviction Be Valid in Federal Court?
On October 27, 1986, the body of a young woman was found on the
Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation in southeastern Montana.6 6 Over
a month later, authorities went to Francis Floyd Ant's house, interrogated
him, and obtained a confession without Ant having been advised of his
right to an attorney.67 After the confession, the police arrested Ant and
read him his Miranda rights. At his tribal arraignment on charges of
assault and battery, Ant pled guilty, again without counsel.69 Tribes can-
not sentence anyone for more than a year in jail70 and the federal gov-
ernment has concurrent jurisdiction over felonies,71 so Ant was charged
with manslaughter in federal court. At that trial, he sought to suppress his
tribal court guilty plea because that evidence was obtained in violation of
his Miranda rights.7 2 The district court denied the motion to suppress
61. 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989).
62. See Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 999.
63. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 605 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting, additionally,
that "Supreme Court authority in this area is unclear" and "reasonable decision-makers may differ"
in their conclusions and interpretations of the Sixth Amendment).
64. 71 P.3d 1239 (Mont. 2003).
65. Id. at 1245.
66. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1390.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1390-91.
70. Tribes can impose a maximum sentence of no more than one year, a $5,000 fine, or both.
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7) (2006); see also COHEN, supra note 35, at
769 (enumerating the punishments that an Indian tribe may impose).
71. The Indian Major Crimes Act of 1885 grants the federal government concurrent jurisdic-
tion over major crimes, such as rape, murder, and sexual assault. Indian Major Crimes Act of 1885,
18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2006); see also COHEN, supra note 35, at 742-45, 759 (discussing jurisdiction-
al issues under the Indian Country Crimes Act and Major Crimes Act).
72. See Ant, 882 F.2d at 1391.
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because "[c]omity and respect for legitimate tribal proceedings requires
that this Court not disparage those proceedings by suppressing them from
evidence in this case."7 3 After Ant was convicted and sentenced to three
years and a $50 fine, he appealed.74
The Ninth Circuit addressed whether an un-counseled guilty plea in
tribal court can be used in a later federal prosecution for a repeat offend-
er statute. The later efficacy of a tribal conviction is predicated on its
initial validity. 6 Review of tribal judgments uses a "clearly erroneous"
standard,77 out of respect for judgments issued by a sovereign, competent
court.78 Earlier convictions, even from "proceedings in different jurisdic-
tions," can generally be used. 79 Therefore, to disallow use of the convic-
tion, the court must determine that the conviction was constitutionally
deficient.80
To do this, the Ninth Circuit asked whether Ant's un-counseled plea
would have been accepted in federal court.8 ' Stressing that it was not
reviewing the tribal conviction, the court merely sought to ensure that
evidence on which a federal conviction was predicated comports with the
Constitution.82 For Sixth Amendment challenges, defendants must have
access to counsel during all "critical stage[s]" of trial.8 Therefore, the
court concluded, even though the conviction complied with tribal law
and ICRA, any procedure that violates the Constitution cannot be used in
84a later federal court prosecution.
2. Spotted Eagle: Respect for Tribal Sovereignty
Like Ant, Spotted Eagle addressed how courts should deal with un-
counseled tribal convictions.8 5 In September 2001, a Montana sheriff
found Eugene Spotted Eagle slumped against his pickup truck.86 After




76. See id. at 1391-92.
77. See id. at 1392 (citing Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir.
1984)).
78. See id. (citing Smith v. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Or., 783
F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1986)).
79. See id. at 1392-93.
80. See id at 1393 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960) (denying the
prosecution use of evidence obtained in an unconstitutional manner)).
81. See id.
82. Id. at 1396 ("[W]e have looked beyond the validity of the tribal conviction itself and have
reviewed the actual tribal proceedings to determine if they were in conformity with the Constitution-
al requirements for federal prosecutions in federal court.").
83. Ant did not have counsel when he entered his guilty plea. Therefore, the court determined,
at this "critical stage," Ant's lack of counsel violated the Sixth Amendment. See id at 1393-94
(citing Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961)).
84. See id. at 1396.
85. See State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1240 (Mont. 2003).
86. Id. at 1240.
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motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. However, this DUI was
Spotted Eagle's fifth conviction-he had been convicted four previous
times in Blackfeet tribal court.88 Under Montana law, the fourth or any
subsequent DUI conviction is a felony. 89 Similar to Ant, Spotted Eagle
moved to dismiss the felony charge because the four prior tribal convic-
tions were made without Spotted Eagle having counsel. 90 The Montana
district court, however, denied the motion noting that "the judicial policy
of the State of Montana is to treat Tribal Court judgments with the same
deference shown to decisions of foreign nations as a matter of comity"9 1
and that Spotted Eagle's prior convictions comported with ICRA and
tribal law.9 2
Despite the similar issue of law, the Montana Supreme Court distin-
guished Spotted Eagle from Ant.9 3 Again, the analysis started with a valid
tribal conviction under ICRA and tribal law.94 The court then analyzed
permissible uses of un-counseled conviction in state and federal court.
Reiterating the U.S. Supreme Court, the Montana Supreme Court noted
that a conviction without counsel is valid so long as the defendant is
charged with a misdemeanor and is not sentenced to imprisonment. 95
These convictions continue to be valid when used as predicate offenses
for an enhancement statute. What matters is whether the convictions
were contemporaneously valid; "there [is] no retroactive right to counsel
... simply because that conviction may ultimately contribute to impris-
onment or felony charges." 97 Noting than Spotted Eagle's conviction in
tribal court would be constitutionally invalid because he was sentenced
to jail time, the court nonetheless deferred to tribal sovereignty.98 It mat-
ters not that a conviction contravenes the Constitution; principles of com-
ity and respect for tribal self-determination drive recognition of tribal
convictions.99 Despite confirming the unconstitutionality of Spotted Ea-
gle's conviction, were it obtained in state or federal court, the Montana
Supreme Court deferred to tribal sovereignty and recognized the un-
counseled tribal conviction. 00
87. Id. at 1240-41.
88. Id. at 1241.
89. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-734(1) (2011).
90. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1241.
91. State v. Spotted Eagle, 2002 ML 831,1 13, affd, 71 P.3d 1239 (Mont. 2003).
92. See id. 115.
93. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1244 (citing "procedural irregularities" and reliance on an
overturned U.S. Supreme Court case as reasons why Ant is not persuasive).
94. See id. at 1242.
95. Id. (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-74 (1979)).
96. See id at 1242-43 (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746-47 (1994)).
97. Id. at 1243.
98. See id at 1243-44.
99. See id at 1245 (noting that respect for the "quasi-sovereignty" of tribes is consistent with
Montana's public policy).
100. See id. at 1246.
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The Ninth Circuit does not recognize un-counseled tribal convic-
tions if they would not have been valid in an American court.o' The
Eighth and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, recognize tribal convictions
so long as they comport with tribal law.102 In December 2011, Mr.
Shavanaux petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision to reverse the dismissal of his federal charge. The Court,
however, declined to review Mr. Shavanaux's petition. 0 3 Consequently,
the ambiguity in how tribal judgments should be recognized in American
courts will persist.
II. UNITED STA TES V. SHA VANA UX
A. Facts
In 2010, a Utah federal district court indicted Adam Shavanaux on
his third domestic assault charge. 104 Because this was his third time, he
was charged with a felony under the federal habitual domestic assault
offender statute.105 Ordinarily, applying an enhancement statute would be
pro forma if based on prior state court convictions obtained with the full
panoply of constitutional protections. However, Mr. Shavanaux is an
enrolled member' 0 6 of the Ute Tribe. 0 7 His first two convictions-in
2006 and 2008-were in Ute Tribal Court. 08 Those convictions were
made without an attorney advising Mr. Shavanaux,' 09 which is allowed
under Ute tribal law.o10 At the time of his hearings, Mr. Shavanaux was
indigent and could not afford an attorney. The Ute Tribe does not pro-
vide public defenders at the tribe's expense.1 12 Nor, as it turns out, do
they have to.1 13
101. See United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989).
102. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 605 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 999 (10th Cir. 2011).
103. Shavanaux v. United States, No. 11-7731, 2012 WL 896004, at *I (U.S. Mar. 19, 2012).
104. United States v. Shavanaux, No. 2:10 CR 234 TC, 2010 WL 4038839, at *1 (D. Utah Oct.
4, 2010), rev'd, 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011).
105. Domestic Assault by an Habitual Offender, 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006).
106. To be an "enrolled member" of an Indian tribe usually involves (1) being able to trace
one's ancestry to individuals living in what is now the United States before it was discovered by
Europeans and (2) recognition as an "Indian" by the tribe or community. Under federal law, tribes
are given wide latitude to determine membership. Membership, depending on the tribe, grants a
swath of protections while also bringing the individual within the tribe's jurisdiction while on tribal
land. See COHEN, supra note 35, at 171-73.
107. Shavanaux, 2010 WL 4038839, at *1.
108. Id.
109. Id
110. See UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 3(l)(b), available at
http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/uteuocode/utebodytl2.htm.
111. Shavanaux, 2010 WL 4038839, at *1.
112. UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 3(l)(b) ("[B]ut no Defendant shall have the right to have appoint-
ed professional counsel provided at the Tribe's expense.").
113. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (2006) ("No Indian tribe in
exercising powers of self-government shall . . .deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right
to ... at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense . . . .").
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Because a tribal court handed down the two prior convictions used
to enhance Mr. Shavanaux's sentence when he was unrepresented, Mr.
Shavanaux challenged his federal conviction as a violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.1 4 The district court dismissed Mr.
Shavanaux's federal indictment."' 5 The court relied primarily on a North
Dakota federal district court case, United States v. Cavanaugh,"'6 which
had remarkably similar facts-Mr. Cavanaugh was also charged under
the federal recidivist domestic violence statute using two un-counseled
convictions in Spirit Lake Tribal Court as the predicate domestic as-
saults.'17
Guided by Cavanaugh, the Utah federal district court determined
that tribal courts are not subject to limits in the Constitution, but rather
are governed by the Indian Civil Rights Act.'18 Mr. Shavanaux's tribal
court convictions did not violate ICRA because ICRA does not mandate
free counsel for indigent defendants." 9 However, problems arise when
prosecutors use un-counseled tribal convictions to enhance federal
charges. The court declared that the right to counsel is "unique" because
the fundamental right to be heard is constitutionally defective if defend-
ants cannot take advantage of that right through counsel. 20 Therefore,
the court concluded that un-counseled tribal convictions could not be
used as predicate offenses under the federal habitual domestic violence
offender statute.121
B. On Appeal
The government appealed the Utah federal district court's dismissal
of Mr. Shavanaux's indictment. 122 Mr. Shavanaux argued that the dismis-
sal should be upheld because "the Sixth Amendment and the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . forbid reliance on his un-
counseled tribal misdemeanor convictions to support a charge under 18
U.S.C. § 117(a)." 23 The court considered each constitutional argument
separately and concluded that un-counseled tribal convictions can be
used as predicate offenses for a habitual offender statute.124 In a unani-
mous three-judge opinion, the Tenth Circuit overruled the district court
and remanded Mr. Shavanaux's case.125
114. See Shavanaux, 2010 WL 4038839, at *1.
115. Id.
116. 680 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (D.N.D. 2009).
117. Id. at 1065-66.
118. Shavanaux, 2010 WL 4038839 at *1.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *2 (citing Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994)).
121. See id.
122. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 995 (10th Cir. 2011).
123. Id. at 996.
124. See id. at 1002.
125. Id.
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1. Sixth Amendment
To determine whether the Sixth Amendmentl 2 6 right to counsel 2 7
applied in this case, the Tenth Circuit first "consider[ed] the relationship
between Indian tribes and the United States."l28 The court reiterated that
neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights applies to Indian tribes.12 9
"[T]he Bill of Rights does not apply" because Mr. Shavanaux's prior
convictions were for violations of tribal law.13 0 Because the protections
of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights do not apply, the only limits on
tribal sovereignty are those few basic protections Congress imposes on
tribes.13' Where Congress has not acted, Indian tribes retain control over
aspects of their internal affairs, including enforcing and prosecuting in-
ternal criminal laws.13 2 Therefore, because his tribal convictions com-
plied with ICRA and Ute law, they "cannot violate the Sixth Amend-
ment" and can be used for prosecution under § 1 17(a).133
2. Fifth Amendment Due Process
The court then asked whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendmentl3 4 is violated when "prior convictions ... obtained through
procedures which did not comply with, but also did not violate, the Con-
stitution" are used in subsequent federal prosecutions. 1 The Tenth Cir-
cuit first analyzed the history of federal-tribal relations, concluding that
tribes share important similarities with foreign countries because the Bill
of Rights does not apply to them.' 36 Therefore, tribal judgments are en-
forced according to principles of comity, determinations of which are
guided by the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Third Re-
statement).137 According to the Third Restatement, a foreign judgment
must not be given force when (1) the foreign tribunal is not impartial or
ignores due process procedures or (2) the foreign tribunal did not have
proper jurisdiction over the defendant.138 Neither factor was met;139
therefore, the court concluded that Mr. Shavanaux's tribal court convic-
tions met fundamental due process because they complied with ICRA
126. U.S. CONST. amend. Vl.
127. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (holding that the assistance of
counsel is protected by the Constitution as a fundamental and necessary right, and that without it,
justice cannot be ensured).
128. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 996.
129. See id. at 996-98 (discussing the relationship between the Indian tribes and the United
States and explaining that neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights applies to Indian tribes).
130. Id at 998.
131. See id. at 997 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)).
132. See id. (citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326).
133. Id. at 998; 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
135. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 998 (emphasis in original).
136. See id.
137. See id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987) (listing two
mandatory and six discretionary bases for non-recognition of foreign judgments).
138. § 482(1).
139. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 999.
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and Ute tribal procedures. 4 0 Following the logic in Spotted Eagle,14 1 the
Tenth Circuit allowed Mr. Shavanaux's prior tribal convictions because
the court determined the tribal convictions did not violate the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.14 2
The Tenth Circuit then bolstered its comity analysis by describing
the extent to which federal courts have recognized foreign judgments.143
It pointed out situations in which federal appellate courts recognized
foreign convictions,'" some of which were obtained without juries. 145
Moreover, federal courts permitted the use of statements made to foreign
law enforcement that would have violated the Fourth Amendment.146
Additionally, evidence obtained abroad is not inadmissible simply be-
cause the procedures do not comply with the Constitution.147 So long as
the procedure meets fundamental principles of due process, the Tenth
Circuit and the Third Restatement encourage foreign judgments and or-
ders to be admitted under principles of comity.148
Mr. Shavanaux also argued § 117 149 violates the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause150 by singling out "Indians," on
racial lines, for prosecution.'' This claim, however, was dismissed; "In-
dian" is not used as a racial classification, but rather as a political distinc-
tion. 5 2 This distinction is a voluntary association whereby a tribal com-
munity recognizes that an individual meets the criteria for member-
ship. ' Due to the "unique status of Indians as separate people with their
own political institutions," regulation is over a "once-sovereign political
140. See id
141. State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1245-46 (Mont. 2003) (holding that ICRA treats
tribes as sovereign nations, and therefore, the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal court pro-
ceedings). See discussion supra Part 1.C.2.
142. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1000-01; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
143. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1000-01.
144. See id at 1000 (citing United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425, 428 (3d. Cir. 2003), rev'don
other grounds by Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005)).
145. See id (citing Unites States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v.
Wilson, 556 F.2d 1177, 1178 (4th Cir. 1977)).
146. See id. at 1000-01 (citing, e.g., United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d. 904, 906 (10th Cir.
1974)).
147. See, e.g., Brennan v. Univ. of Kan., 451 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (10th Cir. 1971) ("The mere
fact that the law of the foreign state differs from the law of the sate in which recognition is sought is
not enough to make the foreign law inapplicable.").
148. See Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1001; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
481 (1987).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 117 (2006) (granting jurisdiction to federal courts of domestic assaults within
"Indian country" with prior convictions in "Indian tribal court").
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 226 n.6 (1981)
("[Tihe Fifth Amendment imposes on the Federal Government the same standard required of state
legislation by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
151. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1001.
152. See id. (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 n.24 (1974)); COHEN, supra note 35,
at 171-73.
153. See WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 30.
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communit[y]," not "a racial group."' 54 The statute does not facially treat
Indians differently; therefore, because Congress's intent to target recidi-
vist domestic abusers is rationally related to the government's legitimate
interest in protecting citizens, the statute does not violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause 155
III. INTERNATIONAL COMITY OR FULL FAITH AND CREDIT?
This section looks at the two methods for dealing with tribal court
judgments: (1) the comity approach, where before a judgment is recog-
nized, courts ensure that fundamental due process rights were protected;
or (2) the full faith and credit approach, where American courts recog-
nize tribal judgments as if they were rendered in another American court.
Comity, however, is the best approach because it more accurately reflects
the nature of tribal status within the United States.'56
A. How Do Federal Courts Treat Tribal Judgments?
Because of the unique treatment of Indian tribes in American law,
difficulties arise when the two legal systems interact. Although Congress
retains ultimate legislative authority over tribes,' 57 the Supreme Court
has "repeatedly recognized the Federal Government's longstanding poli-
cy of encouraging tribal self-government."' 58 This, however, does little to
answer how tribal judgments should be analyzed. Two schools of
thought have arisen in the courts. Some courts, recognizing the unique
treatment of Indians within the federal framework, analyze judgments
using principles of comity.15 9 Other courts, when determining whether to
recognize tribal judgments, treat Indian tribes as part of the federal union
and use a full faith and credit analysis.160
1. International Comity
Despite the "unique circumstances" presented by Indian tribes,
"comity . . . affords the best general analytical framework for recogniz-
ing tribal judgments."' Comity is "the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and conven-
154. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
155. See Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1002.
156. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997); COHEN, supra note 35, at
658-59.
157. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
158. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987).
159. See Clinton, supra note 14, at 904 n.151 (citing a wide array of state and federal cases
applying principles of comity).
160. See id at 903-04, 904 n. 148 (listing Eighth Circuit case law using a "full faith and credit"
analysis).
161. Marchington, 127 F.3d at 810.
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ience, and to the rights of its own citizens."l62 The effect of a comity
analysis is to give foreign judgments force "beyond their proper
sphere." 6 3 It is a discretionary decision that turns on the public policy
interests of the court seeking to enforce the judgment.'" The Tenth Cir-
cuit implicitly rejected the full faith and credit approach to tribal judg-
ments' and adopted a comity approach.16 6
Comity generally favors recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.'6 ' There are limited circumstances when the "balancing of
interests" counsel against recognizing foreign judgments.168 The Third
Restatement spells out a framework for deciding when foreign judgments
do not merit recognition.169 The Ninth Circuit articulated a federal court
comity analysis 7 0 by modifying the Third Restatement's test for use
when analyzing tribal judgments.' 7' Federal courts must not recognize
judgments if "(1) the tribal court did not have both personal and subject
matter jurisdiction; or (2) the defendant was not afforded due process of
law." 72 Discretionary factors for non-recognition include the following
circumstances: when the judgment (1) was obtained by fraud, (2) con-
flicts with another enforceable final judgment, (3) conflicts with "the
parties' contractual choice of forum," or (4) when recognizing the judg-
ment is inconsistent with the public policy of the jurisdiction where en-
forcement is sought.17 3
The Ninth Circuit held that "federal courts must neither recognize
nor enforce tribal judgments if . . . the defendant was not afforded due
process of law." 7 4 The due process requirements for comity do not re-
quire a tribe's "judicial procedures [be] identical to those used in the
United States Courts"'75 because comity, ultimately, is a political deci-
162. Id. (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
163. ROBERT PHILLIMORE, 4 COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (T. & J.W. John-
son eds. 1854-61).
164. See COHEN, supra note 35, at 658-59; PHILLIMORE, supra note 163, at 17-18.
165. Cf MacArthur v. San Juan Cnty., 309 F.3d 1216, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002) (refusing to
address full faith and credit because the issue was not raised at trial); NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan,
276 F.3d 1186, 1192 (10th Cir. 2002) (affirming the separation between Indian tribes and the federal
government).
166. See United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Courts analyze the
recognition of tribal judgments under principles of comity derived from foreign relations law."); see
also Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir. 2006) (recognizing federal court deference to
tribal courts' judgments made within their authority).
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 (1987) ("[A] final judgment
of a court of a foreign state . .. is entitled to recognition in courts in the United States.").
168. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997).
169. § 482 (listing two mandatory and six discretionary bases for non-recognition of foreign
judgments).
170. Wilson, 127 F.3d 805, 809-11 (9th Cir. 1997).




175. Id. at 811.
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sion to give effect to a completely issued judgment.17 6 In Wilson, the
Ninth Circuit adoptedl7 7 the comity factors from an earlier Supreme
Court case laying out how foreign judgments should be treated."' Under
this analysis, due process requires:
that there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial before an im-
partial tribunal that conducts the trial upon regular proceedings after
proper service or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and that
there is no showing of prejudice in the tribal court or in the system of
governing laws. Further, as the Restatement (Third) noted, evidence
"that the judiciary was dominated by the political branches of gov-
ernment or by an opposing litigant, or that a party was unable to ob-
tain counsel, to secure documents or attendance of witnesses, or to
have access to appeal or review, would support a conclusion that the
legal system was one whose judgments are not entitled to recogni-
tion."1
79
When a comity analysis arises, federal courts weigh these factors to de-
termine whether foreign or tribal judgments should be recognized. 80 In
the end, this turns on the due process policy interests most valued by the
court.'8 '
2. Full Faith and Credit
Alternately, some scholars' 82 argue that judgments from Indian
tribes should be afforded "full faith and credit" under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.'83 This argument only stands if one accepts that Indian
tribes have been brought into the "federal union" because the Full Faith
and Credit Clause applies only to states.18 4 However, Congress extended
full faith and credit to judgments of "any State, Territory, or Possession"
of the United States.'85 The question, then, is whether Indian tribes are
included in this extension. Two arguments are advanced to support tribal
inclusion in the federal union: (1) because Federal Courts have never
recognized Indian tribes as fully independent under American law, tribes
are within the federal union; or (2) congressional acts granting "full faith
and credit" to certain aspects of intergovernmental relations are evidence
of Congress's universal intent to bring tribes within the federal union.
176. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1895); COHEN, supra note 35, at 658-59;
PHILLIMORE, supra note 163, at 8.
177. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811.
178. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03.
179. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
482 cmt. b (1987)).
180. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164; Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810.
181. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 35, at 658-59; PHILLIMORE, supra note 163, at 12.
182. See Clinton, supra note 14 at 936 ("[Tihe Article argues that tribal laws and judgments are
entitled to full faith and credit under the Full Faith and Credit Act. . .
183. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
184. See Clinton, supra note 14 at 900.
185. Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
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The first argument turns on a narrow reading of early Supreme
Court cases. Because cases addressing tribal sovereignty, including the
Marshall Trilogy, never held that tribes are fully independent coun-
tries,186 Comity should not apply to tribal decisions.187 In short, because
Indian tribes are not foreign countries, they must fall within the federal
scheme.' However, this line of reasoning ignores the relationship Indi-
an tribes have with the United States and tries to force an independent
system into the federal structure. Although the Supreme Court has never
treated tribes as completely independent countries, neither the Court nor
the Constitution has equated tribes to states.189 The same cases holding
that Indian tribes are not foreign countries also affirm that tribes are not
states and retain independence over internal affairs.190 Courts continue to
chip away at this independence by allowing some state regulation on
reservations; however, tribes continue to make and enforce their own
laws.19' Even though exactly equating Indian tribes to foreign countries
would be inappropriate due to their differences,1 9 2 it is more important
that tribes have never been pulled completely into the federal structure
and thus retain a measure of independence under the Constitution.
The second argument is that Congress intended to extend full faith
and credit to all tribal judgments because Congress passed laws granting
full faith and credit to tribal judgments in certain situations. 19 Public
Law 280,194 the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,'95 the Maine Indian
Claims Settlement Act,196 and the Indian Land Consolidation Act' 9 7 all
provide for full faith and credit for judgments governed by each act.
Therefore, proponents argue that a similar "full faith and credit" analogy
should be applied to tribes through the Full Faith and Credit Act.198 The-
186. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (finding that tribes are "do-
mestic dependent nations" whose "relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian").
187. See Clinton, supra note 14, at 905 ("Thus, courts enforcing tribal judgments based on
notions of comity analogize tribal courts to foreign governments, precisely the analogy the Supreme
Court rejected . . .
188. See id.
189. See discussion supra Part L.A.
190. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559, 561 (1832).
191. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361-62 (2001).
192. See Lindsay Loudon Vest, Comment, Cross-Border Judgments and the Public Policy
Exception: Solving the Foreign Judgment Quandary by Way of Tribal Courts, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
797, 809-10 (2004).
193. See Clinton, supra note 14, at 907-08.
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (2006) (requiring tribal customs and laws be given "full force and
effect" when not inconsistent with state law).
195. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2006) (requiring that federal, state, and tribal court give "full faith
and credit" to tribal judgments regarding child custody proceedings).
196. 25 U.S.C. § 1725(g) (2006) (requiring that "[t]he Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot
Nation, and the State of Maine ... give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of each oth-
er").
197. 25 U.S.C. § 2207 (2006) (requiring an administrative agency to give "full faith and credit"
to tribal proceedings, pursuant to the statute, regarding land distribution).
198. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 14, at 908.
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se statutes, however, reinforce the idea that full faith and credit should be
used sparingly. If Congress intended to extend this principle to tribes
generally, it would have used its plenary powers to pass a statute compel-
ling all tribal judgments be afforded full faith and credit in federal
courts.1 99 Since Congress did not, the inference is that Congress did not
intend the full faith and credit principle to apply universally to Indian
tribes.
B. Best Practice: International Comity
Tribal judgments should be analyzed using the principle of comity.
Federal courts have afforded tribal judgments full faith and credit since
the mid-1800s. 200 However, in 1997 the Ninth Circuit decided Wilson v.
Marchington and reversed the trend201 by using a comity analysis.202 This
federal course change, however, did not create a uniform practice among
203state courts or in subject areas. Every state except New Mexico and
Idaho204 analyze tribal judgments using comity principles. 205 Comity has
developed through the common law in some stateS206 and has been statu-
torily mandated in others. 207 Despite the prevalence of analyzing tribal
judgments using comity principles, 208 several statutes apply full faith and
credit to child custody proceedings, 209 domestic violence protection or-
ders, 210 and child support awards.21 Regardless of the absence of uni-
formity, comity is the best approach considering (1) ambiguities in the
199. See discussion supra Part L.A.
200. See Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A
Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311, 318-22 (2000).
201. See Clinton, supra note 40, at 40-44 (discussing the specious grounds on which the Ninth
Circuit based its decision to use comity, noting the court's cursory distinctions made between Su-
preme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent and weak historical and statutory support).
202. See Leeds, supra note 200, at 325-27.
203. See id. at 335-36.
204. "Only Idaho and New Mexico afford full faith and credit to tribal courts." Id. at 345. See
Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 (Idaho 1982); Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751,
752 (N.M. 1975).
205. See Kelly Stoner & Richard A. Orona, Full Faith and Credit, Comity, or Federal Man-
date? A Path that Leads to Recognition and Enforcement of Tribal Court Orders, Tribal Protective
Orders, and Tribal Child Custody Orders, 34 N.M. L. REV. 381, 387-88 (2004); see also Leeds,
supra note 200, at 339-45 (stating that Montana, Oregon, Minnesota, Arizona, Connecticut, New
Jersey, South Dakota, North Dakota, Michigan, Wyoming, Wisconsin, and Oklahoma use, to vary-
ing degrees, a comity analysis).
206. See Leeds, supra note 200, at 338-39; see also, e.g., Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 654 P.2d
512, 514 (Mont. 1982); Red Fox v. Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918, 920 (Or. Ct. App. 1975).
207. Comity has been mandated either by the state legislature or a judicial rule-making com-
mittee. Some states, e.g., Wyoming and Wisconsin, titled their statutes "full faith and credit" alt-
hough the statutes are more analogous to a comity analysis. See Leeds, supra note 200, at 341-44;
see also, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25 (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 806.245 (2011); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 5-1-111 (2011); N.D. R. CT. 7.2.
208. Federal statutes mandating full faith and credit for certain tribal judgments are mirrored
by the states. See Leeds, supra note 200, at 336-37.
209. See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2006); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 62D.200 (2010).
210. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §
33.090 (2010).
211. See, e.g., Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2006).
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Full Faith and Credit Act,2 12 (2) the framework of federal-tribal relations,
and (3) international law.
1. Ambiguities in the Full Faith and Credit Act
The Full Faith and Credit Act facilitates cooperation between courts
within the United States by mandating recognition of "records and judi-
cial proceedings."2 13 In rejecting the full faith and credit approach, the
Ninth Circuit properly focused on the interpretation of the statute's ap-
plicability. 2 14 It concluded that the Act applied only to states; tribes were
not intended to fall within the scope of the Full Faith and Credit Act.2 15
Much of the scholarly debate has focused around asymmetrical language
in the statute:216 "any court of any such State, Territory, or Possession"
versus "every court within the United States."2 17 The former suggests a
political delineation, while the latter invokes geography.
Arguments favoring the geographic interpretation, which would in-
clude tribes, say it is the "most obvious interpretation . . . [because] this
meaning renders co-extensive the phrase used to describe enforcing
courts . . . and the phrase employed to describe issuing courts."218 How-
ever, this argument is concerned with reciprocity. It is concerned that the
political interpretation would mandate that a court enforce a judgment
from a foreign court that would not be required to enforce a judgment
were their positions reversed.2 1 9 However, this argument ignores the in-
dependence tribal courts enjoy by focusing on reciprocity, which is no
longer a comity requirement. 2 2 0 The Ninth Circuit, not without contro-
versy, adopted the political interpretation.22 1 Under this framework,
tribes are not within the scope of the Act, and therefore, tribal judgments
are not afforded full faith and credit.
212. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (referring to any "State, Territory, or Possession" in applying
full faith and credit).
213. Id.
214. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997); Clinton, supra note 40, at
40 ("[T]he Ninth Circuit recognized that the real issue turned not on the constitutional language but
the interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Act.").
215. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 808 ("By its terms, the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies only to
the states. Nothing in debates of the Constitutional Convention concerning the clause indicates the
framers thought the clause would apply to Indian tribes.").
216. See Clinton, supra note 40, at 26-29.
217. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (emphasis added).
218. Clinton, supra note 40, at 28.
219. See id.
220. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811 (noting the reciprocity for comity has "fallen into disfavor");
Leeds, supra note 200, at 326 n.74, 335 (explaining that reciprocity is no longer considered in a
comity analysis, although it may be considered for the '"public policy' discretionary exemption").
221. Clinton, supra note 40, at 43.
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2. Are Tribes Within the Federal Framework?
Recognizing tribal judgments using full faith and credit necessarily
requires that tribes be fully within the federal framework.222 The history
of tribal relations and the autonomy tribes continue to enjoy, however,
counsel against including them fully within the federal framework.223
First, the fundamental rules governing the relationship between tribes
and the federal government were based on principles of international
law, adapted to the needs of the United States.224 Early interactions with
tribes were made through treaties,225 even though tribes were declared
"domestic dependent nations." 22 6 That "phrase placed tribes outside the
scope of Article III" while declaring that tribes are still subject to federal
authority.227 The Commerce Clause also demonstrates this separation by
treating "Indian Tribes" as distinct entities from states and foreign coun-
tries.2 2 8 Tribes also never consented to federal supremacy. 229 Despite
Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs, tribes retain a high level of
autonomy, especially in internal affairs such as administering justice.2 30
When the Supreme Court articulated the international comity analy-
sis, it defined a foreign nation for that analysis.2 3 1 Justice Gray deter-
mined that "[n]o sovereign is bound, unless by special compact, to exe-
cute within his dominions a judgment rendered by the tribunals of anoth-
er state."232 Tribes are not bound by a "special compact" that compels
recognition of other jurisdiction's judgments; rather, they have the "au-
thority to execute, within their dominions, judgments rendered by tribu-
nals of other jurisdictions."2 33 The Constitution does not apply to Indian
tribes 234 because tribal governments are allowed to exercise their auton-
omy to form whatever kind of government they choose.235 Additionally,
tribes retain jurisdiction over many criminal offenses,2 36 have police
222. See Leeds, supra note 200, at 334-35.
223. See HOWARD MEREDITH, MODERN AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICS 140 (1993).
224. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1902); Stephens v. Cher-
okee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 486-88 (1899); see also COHEN, supra note 35, at 156.
225. See WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 15, at 6-8.
226. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (emphasis added). This recognizes that
although tribes are within the geographic territory of the United States they retain a level of autono-
my. See id.
227. Leeds, supra note 200, at 319.
228. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 ("[The Congress shall have power] [t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."); WILKINS &
LOMAWAIMA, supra note 15, at 5.
229. See Clinton, supra note 14, at 873 (noting that tribes were defacto incorporated into the
federal union and exist as "distinct peoples and sovereigns within the federal union").
230. See MEREDITH, supra note 223, at 86; see also discussion supra Part 1.B.
231. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166 (1895).
232. Id. (quoting HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 147 (8th ed.
1866)).
233. Stoner & Orona, supra note 205, at 388.
234. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 385 (1896).
235. See PEVAR, supra note 36, at 88.
236. See GARROW & DEER, supra note 58, at 79.
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powers, administer justice within their jurisdiction, determine tribal
membership and exclusion, can charter business organizations, and have
sovereign immunity. 237 Therefore, tribes are best considered "foreign
nations," which then requires an international comity analysis when de-
termining whether to give force to a tribal judgment in American
court.238
3. International Law and Tribal Self-Governance
Principles of international law also support treating Indian tribes as
independent, sovereign entities. In 1992, the United States signed239 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),240 which
guarantees that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination ... [to]
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development." 24 1 Countries that are party to the
ICCPR are obligated to give this guarantee effect,2 42 which would require
the United States to provide some level of autonomy to tribes.243 Addi-
tionally, in his definitive text on American Indian law, Felix Cohen ar-
gued that an emerging custom of international law commands countries
to recognize an internal peoples' right to self-determination.244 Similar to
ICCPR's mandate, 24 5 this custom requires that countries with non-self
governing internal populations foster autonomous self-governance. 246
Antonio Cassese, a prominent international legal scholar, tempered the
breadth of self-determination by noting that international law does not
require governments to do anything other than "not decide the life and
future of peoples at their discretion." 247 This mandate is a loose standard,
but internal populations must at least be allowed "to express their wishes
in matters concerning their condition." 24 8
237. See WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 33-36; see also PEVAR, supra note 36, at 143-45.
238. See Montr6 D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1228 (2007); Stoner & Orona, supra note 205, at 388. But see Kevin K.
Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403, 420 (2004) (arguing that
the ease of travel between reservations and the U.S., the level of cooperation between tribal and state
and federal officials, and the reservations' location within contiguous U.S. territory, counsel in favor
of treating tribes as within the federal framework).
239. 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (1992).
240. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
241. Id. art. 1, para. 1; see also ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 101
(1995).
242. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 240, art.2.
243. See COHEN, supra note 35, at 461-65.
244. See id. at 473-78. What constitutes a "people" is not agreed upon. However, a workable
definition, which Indian tribes would meet, is in the ICCPR's protection of "ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 240, art. 27.
245. Id. art. 2.
246. See COHEN, supra note 35, at 475.
247. See CASSESE, supra note 241, at 128.
248. Id
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Although there is no clear framework for how the United States
must treat Indian tribes, international law sets basic principles for how
countries should act.2 4 9 "Self-determination" does not have specific re-
quirements, 25 0 but does seem to require that internal peoples have control
over their governance. 251' This implies a basic level of autonomy and self-
25governance.252 Because of these basic protections in international law,
tribes should not be considered an entity of the United State that, absent a
statutory command, merit a full faith and credit analysis.
IV. INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR COMITY
The Tenth Circuit made a cursory international comity analysis of
Ute tribal court procedures using the Third Restatement's mandatory
factors. 253 The court concluded that complying with ICRA protects fun-
damental due process rights.254 This section does a more thorough comity
analysis, taking statutory protections and tribal practices into account.
The analysis reveals that Ute tribal practices protected Mr. Shavanaux's
fundamental due process rights. Therefore, Mr. Shavanaux's prior tribal
convictions were properly used in federal court.
Comity is a balance between "preserv[ing] and respect[ing] foreign
nations' sovereignty"255 and ensuring that American courts only enforce
256judgments that comport with fundamental due process. American
courts must understand this balancing test when deciding whether to rec-
ognize a foreign judgment.2 57 Because "foreign" tribunals issue judg
ments, the decision to recognize them has political ramifications.2 58 Ef-
fectively, by refusing to recognize a judgment, the domestic court says
"that a foreign country's judicial and political systems are so fundamen-
tally flawed that they do not provide for impartial tribunals or fair proce-
dures"-an "inherently political" determination.2 59 Courts need to be
mindful of the external effects and political ramifications a decision may
carry, yet their main focus should be on ensuring that the judgment meets
standards of due process.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 132.
252. See id at 143-44.
253. See United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998-1000 (10th Cir. 2011).
254. See id at 998.
255. Stoner & Orona, supra note 205, at 388.
256. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th CiT. 1997).
257. This Comment focuses on court-to-court recognition of judgments; however, "recogni-
tion" encompasses many more scenarios. Although outside the scope of the Comment, "recognition"
of foreign decrees can include, for example, protection orders, vital statistics and health department
records, and judicial orders such as warrants and commitment orders. See Leeds, supra note 200, at
315-16.
258. See Carodine, supra note 238, at 1223.
259. Id.
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A. What Process is Due?
A judgment rendered in a foreign court will not necessarily follow
the same procedure as a domestic court-enforcing courts cannot expect
an American style of due process.260 Because enforcing courts must en-
sure that the initial judgment met basic standards of due process, 261 the
analysis requires a fact-intensive case-by-case analysis.262 The Supreme
Court's call for a "fair and impartial" process lays the groundwork for
international due process.2 63 However, more clarity is needed to deter-
mine what process is required.
The fundamental requirements of due process, emphasized by
scholarS264 and echoed by the Third Restatement, 26 5 are (1) adequate no-
tice and (2) fair process. Adequate notice will be satisfied when the for-
eign tribunal meets even basic standards.266 This would encompass actual
or constructive notice, regardless of how that notice was made.267 Fair
process includes "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner." 26 8 Recognizing that foreign jurisdictions are un-
likely to have adopted as complex a due process structure as the United
States, Judge Richard Posner wrote "that the foreign procedure [needs to]
be 'compatible with the requirements of due process of law,"' meaning
"that the foreign procedures are 'fundamentally fair' and do not offend
against 'basic fairness."' 26 9 Although there is no exhaustive list of fun-
damental due process protections, the standard is much less rigorous than
the due process generally applied in American courts. 27 0
B. An International Comity Analysis for Mr. Shavanaux
Applying the international notion of due process to Shavanaux re-
quires an examination of the proceedings in Ute tribal court. The record
260. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811; Carodine, supra note 238, at 1230 31.
261. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205 (1895) ("It must, however, always be kept in mind
that it is the paramount duty of the court before which any suit is brought to see to it that the parties
have had a fair and impartial trial, before a final decision is rendered against either party."); Wilson,
127 F.3d at 811 ("A federal court must also reject a tribal judgment if the defendant was not afforded
due process of law.").
262. See Carodine, supra note 238, at 1231.
263. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03.
264. See Carodine, supra note 238, at 1225-26.
265. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987) (clarifying due process
requirements in the discretionary categories).
266. See, e.g., Int'l Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana, SA de CV, 347
F.3d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Notice is an element of our notion of due process and the United
States will not enforce a judgment obtained without the bare minimum requirements of notice.").
267. Id. at 594-95.
268. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
269. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.) (quoting
Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 687-88 (7th Cir. 1987)).
270. See Carodine, supra note 238, at 1227.
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is sparse on what rights Mr. Shavanaux was afforded.2 7 1 However, study-
ing the Ute Tribe's criminal procedure rules, 2 72 the Indian Civil Rights
Act,27 3 and general tribal practices should be adequate to get an idea of
the process Mr. Shavanaux had. From that, we can glean (1) what sort of
notice Mr. Shavanaux was afforded and (2) the due process protections
he had.
The notice analysis is rather quick. Mr. Shavanaux neither chal-
lenged adequate notice nor is there evidence that his notice was defec-
tive.274 Additionally, the Ute Tribe's criminal procedure rules guarantee
adequate notice.275 With no indication of irregularity, this certainly meets
the "bare minimum" standard for notice.
Fairness of process, however, is more challenging because the term
is not well defimed.276 There are many basic protections granted to de-
fendants in tribal court.2 77 Defendants are given the opportunity to know
the charges against them and the basis on which those charges are
made. 2 78 At trial, defendants can use their own testimony or that of wit-
nesses to present their cases. 27 9 Defendants have the right to cross-
examine adverse witnesses.28 0 Additionally, defendants are protected
from self-incrimination,28 1 have the right to a jury trial,282 and can com-
pel witnesses to appear on their behalf.2 83 Tribal courts must afford de-
fendants equal protection of the law and cannot deprive them of liberty
21without due process.284 Therefore, absent supervening events, Mr.
Shavanaux's tribal convictions should meet the international standards of
due process.
271. See United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 995-96 (10th Cir. 2011) (failing to high-
light any procedural detail concerning process afforded to Mr. Shavanaux during Mr. Shavanaux's
tribal court hearings).
272. See generally UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P., available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/
uteuocode/utebodytl2.htm (establishing, for example, that the required notice a criminal defendant
must receive before a prosecution of his rights can begin without his presence).
273. See generally Indian Civil Rights Act 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006) (extending, among
other rights, the writ of habeas corpus).
274. See United States v. Shavanaux, No. 2:10 CR 234 TC, 2010 WL 4038839, at *1 (D. Utah
Oct. 4, 2010) (stating Mr. Shavanaux challenged only the use of his un-counseled prior convictions),
rev'd, 647 F.3d 933 (10th Cir. 2011).
275. See UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 3(2), 6, 7 (guaranteeing notice of charges and an arraignment
to inform defendant of the nature of the charges).
276. See discussion supra Part IlICI.
277. See GARROW & DEER, supra note 58, at 329-41 (indicating that such basic protections
include the right against double jeopardy, the right to a speedy trial, the right to compulsory process,
and the right not to testify).
278. See UTE INDIAN R. CRIM, P. 5 (requiring that the complaint support the charge with a
statement of facts and other specifics).
279. Id. 3(3), (5) (allowing defendants to testify on their own behalf and subpoena favorable
witnesses).
280. Id 3(4).
281. Indian Civil Rights Act 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) (2006); UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 3(3);
GARROW & DEER, supra note 58, at 340.
282. § 1302(a)(10); UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 15.
283. UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 3(5); GARROW & DEER, supra note 58, at 337-38.
284. § 1302(a)(8).
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Mr. Shavanaux contends, however, that the right to counsel is a
fundamental component of due process.285 Therefore, according to Mr.
Shavanaux, his tribal court conviction lacked fundamental due process
because he was unable to afford counsel and the Ute tribe does not pro-
vide counsel for indigent tribal defendants; therefore, his tribal court
judgment should not be recognized in federal courts based on a comity
analysis.28 6
At first blush, the right to counsel does not fit within the aforemen-
tioned framework of "international due process." The Third Restatement
tries to clarify "fair process" by stating that being "unable to obtain
counsel . . . would support a conclusion that the legal system was one
whose judgments are not entitled to recognition." 2 87 However, only when
lack of counsel is "so incompatible with . . . fundamental principles of
fairness" should a judgment not be recognized.288 The Sixth Amend-
ment's right to counsel initially guaranteed the accused merely the right
to hire counsel.2 89 The right, however, slowly expanded to recognize that
290counsel is an important protection throughout the criminal process.
The Supreme Court, in 1963, determined the right to counsel was so fun-
damental that states must provide indigent defendants with a lawyer be-
cause "[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."29 1 Outside federal
and state courts, however, the right to counsel is not absolute. For exam-
ple, there is no right to counsel for indigent individuals in immigration
proceedings.2 92 In those cases, individuals are afforded more due process
protections only if they can demonstrate the proceedings were fundamen-
tally unfair and there was prejudice.2 93 Prejudice is the difficult element
to meet; Mr. Shavanaux must show "that there is a reasonable probability
285. See United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 996 (10th Cir. 2011) (discussing
Shavanaux's contention that Due Process forbids reliance on his uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tions to support a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1 17(a)).
286. See id.
287. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. b (1987).
288. See id. (citing United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1988)). Salim allowed a
French deposition to be used as evidence when it was taken without counsel. This was a violation of
U.S. rules but compliant with French procedure, because French procedure was not incompatible
with American principles.
289. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979); JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 55 (2002).
290. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (holding that federal criminal
defendants must either have counsel or have waived their right to counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (giving defendants "reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel");
TOMKOVICZ, supra note 289, at 55-56.
291. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
292. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 239(a)(1)(E), 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1229(a)(1)(E), 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2005).
293. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482-84 (2009) (evaluating the claim under the
two prongs of the Strickland test). Under the facts of Shavanaux, the first Strickland prong is best
seen as a breach of fundamental fairness.
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that, but for [the fundamental error], the result of the proceeding would
have been different." 294
Ultimately, however, this comity analysis turns on the public policy
interests of the Tenth Circuit.295 No court is required to enforce a foreign
judgment if the result would offend the court's notions of fairness or
policy. 29 6 Even though Mr. Shavanaux was not represented, his funda-
mental rights were not impinged because he was not prevented from ef-
fectively presenting his case. 2 97 Given that his predicate convictions were
not made in an American court and he must demonstrate prejudice in
order to have an opportunity to secure counsel, the Tenth Circuit did not
exercise its discretion to refuse to recognize Mr. Shavanaux's tribal court
convictions. Therefore, according to the Tenth Circuit, the Ute tribal
court judgments were not in conflict with the standards of international
due process or the court's policy.
CONCLUSION
Despite the academic justification for the decision, Mr. Shavanaux
is likely to be sentenced to several years in federal prison. His federal
public defenders made a spirited appeal that the right to counsel is so
fundamental that due process is violated when convictions are made
without counsel.29 8 However, the Tenth Circuit disagreed. The Supreme
Court, additionally, refused to review the Tenth Circuit's ruling.29 9 Were
Mr. Shavanaux's first two convictions made in an American court, they
clearly would have been unconstitutional. But in tribal court, tribal law
and ICRA sufficiently protect fundamental rights. Because Mr.
Shavanaux was convicted on a reservation and not a few miles away in a
Utah state court, he had vastly different procedural protections; to those
unaccustomed to Indian law, this is a baffling result. However, it is the
correct outcome given tribal sovereignty within the federal structure.
United States v. Shavanaux demonstrates that even a routine convic-
tion can raise constitutional questions and invoke international law. A
misdemeanor domestic assault conviction from a tiny corner of north-
eastern Utah forced the Tenth Circuit to analyze how Indian tribes fit
within the federal framework laid out in the Constitution and how to rec-
ognize their judgments. This unique relationship has never truly been
294. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (emphasis added).
295. See PHILLIMORE, supra note 163, at 12.
296. See id. at 14-16 (providing situations when a British court would not enforce valid foreign
judgments because the result offends traditional British values, for example, judgments upholding
polygamy and slavery).
297. See United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011) (stating that Mr.
Shavanaux's tribal court convictions complied with ICRA and were therefore constitutionally
sound).
298. See id.
299. Shavanaux v. United States, No. I1-7731, 2012 WL 896004, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2012).
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settled-congressional supremacy rules the day, 300 but tribal sovereignty
is not a paper tiger guarantee because tribes retain control over much of
their internal administration.301 Shavanaux reaffirms this concept. The
Tenth Circuit correctly recognized that Indian tribes are not fully within
the federal framework.3 02 Tribes, consequently, can still protect funda-
mental due process rights without following the rigorous procedural pro-
tections American courts apply. This fits perfectly with the principles of
comity-the Tenth Circuit respected tribal sovereignty by recognizing
judgments made within the tribe's competent jurisdiction.
Dan St. John*
300. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998); PEVAR, supra
note 36, at 59.
301. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. 515, 559 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831); MEREDITH, supra note
223, at 140.
302. See Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 998 ("Although Indian tribes are not foreign states, for the
purposes of our analysis they share some important characteristics with foreign states insofar as
tribes are sovereigns to whom the Bill of Rights does not apply.").
* ).D. Candidate 2012. 1 would like to thank Professor Scott Johns for his valuable sugges-
tions and insights. Jesse McLain and Drew Brooks also provided helpful suggestions and edits. My
supportive friends and family were a great inspiration and source of encouragement through the
writing process. Finally, Shavanaux reminds me that even a routine matter can raise interesting,
important questions. It teaches me to persist through stumbling blocks-chances are there is a novel
solution lurking around the comer.
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TAKING IT ALL OFF: SALAZAR V. BUTTERBALL AND THE
BATTLE OVER FAIR COMPENSATION UNDER THE FLSA's
"CHANGING CLOTHES" PROVISION
INTRODUCTION
Immigrant workers are a mainstay in American industries that rely
on minimum-wage, low-skill labor as a key component to their economic
viability.' Immigrants are often more willing to take menial jobs than
low-skilled workers bom in the United States, and they are also more
likely to take jobs in sectors of the economy that U.S.-born workers have
largely vacated over the last few decades.2 These low-wage jobs are
abundant in sectors such as construction, manufacturing, and the hospi-
tality industry, and they often involve strenuous and repetitive labor.3
One of the industries that depends most on the presence of an inexpen-
sive immigrant workforce is the meat-packing industry, especially poul-
try processing.4 The work at meatpacking plants adds another dimension
to the everyday challenges faced by other low-wage workers-not only
is meatpacking inherently messy and unpleasant, but it poses many seri-
ous risks to the health and safety of employees.'
Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C.,6 is a case about a group of these low-
wage meatpacking employees demanding payment for the time they
spend each day putting on and taking off (donning and doffing) required
safety equipment. While the meatpacking industry has come a long way
from the unsettling practices depicted in Upton Sinclair's The Jungle,
abuses of power continue to take place in this industry that illuminate
how far employers and courts still need to go in order to ensure that all
employees receive fair pay and adequate safety precautions.
This Comment explores the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Salazar, in
which the Tenth Circuit rejects the idea that workers should be paid for
time spent donning and doffing personal protective equipment (PPE)
because it falls under the "changing clothes" exclusion of section
§ 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Part I describes the
I. Gordon Hanson, Two Very Different Groups Seeking Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009,
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/the-competition-for-low-wage-jobs/.
2. Id.; Michael Fix, Moving to Where the Jobs Are, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009,
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/the-competition-for-low-wage-jobs/.
3. Fix, supra note 2.
4. Pamela Constable, Immigrant Workers Vital, Va. Firms Say Poultry Industry Seeks Better
U.S. Screening to Cull Illegal Applicants, Avert Fines, WASH. POST, July 13, 2008, at C01.
5. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR: WORKERS' RIGHTS IN U.S. MEAT
AND POULTRY PLANTS 24 (2004) (noting that nearly every worker interviewed for the report had
suffered some kind of serious injury while working at a meat or poultry plant).
6. 644 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2011).
7. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
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landscape of the modem meatpacking industry, explains the employee
protections of the FLSA and the confusion courts have created in their
attempts to define "work" and "changing clothes" under the FLSA and
the Portal-to-Portal Act, and examines the challenges faced by the De-
partment of Labor (DOL) in enforcing the FLSA under this chaotic judi-
cial framework. Part II outlines the facts, procedural history, opinion, and
amicus curiae briefs of Salazar. Part III offers a critique of the opinion
and its approach to the issues, and it concludes that Congress should re-
vise the FLSA in light of the recent circuit split over how to correctly
interpret the Portal-to-Portal Act and that the DOL should use notice and
comment procedures to secure Chevron deference for its interpretation of
"changing clothes." Congress and the DOL must take legally binding
action to ensure the protection employee rights under the FLSA in the
modem workplace.
I. BACKGROUND
The main issue in Salazar is whether or not PPE should be defined
as "clothing" for purposes of excluding the donning and doffing of PPE
from compensable work under the FLSA, also known as the federal min-
imum wage statute. The FLSA does not require an employer to pay its
employees for time spent "changing clothes or washing at the beginning
or end of each workday" if noncompensation for these activities is an
express or implied term of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). 9
The other issue in the case is whether donning and doffing can be con-
sidered "work" under the FLSA, although the court chooses not to ad-
dress this issue.' 0 While payment for donning and doffing PPE may seem
like a straightforward issue of statutory interpretation for the courts, the
legal standards for analyzing this issue are actually incredibly confusing
and not well defined.
A. PPE and the Modern Meat-Packing Industry
The technological advances in mechanized manufacturing at the
turn of the twentieth century turned meatpacking into one of the most
dangerous industries in the United States." According to the United
States Department of Labor (DOL), thousands of employees are injured
while on the job at animal slaughtering and meatpacking plants every
year, making these jobs among the most hazardous in America today.12
As a result, the safety standards for this industry require employers to
8. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1133.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006).
10. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1136 & n.3.
I1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 11.
12. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INDUSTRY INJURY AND
ILLNESS DATA (2009), http://www.bls.gov/iifloshwc/osh/os/ostb2423.pdf.
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provide their workers with PPE to reduce the incidence of on-the-job
illness and injury.13
The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), an
arm of the DOL, is charged with enforcing the right of all employees to a
safe workplace. "OSHA requires the use of personal protective equip-
ment (PPE) to reduce employee exposure to hazards when engineering
and administrative controls are not feasible or effective in reducing these
exposures to acceptable levels."l 4 Employers are required to evaluate
their workplace to determine whether PPE will reduce the risk of injury
to their employees."
OSHA has identified multiple hazards that may require PPE at the
two main stages of poultry processing.16 The first stage of processing is
when the birds are grown and prepared for slaughter, and the second
stage is the actual slaughter, butchering, and packaging of the birds.' 7
The major hazards of the first stage are related to airborne toxins and
particulates, many of which stem from bird feces.' 8 The hazards at the
second stage include those associated with large machinery, knives, and
slippery working areas.' 9 Many of these hazards are unavoidable, espe-
cially because most PPE cannot completely protect workers from all of
the "blood, grease, animal feces, ingesta (food from the animal's diges-
tive system), and other detrius from the animals they slaughter." 20 There
are no specific OSHA standards for poultry processing, but all plants
must meet the minimum standards for general safety areas such as sanita-
tion, machine guarding, and knife safety.2 1
While these standards are extremely important to protecting the
health and safety of poultry workers, many of these workers still suffer
from hand and wrist injuries and repetitive task-related pain conditions,
such as carpal tunnel.22 One journalist summarized these more subtle
dangers in a 2002 article:
Tasks involve repetitive movements (workers sometimes perform the
same motion 30,000 times a shift), and knife-wielding employees
work perilously close together as they struggle to keep up with the
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132 (2011).
14. OSHA Safety and Health Topics: Personal and Protective Equipment (PPE),
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/
personalprotectiveequipment/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
15. Id.
16. OSHA Safety and Health Topics: Poultry Processing, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH




20. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 40.
21. OSHA Safety and Health Topics: Poultry Processing, supra note 16.
22. Peter St. Onge et al., The Cruelest Cuts: An Epidemic of Pain, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Sept. 30, 2008, at 15A.
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production line. [OSHA] statistics for 2000 reveal that one out of
every seven poultry workers was injured on the job, more than dou-
ble the average for all private industries. Poultry workers are also 14
times more likely to suffer debilitating injuries stemming from repeti-
tive trauma-like "claw hand" (in which the injured fingers lock in a
curled position) and ganglionic cysts (fluid deposits under the skin).23
Employers also put a huge amount of pressure on workers to max-
imize the volume of animals that go through processing by increasing the
speed of the processing line. 2 4 The speed of production lines is directly
related to injuries, but there are no state or federal laws that limit line
speed.2 5 A 2002 investigative article in the Denver Post described the
experiences of workers at the Swift & Co. meatpacking plant in Greeley,
Colorado, who could barely move after finishing a day of work at the
plant because they were "exhausted from working on a line that turns
live animals into processed meat as fast as six times a minute."26 Work-
ers also told the Denver Post that "supervisors apply constant pressure to
keep the line moving" because of the company's financial goals:
[A] world in which they are driven, sometimes insulted and humiliat-
ed, to keep the plant's production up. "From the time you enter,
you're told that if the plant stops 10 minutes, the company will lose I
don't know how many millions of dollars," said Maria Lilia Almaraz,
who earns $10.60 an hours cutting bones from cuts of meat with a ra-
zor-sharp blade. "It's always, faster, faster," she said. 27
OSHA issued more restrictive regulations concernmg ergonomic
standards in January 2001 in an effort to reduce the debilitating injuries
caused by the repetitive motions required for tasks like deboning and
cutting.28 However, Congress and President George W. Bush struck
down the standards just two months later amid pressure from large cor-
porations who argued that the standards were based on insufficient scien-
tific and medical understanding. 2 9 OSHA now relies on voluntary adher-
*30ence to ergonomics guidelines.
The PPE generally required for work in a poultry processing plant
includes "frocks, aprons, plastic sleeves, gloves, cotton glove liners,
23. Nicholas Stein, Son of a Chicken Man: As He Struggles to Remake His Family's Poultry
Business into a $24 Billion Meat Behemoth, John Tyson Must Prove He Has More to Offer than the
Family Name, FORTUNE, May 13, 2002, at 136.
24. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 33.
25. Id.
26. Id at 34 (quoting Michael Riley, Woes at Swift Blamed on Pace, Speed Valued Above All
Else, Workers Say, DENVER POST, Nov. 26, 2002, at Al).
27. Id
28. St. Onge et al., supra note 22.
29. OSHA's Ergonomics Regulation, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/labor/oshas-ergonomics-regulation (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
30. St. Onge et al., supra note 22.
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boots or overshoes, hard hats, earplugs, and safety glasses." 31 Employees
that work in deboning and evisceration, the departments that perform the
actual dismembering of the dead birds, also wear mesh gloves, knife
holders, and arm guards to protect themselves from knife and scissor
injuries.32 While payment for donning and doffing time amounts to a
minimal amount each day (around twenty minutes), these wages can add
up to around $500 a year per employee.33 According to expert Robert G.
Radwin, the average amount of daily donning and doffing before and
after shifts, including one meal break per employee, is approximately
16,858 minutes for an average-sized plant. 34
Another major issue in the modem meatpacking industry is its reli-
ance on immigrant labor, both legal and undocumented.35 Many of the
employer abuses that take place in the industry are directly linked to the
vulnerability of these workers and employer willingness to take ad-
vantage of these weaknesses.36 While many undocumented workers are
afraid to assert their rights because they fear deportation, workers who
are in the country legally are also unwilling to stand up to employers for
fear that their fellow workers who are not yet legal will suffer the conse-
quences.3 1 Major poultry production plants, including Tyson Foods, deny
that they hire undocumented workers purposely, although many compa-
nies often find workers though what industry researchers call "ethnic
network recruitment," where companies promise to secure jobs for the
family members of current workers.
B. The FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act
In 1938, Congress enacted the FLSA "to establish nationwide min-
imum wage and maximum hours standards."39 The most important provi-
sions of the FLSA require that employees be paid a minimum wage and
be paid at an overtime rate for any hours they work over the standard
forty-hour workweek.40 Congress created the FLSA as a way to protect
covered workers against unfair wages and unreasonable hours, two sig-
nificant labor concerns that had been exacerbated by the economic tur-
31. Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., 644 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir. 2011).
32. Id.
33. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1134; Steven Greenhouse, Poultry Plants to Pay Workers $10 Mil-
lion in Compensation, NY TIMES, May 10, 2002, at A20.
34. Phase I Expert Report of Robert G. Radwin, Ph.D.for Plaintiffs, Salazar v. Butterball,
LLC, No. 08-CV-02071-MSK-CBS, 2009 WL 6048979 (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2009), 2009 WL
29155833.
35. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 106.
36. Id. at 101; Annette Bernhardt, Expect More Workplace Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2009, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/the-competition-for-low-wage-jobs/.
37. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 103.
38. Id. at 109-10.
39. Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22, 25 (1993).
40. Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., 644 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir. 2011).
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moil of the Great Depression.4 1 Congress also sought to prevent all labor
conditions that were "detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being
of workers.'A2
The FLSA gives employees a private right of action to recover
earned but unpaid wages from their employers.43 The FLSA allows
courts to award any owed back pay as well as any attorney fees and costs
incurred by the employee while pursuing their FLSA claim.44
Employees also have the right to pursue FLSA claims as a class if
the employees are "similarly situated.A'
The Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the DOL routinely reports
that 70% or more of the businesses it investigates are not in compliance
with the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA.46 The WHD is the
sole enforcer of the FLSA, and it responds only to complaints that em-
ployers are not in compliance with the Act. In 2008 alone, the WHD
collected over $185 million in back wages for 228,000 employees based
on almost 24,000 complaints.47 However, this is likely only the tip of the
iceberg in terms of earned wages that employers do not pay to employees
every year. The Employer Policy Foundation, an employer-supported
think tank, estimated in 2004 that workers would receive an additional
$19 billion annually if their employers complied fully with the FLSA.48
Under the FLSA, employers must pay employees for all "hours
worked." There are two main issues in Salazar and other donning and
doffing cases, and there are circuit splits with regard to both issues. The
first is whether time spent donning and doffing PPE and time spent walk-
ing to the production line after donning and doffing PPE constitutes
"work" under the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act, and the second is
whether PPE are clothes for purposes of the exclusion provided by
§ 203(o). In Salazar, the Tenth Circuit focuses its opinion on determin-
ing whether PPE are clothes because the employer in that case entered
into a CBA with the union representing its employees, thus implicating
§ 203(o).4 9 However, the larger and more complex issue is whether don-
41. Danuta Bembenista Panich & Christopher C. Murray, Back on the Cutting Edge: "Don-
ning-and-Doffing" Litigation Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 58-APR. FED. LAW. 14, 14
(2011).
42. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981).
43. Panich & Murray, supra note 41, at 14.
44. Id. at 15.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Collects over 1.4 Billion in Back
Wages for over 2 Million Employees Since Fiscal Year 2001, at 2 (2008),
www.dol.gov/whd/statistics/2008FiscalYear.pdf [hereinafter 2008 WHD Report] (FY 2008: 78%
violation rate); see also U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division 2002 Statistics Fact
Sheet, www.dol.gov/whd/statistics/200212.htm (FY 2002: approximately 70% violation rate).
47. 2008 WHD Report, supra note 46, at 1.
48. Craig Becker, A Good Job for Everyone, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 6, 2004, at 1.
49. Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., 644 F.3d 1130, 1136 (10th Cir. 2011).
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ning and doffing is "work," a question that has created a separate and
more problematic circuit split.
1. Defining "Work" and "Workday" Under the FLSA
The FLSA does not define "work" or "workweek," so the Supreme
Court has developed its own definitions of these terms to assist in its
interpretation of the statute.o The Court's first attempt at defining
"work" came in 1944 in Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Lo-
cal No. 123." The Court held in Tennessee Coal that it had no reason to
assume that Congress meant for the definition of work to be anything
other than its generally accepted meaning, "physical or mental exertion
(whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and
pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his
business."52
The Court again defined "work" and "workweek" broadly in Ander-
son v. Mt. Clemens Pottery, Co. 53 by holding that the "workweek" in-
cluded "all time during which an employee is necessarily required to be
on the employer's premises, on duty or at a prescribed workplace."54 The
Court also held that preliminary activities done solely on the employer's
premises that are a "necessary prerequisite to productive work" also con-
stitute work for purposes of the FLSA.5 5 These preliminary activities
could include tasks such as putting on aprons or overalls, turning on ma-
chines, and sharpening tools. 5 6
However, the court also created an exception to the requirement that
preliminary activities be compensated-any activity that was de minimis
could be excluded from an employee's workday.57 The Court defined this
de minimis exception in the following way: "When the matter in issue
concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled
working hours . . . such trifles may be disregarded[, for) [s]plit-second
absurdities are not justified by the actualities or working conditions or by
the policy of the [FLSA]."5 The Court has not established a test for de-
termining when an activity is de minimis, leading courts to apply the idea
in a variety of ways.59
50. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944)
("[W]e are not guided by any precise statutory definition of work or employment.").
51. 321 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1944).
52. Id. at 598.
53. 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
54. Id. at 690-91 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 693.
56. Id. at 692-93.
57. Id. at 692.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Frank v. Wilson & Co., 172 F.2d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1949) (holding that 9.2
minutes per day consisting of 6.2 minutes of walking time and 3 minutes of other preliminary activi-
ties is considered de minimis); Green v. Planters Nut & Chocolate Co., 177 F.2d 187, 188 (4th Cir.
1949) (de minimis rule applied to employees who reported up to ten minutes before start of shift to
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In 1947, Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Acts in response to
the Supreme Court's decision in Anderson and the cases that followed its
reasoning, which Congress viewed as interpreting the FLSA in a way
that disregarded "long-established customs, practices, and contracts be-
tween employers and employees, thereby creating wholly unexpected
liabilities" that would "bring about the financial ruin of many employ-
ers."61 The key provision of the Portal-to-Portal Act is § 254(a), which
provides that employers cannot be liable under the FLSA for not com-
pensating employees for two categories of activities: "(1) walking, rid-
mg, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the prin-
cipal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform,
and (2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said princi-
pal activity or activities." 62
The Supreme Court has interpreted the term "principal activities" as
requiring compensation for any activities performed before or after a
regular work shift where those activities are "an integral and indispensa-
ble part of the principal activities for which covered workmen are em-
ployed."63 The Court has not specifically stated what activities should be
considered integral and indispensable, but it has declined to alter the test
articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Alvarez v. IBP, 6 which held that an
activity is only integral and indispensable when it is "necessary to the
principal work performed and done for the benefit of the employer."65
The Ninth Circuit referred to this definition to as the bipartite Steiner
test.66
Integral and indispensable activities must also be understood within
the context of the continuous workday rule.6 7 The "workday" is "the pe-
riod between the commencement and completion on the same workday
of an employee's principal activity or activities."6 8 The DOL limited the
application of the Portal-to-Portal Act using the idea of a definable be-
ginning and end to the workday:
[T]o the extent that activities engaged in by an employee occur after
the employee commences to perform the first principal activity on a
check in and prepare for work); McIntyre v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons Co., 72 F. Supp. 366, 372
(W.D. Ky. 1947) (ten to twenty minutes per day going to locker, exchanging uniform, changing
uniform, and reporting to foreman within de minimis rule); Lasater v. Hercules Powder Co., 73 F.
Supp. 264, 271 (E.D. Tenn. 1947) (changing clothes and preliminary preparations for work were de
minimis, although not stating the amount of time preliminary activities took).
60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (2011).
61. Id. at §251(a).
62. Id. at § 254(a).
63. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956) (emphasis added).
64. 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003).
65. Id. at 902-03 (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 750 F.2d 47, 50 (8th
Cir. 1984)); see also Dunlop v. City Elec., Inc., 527 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 1976)).
66. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 903.




particular workday and before he ceases the performance of the last
principal activity on a particular workday, the provisions of [§
254(a)] have no application. 69
Under the continuous workday rule, the commencement of the
workday can cause activities that might otherwise be considered non-
compensable, preliminary activities to function as compensable, princi-
pal activities under the FLSA.70
In 2005, the Supreme Court further broadened this limitation on the
Portal-to-Portal Act by explicitly holding that any post-donning and pre-
doffing walking time, which occurs in most workplaces during the walk
from a locker room to a production area, would be compensable under
the Portal-to-Portal Act, assuming the initial donning and doffing was an
"integral and indispensable activity." 7 1 Although the Portal-to-Portal Act
specifically excludes preliminary activities and walking time from com-
pensation, the continuous workday rule requires that employers compen-
sate their employees for these activities when they occur between the
first and last principal activities of each day. The exclusions of § 254(a)
of the Portal-to-Portal Act have largely been eroded in the in a workplace
where employees must use PPE because of the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion that donning and doffing can be "integral and indispensable" and
therefore not "preliminary or postliminary."7 2
Under this new framework that recognizes the potential for donning
and doffing to be principal activities, the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits have held that employers do not need to compensate their
employees for donning and doffing "non-unique" or generic PPE, even if
employees are required to wear such gear by their employers or by gov-
ernment regulations. The Third and the District Court of Maryland in
the Fourth Circuit have held that employers must compensate employees
for donning and doffing PPE when it is required by an employer or gov-
ernment regulation, making the donning and doffing integral and indis-
pensable to the work performed by the employees.74
69. Id. at § 790.6(a).
70. See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 620 (6th Cir. 2010).
71. IBP Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 36 (2005).
72. Id. at 21.
73. See Von Friewalde v. Boeing Aerospace Operations, Inc., 339 F. App'x 448,454 (5th Cir.
2009) (holding that donning and doffing generic safety gear is de minimis); Pirant v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 542 F.3d 202, 208 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that donning and doffing uniform shirt, gloves, and
work shoes is not integral and indispensable); Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586,
594 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that safety gear can be indispensable to an employee's principal activi-
ties without being integral, even if required by law and the employer); Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d
894, 903 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that donning and doffing non-unique PPE, such as hard hats and
safety goggles, is not compensable because it is de minimis, even though it is integral and indispen-
sable), affd, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
74. See DeAsencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361, 372 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that
employer requirement that employees don PPE mainly benefitted employer); Perez v. Mountaire
Farms, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 670, 679-80 (D. Md. 2009) (noting that donning and doffing PPE is
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The Tenth Circuit has taken a different approach, using the Tennes-
see Coal definition of work as "physical exertion" to hold in Reich v.
IBP, Inc.," that the FLSA only requires compensation for donning and
doffing protective gear that requires time, exertion and concentration to
don and doff.7 6 At least one district court in the Tenth Circuit has ques-
tioned the continuing viability of the Reich test.7 7
2. The Changing Clothes Exception/Exclusion Under § 203(o)
Congress amended the FLSA yet again in 1949, giving further con-
cessions to employers who were unhappy with the repercussions of the
FLSA.x One major addition to the FLSA during this amendment period
was 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). 79 Section 203(o) limits what activities may be
excluded from an employee's "hours worked" if a collective bargaining
relationship exists in the workplace:
In determining for the purposes of sections 206 and 207 of this title
the hours for which an employee is employed, there shall be excluded
any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning or
end of each workday which was excluded from measured working
time during the week involved by the express terms of or by custom
or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement appli-
cable to the particular employee.80
In simpler terms, § 203(o) only applies if two conditions are met:
(1) the items worn by employees are "clothes," and (2) there is an ex-
press or implied term in the CBA that excludes "changing clothes" from
compensation. This provision adds another layer to the FLSA that insu-
lates employers and recognizes their ability to bargain or use a custom or
practice such that they would not have to pay employees for the prepara-
tory activities of changing clothes or washing, even if those activities are
"principal activities" under the Portal-to-Portal Act. However, the Sixth
Circuit has held that changing clothes may be excluded by § 203(o) but
still function as a principal activity that starts the workday.
Section 203(o) can serve as a loophole for employers, especially if
an employer can argue that non-payment for donning and doffing is an
implied term of a CBA, because it allows employers to use the process of
collective bargaining over the issue (or lack thereof) to justify non-
done not merely for the convenience of the employee and that it is necessarily for employer's bene-
fit).
75. 38 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1994).
76. Id. at 1126.
77. Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 474 F.Supp.2d 1240, 1246 (D. Kan. 2007) (noting that the
Tenth Circuit "did not analyze the issues through the lens of the continuous workday rule as clarified
by the Supreme Court in Alvarez").
78. Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 958 (11th Cir. 2007).
79. Id.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2011).
81. Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 619-20 (6th Cir. 2010).
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payment for an activity that is otherwise compensable work in several
circuits.8 2 The circuits are split as to whether § 203(o) is an exemption
for employers, which must be narrowly read in favor of an employee, or
whether it is merely an exclusion that works to remove certain tasks from
compensable hours and does not require a narrow reading.83 The Su-
preme Court has yet to consider this issue or the meaning of "changing
clothes" under § 203(o), and both questions in Salazar were issues of
first impression for the Tenth Circuit.
C Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.
In 2003, the Ninth Circuit issued a controversial opinion in Alvarez
v. IBP, Inc., interpreting the meaning of "changing clothes" under FLSA
§ 203(o). In Alvarez, the Ninth Circuit held that unionized employers
should be required to compensate employees for the time they spend
donning and doffing PPE, even where there is an express or implied
CBA term excluding this activity from compensation, because PPE are
not "clothes" for the purposes of § 203(o).85 The Ninth Circuit also ad-
dressed the important threshold issue of whether donning and doffing
PPE is a principal activity that is integral and indispensable to the work
done at the IBP plant.86
In Alvarez, the Ninth Circuit examined the payment practices of IBP
(formerly known as Iowa Beef Packers), the world's largest producer of
fresh beef and pork.87 Unionized employees at one of IBP's Washington
"kill and processing" plants brought a claim under the FLSA alleging
that IBP was not compensating them for time spent donning PPE at the
beginning of each shift, donning and doffing during their 30-minute un-
paid meal breaks, and doffing PPE at the end of each shift.88 IBP paid its
workers according to a "gang time pay" scheme, under which employees
are only paid during times when they are actually cutting and bagging
meat.89 This means employees are paid starting when the first piece of
meat hits the processing line and ending when the last piece of meat is
packaged. 90
82. See DeAsencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361, 372 (3d Cir. 2007); Alvarez v. IBP,
Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that donning and doffing unique PPE is compensa-
ble); Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 670, 679-80 (D. Md. 2009).
83. Compare Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1138 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding §
203(o) is not an exemption.), and Allen v. McWane, Inc., 593 F.3d 449,458 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding
§ 203(o) is a definition and not an affirmative defense, so employee had the burden of proving a
custom or practice existed), and Franklin, 619 F.3d at 612 (same), and Anderson, 488 F.3d at 957
(holding § 203(o) is a definition and not an affirmative defense), with Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 905
(holding § 203(o) is an exemption and must be read narrowly).
84. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1136.
85. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 897.
86. Id at 904.
87. Id. at 898.
88. Id. at 900.
89. Id. at 900-1.
90. See id. at 901.
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The Ninth Circuit first analyzed the issue of whether donning and
doffing is compensable work using what it described as "Steiner's bipar-
tite 'integral and indispensable test,"' which requires employers to pay
employees for activities that are "necessary to the principal work per-
formed and done for the benefit of the employer." 91 The court held that
donning and doffing required PPE satisfies this test. 92 The court reasoned
that because the PPE "is required by law, by rules of [JBP], [and] by the
nature of the work," the donning and doffing of the PPE is necessary to
the principal work performed. It also held that the donning and doffing
was done for the benefit of IBP to allow it to satisfy its requirements
under OSHA's federal regulations to prevent injury, as well as prevent-
ing contamination of the meat products themselves.93 While the court
held that non-unique items of PPE, such as hardhats and earplugs, and
unique items of PPE, like Kevlar gloves, are both integral and indispen-
sable to the workers' duties at the meatpacking plant, the court ultimately
concluded that employers need not compensate employees for donning
and doffing non-unique items of PPE because the time it takes to do so is
de inmnus.94
The court then addressed the issue of whether PPE should be con-
sidered "clothes" for purposes of § 203(o). The court noted that PPE
does not "plainly and unmistakeably" fit within the meaning of
§ 203(o)'s "clothing" exception, and that the definition of clothing
should be construed against the employer seeking to assert the excep-
tion. 95
Perhaps the most important observation of the Ninth Circuit was
that specialized protective gear is different from normal clothing because
it "provides a barrier against exposure to workplace hazards."96 The court
also referenced the distinction between normal clothes and PPE drawn by
OSHA that "general work clothes (e.g. uniforms, pants, shirts or blouses)
not intended to function as protection against a hazard are not considered
to be personal protective equipment."97 The court used these distinctions
to affirm the district court's ruling that § 203(o) does not apply to the
donning and doffing of PPE.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, but only on
the issue of whether the time employees spend walking between the
changing area and the production area is compensable under the FLSA.99
91. Id. at 903.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 904.
95. Id. at 905 (citing Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)).
96. Id at 905.
97. Id. at 905 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(b)).
98. Id. at 905.
99. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 24 (2005).
[Vol. 89:2560
SALAZAR V. BUTTERBALL
However, the Court did recognize the possibility that donning and doff-
ing can function as principal activities when it held that walking time is
not excluded by the Portal-to-Portal Act if it occurs after an integral and
indispensable activity triggers the workday.'" This possibility that don-
ning a required uniform or other safety equipment could initiate the con-
tinuous workday has led to a new flood of FLSA claims, filed by workers
from many industries, including workers from foundries and nuclear
power plants as well as security guards and police officers. 0 ' More than
one hundred "donning and doffing" claims have been filed since the Su-
preme Court's 2005 decision in IBP.10 2
D. Multi-Million Dollar Settlements in Perdue Farms and In re Tyson
Foods
While the DOL is still pursuing more effective strategies for enforc-
ing the FLSA, it has had some past success in securing back pay for em-
ployees that were not compensated for donning and doffing PPE through
settlement agreements. 0 3 The DOL negotiated multi-million dollar set-
tlements for poultry plant workers in Trotter v. Perdue Farms, Inc. 10 and
more recently in In re Tyson Foods Inc. Fair Labor Standards Act
Litig.o105
In Perdue Farms, the DOL, under the guidance of the Clinton Ad-
ministration, pursued a claim against Perdue Farms, a poultry processing
factory, in an attempt to get poultry companies to compensate workers
for donning and doffing time after years of resistance.10 6 The poultry
companies argued that donning and doffing should be considered part of
the employees' personal time, but the DOL viewed it as a task related
directly to enforcement of workplace safety.10 7 The DOL negotiated a
settlement with Perdue under which it was to distribute $10 million to
25,000 former and current workers. 0 8 One attorney for the DOL estimat-
ed that workers at Perdue spent about eight minutes a day donning and
doffing their PPE, which totaled about $500 worth of unpaid work per
year.109 The settlement covered a two-year period of non-compensation,
meaning many Perdue workers received over $1,000 in back pay." 0 The
back pay also went to undocumented immigrants who worked for Per-
100. Id. at 37.
101. Panich & Murray, supra note 41, at 76.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., In re Tyson Foods Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1370 (M.D. Ga. 2011); Stipula-
tion and Agreement of Settlement at 12, Trotter v. Perdue Farms, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-893-MPT (D.
Del. Aug. 5, 2002), 2002 WL 34226966.
104. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 103, at 12.
105. Order Granting Joint Motion for Final Approval of Settlement Agreement, In re Tyson
Foods Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1370 (M.D. Ga. 2011) (No. 4:07-md-01854-CDL).







due."' In In re Tyson Foods Inc., a Georgia district court recently ap-
proved a settlement of up to $17.5 million in back pay and up to $14.5
million in attorney fees."12
E. Colorado Wage Order 27
Most states also have their own minimum wage laws to govern the
conduct of their employers. The Colorado Minimum Wage Actil 3 prohib-
its employment of workers "for wages which are inadequate to supply
the necessary cost of living and to maintain the health of workers so em-
ployed" or "under conditions of labor detrimental to [workers'] health or
morals."' 14 The Act also allows the Colorado Department of Labor to set
minimum wage and maximum hour standards."' The Colorado Depart-
ment of Labor used this authority to issue Wage Order 27, which pre-
scribes minimum wage and overtime requirements for employees in the
retail, food and beverage, commercial support, and health and medical
industries." 6 Plaintiffs across the country have started to bring "hybrid"
suits that allege employer wage violations under both the FLSA and state
laws governing wage and hour law,"l 7 which is exactly the route taken by
the plaintiffs in Salazar.118
The plaintiffs in Salazar brought a claim under Wage Order 27,
which covers workers in the "food and beverage industry," supporting
their claim with the argument that the Butterball plant produces food for
consumption." 9 The Tenth Circuit agreed with Butterball that Wage Or-
der 27 only applies to retail-type food and beverage employers and not to
"wholesale or industrial" workplaces like the Butterball facility, choos-
ing to strike down the state law claim. 120
Some practitioners argue that claims under state wage statutes
should be preempted by the FLSA,12' but at least one federal court of
appeals has held that the FLSA does not preempt state laws where those
laws offer more protection than the FLSA.12 2
111. Id.
112. Order Granting Joint Motion for Final Approval of Settlement Agreement, supra note
105.
113. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-6-101 to 8-6-119 (2011).
114. § 8-6-104.
115. § 8-6-106.
116. 7 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1103-1:1 (2011).
117. Anna Wermuth & Jeremy Glenn, It's No Revolution: Long Standing Legal Principles
Mandate the Preemption of State Laws in Conflict with Section 3(o) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 839, 841 (2010).
118. Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., 644 F.3d 1130, 1143 (2011).
119. Id
120. Id. at l144.
121. See Wermuth & Glenn, supra note 17, at 841-42.
122. Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir. 2010).
562 [Vol. 89:2
SALAZAR V. BUTTERBALL
II.SALAZAR V. BUTTERBALL, L.L.C.
A. Facts
The plaintiffs in this case, a group of workers at Butterball's plant in
Longmont, Colorado, alleged that Butterball failed to properly compen-
sate them under the FLSA for all of their hours worked.123 The Long-
mont processing plant produces turkey products, including cooked,
ready-to-eat turkey products. 124 Butterball purchased the plant from
ConAgra Foods in 2006 and retained the same hourly employees, man-
agement, and pay practices that ConAgra had used during its time at the
plant.125
There were two named plaintiffs in this case, Clara Salazar and
Juanita Ybarra. Ms. Salazar worked at the Longmont plant from 1981 to
2009. Ms. Ybarra had worked at the plant since 1978 and was employed
at the plant as of 2009 when Magistrate Judge Craig Shaffer initially
heard the case.126 Members of the class worked in the various areas of the
plant, including in the deboning, evisceration, packaging, and quality
assurance departments.127 Company policy required the employees to
wear various pieces of PPE while working in these areas of the plant,
which they had to put on before clocking in at the beginning of their
shifts.128 They were also required to remove and sanitize their PPE after
clocking out at the end of each shift.129
Generally, production employees wore PPE including frocks,
aprons, plastic sleeves, gloves, cotton glove liners, boots or overshoes,
hard hats, earplugs, and safety glasses.130 When working in the deboning
and evisceration areas, employees also wore mesh gloves, knife holders,
and arm guards.' ' ConAgra did not pay most employees for time spent
putting on and removing these articles of PPE, choosing to only pay em-
ployees in the "live hang unit" for donning and doffing time with twenty
extra minutes of pay per day.132 Butterball continued this practice and
only paid live hand employees for donning and doffing time.'33 However,
123. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1134.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., No. 08-CV-02071-MSK-CBS, 2009 WL 6048979, at *2 (D.
Colo. Dec. 3, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 965353 (D. Colo. Mar. 15,
2010) affd, 644 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2011).





132. Id, at 1134 n.2. "Live hanger" employees lift live poultry from the supply conveyer and
hang the birds by their feet from a shackle conveyor. See Occupational Safety & Health Administra-
tion, Poultry Processing Industry eTool-Plant Positions Glossary
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/poultry/glossary.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).
133. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1134 n.2.
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the live hang department was dissolved in 2008, and all remaining em-
ployees became known simply as "production employees." 34
The United Food and Commercial Workers Local 7 (UFCW 7) rep-
resented the production employees at the Longmont plant. 135 ConAgra
and UFCW 7 entered into two CBAs from 2005 to 2009 that outlined a
grievance process for employees to voice any complaints against Butter-
ball.13 1
On December 16, 2005, UFCW 7 filed a grievance claiming that
employees should be paid for time spent donning and doffing PPE.137
ConAgra denied the grievance and the union demanded arbitration on
November 13, 2006.138 However, arbitration never occurred and the un-
ion never brought up the issue of payment for the donning and doffing of
PPE at either CBA negotiation.1 39
B. Procedural History
The plaintiffs filed suit against Butterball on September 25, 2008,
alleging that Butterball had failed to pay employees for all of their time
worked pursuant to the FLSA and Colorado Wage Order 27.140 Magis-
trate Judge Shaffer issued a recommendation and report on the case on
December 3, 2009, granting Butterball's motion for summary judgment
and finding that Butterball had not violated the plain language of the
FLSA.14 1 Judge Shaffer also held that and that Wage Order 27 did not
apply to the case.14 2 The United States District Court for the District of
Colorado adopted Judge Shaffer's report and recommendations. 14 3 The
plaintiffs appealed this judgment, and the Tenth Circuit issued its opinion
on July 5, 2011.144
C Opinion
Chief Judge Mary Beck Briscoe wrote the unanimous opinion of the
court, with Judge Stephanie Seymour and Judge Carlos Lucero partici-
pating in judgment and completing the three-judge panel for the Tenth
Circuit.14 5 The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held
134. Id.




139. Id at 1135.
140. Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, No. 08-CV-02071-MSK-CBS, 2009 WL 6048979, *3 (D.
Colo. Dec. 3, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 965353 (D. Colo. Mar. 15,
2010), af'd, 644 F.3d 1130(10th Cir. 2011).
141. Id.at*l7.
142. Id.
143. Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, No. 08-CV-02071-MSK-CBS, 2010 WL 965353, at *12 (D.
Colo. Mar. 15, 2010), af'd, 644 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2011).
144. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1130.
145. Id at 1133.
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that Butterball was not required to pay any of its employees for time
spent donning and doffing PPE because that time is excluded from
"hours worked" under § 203(o) of the FLSA.14 6 The court also held that
because it chose to base its ruling on § 203(o) rather than on whether
donning and doffing is "work" under the FLSA, the court did not have to
determine whether the Supreme Court's holding in IBP affected the
Tenth Circuit's holding in Reich.147
The court begins its analysis by stating that the definition of "chang-
ing clothes" under § 203(o) of the FLSA is ambiguous, which gives the
court the authority to resolve this ambiguity.148 The court holds that PPE
should be considered clothes because this "expansive" definition "makes
more sense" than a definition that would differentiate between normal
clothes and PPE or between PPE and other equipment.149 The court fur-
ther notes that the unique PPE worn by the plaintiffs in the case is not so
"cumbersome, heavy, or complicated" as to differentiate from regular
clothing, referencing its holding in Reich that donning and doffing non-
unique PPE is not "work.", 0o The court chose not to defer to the 2010
interpretation of § 203(o) by the DOL distinguishing "clothes" from
PPE, stating merely that the "persuasive power" of an agency decision is
diminished if the agency repeatedly alters its interpretation of a statute.
The court also held that the non-payment of donning and doffing
time was a "mutually accepted custom or practice" that became an im-
plied term of the CBA between the parties. The court concluded that
UFCW 7 "acquiesced in the continuation of that practice" when it failed
to bargain for payment for donning and doffing time in its 2008 CBA,
and that UCFW 7 has no legitimate argument as to why the court should
change this status quo.152
Furthermore, the court held that the workers could not appeal their
claim that they should also be compensated for mid-day donning and
doffing to take meal breaks because they failed to object to this aspect of
Magistrate Shaffer's summary judgment order.
146. Id at 1142-43.
147. Id. at 1136 n.3. The Tenth Circuit held in Reich that donning and doffing non-unique PPE
was not "work" under the FLSA in the context of Tennessee Coal rather than evaluating whether this
activity was integral and indispensable, the proper test under Alvarez. Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
474 F.Supp.2d 1240, 1246 (D. Kan. 2007).
148. Id.at1138.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1140.
151. Id.atll39.
152. Id.atll42.




1. National Employment Lawyers Association
The National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) submitted
a brief on behalf of the plaintiffs to highlight the importance of requiring
employers to pay employees for donning and doffing PPE.15 4 NELA ar-
gues that the FLSA offers necessary protection to "a vulnerable work-
force," including many immigrants who are less likely to enforce their
rights, and that this purpose should dictate interpreting § 203(o) to afford
the most protection possible to low-wage workers.'s
NELA also argues that the court should adopt the interpretation of
"clothes" used by the DOL. One important argument made by NELA is
that when Congress amended the FLSA in 1949 to include § 203(o), the
"clothes" Congress had in mind were those that workers in the bakery
industry changed into and took off in the 1940s.15 6 NELA and the DOL
argue that such clothes are nothing like the PPE worn in the meatpacking
industry today. 5 7 NELA implores the Tenth Circuit to adopt the narrow
definition of "clothes" used by the Ninth Circuit in Alvarez v. IBP be-
cause it is a "narrow, workable standard that effectuates the meaning of §
203(o) without overextending the meaning of 'clothes' such that the term
'would embrace any conceivable matter that might adorn the human
body, including metal-mesh leggings, armor, spacesuits, riot gear, or
mascot costumes. ',"158
2. United Food and Commercial Workers Union
The UFCW also wrote an amicus brief on behalf of the plaintiff
workers arguing against a finding that there was a "custom or practice"
of non-payment for donning and doffing at the Butterball plant. The
UCFW argues that this case does not demonstrate "waiver by acquies-
cence." 59
The UCFW cites a number of NLRB precedents holding that em-
ployers are not absolved of their duty to bargain collectively just because
certain subjects were "neither discussed nor embodied in any of the
154. Brief of the National Employment Lawyers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plain-
tiffs-Appellants, Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., 644 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2011) (No. 1:08-cv-02071-
MSK-CBS), 2010 WL 4597212.
155. Id. at *3-4.
156. Id. at *6 (citing DEPUTY ADM'R NANCY J. LEPPINK, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR WAGE AND
HOUR Div., OPINION LETTER FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA), SUBJECT: SECTION 3(o) OF THE
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 203(0), AND THE DEFINITION OF "CLOTHES," 2010 WL
2468195).
157. Id. at *6-7.
158. Id. at *7 (quoting Alvarez v. IBP, Inc. 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003)).
159. Brief of United Food and Commercial Workers International Union and United Food and
Commercial Workers Union Local 7R as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants, Salazar v.




terms and conditions of the contract."l 6 0 It argues that it would be a cir-
cular and superficial analysis of the rights guaranteed by the National
Labor Relations Act and the process of collective bargaining to simply
hold that silence on a particular issue by both employer and union can
create an implied CBA term.161
III. ANALYSIS
The interpretation of the term "changing clothes" under FLSA
§ 203(o) is an issue of first impression in the Tenth Circuit. Varying in-
terpretations of § 203(o) have now resulted in a circuit split between the
Ninth Circuit and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits. 162 fDistrict courts in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Illinois have
also sided with the view of the Ninth Circuit.' 63
The Tenth Circuit's opinion gives little weight to the purpose of the
FLSA, and it spends just four sentences discussing the DOL's interpreta-
tion of § 2 0 3 (o).64 The court fails to do a full analysis of the DOL's in-
terpretation under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 165 instead using a Tenth Cir-
cuit case, Pacheco v. Whiting Farms Inc.,16 6 to write off the DOL's posi-
tion "is not particularly well-reasoned."l 67 The outcome of Salazar hing-
es on the Tenth Circuit's uneasiness with the political nature of the
DOL's opinion letters, leading the court to its decision against applying
judicial deference in this case. However, this fear can be detrimental to
the effective functioning of the administrative state when it leads to deci-
sions like the one in Salazar.
The clear intent of the 2010 DOL Opinion Letter was to point out
that § 203(o) has little practical application to today's modem workplac-
es where employers, government regulations, and the nature of certain
jobs require many workers to wear PPE in order to perform those jobs.' 6 8
The DOL also explains that workers should be compensated for donning
160. Id. at *2 (quoting NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1952)).
161. Id. at*13.
162. See Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1140-41 (holding that poultry workers' PPE were clothes);
Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 614-15 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that frozen food workers'
uniforms and PPE, including hair nets, safety glasses, ear plugs, and hard hats, were clothes);
Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 428 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that meat production
workers' boots, hard hats, smocks, and hair nets were clothes), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 933 (2011);
Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 215-18 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that poultry
workers' PPE were clothes); Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 955-56 (11th Cir. 2007)
(holding that poultry workers' PPE were clothes); Bejil v. Ethicon, Inc., 269 F.3d 477, 480 n.3 (5th
Cir. 2001) (holding that lab coats, hair covers, and shoe covers were clothes).
163. In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d 368, 385 (M.D. Pa.
2008); Gonzalez v. Farmington Foods, 296 F. Supp. 2d 912, 930-31 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (using Alvarez
as persuasive authority to find poultry workers' sanitary and safety equipment were not "clothes").
164. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1139.
165. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
166. 365 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004).
167. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1139.
168. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage and Hour Div., FLSA2010-2, Section 3(o) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), and the definition of"clothes." *2 (2010).
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and doffing time because it often occurs after "clothes changing," which
can be a principal activity that starts the compensable workday under
IBP.169
Congress delegated power to the DOL, under the guidance of the
President, to issue this kind of interpretive policy statement. The DOL is
entitled to a full evaluation of its position under Skidmore, an analysis
the Tenth Circuit did not complete in Salazar. A closer look at the
DOL's position under the framework of Skidmore reveals that the DOL
presents a well-reasoned, expert opinion that it intends to have broadly
applicable effect. The unfortunate consequence of the court's refusal to
consider deference to the DOL is that it allows unionized employers to
continue to exploit the "custom or practice" language of § 203(o) to es-
cape their obligations under the FLSA. With this kind of judicial distrust
of agency policymaking, the best option for the DOL to protect employ-
ees from this exploitation is to use notice and comment rulemaking to
secure more judicial deference.
A. The Court's Definition of Clothes Does Not Reflect the Goals of the
FLSA or the Holding of IBP
The purpose of the FLSA is to protect workers' rights and promote
their safety, health, and well-being.o However, the Salazar court under-
cuts this purpose when it holds that excluding the donning and doffing of
non-unique PPE from compensable time under § 203(o) is appropriate
because this task is not "work.""'7 This assessment is problematic be-
cause it fails to take into account the integral and indispensable nature of
PPE in the poultry packing industry and the role PPE plays in keeping
employers compliant with OSHA and other safety regulations.
Payment for time spent properly donning safety gear should be re-
quired under § 203(o), not only because it serves the employer's goal of
maintaining a safe workplace, but also because donning and doffing PPE
is integral and indispensable to meat and poultry packing. Items of PPE
such as, metal gloves and arm guards are required by employers and the
law to perform many of the extremely dangerous jobs undertaken by
poultry workers, meaning that they are absolutely integral and indispen-
sable under the Steiner test to the tasks at hand.17 2 The PPE used in the
poultry industry are "necessary to the principal work performed and done
for the benefit of the employer," so the donning and doffing of these
items are principal activities themselves that must be included in the
FLSA's expansive definition of work. 7 1
169. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 30 (2005); id. at *3.
170. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981).
171. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1140.




The court's holding that PPE are clothes and should be excluded
from "work" fails to recognize the safety functions that separate PPE
from normal clothing and make the donning and doffing of PPE inher-
ently beneficial to an employer's goal of complying with safety regula-
tions. 17 4 The court fails to engage in a Steiner analysis of donning and
doffing PPE, even though it bases its holding on whether PPE are clothes
on whether or not they require "work" to don and doff, illustrating the
court's view that "work" has an important bearing on whether certain
items are "clothes." The court could have made a much more convincing
argument if it had used the Steiner test to determine if donning and doff-
ing PPE is "work" before incorporating any definition of work into an
interpretation of "clothes." This approach would have been firmly
grounded in the Supreme Court's holding in IBP rather than the outdated
Tenth Circuit holding in Reich, but the court chose to leave the resolution
of whether Steiner is now the proper standard for defining the principal
activities that constitute "work" for another case.175
The court also holds that because it does not take much time or ef-
fort to don and doff the unique PPE in this case-mesh gloves, arm
guards, and knife holders-it is not "work."1 6 This holding implies that
even if the court were to apply the Steiner test and hold that donning and
doffing the PPE is "work," it would still hold that the work is de minimis,
which would support the court's current view that PPE are more like
traditional clothing that do not require quantifiable work to don and
doff.177
Any future use of the de minimis doctrine to adjust the court's inter-
pretation of § 203(o) would undermine the major financial implications
of donning and doffing for employers and employees alike, as evidenced
by one of the WHD's largest settlements against an employer in the Per-
due Farms case.'78 The Supreme Court has previously recognized the de
minimis exception to compensable work, defining the concept in Ander-
son by stating that "[s]plit-second absurdities are not justified by the ac-
tualities of working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act" and that it was "only when an employee is required to give up
a substantial measure of his time and effort that compensable working
time is involved."l 79 However, the Supreme Court has never fully de-
fined what constitutes a "split-second absurdity," leaving the federal cir-
cuit courts to determine when work is de minimis.8 0 Courts have found
activities to be de minimis anywhere from one to twenty minutes, but




178. See Greenhouse, supra note 33.
179. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946).
180. Richard L. Alfred & Jessica M. Schauer, Continuous Confusion: Defining the Workday in
the Modern Economy, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 363, 378 (2011).
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normally only activities that take fewer than ten minutes are de
- *  181minimis.
Time spent donning and doffing amounts to many hours annually in
the aggregate, constituting a huge amount of money per worker each
year. This amount of time is hardly a "split second absurdity" that should
be considered de minimis as a matter of law. Circuit courts are depriving
thousands of low-wage workers within their jurisdictions of millions of
dollars each year simply because they are applying different tests to de-
fine "work" and "clothing." These workers are the very employees the
FLSA was enacted to protect, and any minimization of the impact of
these donning and doffing wages does a disservice to the purpose of the
FLSA.
B. The Court Should Defer to the Department ofLabor's Interpretation
of§ 203(o)
1. The DOL Makes a Logical, Informed Opinion About the Defini-
tion of Clothes Which Merits Some Judicial Deference
Salazar hinges in the court's refusal to adopt the definition of
"clothes" outlined by the Department of Labor in its most recent Opinion
Letter on the FLSA.182 The DOL is charged with the enforcement and
interpretation of the FLSA, and should therefore receive some level of
deference from the courts where an ambiguous provision, such as the one
in § 203(o), is at issue. However, the Tenth Circuit does not even go
through a full analysis of the DOL's interpretation under Skidmore, giv-
ing only four sentences to its evaluation.' 83
The DOL Administrator's most recent interpretation of § 203(o) is
logically supported and serves the guiding purpose of the FLSA. The
DOL distinguished protective equipment from "clothes" as defined in
§ 203(o) and found that "the § 203(o) exemption does not extend to pro-
tective equipment [PPE] worn by employees that is required by law, by
the employer, or due to the nature of the job."8 4 The Ninth Circuit relied
on a similar definition of "clothes" in its decision in Alvarez.' The Al-
181. Id. (citing Green v. Planters Nut & Chocolate Co., 177 F.2d 187, 188 (4th Cit. 1949)
(applying de minimis rule to employees who reported up to ten minutes before start of shift to check
in and prepare for work); Frank v. Wilson & Co., 172 F.2d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1949) (holding that 9.2
minutes per day consisting of 6.2 minutes of walking time and 3 minutes of other preliminary activi-
ties is considered de minimis); Lasater v. Hercules Powder Co., 73 F. Supp. 264, 271 (E.D. Tenn.
1947) (holding changing clothes and preliminary preparations for work were de minimis, although
not stating the amount of time preliminary activities took); McIntyre v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons
Co., 72 F. Supp. 366, 372 (W.D. Ky. 1947) (holding ten to twenty minutes per day going to locker,
exchanging uniform, changing uniform, and reporting to foreman within de minimis rule)).
182. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1139.
183. Id.
184. Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), FLSA2010-2, 2010 WL 2468195
(Dep't of Labor June 16, 2010), at *2.
185. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003).
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varez court took the definition of PPE straight from OSHA's own regula-
tions, which defines PPE as "specialized clothing or equipment worn by
an employee for protection against a hazard."'8 6
The DOL's analysis of the legislative history behind § 203(o) pro-
vides a thorough background for its distinction between normal clothing
and clothing used for protection against a hazard.187 In its analysis, the
DOL highlighted Congress's intent to limit the scope of section § 203(o)
by using the phrase "changing clothes" to limit the bill's original breadth,
which excluded "all activity performed under a [collective bargaining
agreement]" from hours worked for which the employer and union had
an express or implied agreement to do so. 1 88 Congress "narrowed the
scope of § 203(o)" because it wanted to allow the bakery industry to con-
tinue bargaining over the donning and doffing of clothing items like
aprons, as many bakeries had done throughout the 1940s.18 9 The DOL
argues that because these "clothes" worn by bakers were neither required
by law nor intended to protect against environmental hazards, PPE
should be categorized as something entirely different from traditional
clothes.190
A narrow definition of "clothes" that distinguishes between PPE
and regular work clothes allows employers to continue bargaining over
regular work clothes while protecting the safety interests of workers at
the same time.' 9 ' This definition also recognizes that PPE is required due
to the nature of the job and the legal requirements of OSHA and that the
donning and doffing of such equipment should be paid by the employer
because it is "work" under Steiner.19 2
Agency interpretations should be given some weight when they
have the power to persuade,193 and the DOL's interpretation of § 203(o)
deserves at least some deference under this standard because the DOL
has the highest level of expertise in the area of the FLSA and its statutory
definitions. Not only does the DOL's 2010 Opinion Letter protect em-
ployees more than any other interpretation, it is the first of the DOL's
interpretations on § 203(o) that is intended to have a broad application.1 94
Despite this emphasis that the 2010 interpretation provides more formal
and comprehensive guidance, the Tenth Circuit minimizes the fact that it
still owes some level of deference to the DOL under Skidmore.
186. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(b) (1999)).




191. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 905 n.8.
192. See id. at 903.
193. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
194. Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), supra note 185, at *5. The DOL has
since issued multiple amicus briefs for employees in an attempt to secure more deference for its
letter.
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The U.S. Supreme Court held in Skidmore that the analysis of a
non-binding agency interpretation of a statute "will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."1 9 5 The
Tenth Circuit references only the last piece of this framework, stating
that "agency opinion letters are entitled to respect . . . to the extent that
they have the 'power to persuade."'l 96 The court appears to completely
ignore the first two elements of the analysis, the thoroughness of the con-
sideration and the validity of its reasoning, instead basing its decision
against giving deference on the consistency factor.' 97
Other circuits seem to have found a better balance between the fac-
tors. In a 2007 opinion analyzing the DOL's interpretations of § 203(o),
the Eleventh Circuit noted the following about the DOL's 2002 opinion
letter: "While less deference may be called for, the most recent advisory
opinion is entitled to some deference just the same. Moreover, this most
recent opinion provides a far more detailed rationale for its conclusion
than the previous opinions."l 9 8
In the alternative to granting deference, the Tenth Circuit created its
own definition of "clothes." Interestingly, the court goes through the very
same points of statutory analysis as the DOL's opinion letter. Both bod-
ies describe the legislative history of § 203(o) and the various definitions
of "clothes" created in other circuits. However, the Tenth Circuit ulti-
mately relied heavily on its outdated definition of when donning and
doffing is work from Reich to hold that non-unique PPE are "clothes"
because they are not "heavy, cumbersome, or complicated" such that
they should not be considered clothes. This line of reasoning misses a
crucial distinction articulated by the Sixth Circuit-defining something
as clothing does not affect whether that thing is still integral and indis-
pensable to an employee's work, meaning that donning and doffing that
"clothing" can still be a principal, compensable activity outside of the
exclusion offered by § 203(o). The DOL recognizes this distinction, and
it in fact separates its letter into two sections to emphasize the im-
portance of separating the concepts of PPE as clothing and the donning
and doffing of PPE as a principal activity.
The Tenth Circuit seems to convolute these two ideas when it con-
siders the issue of how much "work" is involved in donning and doffing
an item while creating a definition of "clothes." Instead of combining
these two ideas, the court should have determined whether donning and
doffing certain PPE is integral and indispensable before determining if
195. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
196. Salazar v. Butterball, L.L.C., 644 F.3d 1130, 1139 (2011).
197. Id.
198. Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 956-57 (11th Cir. 2007).
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the "changing clothes" exclusion under § 203(o) could apply to this case.
It is precisely this kind of confusion surrounding these two distinct issues
that warrants a ruling by the Supreme Court or a more binding interpreta-
tion from the DOL.
2. The Court's Characterization of the DOL's Shifting Stance on
§ 203(o) Reflects an Unnecessary Trend of Judicial Discomfort
with Agency Interpretations
One of the court's main arguments for choosing not to adopt the
DOL's interpretation of FLSA § 203(o) is that the "persuasive power of
the opinion" was diminished because the agency has repeatedly altered
its interpretation of a statute.199 However, this Tenth Circuit stance seems
to be in direct conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court, which has held that
"the fact that the agency has adopted different definitions in different
contexts adds force to the argument that the definition itself is flexible,
particularly since Congress has never indicated any disapproval of a flex-
ible reading of the statute." 200 The Court's disapproval of the DOL's shift-
ing interpretations seems to stem more from its discomfort with the cur-
rent pro-employee position of the DOL that PPE are not clothes rather
than any well-reasoned opinion that the DOL is no longer entitled to any
level of respect for its opinions.
The DOL's position on § 203(o) has shifted very clearly with the
political landscape of the DOL. During the Clinton era in 1997, the DOL
found that PPE were not "clothes," requiring employers to pay employ-
ees for time spent donning and doffing PPE. The DOL issued another
opinion letter on January 15, 2001, just two weeks before DOL Secretary
Alexis Herman was replaced by former President George W. Bush's
Secretary of Labor, Elaine Chao, that reiterated the same definition. In
2002, during the Bush Administration, an employer-friendly DOL shifted
its official position to give an advantage back to employers by "reconsid-
ering" the DOL's consistent interpretation of § 203(o). The most recent
shift back to the idea that PPE are not "clothes" came in 2010, after the
election of President Obama, who has ushered in a more employee-
friendly DOL administration under current Secretary of Labor Hilda
Solis.
The DOL announced on March 24, 2010, that going forward it
would no longer issue opinion letters based on specific factual predi-
cates, but "will set forth a general interpretation of the law and regula-
tions, applicable across-the-board to all those affected by the provision
199. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1139 (citing Pacheco v. Whiting Farms, Inc., 365 F.3d 1199, 1205
n.3 (10th Cir. 2004)).
200. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)
(noting that a change in an agency interpretation is not automatically invalidating); Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1984) (deferring to change in agency's
opinion and noting that Congress has never disapproved of a flexible reading of a statute).
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in issue." 201 Thus, unlike previous letters, the Administrator's Interpreta-
tion was designed to provide formal, "comprehensive guidance." 202 It is
clear from the DOL's most recent letter that it intends for its 2010 opin-
ion to be the guideline for all employers going forward. The DOL uses
this opinion to recognize the fact that FLSA § 203(o) has been a political
sticking point in the past, and that it was in the best interest of workers to
issue a comprehensive opinion that speaks specifically to the needs of the
modem workplace.
The Tenth Circuit's argument that this more comprehensive guid-
ance does not deserve deference because it represents a shift in DOL
policy illustrates the court's failure to recognize the political nature of
the DOL and the necessity of shifting statutory interpretations to meet
the changing needs of the modem workplace. The court is entitled to
ignore the fact that the DOL is embroiled in a political battle rooted in an
uncertain economic future, but it should step forward with an interpreta-
tion that advances justice and accurately characterizes the state of immi-
grant labor disputes rather than scolding the DOL for inconsistencies.
The Court turns a blind eye to the serious and troubling marginalization
of unionized workers under § 203(o).
The court in Salazar treats these shifts in policy as though any cur-
rent DOL position on the issue of interpreting § 203(o) should be given
no deference whatsoever. However, this kind of political influence over
203
administrative agencies occurs with every shift of White House power.
The most recent DOL interpretation also states that the many opinions it
has issued on § 203(o) reflect the true ambiguity of the statute as well as
the DOL's choice not to issue a general guideline up until 2010. This
aspect of the Salazar decision appears to be largely influenced by the
shifting political ideologies of the DOL and the court's fundamental dis-
trust for this process.
Before her appointment to the United States Supreme Court, Justice
Elena Kagan wrote an article titled Presidential Administration that ex-
amined the transformation of the administrative state under President
Clinton.204 Justice Kagan argued in her article that President Clinton
brought the control of agencies closer to the office of the President than
ever before under what legal scholars call the "presidential control"
model.205 Clinton sought to accomplish what a sharply divided Congress
could not by instituting administrative policies to solve many of the na-
tion's problems.206 Justice Kagan argued that presidential influence over
201. Final Rulings and Opinion Letters, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WAGE AND
HOUR DIVISION, http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/opinion.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2012).
202. Id.
203. Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 955 (2003).
204. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2246 (2001).




agency policy allows for presidents to accomplish important social and
fiscal goals in an "expeditious and coherent" way without having to
wade through a "bureaucracy that hums along on automatic pilot." 20 7
Justice Kagan also predicted in her article that President George W.
Bush would not want to relinquish any of the political power over agen-
cies that Clinton had harnessed and exercised over his eight years as
president.208 This evolution of presidential administrative control resulted
in today's close bond between the policy and politics of the president and
the regulatory activities of agencies. 209 The heads of each agency do eve-
rything in their power to ensure that their actions while serving for the
president set them up to secure employment after the end of the admin-
istration, whereas the president is often interested in securing his place in
history and protecting the prospects of his party.210 This results in agen-
cies issuing a large number of policy statements, rules, and guidelines
just before a new cabinet takes office in an attempt to finish all the work
it undertook during the previous administration. 2 1 1 The DOL has fol-
lowed this trend of agency action during transitional periods, as evi-
denced by the timing of its opinion letters on § 203(o) of the FLSA.
Justice Kagan called for courts to embrace the expeditious and effi-
cient aspects of presidential administration by granting increased defer-
ence to interpretations issued by executive agencies, thereby linking def-
erence with presidential involvement in agency policy and promoting the
President's role in "neglected areas of regulation."212 Justice Kagan noted
that the Chevron deference rule had its "deepest roots" in the idea that
agencies are instruments of the President, and they are "entitled to make
policy choices, within the gaps left by Congress, by virtue of his relation-
ship to the public." 2 13 Furthermore, Justice Kagan argued that "a focus on
presidential action would reverse in many cases the courts' current suspi-
cion of change in regulatory policy." 2 14
Judicial recognition of the benefits of presidential control seems
aptly suited to the DOL and the issue of "changing clothes." This recog-
nition would have two extremely important benefits. First, it would coun-
teract the courts' suspicion of the shifts in DOL policy over the defini-
tion, which has thus far caused all but the Ninth Circuit to find that the
DOL's opinion letters do not deserve deference because of its shifting
stance. Secondly, it would allow the DOL to secure more deference for
its current interpretation without having to resort to notice and comment
207. Id. at 2339.
208. Id. at 2317
209. Id. at 2248.
210. Beermann, supra note 203, at 958.
211. Id. at 955.
212. Kagan, supra note 204, at 2376-78
213. Id at 2373.
214. Id. at 2378.
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rulemaking, which is something that will allow the DOL to change its
215
position as the modem workplace evolves and new views emerge.
If a case dealing with donning and doffing as work or the definition
of "changing clothes" reaches the Supreme Court again, as it likely will,
the court should consider following the deferential path laid out by Jus-
tice Kagan. The DOL needs respect from the judiciary to continue devel-
oping policies to protect employees, and it would be better able to ac-
complish these goals without having to submit each and every interpreta-
tion to notice and comment in order to secure Chevron deference.216
C. The Court's Broad Definition of "Custom or Practice" Gives Em-
ployers an Unfair Advantage, Especially Given the Unsettled Issue of
Whether Donning and Doffing Is a Principal Activity in the Tenth
Circuit
The issue of whether donning and doffing is a principal activity has
not been addressed in the Tenth Circuit since Reich, which was decided
long before IBP. Given that Reich is still the controlling case in the cir-
cuit on the definition of "work," excluding the donning and doffing of
non-unique PPE from compensable activities, the Tenth Circuit makes a
rather circular argument when it holds that UCFW 7 "acquiesced" to a
practice of non-compensation that UCFW 7 had no reason to think it
could challenge as inconsistent with the law. 217
Collective bargaining is an extremely complicated process that in-
volves an incredible amount of strategy and preparation for even the
simplest of issues. The court's discussion of "custom or practice" implies
that if payment for donning and doffing were a real issue for the employ-
ees, it would have been discussed at negotiations.218 However, this stance
ignores the fact that the employees affected by § 203(o) are usually all
low-wage workers who face a constant fight to get employment benefits
that many people take for granted, such as cost of living salary increases
and employer contributions to health insurance. Unions must pick and
chose their battles at every negotiation, so it makes little sense for the
court to require employees to bargain for the compensation of donning
and doffing time that may or may not be afforded to them under Tenth
Circuit law. Just because a vulnerable employee group fails to bring the
issue of donning and doffing time to the bargaining table should not
mean that Butterball automatically receives the upper hand under the
"custom or practice" exclusion under § 203(o).
215. Id..
216. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)
(explaining how courts should evaluate legally binding agency interpretations).
217. Salazar v. Butterball, 644 F.3d 1130, 1142 (2011).
218. Id. at 1141-43.
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The court holds that UCFW 7's failure to bargain for paid donning
and doffing time signals the employees' "acquiescence" to Butterball's
"custom or practice" of non-payment for this activity. The court supports
this argument with one of the key principles of the collective bargaining
process-employers like to maintain the status quo. Employers typically
combat employee requests for more benefits by sticking to what the em-
ployees accepted in the last contract negotiation. It can often be very
hard for employees to get some kind of new benefit if the employer can
argue that the employees were satisfied without that benefit in the past.21 9
In Salazar, the court uses the status quo to point out that employees
must bargain to get the right to compensation for donning and doffing,
just as the employer would have to bargain over a change if it had estab-
lished a practice of paying for this activity. However, this concept as-
sumes that § 203(o) is a subject of bargaining, even if the parties never
discussed the issue or considered it to be a bargaining issue. This as-
sumption is problematic because it means that unionized employees do
not have the same rights to compensation under the FLSA for donning
and doffing PPE that non-unionized employees do unless they bargain
for them. It seems quite far-fetched that the drafters of § 203(o) intended
to give unionized employees fewer rights, especially when the legislative
history of the statute indicates that Congress merely wanted to allow
220bargaining if the parties wanted to engage in such a process.
In fact, UCFW 7 makes this argument on behalf of the employees
that § 203(o) essentially requires that they bargain for compensation for
which they would otherwise be entitled to under the FLSA. The court
discredits this argument, saying that it ignores the fact that § 203(o)
makes donning and doffing time a subject of bargaining rather than a
guaranteed statutory right. The court offers no authority to back up this
proposition, which directly contradicts the legislative history of § 203(o)
as described above.
Other courts have taken broader approaches to the issue of acquies-
cence by recognizing that the issue warrants an evaluation of whether
payment for donning and doffing has been actually discussed by the par-
ties on prior occasions.2 2 1 In fact, a Colorado district court decision cited
in UCFW 7's amicus brief held that the absence of a CBA term for pay-
219. See Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 NLRB 953, 959-60 (1958) (in failing to
pursue subject matter of workload, "union was simply trading off one demand in return for conces-
sions on another, which is an everyday occurrence in collective bargaining having no relation what-
soever to an asserted 'management prerogative' position by an employer and the union's acquies-
cence therein").
220. Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), supra note 184, at *2.
221. Figas v. Horsehead Corp., No. 06-1344, 2008 WL 4170043, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 3,
2008) (citing Kassa v. Kerry, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1071 (D. Minn. 2007) ("Indeed, to the
extent that the union members never raised the issue even among themselves, this may suggest that
they did not knowingly acquiesce in [the employer's] policy of non-payment for clothes-changing
time.").
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ment for the time spent donning and doffing is not the equivalent of a
custom or practice of non-compensation over an eleven-year bargaining
relationship.2 22 The Tenth Circuit does not address any of the case law
cited by UCFW 7.
The court gives little weight to the employees' arguments that
§ 203(o) was never intended to give them less of a right to compensation
in the absence of collective bargaining over that compensation. The
Tenth Circuit's holding that UCFW acquiesced to non-payment of don-
ning and doffing is quite weak, especially when it is clear the UCFW
filed a grievance objecting to this practice on December 16, 2005, only
one month after the Supreme Court issued its holding in IBP. 223 The
Tenth Circuit's approach to the "custom or practice" language in
§ 203(o) gives employers an unfair advantage by requiring unionized
employees to bargain for rights they should already be entitled to under
the FLSA.
D. The Supreme Court Should Defer to DOL's Interpretation of§ 203(o)
Absent any legislative action on the part of Congress or the DOL,
the U.S. Supreme Court should give deference to the DOL's current in-
terpretation of § 203(o) using the modified Chevron deference model
described by Justice Kagan.22 4 In the alternative, it should evaluate the
interpretation using Skidmore, which also warrants a ruling of deference
to the DOL.
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Alvarez that PPE are not clothes,
which the DOL cites in its 2010 letter, reflects that court's understanding
that PPE is integral and indispensable to work in the poultry industry,
making donning and doffing that PPE different from donning and doffing
typical clothing. 225 The Ninth Circuit typically interprets employment
and labor laws with much more deference to the interests of employees
and more emphasis on protecting their rights than any other circuit, and
the split created by this issue illustrates that tendency. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's failure to interpret "clothes" under § 203(o) using the integral and
indispensable standard for activities that are "work" shows the Tenth
Circuit's misunderstanding of how these concepts interact. The Supreme
Court should give more weight to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
§ 203(o) because it is more cognizant of the purpose of the FLSA and it
uses a standard for defining "work" that the Court has already approved.
222. See Brief of United Food and Commercial Workers International Union and United Food
and Commercial Workers Union Local 7R as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra
note 159 at *5 (citing Rogers v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 2010 WL 1904516 (D. Colo. May 11,
2010)).
223. Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1134.
224. See Kagan, supra note 204, at 2376-79.
225. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court should give deference to the exper-
tise of the DOL and the well-reasoned position of its 2010 opinion letter.
All but one of the courts of appeals cases cited by the Tenth Circuit were
decided before the most recent DOL opinion letter was issued on June
16, 2010, with several of the courts noting that their definitions of
"clothes" were consistent with the current interpretation of the DOL.226
This recognition of the DOL's expertise and entitlement to deference by
other courts stands in stark contrast to the four-sentence treatment the
Tenth Circuit gave to the issue in Salazar. In fact, the Sixth Circuit de-
votes more than two full pages to its Skidmore analysis, analyzing the
legislative history of the FLSA, the plain language of § 203(o) itself, and
the varying interpretations issued by the DOL before reaching a decision
on the deference issue.227
The Court should also give deference to the DOL as a matter of
public policy. The FLSA was enacted specifically to protect low-wage
employees who may not be willing to speak up about unfair labor prac-
tices because they fear that they will lose their jobs. The issue of pay-
ment for donning and doffing time may seem like a fairly insignificant
matter, but it becomes truly enormous when one considers that employ-
ers have the deck stacked against immigrant workers in the meatpacking
industry. These employees perform an extremely dangerous type of la-
bor, and they deserve to be paid for all of their work. The DOL is at-
tempting to make sure these employees are compensated, but it needs the
support of the courts to recognize and enforce its interpretations.
CONCLUSION
Courts are entitled to make independent, factual determinations
about whether or not an agency interpretation deserves deference, and
the Supreme Court may well address this deference issue if it grants cer-
tiorari in a donning and doffing case that includes the § 203(o) issue.
However, the circuit split surrounding the definition of clothes in
§ 203(o) and the resulting judicial discomfort with this "gyration" should
be enough to indicate to Congress that it should reevaluate this section of
the statute and amend or supplement it for purposes of clarification and
fairness to the employees it governs.
In the event that the Supreme Court chooses not evaluate § 203(o),
Congress should act to clarify the provision, which has not been amend-
226. See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 615 n.3 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that although
the court's holding that PPE are clothes is inconsistent with the 2010 DOL letter, the Ninth Circuit,
and several district courts, it is consistent with Spoerle); Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614
F.3d 427, 428 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that § 203(o) issue decided based on reasoning of Sepulveda,
despite being issued on Aug. 2, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 933 (U.S. 2011); Sepulveda v. Allen
Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 216 n.3 (4th Cir. 2009) (stressing that the decision complies with
the DOL Opinion Letters of 2002 and 2007); Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 956 (11 th Cir.
2007) (noting that the court's holding is consistent with the 2002 DOL Opinion Letter).
227. Franklin, 619 F.3d at 614-16.
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ed since its creation in 1949. As the number of low-wage and immigrant
workers in the United States increases every year, the need for clarifying
legislation to protect these workers and ensure they receive fair wages
only increases as well. The recent flood of donning and doffing litigation
signals that the modem workplace requires a fresh evaluation of the term
"changing clothes" and the continuing viability of § 203(o). Ultimately,
the aggregate compensation for donning and doffing time is worth an
incredible amount of money to employers and employees alike, and there
does not appear to be an end to this legal battle without intervention.
The Tenth Circuit failed to uphold the employee protections of the
FLSA when it interpreted § 203(o) in a way that allows employers to
continue to exploit the work of a vulnerable, largely immigrant work-
force. Conversely, the DOL has attempted to protect this workforce and
ensure that its members are compensated fairly, but it faces a wall of
judicial discomfort with its methods that can only be altered by the ex-
ample of the Supreme Court. While it is clear the issues of donning and
doffing and changing clothes have become a major sticking point for
employers across the country, it remains to be seen if Congress and the
Supreme Court will take the measures necessary to translate these as-
pects of the FLSA for application in the modem workplace.
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